Democracy, philosophy and sport: animating the agonistic spirit

ABSTRACT

The three social practices – democracy, philosophy and sport – are more similar than we might initially suspect. They can be described as ‘essentially agonistic social practices’, that is, they are manifestations of ‘agon’ (contest). The possibility to participate in agonistic social practices derives from the human condition, i.e. from the necessity to care for one’s existence, which requires ongoing attention and decision-making, and which sometimes means going against others. We call this character of human existence by the ancient Greek term ‘polemos’ (struggle), which can be manifested through various types of agon. If society cherishes agonistic social practices, it enables its citizens to compete to prove themselves and achieve goals (e.g. to push through a persuasive argument, or to win in sport) in a respectful, peaceful and productive way. Believed to have played a significant role in ancient Greece, agon presents itself in both intellectual and physical forms – in philosophy, democratic politics and sport – suggesting that the relationship between these practices is deep-rooted and significant. This paper explores the idea that developing our understanding of polemos and agon can enhance our experience of agonistic social practices and enable our existence to proceed in a more free, pro-social and enriching way.

KEYWORDS:

• Social practice
• democracy
• dialogue
• polemos
• agon
• sport
• war

Introduction

The parallels between sport and democracy have been well established, with scholars often referencing the rise of democracy and sport in ancient Greece (Reid 2010b; López Frías and Isidori 2014; Šiljak and Selaković 2014; Pritchard 2016). However, the strong connection between philosophy and democracy and sport, has been under-represented in the sport philosophy literature. Democracy, philosophy and sport originated in ancient Greece around the same time. Once there was a shift from kingships to a more democratic system in ancient Greek societies, the drive to improve oneself and one’s standing increased and sport, political activities and philosophy were all vehicles through which that self-improvement could take place along with an improvement of the whole city-state (Reid 2010a). While Reid (2010b) describes the foundational ideas of democracy as ‘freedom from tyranny, rule of law, human equality, and public scrutiny’ (146), we would like to add and discuss another important aspect of democracy. This is the opportunity afforded and required by functioning democracies for enabling conflict between different forces (goals, opinions, arguments) to manifest and to be contested in a productive way. This idea also applies to philosophy, for which argumentation and testing of competing views is crucial. Similarly, sport¹ enables a fair and reliable comparison of performances. All of these practices, whether employing discussion, debate or performance comparisons, aim for the improvement of the human being in an environment of (at least basic) respect for one’s opponent. Based on the ancient Greek noun ‘agon’, often translated as ‘war’ or ‘contest’ (Morford 1973; MacIntyre 2007), we shall call these kinds of contests, that encourage openness and respect towards different views and capacities, and a willingness to have one’s views or skills contested: ‘agonistic social practices’.

We claim that the agonistic aspect of these practices arises through the ‘polemic’ nature of human existence. We derive the adjective ‘polemic’ from the ancient Greek noun ‘polemos’ (war, struggle) which is the source of our contemporary noun ‘polemic’: ‘an aggressive attack on or refutation of the opinions or principles of another’ or ‘the art or practice of disputation or controversy’ (Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2021). For the purposes of this paper, we shall use the noun ‘polemos’ and the adjective ‘polemic’ as ontological terms that describe the nature of human existence in terms of conflict, or the struggle of various forces. Here we draw on Heraclitus, as interpreted by Drew Hyland (2020) and also by Jan Patočka (1996), who describes polemos as a characteristic feature of human existence.

While polemos is the ontological basis of all agonistic practices, for the purpose of this paper we have to distinguish between ‘agonistic social practices’ that support the development of the human and of society (with special reference to philosophy, democratic politics and sport) from those that are more destructive (e.g. war),² and that could be termed ‘agonistic anti-social practices’. This paper will be concerned with the former. An important feature of agonistic social practices is that they mirror the polemic human condition and channel it for the betterment of human society. In addition to exploring the relationship between polemos and agon, we will illustrate the impact that this relationship has on different areas of life, such as philosophy, democratic politics and sport.

Polemos – the ontological basis of agon

Sport is explicitly agonistic, requiring at least two opponents competing against each other. In philosophy, Plato’s dialogues are exemplary cases of agon, in democratic politics there is explicit discussion and contest over our future ways of living together. Agon is possible in all of these areas of our lives due to the ontological conditions of our existence – one of which can be best encapsulated by the ancient Greek word ‘polemos’. We shall use the ideas of Heraclitus, as interpreted by Drew Hyland, and the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger and Jan Patočka, to help to clarify this theme.

The word ‘polemos’ is often literally translated as ‘war’. This translation is arguably too narrow for the meaning of the word, so it is important to come to a more accurate understanding. Hyland (2020, 112) notes that ‘polemos’ is mentioned three times in the Fragments, each time being translated as war.

War is father of all and king of all; and some he has shown as gods, others men; some he has made slaves, others free. (D-K 53)

One must realize that war is shared and conflict is justice, and that all things come to pass (and are ordained) in accordance with conflict. (D-K 80)

The god: day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger. It alters, as when mingled with perfumes, it gets named according to the pleasure of each one. (D-K 67)

Hyland (2020) acknowledges that the translation of ‘polemos’ as ‘war’ could work in all of those cases, though he is not convinced that it is the best translation. He suggests that ‘struggle’ or ‘opposition’ might be more accurate and provides two main arguments for such an assertion (Hyland 2020, 112). Firstly, translating ‘polemos’ as ‘war’ in D-K 80 would suggest that war is shared by all and common to all. Since war might not be common to all, then struggle would be a more appropriate choice in this case. Secondly, in D-K 67, most of the pairs mentioned are universal in nature (day and night, winter and summer, satiety and hunger) and in order for the final pair, war and peace, to exhibit the same level of universality, it would necessitate translating ‘polemos’ as ‘struggle’.

This translation of ‘polemos’ as ‘struggle’ can be interpreted in ontological terms. Ontology refers to the being of entities. With respect to humans, it describes the basic conditions of human existence, which is one of the main tasks of phenomenological philosophy as seen, for example, in the work of Heidegger and Patočka. In ontological terms, Heidegger uses the term ‘Dasein’ to refer to the human being, and the main existential structure of Dasein is ‘Care’: ‘The basic [relational] sense of the movement of factic life is caring [Sorgen] (curare) … Correspondingly, caring is the care of livelihood, of profession, of enjoyment, of not being disturbed, of not dying, of being familiar with things and persons, of knowing about them, of securing life in its final goals’ (Heidegger 2007, 159). ‘Care’ thus captures the fact that Dasein has to make a continuous effort to be and to sustain its existence. Existence is thus an unfinished project, since it requires our ongoing attention and decision-taking. Care is an ontological term: ‘As a primordial structural totality, care lies “before” every factical “attitude” and “position” of Da-sein, that is, it is always already in them as an existential a priori’ (Heidegger 1996, 180). The necessity to ‘care’ for our own existence impacts our social lives: we sometimes find ourselves in conflict with others’ intentions, goals, and views about how to live together.

In his Heretical Essays, while enhancing the phenomenological view of existence and discussing its relationship to history, Patočka (1996) interprets Heraclitus in his analyses of the ‘three movements of human existence’³ with respect to historical development. He discusses ‘polemos’ in the context of the origin of the ancient Greek polis (city-state) and philosophy: ‘polemos is at the same time that which constitutes the polis and the primordial insight that makes philosophy possible’ (Patočka 1996, 43). Both democratic polis and philosophy are based in an acceptance of the possibility of conflict between competing views. This differs from pre-democratic political structures (such as, e.g., kingdoms), in which society was contained within one view of the world. Prehistoric societies are described as those in which everything has already been explained by myths and traditions, with little room for openness to question them. The order is pregiven, it can be described as a ‘frozen’ state of affairs: ‘ … nothing here is freely chosen, there is only a fascination with something to which a person had previously self-committed – or better, to which a person had been committed’ (Patočka 1998, 159). Polemos is suppressed, agon (contest) amongst the people is not supported. Polemos becomes apparent when the set order changes, e.g. when the king dies and there is no successor.

The concept of polemos depicts the character of struggle in our existence, giving rise to a world wherein we find ourselves in situations set against each other. However, whilst capturing the struggle and agonism within our human condition, polemos also unites us. Patočka says:

(t)he spirit of the polis is a spirit of unity in conflict, in battle. One cannot be a citizen – polites – except in a community of some against others, and the conflict itself gives rise to the tension, the tenor of the life of the polis, the shape of the space of freedom that citizens both offer and deny each other – offering themselves in seeking support and overcoming resistance. (Patočka 1996, 41-2)

Polemos, the flash of being out of the night of the world, lets everything particular be and manifest itself as what it is. Thus the greatest contradiction cleaves together in a unity which is above all, which manifests itself in all and governs all … adversaries meet in the shaking of a given meaning, and so create a new way of being human … (Patočka 1996, 43)

In philosophy and democratic politics, adversarial argument binds the people together in a discussion, in openness for an outcome. The cooperative side of agon is clearly seen in sport, since a competition needs at least two opponents who agree to play together, respecting the same rules, and to be open for an outcome. Hyland (1988, 236) emphasizes competition: ‘It is a questioning of each other together, a striving together, presumably so that each participant achieves a level of excellence that could not have been achieved alone, without mutual striving, without the competition.’

The important thing is to create the possibility of a way of being together that stems from an openness for an outcome, and that aims for understanding both of what existence is (i.e. it is not ready-made and must be repeatedly interpreted and construed), and how it could be (with respect to the circumstances of the given society, based on agreement about how we want to live together). This possibility enables different views and forms of life to emerge and contest against each other, giving rise to the possibility of choice – in other words, of freedom:

Freedom, in the end, is freedom for truth, in the form of the uncovering of being itself, of its truth, and not only of what-is (in the form of open comportment and the correctness of statements). Freedom is not an aspect of human nature but rather means that Being itself is finite, that it lives in the shaking of all the naive “certainties” that would find a home among what-is so that they would not need to admit to themselves that humans have no home other than this all-revealing and free being which for that very reason cannot “be” as particular existents are. It is Being in its mystery and wonder – that Being is. (Patočka 1996, 49)

It is only in a free society that polemos is understood, respected and incorporated within the structures of the society. Society changes when people start asking questions about what life is and what it could be, which shakes the sedimented meanings that have been preserved in myths. This demands taking over one’s existence that sees itself in its wholeness, in its vulnerability (to death) and in the interdependence of the human community: ‘Life unsheltered … is differently, since it itself opens up the possibility for which it reaches; while seeing this liberation, both the dependence of the one and the free superiority of the other, sees what life is and can be’ (Patočka 1996, 39). Questions give us an opportunity to change, to consider a new way of being together: ‘Nothing of the earlier life of acceptance remains in peace; all the pillars of the community, traditions, and myths, are equally shaken, as are all the answers that once preceded questions, the modest yet secure and soothing meaning, though not lost, is transformed’ (Patočka 1996, 39–40). The meaning of the new society has to be discovered through dialogue with others, similarly open citizens.

When describing the origin of the ancient Greek polis and the new direction of human life, Patočka (1996, 37) speaks about ‘the possibility of living for something else’, that arises in an open space and with the freedom of citizens. A shift occurs in the human spirit when individuals are not simply concerned with procuring physiological needs. This kind of societal change happened in the Greek polis around the 5th century BC. Foregoing the authoritarian political systems of monarchies or dictatorships, pockets of inhabitants across Greece opted to permit eligible citizens to voice their opinions, deliberate, and make decisions together. It is in this space that ‘sense and meaning get established, destroyed, and reconstituted through polemos’ (Fried 2008, 138). This, of course, requires that the society values freedom and enables democratic processes as the medium through which that freedom in the political arena is exercised. The newly found openness was enabled by the existence of free time, equality of (at least some groups of) citizens, the search for excellence, the will to cooperate and the courage to compare one’s achievements or performances with others.

The defining characteristic of the polis has nothing to do with the outcomes produced or with who is in power. The defining characteristic is what gives rise to the polis and remains constant; that is, struggle (polemos) channelled through agonistic practices. Due to the aforementioned establishment of the deconstruction and reconstitution of meaning, ‘truth’ inevitably changes (or may change) throughout that process. It is not the role of the polis to house a determinate condition, but to 'hold open for Dasein the possibility of confrontation and dissolution in the understanding of its world' (Fried 2008, 141). It is with this newfound ‘possibility’ in life that allows a force such as polemos to take hold.

Once a society achieves the preconditions necessary for polemos to manifest itself, philosophy, democratic politics and sport represent realms of social life in which polemos can be clearly exhibited through agon. Once an individual has possibilities, engaging in political life is one of the ways in which they can understand what those possibilities are. According to Habermas, ‘the individual can get a clear sense of commonalities and differences, and hence a sense of who she is and who she would like to be, only in the public exchange with others who owe their identities to the same traditions and similar formation processes’ (Habermas 1994, 4). It is through this collective form of life or being in a society that individuals are able to realize their potential.

This is also why the process of agon is so important for participants. Unless we take part in the process, we do not fully understand the result. And so the process is a logically necessary condition for the understanding of the result. The results of our three agonistic social practices – sports results, ‘truth’, and social organization – will be more fully understood only if we know how we arrived at them. In sport, this idea is mirrored in de Coubertin’s well-known motto: ‘What counts in life is not the victory, but the struggle; the essential thing is not to conquer, but to fight well’ (de Coubertin 2000, 589). This motto of de Coubertin is often misinterpreted to mean that taking part is more important than winning. But de Coubertin’s point was that, without participants, sport is logically impossible. And in that sense, the importance of participation lies in the fact that it is logically prior to competition, winning and sport results. Similarly, in philosophy, learning and repeating an outcome of a philosophical discussion does not grant us deeper understanding. What does grant us deeper understanding is the process: discussions, thinking and re-thinking an issue, understanding it with all its limitations, etc. For example, when grasping a concept that is based in the empirical world, we understand its fuzzy limits; or when dealing with a problematic situation, we can understand both the advantages as well as disadvantages of a decision. Both of these might be hidden from those who just adopt the outcome.

So, the ontological understanding of polemos (struggle) can be seen as an underlying aspect of human existence, giving rise to various ontic manifestations, which can be institutionalized into social practices and which we shall refer to as ‘agon’ – hence ‘agonistic social practices’. Agonistic social practices may have various social forms, their most notable feature being that they enable conflict/competition of different parties. This means that people (their arguments, their skills) are set against each other, but this ‘against’ presupposes togetherness, the will to cooperate and the courage to test their views or skills. Understanding the ontological concept of polemos is crucial for being able to identify and appreciate agonistic social practices and to understand their role in society. Understanding polemos also allows us to better recognize the relationship between democracy and other agonistic social practices, such as sport and philosophy. Noting the necessary preconditions for polemos to arise within a society (openness, freedom, equality, fairness, justice) clearly illustrates the democratic nature and openness of this society, such as in ancient Greece during the period of the rise of democracy and in 19^th century Europe – both of which enabled sport to develop and become an important practice within the society.

Agonistic social practices

A practice can be defined as ‘any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity’ (MacIntyre 2007, 187). Participating in social practices is a prerequisite for citizens’ acquisition of the relevant internal goods in addition to the positive impact of participation on societal development. Internal goods that can be achieved through practices include distinction, honor, and excellence (Loy and Morford 2019). One of the main distinctions between internal and external goods holds that external goods (i.e. money, land, power) are good for only a few, while the achievement of internal goods are good for all who participate in the activity (MacIntyre 2007).

Not all social practices are essentially agonistic and some are only agonistic in particular circumstances, for example, when we make a contest out of a non-competitive activity. In ancient Greece, dramatic plays were considered as agonistic social practices, since playwrights would compete against one another (although this was obviously not always the case).⁴ However, there are some social practices that are ‘essentially agonistic social practices’. This means that the activity must change its nature if it does not involve conflict. We believe that philosophy, democracy and sport belong in this category. All of these activities require some conflict or disputation with others. This is most clearly the case with sport, since it is an ‘essentially contested’ activity (Parry 2019, 10). Democracy implies a struggle amongst conflicting ideas within society in order to find a way to live together. Lastly, declarations posited in philosophical works are meant to be confronted in order to move closer towards the ‘truth’, a willingness to have one’s ideas challenged as well as challenging the ideas of others is essential.

Although agonistic social practices, such as philosophy, democratic politics and sport, have the capacity to help us realize virtues, they may be performed in more or less agonistic ways, which will have an effect for better or worse on the realization of the virtues they offer. MacIntyre (2007) asserted that social institutions consist of social networks and structures that both enable and constrain practices. Social institutions provide the structure necessary for practices to arise within a society. However, institutions are also necessarily concerned with external goods and are structured around power and status, making them vulnerable to corruption (MacIntyre 2007, 194). Too much focus on an individual’s or institution’s own status and power stops conflicting forces from manifesting and impedes the openness of negotiations. This can lead to a decline in the polemic spirit and results in agonistic practices becoming less agonistic.

As noted above, participating in certain activities can be rewarding for participants if the focus is placed on the right elements and if the activities have the characteristics associated with agon. We may distinguish two modes of agon, ‘physical agon’ as seen in war and sporting competitions and ‘intellectual agon’ which includes political and philosophical debates or even dramatic contests. According to Daqing (2010, 6809), there are three main characteristics that illustrate the agonistic spirit in the physical and intellectual realms:

(1) the openness of agon;

(2) the fairness of agon;

(3) the justice of the procedure.

With regard to openness, sporting competitions as well as political and philosophical debates in ancient Greece were held in public and all citizens had access, either as a participant or spectator. Openness means that the result (of debates, negotiations, athletic contests) is not known in advance, but created through agonistic encounters. Both the athletic and intellectual arenas encapsulate the fairness of agon because participants are seen as equal and their performance is the only factor on which the outcome depends. Finally, a just procedure also binds the athletic and intellectual realms together due to regulations or other guidelines and if a judgment needs to be made within the activity, then the decision-making entity is generally neutral and capable of making just decisions (Daqing 2010). Each aspect on its own contributes to agonism but the more aspects we include, the more fully realized agon can be.

Such openness, fairness and justice were all able to arise as ancient Greece moved from kingdoms to more democratic systems. When competitions were held during the era of kingships, only a small group of people would be able to compete such as knights or members of the aristocracy. During this time, justice and fairness were not expectations that members of society had as they were subject to the whims of the rulers. Once openness, fairness and justice became priorities, then citizens had hope and had more of an opportunity to try and upgrade their station in life. In earlier times, such hope might have posed a threat to the status quo and undermined the immovable hierarchy in place.⁵

Agon in philosophy and politics

In a paper on sport and democracy, López Frías and Isidori (2014) cite an argument proposed by Guttman (1978) which suggests that ancient Greece was in part characterized by a ‘common social consciousness, highly marked by the agonistic spirit, from which sports, philosophy and politics emerged’ (López Frías and Isidori 2014, 193). Reid (2010b, 2010c) draws a parallel between sport and philosophy, while López Frías and Isidori (2014) draw a parallel between the sporting arena and political arena – these papers explain that philosophy, democratic politics as well as sport give individuals an opportunity to excel whilst communing with others. López Frías and Isidori (2014, 194–5) noted Aristotle’s assertion that the self-improvement of humans is reliant on their being part of a society. Similarly, MacIntyre (2007, 138) argued that agon was central within each Greek city-state, with its form changing based on context. It was reflected in comedic and dramatic pieces of theatre, debates in the assemblies and law courts, and the dialogue form of philosophical argument.

Agon is so closely associated with ancient Greek culture because, to our knowledge, no group had ever been so consumed by this drive for self-improvement up to this point (Gardiner 2002). Only ancient Greek societies had centered agon in their social life and as a result the agonistic spirit permeated Greek thought, lifestyle, and the political system (MacIntyre 2007; Daqing 2010). In the case of intellectual agon, the citizens engaged with one another in political spaces with the hope of earning distinction, honor, excellence, etc. while making better and more convincing points than those on the opposing side. Castoriadis (1983) notes that, unlike those before them, the Greeks took an interest in ‘the other’ whereas societies had typically believed that their view of the world was the only meaningful one. This interest in the other led them to critically examine and interrogate their own institutions and was a driving force of the democratic and philosophical movement (Castoriadis 1983, 80).

The form of philosophy that arose out of Greece during this time is also reportedly distinct since the ancient Greeks had a very strong inclination towards disputation (Lloyd 2012). According to Lloyd, Greek philosophers used the tools of criticism and argument more than other groups and when proposing their views, they mentioned and criticized others’ views in the process. This talent for debating also extended into the political and judicial realms. With debate being so important in those areas, the skills related to it, such as persuasion, elocution, rhetoric, and dialectics became refined.

As it relates to politics, polemos (and its ontic counterpart of agon) is more apparent in more democratic societies. So, democratic political pursuits would be the ideal representation of political agonistic social practices. Today, agonism is a political theory that emphasizes conflict and aims to center democratic debate around conflict as opposed to trying to eliminate it (Thomson 2016). With conflict being the central tenet of agonist politics, it is implied that the system is democratic, i.e. there must be at least two sides with the ability, will and opportunity to struggle over the decision-making. As agonistic practices, sport and democracy share commonalities in that the rules should apply equally to all participants and be understood by all of those involved (Reid 2010b, 149). According to Reid (ibid), this common awareness creates a sense of collective authority.

When noting the agonistic roots of democracy, López Frías and Isidori (2014) assert that like sport, democracy is ‘primarily based on confrontation practiced in accordance with several shared principles and a common discursive framework’ (195). According to them, sport and democracy differ from other agonistic practices because they are essentially agonistic. That is to say, there is no way to participate in them without agonistic conditions. Even in these scenarios, though, the proportion of agonistic aspects present can be decreased or increased and the activities impoverished or improved. For example, in modern societies, democracy is often reduced to mass voting eligibility or individual choice, but if voter engagement is low or the democratic process lacks openness and transparency, or if the role that conflict has within communities is undervalued, then the agonistic aspects of the democracy are being undermined. Those societies may be democratic in name, but they are (more or less) lacking with regard to their agonistic nature. This applies to all essentially agonistic social practices, including philosophy and sport.

Agon in sport

Morford (1973) characterizes agon as a contest ethic which embodied one’s struggle within life for personal excellence and this could be achieved through the practice of sport. Sport provides an opportunity for competitors to prove themselves and acquire status and prizes, but the struggle amongst competitors is necessary to the sporting process. In a 2019 paper, Loy and Morford use the phrase ‘agon motif’ to describe the structure and ideation of agon. Regarding the structure, the agon motif illustrates the ‘overall properties, processes, and products of agonal competition’ (14). Meanwhile, in the ideational sense it refers to the ‘ethos of chivalric competition associated with the pursuit of prestige and the active quest to achieve excellence through physical prowess in agonal contests where individuals place their reputation, moral character, and at times their very lives at stake’ (ibid, 14).

According to Loy and Morford (2019) excellence, honor and prestige would all be recognitions with differing status associations, since each has its own motivation. The motivation for prestige is the desire for social recognition, the motivation for honor is the desire for earned respect, and the motivation for excellence is the desire for distinction (ibid, 20). Within this typology, prestige would be the easiest to attain and excellence the most difficult to attain. The quest for excellence would be the recognition with the highest status and therefore the most indicative of the motivation for engaging in agonistic contests. Recognizing the components of the quest for excellence allows us to better identify what a commitment to an agonistic contest entails and how we may be falling short in modern approaches. Loy and Morford (2019, 24) propose three steps⁶ that characterize the quest for excellence in sport, a major part of the agon motif:

(1) ”Preparing to be the best” by learning to excel by engaging in youthful play-fighting and athletic activities;

(2) ”Competing with the best” by testing oneself in the course of competing against one’s immediate peers;

(3) ”Winning against the best” by risking defeat while achieving victory against the best of one’s peers.

The steps, independent of one another, would not be a sufficient realization of agon in sport. Step one would include the physical training and mental preparation required to attempt a quest for excellence in sport. While this step is crucial, training or exercising as an individual or in a setting that is competitive but has low stakes, does not fully encapsulate the spirit of agon. The second step, 'competing with the best' of one’s peers, can be easily overlooked by athletes, coaches and fans, as they may not value the role that competitors play as participants, or the role of the contest itself in the quest for excellence. In team sports, the spirit of togetherness is even more central because athletes are dependent on and playing ‘with’ teammates and competitors. The phrasing (i.e. use of ‘with’ as opposed to ‘against’) points to the importance of the other contestants during the process of an athlete’s testing of themself.

The second and third steps are closely related, though the phrasing in the third step (‘winning against the best by risking defeat … ’) emphasizes the adversarial nature of this final step. Words such as ‘against’, ‘defeat’, and ‘victory’ suggest a more serious approach to competition. While ‘winning’ may not be necessary in a quest for excellence, the desire to win is a major aspect of the quest. Another distinction between the second and third steps is that the third step has higher stakes and competitors have to be willing to lose something. ‘Risking defeat’ is a necessary condition alongside the desire to win and this is more pronounced when external factors are involved such as titles or monetary prizes. While few make it to step three, far too often young athletes approach sporting contests with a step three mindset when it is premature and inappropriate. This can lead to an overemphasis on winning too early in inadequate settings as well as unsportsmanlike conduct.

Focusing on the last step of the quest for excellence and neglecting the value that the first two steps would prevent participants from experiencing the full value of the agonistic contest and the sporting experience. It is unwise to place all the emphasis in sport on winning, but it is also unreasonable to suggest that winning does not matter at all. Hyland (1990, 35) suggests that a more balanced approach should be taken so that winning can be kept ‘in proper perspective’. He notes that the origins of the term ‘competition’ in fact make clear that togetherness is significant to the experience, firstly pointing to the cooperation involved and secondly pointing to the ‘striving towards’ something (Hyland 1984, 64). Placing too much emphasis on competition in sport and not enough on the striving together aspect in turn leads to alienation and a defective mode of sport (Hyland 1984, 66). Hyland goes as far as to argue that sport’s telos or its true nature is an occasion of friendship, not alienation. Sport’s stakeholders should work to understand the conditions that keep sport from achieving its true telos, in addition to understanding and then pursuing the conditions which allow for the best iteration of sport (Hyland 1990, 46). We believe that understanding the polemic and agonistic aspects of sport can help with this process; highlighting the different aspects of agon and enabling us to realize sport more fully as an agonistic social practice.

In addition to the aforementioned characteristics associated with agon (openness, fairness, justice), there are others that would need to be present in order for an activity to be a more fully realized agonistic social practice. Whereas the first set of characteristics were related to the external conditions required for agonistic contests to take place, the characteristics described in this section (preparation and commitment, competition, desire for achievement) are better seen as internal and dependent on a participants’ motivations and mindset when engaging in agonistic contests. Both the external conditions and internal drive are important for the agonistic social practice. While each aspect may not be essential (since the only essential aspect is conflict in the form of debate/contest/competition), some combination of external and internal characteristics must be present for the activity to be considered a meaningful agonistic social practice.

Conclusion

Democratic politics, philosophy and sport can be defined as ‘essentially agonistic social practices’, i.e. contests between individuals or groups wherein all direct and indirect participants are aware of the rules, their own roles in the context as well as the role of the opponent, expectations of an open outcome, and are able to hold each other accountable. These types of contests are only possible in contexts wherein both conflict and respect for an opponent are valued. While the role of agon during these practices in ancient Greece and more modern times has been well documented (Burckhardt 1963; MacIntyre 2007; Reid 2010b; Loy and Morford 2019), the relationship between polemos and agon has been underexplored.

Throughout this paper we have established that agonistic social practices provide the setting in which individuals have the opportunity to excel, to prove themselves and to achieve recognition from others, while polemos is the foundational ontological concept that can help us understand why humans have this possibility to take part in and value these contests. Examining the relationship between polemos and agon better positions us to comprehend how we can maximize our benefits while participating in agonistic social practices such as sport.

Acknowledging that philosophy, democratic politics and sport are all manifestations of agon allows us to appreciate that those manifestations of life were much more connected in the ancient Athenian world than we know them to be today (MacIntyre 2007, 138). Arguably, this disconnect has had a negative impact on many of our social practices including sport. This sentiment is reiterated by MacIntyre, who wrote: ‘hence we lack, as [the ancient Greeks] did not, any public generally shared communal mode either for representing political conflict or for putting our politics to the philosophical question’ (MacIntyre 2007, 138). The decline in the spirit of agon in those practices which are essentially agonistic has prevented us from gaining as much as we could from our experiences with those activities. This includes sport, as many participants and stakeholders have continuously focused on the more external goods related to sport – creating issues in the governing of sport (e.g. mistrust between athletes and governance officials) as well as the sporting contests (e.g. doping).

It is not our intention to assert that agonistic social practices are more corrupt now than they were in ancient times. Everything can be corrupted, and this is just as true today as it was 2500 years ago. Sophists corrupt philosophical practices by seeking to win an argument as opposed to seeking understanding or truth; ideology corrupts free philosophical discussion; doping, match-fixing and other forms of cheating corrupt sporting practices; and autocracies, timocracies and authoritarian policies masquerading as democracy more generally corrupt democratic politics. Corruption and manipulation will always pose a threat to these activities and negatively impact the social gains that can be found in agonistic social practices. However, it is our belief that a crucial step in combatting such corruption involves having a robust understanding of why we feel compelled to participate in these activities, how to ensure the conflicting sides have opportunities to take part, what conditions they need so that agon can thrive, and how the participation can benefit us and our communities.

Not all social practices are, or need to be, agonistic, but it is important to do our best to understand and take care of those essentially agonistic social practices, in order to preserve their character. In order to live up to the agonistic potential of sport and other social practices, we have to understand their character and those forces that diminish their potential. The similarities between philosophy, democracy and sport indicate that the three practices are inherently related, and that this relationship may be able to help us the better to understand them. Ultimately, we believe that our polemic nature should be respected and even celebrated through agonistic social practices.

Acknowledgments

This paper was written with institutional support from Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic – Cooperatio (Social Sport Sciences) and SVV (Specifický vysokoškolský výzkum no. 260599) and the Grant Agency of Charles University (project no. 14222).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. For the purposes of this paper, we are using a definition of sport as competitive – e.g. as derived from the Olympic sports as defined by Parry (2019) ‘as an institutionalised, rule-governed contest of human physical skill.’ So, we are considering only ‘competitive sport’ as an ‘essentially agonistic’ social practice. Forms of ‘sport’ that are not competitive (e.g. when we talk of ‘slow sport’ – see Martínková, Andrieu, and Parry 2022 or ‘nature sport’ – see Krein 2020) are not considered to be necessarily agonistic and therefore they stand outside the scope of this paper.

2. An agonistic practice of note which will not be discussed throughout this paper is war. While war can be considered as a manifestation of agon, it can be considered an uncivilized form of agon while the discussed agonistic social practices are civilized. War has the capacity to become a manifestation of agon in its most destructive form, bringing out some of the more violent characteristics of the human condition and placing it at odds with the agonistic social practices discussed throughout this paper. However, some interpret war in a different way – as similar to athletic contests, or non-agonistic. Šiljak and Selaković interpret wars in ancient Greece as not being fought for freedom or survival, but rather proving superiority of certain groups and each new success only escalated that ambition: ‘war and athleticism can be observed as two parallel manifestations of the same aggressively expressed drive for competition and as different expressions of the same drive conditioned by warfare or times of peace respectively’ (Šiljak and Selaković 2014, 94). They claim that the relationship between athletic activities and war has always been close, namely because athletic endeavours enhanced the ‘belligerent spirit’ necessary for young Greek men who would need to be prepared for war. In contrast, Loy and Morford (2019, 15) characterize modern warfare as mostly non-agonal warfare by noting that the features of non-agonal war include an army of soldiers, command and duty through military hierarchy, no limit of lethal impact, dependence on military arsenal, etc.

3. For an introduction of Patočka’s ‘three movements of human existence’, see e.g. Martínková (2011).

4. Dramatic plays and many other forms of expression have value outside of their relation to agon and we are not suggesting that all social practices within a society should be agonistic. Citizens of all ages can realize virtues through participation in different kinds of practices. We only intend to make claims of the values inherent to agonistic social practices, not to say that those values are the only ones worthy of pursuit.

5. In ancient Greece, the transition from closed systems to more open ones happened over time due to various catalysts and did not result in all free citizens being viewed as equals. According to Wyskok and Bronikowska (2018, 1478), the second Greek colonization played a major role in the working class’ (kakoi) ability to gain wealth and increase their status in society and subsequently allowing for a more fluid relationship between the kakoi and aristoi (wealthy class). Similarly, the democratization of war also led to more opportunities for lower class citizens due to the close relationship between athletics and war (Pritchard 2016, 2). Once kingdoms had been replaced by more democratic systems, those who were wealthy still had major advantages. The shift away from the certainty of life during kingships did not mean that everyone had equal access to opportunities. However, the rise of democracy in ancient Greece did result in citizens (i.e. free men) of the society having more opportunities (Reid 2010b; Pritchard 2016).

6. These steps would all culminate in a ‘final outcome stage’: being the best, receiving recognition from one’s peers that one is ‘the best of the best’ (Loy and Morford 2019, 24).