Rights and consent in mixed martial arts

ABSTRACT

Mixed martial arts (MMA) fighting in a competition is not necessarily wrong and is often, as far as we can tell, permissible. Our argument has two premises. First, if an act does not infringe on anyone’s moral right or violate another side-constraint, then it is morally permissible. Second, MMA-violence does not infringe on anyone’s moral right or violate another side-constraint. The first premise rests on two assumptions. First, if a person does a wrong act, then he wrongs someone. Second, if one person wrongs a second, then the first infringes on the second’s right. We then look at Nicholas Dixon’s powerful Kantian argument that MMA fighting is wrong.

KEYWORDS:

• Mixed martial arts
• Immanuel Kant
• rights
• degradation
• violence

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. For a discussion of side-constraints, see Nozick (1974, 4). For a discussion of permission not to maximize the good, see Kagan (1991, 10).

2. For this notion of a right, see Kramer (1998, 7–111).

3. For the Kantian objection, see (Kant 1996). For exploitation, see Wertheimer (1999). For objectification, see Nussbaum (1995).

4. For these criteria for valid consent, see Wertheimer (2003).

5. For an interpretation of Kant along these lines, see Nozick (1974).

6. For an interpretation of Kant along these lines, see Rawls (1971, 17).

7. For a defense of this position, see Sher (2017).

8. For the general notion that failure to demand to be treated in a dignified manner can violate the Categorical Imperative and thus be wrong, see Hill (1973).

9. For different interpretations, see Beyleveld and Brownsword (2002).

10. For Dixon on trash-talking, see Dixon (2007; Dixon 2008).

11. For an interpretation of Kant along these lines, see Nozick (1974, 14).

12. For an argument for this position, see Hurka (2001a, 2001b, 9).