National Parliamentary Control of European Union Affairs: A Cross-national and Longitudinal Comparison

Abstract

Recent research on national parliamentary control of European Union affairs relies primarily on cross-sectional, contemporary data, whereas information on the nature and frequency of changes within countries and over time is currently lacking. This lack of data not only limits our substantive knowledge of the role of national parliaments in EU affairs but also constrains studies of the causes of parliamentary control. This research note offers a cross-national and longitudinal comparison of all member state parliaments from 1958 to today. Thus, it refines and updates recent measurements and provides a starting point for more conclusive analyses of cross-national and temporal variation.

Acknowledgements

Financial support of the ‘National Center of Competence in Research: Challenges to Democracy in the 21st century’ is gratefully acknowledged. For valuable comments on the paper and/or the data, I thank Johannes Pollak, Tapio Raunio, members of the European Politics Group (ETH Zurich) and participants at the ‘Parliaments and Parliamentarians’ workshop (May 2011, ETH Zurich).

Notes

1. The timing of information is another possible indicator of parliamentary control. However, due to a significant number of inconclusive formulations in the rules governing parliamentary control in various countries, this indicator is difficult to use for a systematic comparison. The problems mainly stem from formulations such as ‘earliest possible stage’, ‘as soon as practicable’, ‘as soon as possible’, or ‘early enough for serious consideration’. It is difficult to relate these statements to rules which contain specific time limits such as a number of weeks that are allowed to pass before a Commission proposal is sent to parliament. Therefore, the timing of information is not included in the measurement. Table A1 in the appendix lists all timing rules discovered in the data collection for the provision of both documents and explanatory memoranda.

2. Constitutional rules often prescribe general rules that have to be implemented in legislation and parliamentary rules of procedure. In such cases, the specific legislation intended to give effect to general provisions is taken as the basis for coding.

3. The dataset also contains information on the period between the application for membership and eventual accession. However, it has been more difficult to find sources that go beyond the conventional wisdom that parliaments suffered from the external pressure to implement the acquis communautaire swiftly and comprehensively.

4. A parliamentary reform is defined as a change of at least one of the indicators in Table 1.