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Abstract
The question posed in this article is how to explain that the governance of secrecy in EU external relations varies. While the Common Foreign and Security Policy appears to retain its secretive character, the EU’s external trade policy has recently seen a shift towards more transparency. This article argues that to understand this variation, one has to take into account the institutional power of the European Parliament as well as the extent to which the rules and practices of secrecy are perceived as legitimate. The empowerment of the Parliament in trade means that it has had recent success in pushing back secrecy in this area. However, a general finding is that the majority of parliamentarians seem only rarely to question the executive’s governance of secrecy in external relations. The analysis shows that perceptions of legitimacy are crucial to account for different secrecy regimes – a finding that is likely to be relevant for the understanding of secrecy in foreign policy beyond the EU.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Klaus Goetz, Berthold Rittberger, as well as Christilla Roederer-Rynning and Anne Elizabeth Stie for providing constructive criticism and insightful comments on previous versions of this article. I am also grateful for the valuable feedback from two anonymous reviewers.
Notes
1. This article uses a wide definition of foreign policy, meaning ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor … in international relations’ (Hill Citation2003: 3). Thus, external relations and foreign policy are used interchangeably.
2. A notable exception is the field of intelligence, encompassing issues of both internal and external security (e.g. Johnson Citation2007; Lester Citation2015; Roberts Citation2006).
3. This article focuses on the powers of the Parliament, but the argument could potentially be extended to, for example, courts as well.
4. The CFSP also encompasses the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
5. Note that different rules can apply according to who is in possession of the information (e.g. Jørgensen Citation2014).
6. In addition, it has used indirect powers to enlarge its involvement. Especially the power of the CFSP budget has been an efficient lever for the EP to establish rules and procedures for information and control (Rosén Citation2015).
7. The EP’s consent powers do not encompass international agreements in the field of CFSP (Article 218(6), Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)).
8. See also Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC), 23rd Bi-annual Report, http://www.cosac.eu/documents/bi-annual-reports-of-cosac.
9. Note from the European Parliament’s DG for Research on the treatment of confidential information by the national parliaments, 27/09/00, PE 296.415/BUR.
10. But see Lagassé and Saidemann (Citation2017) who focus on party-political factors.
11. It is important to note that this effect is likely to be even stronger in a national context.
12. The analysis is based on data consisting of official documents from the different EU institutions as well as 30 interviews conducted in the period from 2010 to 2017, with MEPs, EP officials, members of the Commission, Council secretariat, the European External Action Service, and representatives of the member states. NAT#X refers to interviewees from national representations - similarly EEAS#X from the European External Action Service, EP#X from European Parliament.
13. OJ 2002/C298/01.
14. Several policy areas fall under EU external relations, and this is likely to represent only some of the actual variation.
15. OJ 2010/C210/01.
16. Letter to Cecilia Malmström from Martin Schulz and Bernd Lange, 2015: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/110464/access-to-ttip-related-docs.pdf
17. Letter to the EP-President, 05/09/00, PE 293.538.
18. Termed the European Security and Defence Policy at the time.
19. See ‘Declaration by the High Representative on Political Accountability’, OJ 2010/C210/01.
20. C-658/11 and C-263/14.
21. European Parliament resolution, P7_TA(2009)0016.
22. Conference of Presidents minutes, 10/06/10, PE 443.243/CPG.
23. European Parliament resolution, P7_TA(2010)0058.
24. OJ 2014/C095/01.
25. The principle of originator control (orcon) ‘provides that information may not be downgraded, released or declassified without the consent of the originating government or executive entity’ (Curtin Citation2014: 8). The orcon principle encompasses both third parties and member states.
26. Letter to the EP-President, 07/09/00, PE 293.545/BUR.
27. In the case of the ad hoc procedures followed for CFSP documents, it can cause considerable problems for MEPs who are rapporteurs, because it might take up to half a year to get clearance (EU Observer Citation2010).
28. OJ 2011/C190/02.
30. There are also interesting differences between Commission’s Directorates General (DGs), where those DGs that deal with matters of security are more secretive (EP#12), which indicates that secrecy governance not only depends on institutional divides but also on substance.
31. Press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2131_en.htm.
32. Press release: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20151202IPR05759/all-meps-to-have-access-to-all-confidential-ttip-documents.
33. European Parliament resolution, P7_TA(2013)0227.
34. European Parliament resolution, P8_TA(2015)0252.
35. European Parliament resolution, P7_TA(2010)0058.