The domestic foundations of Italy's foreign and development policies

Abstract

The end of the Cold War and the so-called First Republic produced new challenges and opportunities for Italy's foreign and development policies, as well as a new set of domestic factors shaping those policies. Despite various examples of bipartisan consensus, there are fundamental differences in the way the centre-right and centre-left coalitions now pursue foreign policy goals (i.e. neo-Atlanticism and pragmatic bilateralism for the centre-right, neo-Europeanism and effective multilateralism for the centre-left). In addition, the increased fragmentation of the political system and the politicisation of foreign policy have resulted in a number of quarrels within the two coalitions. Finally, the trajectory of Italy's development policy is opposite to that of its foreign policy: rising activism during the Cold War, declining interest since the early 1990s. Italy is one of the largest donors in terms of volume of aid – though only in absolute terms – yet it has faced a bipartisan failure in its relations with the developing world.

Notes

1. ‘Public diplomacy’ includes a number of activities that diplomats carry out in public through speeches, interviews, articles in newspapers, rather than secretly. On this issue, see Hill (2003).

2. The term ‘dual crisis’, introduced in a report published by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in 1993, is now widely used in the commentaries on Italy's foreign policy (Aliboni and Greco 1996; Brighi 2007a).

3. An analysis of the debate over the international–domestic linkage in foreign policy is beyond the scope of this article. For two excellent overviews, see Hill (2003) and Brighi (2005).

4. The literature on the party system in Italy is wide. For some recent examples, see D'Alimonte and Bartolini (2002), Bull and Newell (2005) and Morlino and Tarchi (2006).

5. On the first Berlusconi government, see Romano (1995), Neal (1996). On Italy's role in the Bosnian crisis, see Bellucci (1997).

6. In the early 1990s, following the end of the communist regime in Albania, Italy had experienced a flow of immigrants from Albania. For that reason, it had launched a humanitarian mission between October 1991 and December 1993 (Operation Pelican).

7. The decision to participate in the war in Kosovo was broadly supported by public opinion. The Vatican maintained a cautious attitude, for two reasons: first, because of the difficulty of negotiating with Milosevic as experienced by a diplomatic initiative taken by Cardinal Tauran on 1 April 1999; second, because of ethnic cleansing, which also involved Catholics.

8. Following Ruggiero's resignation in January 2002, Berlusconi held the post of MFA ad interim, a rare case in the history of the Italian Republic, until November 2002. His close and loyal collaborator Franco Frattini held the post for about two years, when he was appointed EU commissioner in substitution of Rocco Buttiglione. Finally, Gianfranco Fini held the post between November 2004 and April 2006.

9. There is now a wide consensus among commentators on the fact that the special relationship with the US and the low relevance given to the EU broke with the tradition of foreign policy (Ignazi 2004; Walston 2004; Romano 2006). Croci (2005), on the contrary, emphasises a degree of continuity in Italy's foreign policy (see also Aliboni 2003; Brighi 2007a).

10. Another example is the ‘historical’ meeting held in Pratica di Mare (near Rome) between NATO and Russia.

11. It should be noted, however, that the Berlusconi government had at various times announced the progressive withdrawal of Italian troops from Iraq, which would have concluded in December 2006.

12. The United Nations Interim Forces (UNIFIL) in Lebanon is a contingent established back in 1978 and reinforced following UN resolution 1701 which tasked UNIFIL with keeping peace between Lebanon and Israel. The UNIFIL2 mission answers to an Italian general at the UN in New York, while on the ground it was initially led by France and since February 2007 by Italy (Financial Times, 26 August 2006).

13. Both Brighi (2007a) and Missiroli (2007) note that elements of continuity and discontinuity coexist in the new Prodi government, in a sort of ‘back to the future’. Brighi (2007a) in particular is more balanced in celebrating the successes of the Prodi government, which are not only due to the ability of the government itself, but are contingent on a favourable environment in the international arena, namely the weakening of American unilateralism, the revival of the UN, and the end of another phase of Euro-paralysis.

14. Meanwhile, in 1985 a special development fund (Fondo Aiuti Italiano – FAI) had been created for assistance which traditionally falls between development and humanitarian aid. The FAI allowed for exemption from the process of competitive bidding, but soon the bulk of activities came to be handled under these ‘extraordinary procedures’. It was unsurprising that it was misused (Carbone, 2007b).

15. Another characteristic of Italy's foreign aid programme is that a significant percentage (about 10 per cent of the bilateral programme) is managed by local governments (i.e. regions and municipalities). These decentralised projects are implemented either by international organisations or NGOs. While until the early 1990s local governments received funds from the MFA, in recent years they have started to finance their own projects.

16. In terms of geographic destination of resources, there are no substantial differences between the two coalitions, or at least they are not informed by a strategic vision. For example, during the centre-left government the top five recipients of Italian foreign aid were Madagascar, Mozambique, Haiti, Uganda, and Ethiopia. Italy in 1998 provided the largest share of its aid programme to sub-Saharan Africa (57%), South America (7%) and Asia (6%). Concentration in low-income countries continued during the centre-right government. The top five recipients in 2003 were Mozambique, DRC, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Tunisia. In terms of developing regions, aid for Africa was 63% of the total, for Asia 10% and for South America 2% (Carbone, 2007b).

17. Incidentally, it should be noted that not only have the Lega Nord and Rifondazione Comunista on some occasions voted in the same way (military mission in Kosovo; ratification of the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union), but in 1999 they even took a joint initiative to solve the crisis in the Balkans.

18. In making these points I have been inspired by a series of articles of Angelo Panebianco, Filippo Andreatta and Piero Ignazi in Il Sole 24 Ore.