A long quest in vain: Institutional reforms in Italy

Abstract

The perceived need for institutional and constitutional reform has figured prominently in the Italian political debate over the past three decades, yet the outcome has been characterised by continual failure. The most recent failure – the rejection of the centre-right's proposed root and branch overhaul of the Constitution in a referendum held in June 2006 – offers a valuable prism through which to analyse the main institutional deficiencies (as apparently perceived by the political class) of the Italian political system, and the attempt to overcome them in the past 15 years: executive–legislative relations (and notably the powers of the Prime Minister and bicameralism), devolution, and (formally beyond the Constitution but inseparable from its functioning) the electoral system. The decisive rejection of the centre-right's proposals in 2006 increases the dilemma confronting the Italian political system in its quest to secure constitutional reform by precluding certain types and methods of reform while failing to quash aspirations for its achievement amongst politicians and the public.

Notes

1. In fact, at the time of writing (July 2004), Sartori (2006 – the book is a collection of his essays) had indicated that, for Marco Follini (leader of the UDC) there were ‘no cows in sight’. The reform of the electoral law occurred in December 2005, just after the definitive parliamentary approval of the constitutional reform in November. See also Vassallo (2005).

2. It should also be remembered that some scholars have blamed the introduction of proportional representation in Italy for providing the fascists with parliamentary representation and greater visibility.

3. These were both ‘abrogative’ referenda, which can either repeal laws or cut specific sections from laws.

4. The reference is to Shugart and Wattenberg (2001), where there are two useful chapters on the Mattarellum by Katz (2001) and D'Alimonte (2001).

5. Eight governments were led uninterruptedly by De Gasperi (1945–53), seven by Andreotti, six by Fanfani, five by Moro, five by Rumor, two by Cossiga, Spadolini and Craxi.

6. The Constitution grants the power of dissolution to the President of the Republic, who makes a decision after consultation with the Speakers of the two houses as to whether or not there still exists a parliamentary majority capable of sustaining a government.

7. When the Northern League withdrew its support, which led to the formation of a government led by Lamberto Dini, something always denounced by Berlusconi as a betrayal of the people and a possibly (he was wrong in fact) unconstitutional ribaltone.

8. If, for example, unable to govern, unlikely to win the next election, acting against the Constitution, or no longer representing the will/preferences of his/her party.

9. Eighteen of whom would be elected in overseas constituencies; to this number should be added life deputies (nominated by the President, maximum three at any one time) and former Presidents of the Republic.

10. Which is not to suggest the existence of agreement amongst politicians on the meanings of these terms.

11. For a critical summary of the proposals see Cento Bull (2002).

12. Of many critiques, see, for example, Diamanti (2006), Manzella (2006), Sartori (2006: 29–30, 33–4, 64–72).

13. Which proved to be equally controversial, since referenda are meant to pose precise questions to the citizenry about specific laws, while this one was asking them to approve or disapprove an entire series of different measures in a single vote.

14. For the reform were FI, AN, the Lega and the UDC. Against the reform were the DS, Margherita, Rifondazione, Pdci, Italian dei Valori, Udeur, Verdi, Rosa nel Pugno and the Socialisti-Craxi. Three parties did not align with the coalitions: Alternativa sociale, Fiamma tricolour and DC-PSI. Some politicians broke with their party lines, the most important being Marco Follini and Bruno Tabacci (both UDC).