Athletic imagery as an educational tool in Epictetus

ABSTRACT

This paper examines Epictetus’ use of athletic imagery as a pedagogical tool and what this tells us about his views on what philosophers can learn from athletes. This paper argues that this imagery serves an important protreptic, or motivational, function. By comparing virtue to Olympic victory and philosophical progress to athletic training, Epictetus inspires students to take up a life of philosophy and treat Stoicism as an ethically transformative practice rather than an abstract intellectual pursuit. These comparisons also show that Epictetus considers achieving virtue and athletic excellence to be similar kinds of pursuits, and because of this the philosopher can benefit by learning from the athlete’s example.

KEYWORDS:

• Stoicism
• athletics
• sport
• imagery
• education

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Disc. 2.21.5; 3.21.20; 3.23.30.

2. Disc. 3.24.31; 4.1.86; 4.5.25.

3. Disc. 1.18.21; 1.24.2; 3.15.2; 3.10.7.

4. There is one passage of Epictetus concerning athletic imagery which is a notable exception and has received significant scholarly attention. This is Disc. 2.5.15–21 where Epictetus compares the philosopher to a ball player (See Xenakis 1969, Ch. 2; Long 2002, 202–3; Stephens 2007, 51–54; Klein 2014, 14–5). Xenakis, Long and Stephens read this passage as a demonstration of how to make use of indifferents without becoming attached to them. The philosopher uses externals like an athlete uses a ball but does not become attached to them anymore than the athlete becomes attached to the ball. Klein argues that the passage shows that Epictetus considers virtue to be a performative skill, one which is actualized depending on how we perform, rather than the result we achieve.

5. Cf. (Sorabji 2002), Part 2.

6. See also (Stockdale 1993, 1995), who describes how his experiences in the military and as a prisoner of war were deeply shaped by his knowledge of Stoicism and Epictetus in particular.

7. It should be noted that Reid has done an excellent job of developing the relationship between sport and ancient ethics. However, her project differs from my own in two respects. First, much of her work focuses on non-Stoics, such as Plato and Aristotle (Reid 2007, 2009, 2012). Second, her work, including the paper she has written on Seneca’s view of gladiatorial combat (Reid 2010), focuses on how ancient thinkers view on the relationship between practicing or observing sport and the cultivation of virtue. I am interested in Epictetus’ use of athletic imagery as a pedagogical tool to help his students better understanding the nature of philosophy. In terms of the practice of actual sport, Holowchak (2010) argues that there is no evidence any Stoics think that practicing sport is effective for cultivating virtue, while Reid (2010) and Stephens and Feezell (2004) argue that the observance of sport is a viable means to practice equanimity and observe role-models of virtue.

8. Bk. 3.6.22. In Epitome of Stoic Ethics, 5b5, Didymus attributes this metaphor to Panaetius, although we no longer have access to the original.

9. For a thorough analysis of this archer passage, see (Klein 2014).

10. These styles are identified and discussed at length by Long (2002, 52–64). Much of my explanation of these three styles relies upon his account provided there.

11. Cf. Disc. 3.23.34–7. The protreptic style was common in those proceeding Epictetus. In Plato it is perhaps most notably present in the Apology and Euthydemus, and Aristotle wrote a now lost book titled the Protrepticus, of which there has been attempts at reconstruction (Wilson 1957; Chroust 1964; Hutchinson and Johnson 2005).

12. For the definitive account of Socrates elenchus, see (Vlastos 1983, 1991).

13. We can find an example of the purely didactic style in Disc. 1.1.1, where Epictetus explains that there is no art of faculty which may study itself besides the faculty of reason.

14. Cf. Disc. 1.1.7; 1.3.4; 1.6.13; 1.7.33; 1.12.34; 1.20.15. Also see Long (2002, 214–220).

15. As Long (2002, 195–196) and Xenakis (1969, 14) have discussed previously, even though Epictetus talks of an Olympic contest we should not think of the competitive element of sport being operative here. As Long makes clear, Epictetus is trying to demonstrate that happiness is an achievement rather than a passive psychological state. But unlike wrestling, it is not an achievement that requires someone else to lose or fall short of their goal. In this sense, we are not competing against others, although we may still use the insults and difficulties caused by others to help us improve.

16. Cf. 2.17.29.

17. Cf. (Long 2002), 195–196.

18. Cf. Disc. 1.8; 2.17.34; 2.19; 2.21.15–19.

19. For a further discussion of the metaphor of digestion in Epictetus, and how it relates to moral progress and Epictetus’ view on the relationship between theory and training, see (Tremblay 2019).

20. For Epictetus’ discussion of these area of studies see Disc. 1.4.11–12; 2.17.15–17 and 31–33; 3.2; 3.12.13–14; 3.26.14; 4.10.13; Ench. 52; Fragment 27. For discussion of Epictetus’ topoi in secondary literature see (Hadot 1978; Long 2002, 112–118; Cooper 2007, 15–19).