Abstract
The EU responded quickly to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The analysis of defence, energy, fiscal and migration policy shows that although the EU reacted in all fields its reactions were strongly embedded in already actively pursued agendas and limited to the most pressing dysfunctionalities, except for migration where a reaction was possible by decoupling the policy response from the disputed ongoing policy agenda. As in earlier crises, exogenous shocks do not trigger ad hoc policy overhauls, let alone instant integration. Reactions depend on the partial agreement policymakers have already established. In sum, the EU is a venue for quick reactions to exogenous shocks but responses are closely linked to the ongoing every-day problem-solving for which the EU provides the infrastructure. The empirical findings on four policies highlight that the sustainability of the ad hoc policy responses will depend above all on the more fundamental decision about the EU’s future fiscal governance.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks go to the peers who reviewed this piece, their careful reading and constructive comments that made this a better article.
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Notes
1 The European Research Council funded project SOLID - Policy Crisis and Crisis Politics. Sovereignty, Solidarity and Identity in the EU Post 2008 uses the term explicitly in this sense, implicitly it is used accordingly in a project-related publication (Ferrera et al. Citation2023).
2 Key actors vary according to policy. Besides the overarching role of the European Council and the Council of the EU, which can take binding legislative and budgetary decisions, and its presidencies, in defence also the High Representative plays an important guiding and coordinating role while the EP is by-and-large excluded as legislator. Fiscal competences remain largely in the hands of the member states (Council of the EU), yet the European Semester and the increasing control functions of the Commission provide it with leeway to take decisions regarding rule application and a limited re-allocation of EU funds, the Euro-Group has further coordinating functions as well as communication, and decisions by the ECB impact directly on fiscal policy; the EP has limited co-legislative powers only if substantive legislation is proposed. Energy and migration policy fall under the ordinary decision-making procedure. Tthe EP has thus a larger role, except exceptional decision-making rules apply that allow the Council of the EU to take fiscal or legislative decisions without the EP (in particular Article 122 TFEU on crisis measures has played an important role in this respect in the the past years, see Duff, Andrew (2023) “The rise of Article 122 TFEU” Verfassungsblog, 1 February, at: https://verfassungsblog.de/the-rise-of-article-122-tfeu/(accessed 23 October 2023).
3 No systematic media analysis was intended or conducted. Only where data from official actors did not suffice to contextualise decisions or crucial information was missing (e.g. the actual amount of additional defence spending in government communications), additional information was gathered in searches of quality media reporting or other reliable sources, mainly policy briefs by analytical think tanks. Where used, sources are cited.
4 Among the EU member states, Poland, Hungary, Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden did not sign up to the Declaration, besides the remaining EU member states, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein signed.
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Eva G. Heidbreder
Eva G. Heidbreder is a Professor of Multilevel Governance and Jean Monnet Chair at the Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg. Her research focuses on EU institutional development and the coordination and administration of EU policies on the national and sub-national levels. She publishes regularly in outlets such as the Journal of European Public Policy, Public Administration, and Governance. [[email protected]]