Elections, parties and institutional design: A comparative perspective on European Union democracy

Abstract

The standard version of the European Union (EU) ‘democratic deficit’ maintains that genuine pan‐European elections and parties will only come about if the EU is transformed into a classic parliamentary system: if the European Parliament (EP) is given more power in the legislative and executive‐selection processes. Two influential critiques of this view are that majoritarian democracy is inappropriate in such a deeply divided society, and that European‐level parties would form ‘cartels’ rather than compete for political office. To assess these claims and critiques, a typology of multi‐level systems is developed and a series of hypotheses about the role of elections and parties within these systems are proposed. These are subsequently tested in a comparative analysis of eight cases. The key finding is that European elections and parties are unlikely to emerge if the EP is given more power. Nevertheless, real ‘European’ elections and competitive parties may develop if the EU becomes a (partial) presidential/interlocking system: if the institutional balance is kept, but the Commission president is directly elected.