A more fragile chain of governance in Norway

Abstract

Although in practice Norway has been a parliamentary democracy since 1884 its political institutions differ in a number of ways from the typical parliamentary model. Among its peculiar features is a lack of parliamentary dissolution powers and a set of informal and permissive cabinet formation rules which have contributed to Norway's high and increasing frequency of minority governments. This article explores the distinctive features of the democratic chain of delegation and accountability, from voters to ultimate policy-makers, in Norway. It focuses on three increasingly problematic aspects of this chain of delegation: (1) the growing constraints on popular sovereignty due to judicialisation and Europeanisation, (2) the declining importance of parties as vehicles of democratic delegation, and (3) most specifically the Norwegian inclination towards minority government and its consequences. The increasingly fragile minority governments since the 1980s have complicated prospective as well as retrospective accountability in Norway.

Notes

1. The 1905 referendum was about the dissolution of the union with Sweden; the 1972 and 1994 referendums were about EEC and EU membership.

2. Of the 36 stable democratic states covered in Lijphart's Patterns of Democracy (1999), by our standards today only five – the USA, Switzerland, Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela – are not parliamentary.

3. For bicameral systems, it suffices for the prime minister and cabinet to be accountable to the majority in one chamber, typically the lower chamber. Constitutions under which the prime minister and cabinet are accountable to both chambers, such as in Italy, are rare.

4. Although we obviously share a common empirical referent, our Westminster model should not be confused with the one developed by Arend Lijphart (1999). Our objective is to describe a system of democratic delegation and accountability, and our model is designed to capture the essential institutional features for that purpose.

5. Smith (2003: 186) claims that the prestige that the Westminster parliamentary system enjoys, and its doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, would most likely mean that Norwegian MPs ‘would not easily accept someone “above parliament” ’.

6. In December 1997, the Norwegian Parliament authorised a major five-year research project on Power and Democracy in Norwegian society. Its final report was delivered in the autumn of 2003 (Østerud et al. 2003).

7. The protest character of the Progress Party was clearly reflected in the original party label: Anders Lange's Party – for a drastic reduction of taxes, rates and state intervention.

8. For a dramatic example of the importance of this rule, see Strøm (1994).

9. On average, incumbency costs have been greatest in Spain, where the average incumbent government has lost a staggering 9.5 per cent of the total national vote. Cabinets in Ireland, Greece and Belgium have also suffered substantial losses. Incumbency costs have been lowest in Germany and Denmark.