Russian nuclear weapons, 2021

ABSTRACT

The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, and Matt Korda, a research associate with the project. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue’s column examines Russia’s nuclear arsenal, which includes a stockpile of nerarly 4,500 warheads. Of these, some 1,600 strategic warheads are deployed on ballistic missiles and at heavy bomber bases, while an additional 985 strategic warheads, along with 1,912 nonstrategic warheads, are held in reserve. The Russian arsenal is continuing broad modernization intended to replace most Soviet-era weapons by the mid- to late 2020s. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns, go to https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-risk/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-notebook/.

KEYWORDS:

• Ballistic missiles
• ballistic missile submarines
• bombers
• delivery systems
• nuclear weapons
• Russia
• Nuclear Notebook

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding

This research was carried out with grants from the John D. and Katherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation.

Notes

1. We estimate that Russia stores its nuclear weapons at approximately 40 permanent storage sites across the country, including about 10 national-level central storage sites (Kristensen and Norris 2014, 2–9). Essential references for following Russian strategic nuclear forces include the general New START aggregate data that the US and Russian governments release biannually; BBC Monitoring; Pavel Podvig’s website on Russian strategic nuclear forces (Podvig n.d.); and the Russia profile maintained by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (2018) on the Nuclear Threat Initiative website.

2. For examples of such analyses, see Sokov (2020); Oliker (2018); Tertrais (2018); Oliker and Baklitskiy (2018); Bruusgaard (2016, 2017).

3. Three Typhoon-class (Project 941) submarines also remain afloat. One has been converted to a missile test platform. None of these submarines carries nuclear weapons.

4. One normally well-informed source says there are no nuclear gravity bombs for the Tu-95MS and Tu-160 aircraft (Podvig 2005).

5. Russia is also adding conventional cruise missiles to its bomber fleet, a capability that was showcased in September 2015 when Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers launched several long-range conventional Kh-555 and Kh-101 cruise missiles against targets in Syria. New storage facilities have been added to Russia’s bomber bases over the past few years that might be related to the introduction of conventional cruise missiles.

6. A US government telegram stated in September 2009 that Russia had “3,000–5,000 plus” nonstrategic nuclear weapons (Hedgehogs.net 2010), a number that comes close to our estimate at the time (Kristensen 2009). The US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, James Miller, stated in 2011 that nongovernmental sources estimated Russia might have 2,000 to 4,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons (Miller 2011). For a more in-depth overview of Russian and US nonstrategic nuclear weapons, see Kristensen (2012). Some analysts estimate that Russia has significantly fewer warheads assigned to nonstrategic forces (Sutyagin et al. 2012).

Additional information

Funding

This research was carried out with grants from the John D. and Katherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation.

Notes on contributors

Hans M. Kristensen

Hans M. Kristensen is the director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, DC. His work focuses on researching and writing about the status of nuclear weapons and the policies that direct them. Kristensen is a coauthor of the world nuclear forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University Press) and a frequent adviser to the news media on nuclear weapons policy and operations. He has coauthored Nuclear Notebook since 2001. Inquiries should be directed to FAS, 1112 16^th Street NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC, 20036 USA; [phone].

Matt Korda

Matt Korda is a research associate for the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, where he coauthors the Nuclear Notebook with Hans Kristensen. Previously, he worked for the Arms Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre at NATO headquarters in Brussels. He received his MA in International Peace and Security from the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where he subsequently worked as a Research Assistant on nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. Matt’s research interests and recent publications focus on nuclear deterrence and disarmament, progressive foreign policy, and the nexus between nuclear weapons, climate change, and injustice.