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Abstract
The purpose of the current paper is to examine the adoption and adaptation process of mission command (Auftragstaktik) in the US Army. This concept, developed by the Prussians, denotes a decentralized command approach wherein superiors dictate their intent and allow subordinates to formulate their operational plans independently and change it according to the emerging situation. The paper examines the US command approach prior to the adoption of mission command. It argues that it was heavily influenced by corporate management practices which inherently contradict mission command approach. It continues and investigates how the US Army endeavored to emulate the approach in its doctrine and in major operations.
While it has officially incorporated mission command into its doctrine, it has been less successful in utilizing it in operational situations. This state of affairs has to do with the cultural legacy of the managerial approach to command that still persist. Despite the partial success, the US Army has recently reaffirmed its commitment to this approach.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank David Betz from King's College for his comments on earlier versions of this article.
Material from this article will appear in the author's forthcoming book Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the US, UK and Israeli Armies (Stanford 2011).
Notes
1Of the various translations offered for the term Auftragstaktik, Mission Command is the one used in American doctrine.
2While management theory is vast and varied, the above characterization refers primarily to the scientific and quantitative school represented by Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856–1915) and Henry Ford (1863–1947) among others, as well as by the theories of operations research and system analysis.
3Daniel Hughes (ed. and trans.), Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings (Novato, CA: Presidio 1995).
4For example: Richard Lock-Pullen, US Army Innovation and American Strategic Culture After Vietnam (Abingdon, UK: Routledge 2006); Rodler F. Morris et al., Initial Impressions Report: Changing the Army (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Centre for Army Lessons Learned 1996). Concerning the British see: Sangho Lee, ‘Deterrence and the Defence of Central Europe: The British Role from the Early 1980s to the End of the Gulf War', PhD dissertation, King's College London 1994.
5Dept. of the Army, Field Manual 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency (Washington DC 2006), 1–26, 7–4.
6Jim Storr, ‘A Command Philosophy for the Information Age’, in David Potts (ed.), The Big Issue: Command and Combat in the Information Age (Washington DC: Command and Control Research Program 2003), 77–94.
7Werner Widder, ‘Auftragstaktik and Innere Führung: Trademarks of German Leadership’, Military Review 82/5 (Sept.–Oct. 2002), 4.
8Walter von Lossow, ‘Mission-Type versus Order-Type Tactics’, Military Review 57/6 (June 1977), 87–91.
9Antulio J. Echevarria, ‘Auftragstaktik: in its Proper Perspective’, Military Review 66/10 (Oct. 1986), 50–6.
10Daniel Hughes, ‘Auftragstaktik’, in Trevor N. Dupuy (ed.), International Military Defence Encyclopedia, Vol. 1 A–B (London: Macmillan 1993), 332.
11Benjamin Amidror, ‘Foreword’, in Bruce Catton, The Penguin Book of the American Civil War (Ma'arachot: Tel Aviv 1979), 12, 14, 18–19 [Hebrew].
12David E. Johnson, Commanding War: The Western Origins of American Military Hierarchy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2004), 161.
13J.D. Hittle, The Military Staff: Its Origin and Development (Westport, CT: Greenwood 1975), 196– 204.
14Martin van Creveld, The Training of Officers (New York: Free Press 1990), 61.
15Ibid., 62–3, 66.
16Hittle, The Military Staff, 210. (G1 Administrative; G2 Intelligence; G3 Operations; G4 Supply; G5 Training).
17Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance 1939–1945 (London: Arms & Armour 1983), 51.
18Ibid.
19Johnson, Commanding War, 186.
20Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crises in Command: Mismanagement in the Army (New York: Hill and Wang 1979), 18.
21Creveld, Fighting, 31–3.
22Ibid., 40.
23Donald Vandergriff, The Path to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution of Human Affairs (Novato, CA: Presidio 2002), 56–63.
24Creveld, Fighting, 127–46.
25Edward N. Luttwak and S.L. Canby, Mindset: National Styles in Warfare and the Operational Level of Planning, Conduct and Analysis (Washington DC: Pentagon Reports 1980), 4–5.
26Creveld, Fighting, 168.
27Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944–1945 (Macmillan: London 2005), 32–3.
28Martin Blumenson, ‘General George S. Patton’, in Michael Carver (ed.), The War Lords (Boston: Little Brown 1976), 383–4.
29Gabriel and Savage, Crises in Command, 17–22; Vandergriff, The Path to Victory, 95–105.
30Ibid., 18–19.
31Michael Goodspeed, When Reason Fails: Portraits of Armies at War: America, Britain and Israel and the Future (Westport, CT: Praeger 2002), 15–16.
33Ibid., 256.
32Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1985), 238–51.
34Ibid., 259.
35John English and Bruce I. Gudmundsson, On Infantry (Westport, CT: Praeger 1994), 156–60.
36Gabriel and Savage, Crises in Command, 18, 176–7.
37Martin van Creveld, Moshe Dayan (London: Weidenfeld 2004), 119.
38Roger Beaumont, ‘Perspectives on Command and Control’, in Jon L. Boyes and S. Andride (eds), Principles of Command and Control (Washington DC: AFCEA International Press 1987), 4.
39The phrase was introduced by: Russell L. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana UP 1973).
40Max Boot, ‘The New American Way of War’, Foreign Affairs 82/4 (July–Aug. 2003), 41–58.
41Colin S. Gray, ‘The American Way of War’, in Anthony D. McIvor (ed.), Rethinking the Principles of War (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press 2005), 27.
42Saul Bronfeld, ‘Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the US Army’, Journal of Military History 71/2 (April 2007), 471.
43Suzanne Christine Nielsen, ‘Preparing for War: the Dynamics of Peacetime Military Reform’, PhD dissertation, Boston: Harvard Univ. 2003, 250.
44Dept. of the Army, Field Manual 100–5 Operations (Washington DC 1976), 5–13, 5–14.
45Dept. of the Army, Field Manual 100–5 Operations (Washington DC 1982), 2–1, 2–3, 2–7.
46Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (London: Frank Cass 1997), 292.
47Huba Wass de Czege, ‘From Vietnam to the 1991 Gulf War: The Struggle to Get the Doctrine Right Enough’, unpublished monograph, 2006.
48Ibid., 3.
49William S. Lind, ‘Some Doctrinal Questions to the United States Army’, Military Review 57/3 (March 1977), 58.
50William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO: Westview 1985), 6.
51William S. Lind, ‘The Theory and Practice of Maneuver Warfare’, in Richard D. Hooker Jr (ed.), Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology (Novato, CA: Presidio 1993), 3.
52Lind, Handbook, 7.
53Ibid., 73.
56Lind, ‘Theory’, 11–12.
54Ibid., 76.
55Ibid., 91.
57Ibid.
58Richard Lock-Pullan, ‘The Modern Sources of Maneuver Warfare Doctrine’, British Army Review 137 (Summer 2005), 12.
59Lind, Handbook, 58–66.
60Terry Terriff, ‘“Innovate or Die”: Organizational Culture and the Origins of Maneuver Warfare in the United States Marines Corps’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/3 (June 2006), 475–503.
61Huba Wass de Czega and L.D. Holder, ‘The New FM 100–5’, Military Review 62/7 (July 1982), 53.
62Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence, 251.
63Bronfeld, ‘Fighting Outnumbered', 28.
64Ibid., 31.
65Generaloberst Herman Balck (1897–1982), commander of Army Group G. Generalmajor Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin (1904–1997) served as the operations officer of the Afrika Korps.
66William DePuy, Generals Balck and von Mellenthin On Tactics: Implications for NATO Military Doctrine (Munich: Bundeswehr Univ. 2004), 3.
67Ibid., 14.
68Ibid.
69FM 100–5 Operations1982, 2–1.
70Ibid., 2–2.
71Dept. of the Army, Field Manual 100–5 Operations (Washington DC 1986), 10.
72Ibid., 2–6.
73Lock-Pullan, ‘Modern’, 6.
74Lock-Pullan, ‘Rethink War’, 691.
75FM 100–5 Operations1986, 17.
76Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle (Novato, CA: Presidio 1991), 186.
77Roger A. Beaumont, ‘On the Wehrmacht Mystique’, Military Review 66/7 (July 1986), 48.
78Daniel Hughes, ‘Abuses of German Military History’, Military Review 66/12 (Dec. 1986), 66–76.
79Martin van Creveld, ‘On Learning From the Wehrmacht and Other Things’, Military Review 68/1 (Jan. 1988), 62–71.
80Daniel P. Bolger, ‘Maneuver Warfare Reconsidered’, in Hooker, Maneuver.
81For instance: Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years War to the Third Reich (Lawrence: Univ. of Kansas Press 2005), 307–11.
82See the debate concerning ‘intent’: David A. Fastabend, ‘The Application of the Commander's Intent’, Military Review 67/8 (Aug. 1987), 60–8; Edward J. Filiberti, ‘Command, Control and Commander's Intent’, Military Review 67/8 (Aug. 1987), 54–9; and Russell W. Glenn, ‘The Commander's Intent: Keep It Short’, Military Review 67/8 (Aug. 1987), 49–53. Concerning ‘centre of gravity’: Dale C. Eikemier, ‘Centre of Gravity Analysis’, Military Review 84/4 (July–Aug. 2004), 2–5; and Milan Vego, ‘Centre of Gravity’, Military Review 80/2 (March–April 2000), 23–9.
83Francis Fukuyama and Abram N. Shulsky, The Virtual Corporation and Army Organization (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1997), 42–3.
84Dept. of the Army, Field Manual 3–0 Operations (Washington DC 2001), Chapter 5, paras. 4–9, 61–3, 71–2; Chapter 6, paras. 37–9.
85Dept. of the Army, Field Manual 6–0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (Washington DC 2003).
86William M. Connor, ‘Emerging Army Doctrine: Command & Control’, Military Review 82/2 (March–April 2002), 80.
87Paul van Riper, Planning for and Applying Military Force: An Examination of Terms (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2006), 13.
88Robert Leonhard, Fighting By Minutes: Time and the Art of War (Westport, CT: Praeger 1994), 117.
89Citino, The German Way of War, 310.
90Creveld, ‘Learning’, 70.
93Hughes, ‘Auftragstaktik’, 332.
91Hughes, ‘Auftragstaktik’, 332.
92Hughes, ‘Abuses’, 67.
94Echevarria, ‘Auftragstaktik’, 50–6.
95David M. Keithly and Stephen P. Ferris, ‘Auftragstaktik or Directive Control in Joint and Combined Operations’, Parameters 89/3 (Autumn 1999), 118–33; Joseph S. McLamb, ‘The Future of Mission Orders’, Military Review 77/5 (Sept.–Oct. 1997), 71–4.
96Stephen Badsey, ‘Coalition Command in the Gulf War’, in G.D. Sheffield (ed.), Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Experience since 1861 (London: Brassey's 2002), 198.
97Naveh, 329.
98Tom Clancy and Fred Franks, On The Ground in Iraq: Into the Storm, A Study in Command (New York: Berkley 2004), 465.
99Jonathan M. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Lawrence: UP of Kansas 2001), 273.
100Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver, 269.
101Leonhard, Fighting, 52–8; also in Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (London: Brassey's 1985), 288–92.
102Leonhard, The Art, 270.
103Martin van Creveld, Kenneth S. Brower and Steven L. Canby, Air Power and Maneuver Warfare (Montgomery, ALA: Air UP 1994), 214.
104Ibid., 219
105Douglas A. Macgregor, Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights (Westport, CT: Praeger 2003), 99–101.
106Gen. (ret.) Sir Rupert Smith, Commander of 1st British Armoured Division (First Gulf War), Interview with author, 1 Sept. 2006, Brussels, Belgium.
107Ibid.
108Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Penguin 2006), 93–4.
109Smith, The Utility of Force, 94.
110Vandergriff, The Path to Victory, 150–1.
111Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: Little, Brown 1995), 380–1.
112Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War (Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies 1996), 49–50, note 39.
113Robert H. Scales Jr, Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War (London: Brassey's 1994), 254.
114Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Weidenfeld 2005), 94.
115Dr Bruce R. Nardulli, RAND, Senior Analyst, Interview with author, 7 Sept. 2006, Washington DC.
116Mark Bowden, ‘Foreword’, in David Zucchino, Thunder Run: Three Days in the Battle For Baghdad (New York: Grove 2004), xi.
117Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin 2006), 125.
118Nardulli, interview.
119Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (London: Atlantic 2006), 430–1.
120Douglas Macgregor, ‘The Failure of Military Leadership in Iraq, Fire the Generals!’, Counterpunch!, <www.counterpunch.org/macgregor05262006.html> accessed April 2007.
121Jack Kammerer, ‘Preserving Mission-Focused Command and Control’, <www. cgsc.army.mil/milrev>, accessed 29 Sept. 2003.
122Adam Grissom, ‘To Digitize an Army: The US Army Force XXI Initiative and the Digital Divide, 1993–2003’, PhD dissertation, King's College London 2008, 2.
123Grissom, ‘Digitize’, 12.
124Ibid., 2.
125Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 162.
126Donald P. Wright, Timothy R. Reese and the Contemporary Operations Study Team, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign, The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003–January 2005 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press 2008), 77–80, 160–1.
127Brig. Nigel Aylwin-Foster, ‘Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations’, Military Review 84/6 (Nov.–Dec. 2005), 7.
128Kevin C.M. Benson, ‘OIF Phase IV: A Planner's Reply to Brigadier Aylwin-Foster’, Military Review 86/2 (March–April 2006), 61.
129Ibid., 63–5.
130Ibid., 65.
131William S. Wallace, ‘TRADOC Commander, TRADOC Commander's Reply to Brigadier Aylwin-Foster’, Military Review 86/2 (March–April 2006), 117.
132Susan Craig, ‘Aylwin-Foster's Critique’, Military Review 86/2 (March–April 2006), 118.
133John D. Johnson, Mission Orders in the United States Army: Is the Doctrine Effective? (Fort Leavenworth: Army Command and General Staff College 1990).
134Vandergriff, The Path to Victory, 139–40.
135Ibid., 138.
136Ibid., 142–3.
137MacGregor, Transformation, 205.
138Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/5 (Oct. 2006), 905–34.
139One exception is Emily Goldman and Leslie Eliason (eds), The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford UP 2003). Management theory uses the term ‘best practice’ along with ‘benchmarking’ to describe a systematic comparison of successful organizational practices and the adoption of the best of them, there a host of literature on the subject see for example: Robert C. Camp, Benchmarking: The Search for Industry Best Practices That Lead to Superior Performance (Portland, OR: Productivity 2006).
140Alan L. Wilkins, Developing Corporate Character: How to Successfully Change an Organization Without Destroying It (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 1989), 7–19.
141Ibid., 52.
142James N. Mattis, Memorandum for US Joint Forces Command (Norfolk, VA: Dept. of Defense, US Joint Forces Command 14 Aug. 2008), 3, 6.
143Ibid., 5.
144US Army, TRADOC, Army Capstone Concept Draft, Version 2.7, Sept. 2009.
