Non-ideal theory, cultural studies, and the transgender inclusion debate

ABSTRACT

This paper centers two complementary theoretical approaches to advance the debate about transgender women’s inclusion in elite women’s sports – namely, non-ideal theory and cultural studies. In doing so, the paper highlights divisions between ideal theory and non-ideal theory, normative internalism in sports and normative externalism in sports, and essentialist views of sports compared to non-essentialist views of sports. The paper’s main agenda is to show the value of applying non-ideal theory, externalism, and non-essentialism to the discourse over transgender inclusion.

KEYWORDS:

• Transgender
• non-ideal theory
• cultural studies
• internalism
• externalism
• essentialism
• non-essentialism

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. This paper does not address sports policy for non-binary, gender non-conforming, or gender-fluid athletes. These are important topics that deserve much more philosophical analysis. But they remain beyond the scope of the analysis herein.

2. A critic might suggest that this is an overly cynical interpretation of Republican political strategy. However, it is an interpretation consistent with historical and political science findings pertaining to the last sixties years. See Maxwell and Sheilds (Maxell and Sheilds 2019).

3. Mills credits feminist theorists, in particular Onora O’Neill (1987), for recognizing and demonstrating the value of non-ideal theory.

4. Sport historians have, for all intents and purposes, verified the merits of the cultural studies view. See Elliot Gorn (1986), Susan Cahn (1994), Katherine Mooney (2014), Alan Downey (2018) as definitive examples. Figures such as Jackie Robinson, Katherin Switzer, and Billy Jean King likewise represent prime evidence of sport’s dialectical relationship with culture.

5. An example where internalism seems appropriate would be the debate over whether to allow strategic intentional fouls at the end of basketball games. See Warren Farleigh (Fraleigh 2007) and Robert Simon (2007) for the debate on intentional fouls.

6. For a deeper argument related to this point see (Berg 2018). A critic might worry that this analysis opens the door to a sport becoming changed so drastically that it is no longer the same sport. That is a possible outcome. Vitally, however, any argument that a sport ought to remain intact – to whatever extent – would need to be based on the values or goods that a sport promotes in the world beyond the sport.

7. One could argue that Pike is actually thinking like an externalist here by privileging safety (and not necessarily tackling) – a general value from beyond sports. Nonetheless, by assuming tackling (a constitutive element of rugby) must remain intact he seems to more consciously carry an internalist predisposition.

8. This presentation of fairness begs the question of what counts as ‘reasonable;’ it also discounts the possible value of lopsided matches, which, Nicholas Dixon (1992) shows, can be instructive and meaningful.

9. This is not to say that there is not any value to society for WR keeping rugby intact as it is traditionally practiced. But, again, that argument would have to be made on externalist grounds, showing it is in society’s interest (not rugby’s per se) to do so.

10. It should be noted that one could argue Burke (2022a) fails to give enough credence to sport’s narrative potential for transgender empowerment specifically. Instead, he is mainly concerned with the empowerment, it seems, of cis gender women, arguing for transgender inclusion only when it does not create obstacles to ‘the utility of cis female success to the achievement of broader feminist goals of recognition and transformation’ (222). I should also acknowledge Miroslav Imbirsevic’s (Imbrisevic2022) thoughtful critique of Burke and Burke’s (2022a) clarifying response.

11. I am grateful to Colleen English for emphasizing this point to me.