National Political Parties and European Governance: The Consequences of ‘Missing in Action’

Abstract

This article first summarises the findings of a three-year research project on the Europeanisation of national party organisation, then proceeds to a critical analysis of the consequences for national as well as EU governance. The account begins with the general finding that mainstream centre-left and centre-right parties have not created new procedures to make their leaders more accountable for their actions in EU decision-making, nor expanded to any appreciable degree the number and/or influence of party personnel responsible in the area of EU matters. It then identifies three clusters of impact: a) public opinion and partisan discourse; b) the legitimacy of both MEPs and transnational party federations; and c) the dynamics of party government at the national level. The article concludes with discussion of the ‘democratic deficit’ inside parties and the merits of politicising the EU without taking into consideration the role of national parties.

Notes

1. Europeanisation in this article is defined as changes in party behaviour and/or structures, traceable to influences emanating from the EU, whether direct or mediated through institutional and policy changes in the national political system member states.

2. ‘The Europeanisation of National Political Parties’, supported by a grant from the British Economic and Social Research Council (award no. R000 23 9793), and additional funding from the Keele University Research Investment Scheme. In-depth interviews were carried out from 2003 to 2006 with party personnel, both elected and staff, in parties having national parliamentary representation in the UK, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and Austria.

3. The findings are contained in Poguntke et al. (2007).

4. Especially those that assert that national executives have increased their power vis-à-vis other domestic institutions and actors. Regarding parties in particular, see Raunio (2002).

5. Koepke and Ringe (2006) and Schmitt (2005) suggest that EP elections in post-communist EU member states are not second-order, so our findings should not be extended to parties in these countries.

6. The UK Labour Party's ‘link-MEP’ system links MEPs with government advisors, not the party organisation, see Messmer (2003) and Carter and Ladrech (2007). On MEPs' relations with their respective national parties, see Raunio (2000).

7. Hix et al. (2005) on increasingly left vs. right voting in the EP. See also Kreppel (2002) on details of group voting formation.

8. See the recent exchanges between Moravcsik (2002) and Føllesdal and Hix (2006).

9. The internal referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty in the French Socialist Party in December 2004 was made possible by use of a new statute adopted at the Dijon party congress in 2003 that allows a ‘consultation des militants’, approved by the party's Conseil National (CN), its parliament.

10. In addition to the EP party groups, party leaderships in national government may also bring their ideological perspective to bear in Council meetings as well as inter-governmental conferences, etc. See Aspinwall (2002).