Polaris, East of Suez: British Plans for a Nuclear Force in the Indo-Pacific, 1964–1968

Abstract

This article investigates the little-known plans formulated by Harold Wilson's Labour government to deploy Polaris submarines in the Indo-Pacific region. The scheme was first proposed in 1965 as a response to several problems faced by British policy-makers, including China's acquisition of a nuclear capability, Britain's wish to maintain a meaningful position ‘East of Suez’ at reduced cost, and German pressure for equal treatment within NATO on nuclear matters. Despite extensive high-level discussion, the plans were finally abandoned in mid-1968, as Labour moved more decisively to forsake the world role.

Key Words:

• Great Britain
• Polaris, Nuclear Weapons, Cold War, Strategic Deterrent, Indian Ocean

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the Journal's anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.

Notes

¹Saki Dockrill, Britain's Retreat from East of Suez (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 2002), mentions Polaris East of Suez at 136, 198 and 217. See also John W. Young, The Labour Governments, 1964–70, Volume 2 International Policy (Manchester: Manchester UP 2003), Chapter 2; Matthew Jones, ‘A Decision Delayed: Britain's withdrawal from South East Asia reconsidered’, English Historical Review 67/472 (2002), 569–95.

²See John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1964 (Oxford: OUP 1995), 325.

³[Kew, United Kingdom, The National Archives] PREM [Records of the Prime Minister's Office] 13/390, Ayub Khan to Wilson, 13 Nov. 1964, ‘Background Note’, 23 Feb., and Trend to Wilson, 30 March 1965.

⁴PREM 13/973, Wright to Hockaday, 4 Dec. 1964, record of meeting, 20 Jan. 1965, and see Healey to Wilson, 3 May 1965.

⁵[Kew, United Kingdom, The National Archives] FO [Records of the Foreign Office] 371/181355, IAD1013/26, Record of Rusk–Stewart meeting, 22 March 1965.

⁶PREM 13/973, Stewart to Wilson, 11 March 1965; PREM 13/225, Stewart to Wilson, 26 March 1965.

⁷[Kew, United Kingdom, The National Archives] CAB [Records of the Cabinet Office] 148/18, OPD (65)19th, 31 March 1965.

⁸PREM 13/973, ‘Secret Background Note’ for parliamentary question of 27 July 1965.

⁹PREM 13/966, Mackilligin to Palliser, 2 June 1966, and record of Wilson–Singh meeting, 3 June 1966.

¹⁰PREM 13/973, Zuckerman to Wilson, 26 July 1966; see also Susanna Schrafstetter, ‘Preventing the “Smiling Buddha”: British–Indian Nuclear Relations and the Commonwealth Nuclear Force, 1964–68’, Journal of Strategic Studies 25/3 (Sept. 2002), 95–101.

¹¹Matthew Jones, ‘Up the Garden Path? Britain's Nuclear History in the Far East, 1954–1962’, International History Review 25/2 (2003), 306–33.

¹²CAB 134/1938, FP(B)(61)7 Revise, ‘The Far East’, 28 Aug. 1961.

¹³CAB 133/246, PM(W)(62)20, ‘Strategic Nuclear Deterrence Against China’, 17 April 1962.

¹⁴CAB 130/213, MISC 17/1st to 4th, 21–22 Nov. 1964, and papers 1 to 3, 13 and 18 Nov. 1964.

¹⁵PREM 13/104, records of meetings, 7 Dec. 1964.

¹⁶For background: Andrew Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and NATO: Britain, America, and the Dynamics of Alliance, 1962–68 (London: Routledge 2006); Donette Murray, Kennedy, Macmillan and Nuclear Weapons (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan 1999); Susanna Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge, ‘Trick or Truth? The British ANF Proposal, West Germany and US Non-Proliferation Policy’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 11/2 (July 2000), 161–84; and John W. Young, ‘Killing the MLF? The Wilson Government and Nuclear Sharing in Europe’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 14/2 (July 2003), 295–324.

¹⁷Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 306–14.

¹⁸CAB 21/6050, Caccia to Mottershead, enclosed paper ‘Nuclear Forces Outside NATO’, 30 Dec. 1964, and Planning Staff paper, ‘Nuclear Matters East of Suez including the Problem of Safeguards for India’, 27 Jan. 1965; see also [Kew, United Kingdom, The National Archives] DO [Records of the Commonwealth Relations Office] 182/158, SC(65)5, 28 Jan. 1965.

¹⁹DEFE 13/350, Chief of Naval Staff to Secretary of State and attached Navy Dept. note, No. 171/65, ‘Polaris Submarines: Deployment East of Suez’, 13 Jan. 1965.

²⁰At this stage the issue was very low key: the COS did not even discuss the question face-to-face, but dealt with it on the basis of written comments. [Kew, United Kingdom, The National Archives] DEFE [Records of the Ministry of Defence] 4/187, COS 36th/65, 13 July, and paper COS 1969, with annexes, 1 July 1965.

²¹PREM 13/216, Trend minutes to Wilson, 12, 23 and 24 Nov. 1965. These minutes helped prepare for a discussion at the Cabinet Overseas Policy and Defence Committee (OPD): CAB 148/18, OPD (65)52nd, 24 Nov.

²²PREM 13/681, Record of meeting, 26 Nov. 1965.

²³PREM 13/799, Wright to Bridges, 30 Nov. 1965.

²⁴[Austin, Texas, Lyndon B. Johnson Library] NSF [National Security File], Memoranda to the President, box 5, vol. 17, Bundy memorandum on Wilson–Johnson conversation, 16 Dec. 1965.

²⁵NSF, Country File, UK, box 215, UK Defence Review 1/27/66, Bator notes on Wilson–Johnson meeting, 16 Dec. 1965.

²⁶PREM 13/799, Record of Wilson–Pearson meeting, 19 Dec. 1965, and CRO to Canberra, 24 Dec. 1965.

²⁷PREM 13/686, Record of meeting, 17 Dec. 1965.

²⁸CAB 148/68, OPD(O)2nd, 7 Jan. 1966; CAB 148/69, OPD(O)(66)2, 4 Jan. 1966.

²⁹Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 315–17.

³⁰PREM 13/800, Trend to Wilson, 21 Jan. 1966.

³¹PREM 13/799, Zuckerman to Wilson, 7 Jan. 1966.

³²DEFE 4/195, COS 1088/19/1/66, Annex A, undated.

³³DEFE 4/195, COS 4th/66, confidential annex, 20 Jan. 1966, COS 1088, 19 Jan. 1966, and see COS 5th/66, 24 Jan. 1966, for final approval of the paper, which became DEFE 5/165, COS 11/66, 24 Jan. 1966.

³⁴PREM 13/1316, Trend to Wilson, ‘UK Nuclear Policy’, 21 Jan. 1966. The Foreign Office was particularly concerned that Polaris remain in the Atlantic as it gave Britain the chance to influence any nuclear-sharing arrangements in line with its own interest, see FO 953/2256, SC(65)37, ‘United Kingdom Nuclear Policy’, 23 Dec. 1965.

³⁵CAB 148/25, OPD(66) 8th, 23 Jan. 1966; CAB 148/27, OPD(66) 18, 21 Jan. 1966. The Americans were given an aide-memoire explaining that the idea of deploying Polaris East of Suez had been examined in London but that, since ‘to suggest any change in our plans now might hamper the development of proposals for the control of nuclear forces in Europe’, it was not intended to take this further ‘for the present’. See NSF, Country File, UK, box 215, ‘The UK Defence Review’, 25 Jan. 1966.

³⁶NSF, Country File, UK, box 209, UK Memoranda, Vol. VIII, Rostow memorandum, 20 Jan. 1966, and Valenti memorandum, 24 Jan. 1966.

³⁷NSF, Country File, UK, box 215, Joint State-Defense Scope Paper, 27 Jan. 1966; CAB 164/713, Laskey note, 25 July 1966.

³⁸CAB 148/68, OPD(O)(66)12th, 20 May 1966 ; DEFE 4/200, COS 27th/66, 24 May 1966.

³⁹CAB 164/713, Healey to Wilson, 1 July 1966, Palliser minute with Wilson's handwritten comment, 3 July 1966, Palliser minute, 19 July 1966, and Rogers to Trend, 25 July 1966.

⁴⁰This meeting agreed that officials should again study the case for sending Polaris East of Suez: CAB 148/25, OPD(66)34th, 5 Aug. 1966.

⁴¹FO 800/961, ‘Nuclear Policy’, 13 Sept. 1966.

⁴²CAB 130/301, MISC 129(66)1st, 22 Oct. 1966. A few days later the OPD officials reviewed the implications of sending Polaris East of Suez, but the position had not advanced much. The need to finalise NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements and the absence of proper basing facilities East of Suez meant that Polaris submarines must remain in the Atlantic until at least 1972: CAB 148/69, OPD(O)(66)20th, 24 Oct.; CAB 148/69, OPD(O)(66)38, 20 Oct. 1966.

⁴³CAB 134/3120, PN(66)4, 14 Dec. 1966. Basing was another problem. A base in Australia might be constructed, but the Australians (who had not been asked their opinion) might be reluctant to accept a nuclear deployment. An Indian Ocean (rather than a Pacific) deployment was felt more acceptable to the Americans, who would not welcome a British share in a Pacific force.

⁴⁴PREM13/1316, Trend to Wilson, 6 Jan. 1967.

⁴⁵The Minutes of the 9 Jan. meeting have been retained, but its outcome is summarised in DEFE 24/504, Annex A to COS 82/67, 17 Aug. 1967. Wilson raised the issue again at an OPD meeting in May: CAB 148/30, OPD(O)(67)19th, confidential annex, 12 May 1967.

⁴⁶LBJL, White House Confidential File, CO 305 UK 1967–68, box 12, London 10310, 12 June 1967.

⁴⁷CAB 129/130, C(67)81, 23 May 1967.

⁴⁸PREM 13/1965, Maclehose to Palliser, 22 May 1967, Trend to Wilson, 24 May 1967, Nairne to Maclehose, 9 June 1967, and Palliser to Maclehose, 12 June 1967.

⁴⁹CAB 148/81, OPD(O)(67)16, annexed minute by Wilson, 24 July 1967.

⁵⁰CAB164/713, Healey to Wilson, 3 Aug. 1967, and Trend minute, 3 Aug. 1967; Peter Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb (Oxford: OUP 2007), 213–17.

⁵¹At the meeting the Chiefs approved a paper from the Navy Dept. that updated their Jan. 1966 study of the East of Suez proposal. DEFE 4/220, COS 63rd/67, confidential annex, 15 Aug. 1967, paper COS 1689, 9 Aug., COS 64th/67, confidential annex, 22 Aug. 1967, and paper COS 1721, 18 Aug. 1967. The COS took the same view in Oct. when, as in previous discussions, their decision partly rested on the low cost of keeping the East of Suez option open. Abandoning it immediately and trying to revive it later would be much more expensive than keeping it on the drawing board: DEFE 4/222, COS 72nd/67, 12 Oct. 1967, and see 73rd/67, 13 Oct. 1967.

⁵²CAB 128/43, CC1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 (68), 4, 12 and 15 Jan. 1968. The East of Suez option was discussed at the Nuclear Policy Committee in Dec. 1967. For economic reasons, the Treasury and Dept. of Economic Affairs wanted to abandon Polaris altogether. But, other Depts., including Defence and the FO, wanted to retain both Polaris and the East of Suez option: CAB 134/3120, PN(67)6, 1 Dec., and PN(67)4th meeting, 5 Dec. 1967; and see CAB 148/81, OPD(O)(67)18, 4 Dec. 1967; Hennessy, Cabinets, 220–39. Ministers again decided to keep the option open. The decision does not form part of the minutes of PN(67)4th but is referred to in DEFE 24/504, ‘Polaris East of Suez’, covering note dated 25 April 1968.

⁵³Tony Benn, Office Without Power: Diaries, 1968–72 (London: Hutchinson 1988), 5–6.

⁵⁴CAB 164/713, Healey to Wilson, 5 June 1968; DEFE 24/504, COS 38/68, Annex A, 13 June 1968.

⁵⁵ADM 324/7, Acquaint 7/68, 15 March 1968.

⁵⁶ADM 324/7, Bradbury to DG Ships, 18 March 1968; DEFE 24/504, ‘Polaris East of Suez’, covering note dated 25 April 1968.

⁵⁷DEFE 24/504, Jaffray minute, 21 May 1968.

⁵⁸PREM 13/2493, letters by Healey, Stewart, Jenkins and Thomson to Wilson, 5, 14, 19 and 21 June 1968, and see Trend to Wilson (24 June 1968).

⁵⁹CAB 148/35, OPD(68)12th, 28 June 1968.

⁶⁰See, for example, PREM 13/315, Healey to Wilson, 4 Aug. 1965.

⁶¹PREM 13/214, record of meeting, 14 May 1965.

⁶²PREM 13/18, Trend to Wilson, 19 Nov. 1964.

⁶³PREM 13/2636, Trend to Wilson, 26 Feb. 1968.