‘While You're Busy Making Other Plans’ – The ‘Other RMA’

Abstract

This study argues that, in parallel to the developments in the West over the last three decades, several nations and organizations on ‘the other side of the hill’ have also undertaken a significant development in their military thought. This conceptual development is referred to in the study as the ‘Other RMA’ (‘O-RMA’). This study aims to identify and describe O-RMA, to analyze the learning process that led to it and to trace its intellectual origins. This ‘way of war’, whose roots lie in a series of dramatic and tumultuous events that took place in the Middle East between the years 1979 and 1982, is based on the following components: Improving absorption capability, in order to increase survivability and provide a breathing space for the ‘weaker side’, creating effective deterrence, in order to deter the ‘stronger side’ from attacking the ‘weaker side’ and shifting the war to more convenient areas in case this deterrent fails; and winning the war by not losing it, while creating an attrition effect. O-RMA is an exceptionally eclectic conception and its development was not intentional or systematic. This study claims that the main ideas that underlie this conceptual development evolved within the different elements, while maintaining a common image, concerning the military, technological, economic, social and political developments in the West during the 1990s.

Key Words:

• Middle East
• Military Thought
• Changes in Warfare
• Terrorism
• Insurgency
• Guerrilla
• Revolution in Military Affairs

Acknowledgements

The author would like to express his deep gratitude to Carmit Valensi for her valuable contribution to this study. He would also like to thank Dima Adamsky, Zehavit Berman, Haim Meyer, Ori Goldberg, Avi Altman and Yael Brahms for their assistance.

Notes

¹Hassan Nasrallah, speech, Al-Manar TV station, 22 Feb. 2008.

²I prefer the term, the ‘Other RMA’, which reflects the idea that it was a different and sometimes parallel development, rather than the term ‘Counter-RMA’, which was introduced by Ralph Peters. See Ralph Peters, ‘The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs’, The Weekly Standard, 11/20, 6 Feb. 2006. This study uses the term ‘RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs)’ as a general title for military innovations, without committing to the term ‘revolution’. The study does not deal with the question whether the developments on the ‘other side of the hill’ were evolutionary or revolutionary in nature. However, it seems that the term ‘evolution’ fits the way this article describes the process of O-RMA development more accurately.

³Richard Lock-Pullan, ‘How to Rethink War: Conceptual Innovation and AirLand Battle Doctrine’, Journal of Strategic Studies 28/4 (Aug. 2005), 679–702.

⁴On Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri, see Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf 2006); On Al-Zawahiri, in his own words, see also Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Knights under the Prophet's Banner (London: Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Dec. 2001).

⁵On Imad Mughniyah, see Ibrahim al-Amin, ‘Things That can be Said About the Resistance Magician’, Al-Akhbar newspaper, 12 Feb. 2009.

⁶On Hassan Nasrallah and Abbas Musawi, see Eyal Zisser, Lebanon: Blood in the Cedars (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad 2009) [in Hebrew]; Shimon Shapira, Hizballah between Iran and Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad 2000) [in Hebrew].

⁷US Dept. of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington DC, 20 Aug. 1982).

⁸Gen. Donn A. Starry, ‘A Tactical Evolution – FM 100-5’, Military Review 58 (Aug. 1978), 2–11.

⁹Andrew Marshall, Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions – Second Version (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense 23 Aug. 1993).

¹⁰For Arab military strategy and operational doctrine prior to the 1990s, see Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Strategies and Israel's Response (New York: The Free Press 1977); Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War, Military Effectiveness 1948–1991 (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press 1991).

¹¹On the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on the Syrian national security strategy, see: Eyal Zisser, Assad's Syria at a Crossroads (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad 1999), 65 [in Hebrew].

¹²Hafez al-Assad, ‘A Message from the President of the Republic and the Supreme Commander to his Fighting Sons’, 21 June 1982. Cited in Mustafa Tlas, The Israeli Invasion to Lebanon, 1988[Hebrew translation], 19.

¹³See Zisser, Assad's Syria at a Crossroads.

¹⁴Saddam Hussein, ‘A Speech to the Islamic Conference in Baghdad', 11 Jan. 1991.

¹⁵Kevin M. Woods, The Iraqi Perspective Report – Saddam's Senior Leadership on Operation Iraqi Freedom from the Official US Joint Forces Command Report (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2006), 16.

¹⁶Ephraim Kam, From Terror to Nuclear Bombs: The Significance of the Iranian Threat (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Press 2006), [in Hebrew], Chapters 1, 3.

¹⁷On Hizballah's history and background, see Naim Qassem, Hizbullah – The Story from Within (London: Saqi Books 2005). See also Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton UP 2007); Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: the Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B. Tauris 2005).

¹⁸On Hamas' history and background, see Matti Steinberg, Facing their Fate (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot 2008) [in Hebrew]; Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas (New York: Columbia UP 2000).

¹⁹On Al-Qa'eda's history and background, see: Wright, The Looming Tower; Mark E. Stout, Jessica M. Huckabey and John R. Schindler, The Terrorist Perspective Project (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press 2008).

²⁰On the linkage between winning the Afghanistan war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, see, for example: Ayman Al-zawahiri, letter to Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, dated 9 July 2005.

²¹Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press 1992).

²²Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: Comparing the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US and Israel (Stanford UP 2010).

²³David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals (New York: Scribner 2001).

²⁴For learning techniques, see e.g.: Abu Ubeida [spokesman for Hamas], Hamas website, 10 Jan. 2009 (learning through friction); Osama bin Laden, ‘Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Lands of the Two Holy Places’, 1996 (learning the West's weak points); Osama bin Laden [and others], ‘Jihad against Jews and Crusaders’, 1998 (parallel interpretation); Gholam Reza (head of the Iranian Passive Defense Authority), interview, Sobhe-Sadeq, 19 May 2008 (learning the West's military doctrines); Bashar al-Assad, interview, As-Safir newspaper, 22 Feb. 2002 (learning Israel's military doctrines).

²⁵Saddam Hussein, ‘A Speech to the Islamic Conference in Baghdad', 11 Jan. 1991.

²⁶For references to these events and their lessons by Osama bin Laden, see: Osama bin Laden, ‘Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Lands of the Two Holy Places’, 1996; Osama bin Laden [and others], ‘Jihad against Jews and Crusaders’, 1998; Osama bin Laden, interview, ABC News, 26 May 1998. For references to these events and their lessons as perceived by Saddam Hussein, see M. Woods, The Iraqi Perspective Report, 15. For Hizballah's perspective, see Qassem, Hezbollah, 109–12, 114–18, and also many of Nasrallah's speeches.

²⁷The weak points of air power are clearly specified in statements that were made by Saddam, Nasrallah, Bashar al-Assad and others. See, e.g. Saddam Hussein, ‘A Speech to the Islamic Conference in Baghdad’, 11 Jan. 1991; Hassan Nasrallah, interview, Alhawadat, 19 March 1999.

²⁸Nasrallah, ibid.

²⁹For the Iraqi perspective concerning the sensitivity of the West to casualties, see: Woods, The Iraqi Perspective Report. For Hizballah's perspective, see Qassem, Hizbullah, 71. For Hamas' perspective, see Senior Officer of Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, interview, Hamas website, 6 Feb. 2007.

³⁰One of the clear conclusions that can be derived from analyzing O-RMA rhetoric is the similarity between the way the different elements describe the technological gap and the ways they devise for offsetting their inferiority. See e.g. Bashar al-Assad, interview, Al-Sharak al-Awsat, 12 June 2000; Qassem, Hizbullah, 73; Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas website, 5 Jan. 2009; Osama bin Laden, ‘Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Lands of the Two Holy Places’, 1996; Saddam Hussein to Yasser Arafat, April 1990, quoted inWoods, The Iraqi Perspective Report, 6; Mohammad Ali Aziz Jafari (IRGC commander), interview, Mehr News, 3 Sept. 2007.

³¹On absorption as a key element of O-RMA, see e.g.: Saddam Hussein, ‘A Speech to the Islamic Conference in Baghdad’, 11 Jan. 1991; Bashar al-Assad, interview, As-Safir newspaper, 22 Feb. 2002; Gholam Reza (head of the Iranian Passive Defense Authority), interview, Mehr News, 24 Aug. 2007; Mohammad Ali Aziz Jafari (IRGC commander), interview, Iftab, 27 Nov. 2007.

³²On deterrence as a key element of O-RMA, see e.g. Hassan Nasrallah, interview, Al-Jazeera TV, 27 May 2003; Saddam Hussein, speech, April 1990; Rahim Safavi (Khamenei's advisor for Iran's armed forces), interview, Mehr News, 23 Sept. 2007; Ali Shamkhani (Iranian defense minister), interview, Siyasat e-Ruz, 18 Feb. 2003.

³³On attrition as a key element of O-RMA, see e.g. Qassem, Hizbullah, 71; Muhamad Def [and other senior members of Hamas's military wing], interview, Al-Jazeera TV, 4 July 2006.

³⁴On ‘victory by not losing’ as a key element of O-RMA, see e.g. Hassan Nasrallah, interview, Al-Jazeera TV, 21 July 2006; Mushir Al-Masri (Hamas spokesman), interview, Qudspress news agency, 11 Jan. 2009. See also Bashar al-Assad, 22 Feb. 2002.

³⁵On increasing survivability as a tactical pattern related to the absorption element of O-RMA, see for example: Nasrallah, 19 March 1999.

³⁶On the logic of using SSM and SSR as part of O-RMA, see e.g. Hamas's senior commander, Al-Qassam website, 1 Feb. 2009; Mohammad Ali Aziz Jafari (IRGC commander), interview, Mehr News, 3 Sept. 2007; Hassan Nasrallah, interview, Al-Safir newspaper, 17 May 2006.

³⁷On the importance of inflicting pain and casualties as a main part of O-RMA, see e.g.: Hassan Nasrallah, speech, Al-Manar TV, 4 Aug. 2006; Saddam Hussein, speech, Baghdad domestic service, 17 Jan. 1991; Ali Larijani, interview, Irana, 29 Oct. 2008.

³⁸On the role of the media within O-RMA, see e.g. Al-Zawahiri, 9 July 2005; Abu Ubeida [and other senior members of Hamas's military wing], interview, Al-Jazeera TV, 4 July 2006.

³⁹On the logic of ‘close battle’ as part of O-RMA, see e.g. Saddam Hussein, ‘A Speech to the Islamic Conference in Baghdad', 11 Jan. 1991; Nasrallah, speech, 16 July 2006.

⁴⁰On the importance of coping (passively) with air superiority as part of O-RMA, see e.g.: Nasrallah, 19 March 1999. On the need to also cope actively, with Air Defense systems, see Hassan Nasrallah, speech, 19 Feb. 2009.

⁴¹Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (London: Weidenfeld 2003).

⁴²On using Islam as a tool for mobilization and for increasing legitimacy as part of O-RMA, see, e.g. Osama bin Laden, ‘Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Lands of the Two Holy Places’, 1996; Osama bin Laden [and others], ‘Jihad against Jews and Crusaders’, 1988. See also Ofra Bengio, Saddam's Iraq – Political Discourse and theLanguage of Power (Tel Aviv UP 1999) [in Hebrew].

⁴³On using Islam as a mean of communication for explaining both the elements of O-RMA and the relevant patterns, see e.g. Nasrallah, 19 Feb. 2009. See also Lewis, The Crisis of Islam.

⁴⁴On using Islam as an intellectual source of O-RMA, see S. K. Malik, The Qur'anic Concept of War (Delhi: Adam Publisher 1992).

⁴⁵On ‘Jihad’, see Hassan Al-Banna, ‘Jihad’[from 1949], in Jim Lacey (ed.), The Canons of Jihad: Terrorists’ Strategy for Defeating America (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press 2008), 4–10; Sayyid Qutb, ‘Milestones’[from 1966], in Lacey, The Canons of Jihad, 11–34; Abdullah Azzam, ‘Defense of the Muslim Land: The First Obligation after Iman’ (1984 fatwa).

⁴⁶On classic ‘guerrilla’ as a source of O-RMA, see e.g. Nasrallah, 26 July 2006. In 1995, one of Saddam's generals, Hamdany, offered to transform the Iraqi military to a guerrilla-like force. See Woods, The Iraqi Perspective Report.

⁴⁷Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘Armies of Snow and Armies of Sand: the Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries’, Middle East Journal 55/4 (Winter 2001), 549–70.

⁴⁸Donn A. Starry, ‘The Legacy of Drummers, Warriors and Storytellers’, Army Magazine 52 (July 2002). See also Saul Bronfeld, ‘Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the US Army’, Journal of Military History 71/2 (April 2007), 465–98; George F. Hofmann and Donn A. Starry, Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of US Armored Forces (Lawrence: UP of Kentucky 1999); Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War (Washington DC/London: Brassey's 1994).

⁴⁹See Amos Gilboa, ‘The Arab Security Strategies Following the Yom Kippur War’, Maarchot, No. 361, (Nov. 1998) [in Hebrew].

⁵⁰On lessons from the First Lebanon War as a source for O-RMA, see e.g. Abu Ubeida, 10 Jan. 2009; Bashar al-Assad, interview, Asharq al-Awsat Newspaper, 12 June 2000.

⁵¹Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet–Afghan war (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office/ US Army Command and Staff College 1995). On lessons from the war in Afghanistan as a source for O-RMA, see e.g. Al-Zawahiri, Knights under the Prophet's Banner; Bin Laden, ‘Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Lands of the Two Holy Places’.

⁵²On Lessons from the Iran–Iraq War as a source for O-RMA, see e.g.: Ali Shamkhani (Iranian defense minister), interview, Siyasat e-Ruz, 18 Feb. 2003. See also Fariborz Haghshenass, Iran's Asymmetric Naval Warfare, Policy Focus No. 87 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy 2008); William D. Bryant, The Iranian Way of War (Montgomery, ALA: Air Univ. 2007).

⁵³Nasrallah spoke on the components of O-RMA in numerous speeches and interviews that were quoted in previous notes. For a more comprehensive description of O-RMA by Nasrallah, see e.g. Nasrallah, 22 Feb. 2008.

⁵⁴Quoted in Steinberg, Facing their Fate.

⁵⁵On the Iraqi perspective toward the Second Gulf War, see Woods, The Iraqi Perspective Report.

⁵⁶On Hizballah's preparation for the second Lebanon war, and its activities during the war, see e.g.: Andrew Exum, Hezbollah at War: A Military Assessment, Policy Focus No. 63 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Dec. 2006); Amir Kulick, ‘The IDF's Combat Approach vs. Hezbollah’, Strategic Assessment 9/3 (The Institute for National Security Studies, Nov. 2006).

⁵⁷On the debate concerning the outcome of the Second Lebanon War, see Shai Feldman, ‘The Hezbollah-Israel War: A Preliminary Assessment’, Middle East Brief (Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Waltham, MA, Sept. 2006); Avi Kober, ‘The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance?’, Journal of Strategic Studies 31/1 (Feb. 2008), 3–40; Edward Luttwak, ‘Misreading the Lebanon War’, Jerusalem Post, 20 Aug. 2006; David Makovsky and Jeffrey White, Lessons and Implications of the Israel–Hezbollah War: A Preliminary Assessment, Policy Focus No. 60, (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Oct. 2006); Shlomo Brom, ‘Political and Military Objectives in a Limited War against a Guerilla Organization’, in Shlomo Brom and Meir Elran (eds.), The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies 2007); Zisser, ‘The Battle for Lebanon: Lebanon and Syria in the Wake of the War’, in Brom and Elran, The Second Lebanon War.

⁵⁸Within this institutionalization effort, the Iranians had to conceptualize O-RMA. They chose the Western term ‘Asymmetric Warfare’ for describing their concept. See Mohammad Ali Aziz Jafari [IRGC commander], interview, Mehr News, 3 Sept. 2007.

⁵⁹The institutionalization of operational knowledge within Al–Qa'eda can be attributed to the unique characteristics of this movement, among them the absence of direct command and control, the decentralized structure and its global aspirations. Examples for these kinds of sources are the Jihad's journal Al-Battar, various encyclopedias of Jihad that were prepared by the Mujahidin of Afghanistan and the writings of Abu Musab al-Suri and Abu Bakr Naji.