Asserting oneself. On aggression and suicide. A metapsychological (economical/quantitative) approach

ABSTRACT

Aggression is an integral part of all conceptualizations of suicide. Using Freud’s economical (quantitative) point of view of metapsychology and her revised drive theory, the author offers a conception of aggression that integrates the assumptions of different psychoanalytic schools. Aggression is understood as the forceful way of asserting one’s needs and desires whenever they are or seem to be thwarted. In economic terms, aggression is conceptualized as the intensified effort (increased energy quantities) of the preservative and/or sexual drives to reach their goals. This view sheds new light on the presuicidal state of mind when an important object (or its substitute) is lost. The extraordinary rise of drive energies, activated in a desperate and unrelenting effort to reach the unreachable object – sometimes in addition to the power of Nachträglichkeit – overwhelms and breaks the containing function of the psychic structures. Such breach causes the unbearable pain the suicidal person wants to escape from. Some clinical suggestions derive from this conception.

KEYWORDS:

• Aggression
• Suicide
• Metapsychology
• Drive theory
• Pain

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. For its detailed description of ‘The experience of satisfaction’ in (S. Freud, 1950, pp. 317–319), and (Schmidt-Hellerau, 2001, pp. 61–63).

2. This is one of the reasons why psychoanalysis, the talking cure works: the patient’s articulations and associations, and the analyst’s interventions and interpretations are stored, can be remembered – new structures have been built.

3. The same principle applies, of course, to all transference relationships: The infantile (e.g., Oedipal) object has long since been recognized in reality as unattainable; and yet the unconscious (e.g., sexual) drive continues to claim: I want you!

4. Biro (2010) highlights that ‘psychological pain seems to run on the same neural tracks as physical pain’ and concludes ‘that psychological pain exists and is just as important and worthy of our attention as physical pain. They are two sides of the same coin and should be spoken of and treated as such.’

5. At the same time, pain also enables learning, which ensures survival. For example, when a toddler wants something and is prevented from doing it, she initially reacts by crying and screaming. We could understand the crying as an expression of her anger at being forbidden. But why does she cry? Is the parental prohibition causing it pain? The toddler cannot tell us, but in the context of the considerations presented here, we can assume that the prohibition does indeed produce a pain in the child. The coveted, desired object has become unattainable because of the parental no. The drive energies already mobilized for this purpose now cause a pain, which she releases by crying and weeping. But on the next occasion the memory trace of this painful experience can produce an avoidance reaction in the child: she has learned not to touch this object. The parents have taught her how to keep herself safe.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Cordelia Schmidt-Hellerau

Cordelia Schmidt-Hellerau, Training and Supervising Analyst of the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society and The Boston Psychoanalytic Society and Institute, Chair of the IPA in Culture Committee, Practice in Chestnut Hill, MA, USA