Norway: Resources count, but votes decide? from neo-corporatist representation to neo-pluralist parliamentarism

Abstract

In comparative studies Norway is ranked at – or close to – the top of the list of corporatist countries. However, this picture needs to be updated. During the last part of the twentieth century significant changes have occurred in Norwegian society and politics. An ongoing process of pluralisation and dispersion of public and private power is paralleled by a process of parliamentarisation with regard to executive–legislative relations. The Norwegian parliament has become more active, less predictable and more influential compared with the executive. Corporatist representation has partly been replaced and partly supplemented by less institutionalised forms of lobbyism. In their attempts to influence policies, organised interests need to appeal to general interests in order to build broader coalitions. Entering the twenty-first century, we may ask whether Stein Rokkan's ‘to-the-point’ formulation in the 1960s should be turned round: resources count, but do votes now decide?

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Arild Farsund, Ruth Johnson, Oluf Langhelle, Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke and the contributors to this issue for their advice and assistance.

Notes

1. One may raise the question of whether the described phases reflect the political ‘reality’ or the political scientists' perceptions of ‘reality’. In my opinion, the strength of corporatism in the 1950s and 1960s and of segmentation in the 1970s has been overstated by many political scientists. ‘Reality’ was more nuanced than perceptions. I do believe, however, that the ‘real’ changes are significant enough to substantiate my characterisations.

2. Statistics Norway, http://www.ssb.no.

3. Galtung (1974: 397); Statistics Norway, http://www.ssb.no.

4. Stokke (1995: 11) and updated information given by Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke.

5. Letter of 31 March 2004 from the Prime Minister to the Federation of Norwegian Manufacturing Industries (TBL), the Federation of Norwegian Construction Industries (BNL), and Fellesforbundet (an amalgamation of five former unions and the largest union in the private sector).

6. http://www.brreg.no and personal communication with the Register Centre.

7. In theory, the index ranges from 0 and 1. It is zero if all MPs belong to one party and 1 if all MPs represent different parties, see Rae (1967).

8. Statistics Norway, http://www.ssb.no. It should be added that in 2002 the responsibility for public hospitals was transferred from the county councils to the central government. As a consequence, the local share of public employment dropped to 60 per cent. It should also be added that local politicians criticise central government for giving them less leeway.

9. The figures include people employed by the Storting and the parliamentary parties. Sources: The Storting administration, the internal telephone book of the Storting and Rommetvedt (2003: 59).

10. The Norwegian Storting is a semi-bicameral parliament. Most issues are dealt with by the Storting in plenary sessions, but when it comes to legislation the Storting is split into two chambers: the Odelsting and the Lagting. Propositions concerning laws are first dealt with by the Odelsting and then by the Lagting, see Rommetvedt (2003: 43ff).

11. Budget recommendations not included. Source: Norwegian Social Science Data Services, http://www.nsd.uib.no, see Rommetvedt (2003: 51).

12. The Storting is assembled from October to June. Consequently, calculations of government defeats per month are based on nine months per year, see Rommetvedt (2002a: 79).

13. Østerud et al. (2003) conclude that parliament has lost power due to privatisation and the increased importance of international treaties and conventions. Norway's agreement with the European Union on a European Economic Area implies that EU directives should also be implemented in Norway, even though Norway is not a member of the EU. Power has no doubt been transferred from national parliaments to international organisations. This transfer is motivated, however, by the wish to overcome collective action problems at international level, and the loss of national parliamentary power is possibly overestimated. In the first half of the 1980s, one per cent of the new acts and law amendments in Norway were made with reference to commitments governed by international law. In the last half of the 1990s, this proportion increased to 15 per cent, but still 85 per cent of the new acts and amendments had no reference to international commitments (Statskonsult 2000). According to traditional constitutional theory, foreign affairs is a prerogative of the executive. In recent years, however, the Norwegian parliament has become more actively involved with international relations, for example the WTO negotiations (Langhelle and Rommetvedt 2004). At least we may conclude that the Norwegian parliament's share of the power that is still controlled by national political authorities has increased.

14. This definition does not preclude the regulations of lobbyism which many countries have implemented. However, such regulations imply a certain degree of institutionalisation of lobbyism.

15. Sources: Nordby (1994: 80ff); Roness (1981: Table 5); Christensen et al. (2002: 139). The figures are uncertain but the trends are trustworthy.

16. The surveys comprised all Norwegian organisations. However, we concentrate here on the 363 organisations that completed the question forms in both 1982 and 1992, see Holmefjord (1998).

17. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, WTO Agricultural Negotiations: – Norwegian Proposal. Submitted to the Special Session of the WTO Committee on Agriculture, 16 January 2001, http://odin.dep.no/ud/engelsk/p2500832/032061-990010/index-dok000-b-n-a.html.