Arms control in outer space: The Russian angle, and a possible way forward

ABSTRACT

Against the background of new US-Russia and US-China political confrontation and the comprehensive crisis surrounding nuclear arms control treaties, there may be little immediate hope for successful talks on the non-weaponization of space. Even so, if and when political preconditions change and serious arms control negotiations resume, the non-militarization of outer space will inevitably return to the disarmament agenda. The United States and Russia, as a minimum, have an obvious common security interest in space – limiting as much as possible the dedicated anti-satellite (ASAT) systems that threaten the satellites that are designed to warn each nation of a ballistic missile attack by any state. A focus on the verifiable ban on the testing of such anti-satellite systems would give the United States and Russia a practical starting point for further negotiations on the non-militarization of space.

KEYWORDS:

• Satellites
• anti-satellite weapons
• ballistic missile defense
• nuclear arms
• launch-on-warning
• strategic stability
• non-weaponization of outer space

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

This article has been supported by a grant of the Russian Science Foundation (project №18-18-00463 “Prospects of arms control under the effect of new military-political and technological factors”).

Notes

1. In particular: the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) and Space Treaty (1967) banned nuclear tests and deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space. The ABM Treaty (1972) prohibited tests and deployment of space-based missile defense systems, including those using directed energy means of interception. SALT-I, SALT-II, and START-I (1972, 1979, 1991 respectively) prohibited interfering with national technical means of verification (foremost reconnaissance satellites) and deployment of nuclear fractionally orbital bombardment systems (FORBS – i.e. long-range ballistic missiles’ placement on Earth orbit).

2. IS stands for istrebitel’ sputnikov – satellite killer; M, for modernized. See Dvorkin (2010).

3. See Molchanov (2010), Tarasenko (1992), and Dvorkin (2010).

4. “Russia is developing anti-satellite weapons in response to US steps in this area,” said deputy minister of defense for armaments general of the army Vladimir Popovkin. RIA Novosti, 05.03.2009. (In Russ.) Available at: https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20090305/163953438.html (accessed 15.08.2018).

5. The Kontak system–an analogue to the US MALS system of the 1980s (based on F-15 fighter armed with SRAM-Altair anti-satellite missile against low-orbit spacecraft). Naryad-VN and Naryad-VR ASAT systems were based on UR-100 (SS-19) ICBM booster, and developed in the 1980s to counter the US SDI program or attack geostationary orbit satellites; they were tested three times in 1990–1994, but not against real target in space. See Podvig (2008).

6. Falichev O., Petrov Yu. Giperzvuk dlya boegolovok [Hypersonic warheads. Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er, 02.07.2018.] Available at: https://vpk-news.ru/articles/43508.

7. Ramm A, Kornev D. Okhotnik za sputnikami. Zaoblachnaya taina priotkryvaetsya s pomoshch’yu minskogo shassi [Hunter for Satellites. Sky-high mystery is revealed with the help of the Minsk chassis. Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er, 20.06.2016.] Available at: https://vpk-news.ru/articles/31120.

8. Ramm A, Kornev D. Okhotnik za sputnikami. Zaoblachnaya taina priotkryvaetsya s pomoshch’yu minskogo shassi [Hunter for Satellites. Sky-high mystery is revealed with the help of the Minsk chassis. Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er, 20.06.2016.] Available at: https://vpk-news.ru/articles/31120.

9. [Sivkov K. Asimmetrichniy Kalibr [Asymmetric Calibr]. Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er, 23.07.2018.] Available at: https://vpk-news.ru/articles/43965.

10. Bet on “Rudolph”: anti-satellite weapons will give Russia a huge advantage in a major conflict. 30.11.2017. (In Russ.)] Available at: https://rueconomics.ru/292171-stavka-na-rudolfa-antisputnikovoe-oruzhie-dast-rf-ogromnoe-preimushchestvo-pri-krupnom-konflikte#from. Anatoly Zak, “Russian Anti-Satellite Systems,” Russian Space Web, updated November 30, 2017, http://www.russianspaceweb.com/naryad.html.

11. See Weeden and Samson (2019).

12. See Dvorkin (2010).

13. See Sukhanov, Grinko, and Smirnov (2008), p. 42.

14. See: http://redstar.ru/vektory-razvitiya-voennoj-strategii/and https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3900989.

15. Transcript of the meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, October 18, 2018. Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848.

16. See: http://www.russianspaceweb.com/oko.html.

17. See: http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2014-10-17/1_shojgu.html and http://www.mk.ru/politics/2015/02/11/rossiya-ostalas-bez-oka-kogda-zarabotaet-novaya-sistema-obnaruzheniya-raket.html.

18. The President’s Address to the Federal Assembly. March 1, 2018, Moscow. (In Russ.)] Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957 (accessed 10.03.2018).

19. See: “The President’s Address to the Federal Assembly” (In Russian). Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957 (accessed 10.03.2018).

20. See: http://www.russianspaceweb.com/spacecraft_military.html.

21. See: http://www.russianspaceweb.com/spacecraft_military.html.

22. See Missile Defense Review, available at: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF.

23. See: http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3479839 .

24. See Missile Defense Review, Executive Summary, p.XI: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF

25. To constantly target certain sites on the ground a very numerous constellation of such space battle stations would have to be maintained, since at low orbits most of them would always be circling over other parts of the Earth due to the high speed of spacecraft’s revolution (about eight kilometers per second) and rotation of our planet (the supersonic speed of 465 meters per second at the equator,) each  operating in different planes, except at the geostationary orbit over equator at the altitude of 36,000 kilometers.

26. See Komlev and Malinetskiy (2019).

27. See: http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf and http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2004-10-01/4_cosmos.html.

28. See Einhorn and Pifer (2017).

29. See Mikrosputniki (2018).

30. See Arbatov (1999).

31. The United States took advantage of the fact that relying on the methods of SALT-I and SALT-II, a ban on the Soviet IS-M and IS-MU systems would be much easier to verify than prohibition of the US MALS project. The issue of on-site inspections was also raised by the US delegation, but the Soviets insisted on relying on national technical means of verification (i.e. satellites) and consultations only in case of disputes. See United Nations General Assembly (1981); United Nations General Assembly (1984a).

32. See United Nations General Assembly (1984b).

33. See Talbott (1988).

34. See Moskvin and Oznobishchev (1992).

35. See Mizin, Oznobishchev and Rogov (1992).

36. During ten years the principal achievements were: INF, CFE, START-I, parallel reductions of tactical nuclear arms, CWC, START-II, NPT indefinite extension, CTBT, Framework START-III Agreement, and ABM Differentiation Agreement.

37. See Zhukov (2009).

38. See: https://www.politico.eu/article/leaked-document-vladimir-putin-lobbied-donald-trump-on-arms-control-helsinki-summit/.

39. See: https://russiaeu.ru/en/news/statement-sergey-lavrov-conference-disarmament-geneva.

40. See: http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/us/-/asset_publisher/unVXBbj4Z6e8/content/id/3597131 .

41. See: http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database#.WCHPuE2LSUk (accessed 15.03.2018).

42. See: https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/gadis3583.doc.htm; https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/255834.htm.

43. For example, see: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-unveiling-america-first-national-space-strategy/and http://spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=52251.

44. Those were START-I (1991), START-II (1993), START-III Framework Agreement (1997), SORT (2002) and the New START (2010).

45. See: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18541.

46. Transcript of the meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, October 18, 2018. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848.

47. With boost-glide hypersonic systems, due to their depressed trajectory (50–60 km altitude), the radars’ warning time may be as short as three to five minutes, which would not leave time for implementing launch-on-warning. See Acton (2013).

48. See: https://carnegie.ru/2019/03/22/nuclear-deterrence-guarantee-or-threat-to-strategic-stability-pub-78663.

49. If other nations follow India’s 2019 ASAT test example, it might be politically difficult to preserve a bi- or trilateral ASAT test ban. However, strategically this should not be an obstacle: the deterrence to ASAT development by third states may rely on other weapon systems and strategies rather than development of analogous anti-satellite arms (all the more so that third states would hardly have similar high-value space systems of their own as objects for retaliation).

50. See McNamara (1968).

Additional information

Funding

This article has been supported by a grant of the Russian Science Foundation (project №18-18-00463 “Prospects of arms control under the effect of new military-political and technological factors”).

Notes on contributors

Alexey Arbatov

Alexey Arbatov has worked at IMEMO (the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences) since 1976, with an interval from 1994 to 2003, when he was a member of Russian parliament (State Duma), where he was deputy chair of the Defense Committee. Since 2004 he has been the head of the Center for International Security at IMEMO. From 2004 to 2017, he also worked part-time at the Carnegie Moscow Center as a head of its program on nuclear non-proliferation. He is a member of the advisory council to the Russian foreign minister and an adviser on defense and security to the head of the Center for Strategic Research, Alexey Kudrin (who recently was appointed chair of the Accounts Chamber, a watchdog institution that monitors Russian government spending). Arbatov is also a member of the governing board of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. He participated as a member of the official Russian delegation for START I negotiations and in Russian Foreign Ministry working groups on INF/SNF, CFE, and START II arms control negotiations. Arbatov is the author of numerous books, articles and papers on issues of global security, strategic stability, arms control and nuclear nonproliferation, published in Russia and abroad.