What do players do in a game? A Habermasian perspective

ABSTRACT

By adopting Habermas’ communicative theory, this paper categorizes players’ actions into four elements. The strategic action involves players manipulating each other within the framework of a game¹; normative action is manifested in following the rules and the underlying ethos; dramaturgical action emerges through the players’ deliberate presentation of themselves to both participants and spectators; and communicative action reveals the purpose of a game as a way of being. The conceptualization of game actions leads to a qualitative redefinition of the perfect game, which enables a greater understanding of the game, its participants, and human excellence. As such, this paper’s significance lies in the proposal that the Habermasian perfect game is a potential solution to Suits’ puzzle about what type of games can be played in his Utopia.

KEYWORDS:

• Habermas
• theory of communicative action
• perfect game
• Utopia

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. In this article, we employ the terms ‘game’ and ‘sport’ interchangeably. However, when we use the term ‘sport’ in this context, we are specifically referring to sports of the game-type variety. Besides, we acknowledge the significance of physicality in sports due to the inherent embodiment of humans, but we haven’t dealt with the issue if the physicality makes any difference to the game playing analysis, because a comprehensive discussion of this aspect would require a separate paper due to its depth and complexity.

2. Sport serves as a mirror of society, albeit not in a one-dimensional manner. It does more than merely reflect societal aspects; in its finer moments, it assumes the role of a model for effective communication and a societal ideal. It embodies a dual nature, transcending the ordinary, presenting itself as both a commendable exemplar and occasionally, regrettably, a showcase of human behavior that surpasses and falls short of what we encounter in our day-to-day interactions.

3. With respect to gamesmanship, noted above, it may be argued that the ethos or spirit of particular games tolerates greater or lesser degrees of gamesmanship. Thus, while gamesmanship may superficially be sent as respecting the rules and not the spirit of the sport, this is an over-simplification. In practice, to participate in certain sports may entail that the players accept gamesmanship as part of the culture and spirit of that sport. The tolerance of sledging (trash-talking) in professional cricket is a case in point.

4. We are arguing that on one level sporting action is akin to language (it has syntax and thus meaning), but the point is that this is not ordinary, spoken language. It is akin to the claim that Nelson Goodman makes in Languages of Art – Arts are languages, just not everyday spoken languages.

5. Habermas’ discourse ethics emphasizes that moral norms should be acceptable to all individuals in a society if they engage in a fair and open dialogue. In games, the common acceptance of and respect for constitutive rules allows for a shared engagement, a shared form of life. This is itself a moral achievement that involves cooperation, respect, and social interaction.

6. We have argued above that deception (for example in the form of feints) and even gamesmanship are legitimate components of a game. The judgment that a game has been played perfectly is thus made within the context of the agreed interpretation and construction of the meaning (and thus ethos) of the game. A perfect game, in some sports, might thus involve (perhaps at least creative and witty) gamesmanship.

7. A professional foul would be a paradigmatic example of play that respects the rules – as the foul is not concealed – without respecting the ethos of the game and its communicative nature.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by National Social Science Fund of China (22BTY005) and China Scholarship Council (202108515067).