Keeping Nothing Secret: United Kingdom Chemical Warfare Policy in the 1960s

Abstract

After renouncing an offensive chemical warfare programme in 1956, the UK Cabinet Defence Committee decided in 1963 to re-acquire a chemical warfare retaliatory capability. This article describes how the re-acquisition decision was engendered by a combination of novel research findings, changes in strategic thinking, new intelligence and pressures from NATO. Despite the 1963 decision, no new chemical weapons capability was acquired by the UK and information that Britain lacked a stockpile of chemical weapons was eventually leaked to the public, initiating a fierce debate between ministries over the significance of this leak. This paper argues that non-existent technology is equally problematic for government secrecy, and equally consequential for government action, as what exists. Furthermore, actors' different interpretations of what constituted a secret, point towards a more subtle understanding of secrecy than simply construing it as the hiding or uncovering of items of information.

Key Words:

• Chemical Weapons, Biological Weapons, Nuclear Weapons, Secrecy, Strategic Deterrent, WMD, United Kingdom

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Julian-Perry Robinson, John Stone and John Walker for comments on earlier versions of this article.

Notes

¹David Vincent, The Culture of Secrecy: Britain 1832–1998 (Oxford: OUP 1998); Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London: Pimlico 2001); Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War (London: Penguin 2003).

²David Kaiser, ‘The Atomic Secret in Red Hands? American Suspicions of Theoretical Physicists During the Early Cold War’, Representations 90/1 (2005), 28–60; Brian Balmer, ‘How Does Secrecy Work? Keeping and Disclosing Secrets in the History of the UK Biological Warfare Programme’, in Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish (eds), A Web of Prevention: The Life Sciences, Biological Weapons and the Governance of Research (London: Earthscan 2007), 173–88.

³Strictly speaking, the dual-use potential of the UK chemicals industry could be construed as a possible safeguard against having absolutely no potential to acquire a capability.

⁴This is admittedly a somewhat anachronistic definition of chemical weapons, as this primary mode of operation is a more recent understanding of toxic chemical as defined in the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.

⁵Julian Perry-Robinson and Milton Leitenberg, The Rise of CB Weapons. The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Volume I) (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 1971); Julian Perry-Robinson, ‘Chemical Arms Control and the Assimilation of Chemical Weapons', International Journal 36/3 (1981), 515–34; Adrienne Mayor, Greek Fire, Poison Arrows and Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World (London: Duckworth 2003); Kim Coleman, A History of Chemical Warfare (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan 2005).

⁶Coleman, Chemical Warfare; Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret History of Gas and Germ Warfare (London: Chatto & Windus 1982); Edward Spiers, Chemical Warfare (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan 1986); L. F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986); D. Richter, Chemical Soldiers: British Gas Warfare in World War I (Lawrence: UP of Kansas 1992); Edward Spiers, ‘Gas Disarmament in the 1920s: Hopes Confounded’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/2 (April 2006), 281–300; Rodney McElroy, ‘The Geneva Protocol of 1925’, in M. Krepon and D. Caldwell (eds), The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification (New York: St Martin's Press 1991). The number of reservations added by different states meant that the protocol was generally regarded as a ‘no first use'-agreement. More recently, many states have lifted their original reservations.

⁷[Kew, The National Archives], DEFE[nce Ministry papers] 10/19, DRPC, Final Version of Paper on Future of Defence Research Policy, 30 July 1947.

⁸[Kew, The National Archives], CAB[inet Office papers] 131/1, Minutes of Defence Committee of the Cabinet, 20 June 1946.

⁹Caitriona McLeish, ‘The Governance of Dual-use Technologies in Chemical Warfare’, MSc dissertation, Univ. of Sussex 1997; Jonathan Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to al-Qaeda (New York: Pantheon 2006).

¹⁰Gradon B. Carter, Chemical and Biological Defence at Porton Down, 1916–2000 (London: TSO 2000).

¹¹CAB 131/17, DC(56) 6th Meeting. Defence Committee Minutes, 10 July 1956; CAB 13/17 DC(56)13 (Revise) Chemical Warfare Policy, Memorandum by the Minister of Defence, 4 July 1956.

¹²This was not untypical of the secrecy surrounding chemical and biological warfare at this time. Although a search by the author of The Times online for 1945–65 revealed occasional revelations about research, for example new nerve gases or open air trials, it is far rarer to find statements of policy. Where they occur they are typically rather bland, for example, stating that ‘it is plainly the duty of the Government to study this type of warfare in both its offensive and defensive aspects, not with a view to using it but as a deterrent and precaution’. Anon, ‘Germ Warfare Defence: Trials to be Held Near Bahamas', The Times, 12 March 1954, 8.

¹³Brian Balmer, Britain and Biological Warfare: Expert Advice and Science Policy, 1935–65 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 2001).

¹⁴DEFE 11/660, COS(62) 69th Meeting Chemical and Biological Warfare (Previous Reference: COS(58)2nd Meeting Minute 5) JP(62)96(Final), 1 Nov. 1962.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995); Andrew J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939–1970 (Oxford: OUP 1972).

¹⁷The armed services had plans for a wide range of tactical nuclear warheads, all of which had been cancelled by the early 1960s.

¹⁸[Kew, The National Archives], WO 11/660, JP(62)96(Final), Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Planning Committee, Chemical and Biological Warfare, 12 Oct. 1962.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹DEFE 11/660, COS(62)69th Meeting, Chemical and Biological Warfare, Annex to Minute 1. Amendments to JP(62)96, 1 Nov. 1962.

²²Ibid.

²³DEFE 11/660, COS(62)69th Meeting (Extract), Chemical and Biological Warfare, 1 Nov. 1962.

²⁴DEFE 11/660, Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare, Note for the Minister of Defence. Attachment to Memorandum J.C.A. Roper to Mr Hockaday, 31 Jan. 1963.

²⁵DEFE 11/660, Biological and Chemical Warfare Policy, Note by the Ministry of Defence, Attached to Biological and Chemical Warfare Policy, 18 Feb. 1963.

²⁶DEFE 11/660, D(3)14, Cabinet Defence Committee, Biological and Chemical Warfare Policy. Memorandum by the Minister of Defence, 16 April 1963.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸[Kew, The National Archives], AIR 8/2391, Chemical Warfare Weapons, 13 June 1966.

²⁹As note 26.

³⁰CAB 131/28, D(63)3, Cabinet Defence Committee Meeting, 3 May 1963.

³¹DEFE 11/660, D(3)14, Cabinet Defence Committee, Biological and Chemical Warfare Policy, Memorandum by the Minister of Defence, 16 April 1963.

³²Robert Evans, Gassed: British Chemical Warfare Experiments on Humans at Porton Down (London: House of Stratus 2001).

³³AIR 8/2391, Chemical Warfare Weapons, 13 June 1966.

³⁴Although the choice of VX, also manufactured in the USA, could imply a reserved option to purchase the agent from the USA.

³⁵AIR 8/2391, Staff Requirement for an Aircraft Spray System for Retaliatory Chemical Warfare (COS 1972/2/7/65), 7 July 1965.

³⁶DEFE 11/660, Staff Requirement for An Aircraft Spray System for Retaliatory Chemical Warfare, Annex A to COS 1972/2/7/65, 2 July 1965.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸DEFE 13/557, MO/26/14, DWH, Ministry of Defence, to Prime Minister (Harold Wilson), 8 Nov. 1965.

³⁹Healey noted that the United Arab Republic (Egypt) was already known to have some capability in chemical warfare.

⁴⁰DEFE 13/557. MO/26/14, DWH, Ministry of Defence to Prime Minister (Harold Wilson), 8 Nov. 1965.

⁴¹DEFE 11/660, 10 Downing Street to P.D. [Patrick] Nairne, Ministry of Defence, 10 Nov. 1965.

⁴²DEFE 11/660, R.J. Painter (Treasury) to P.D. Nairne (11 Nov. 1965); Foreign Office to J.O. Wright, 10 Downing Street, 26 Nov. 1965.

⁴³DEFE 11/660, Defence Research Committee, Review of CW and BW Research Programme, Note by the Defence Research Staff, 1 Dec. 1966. It is likely that Defence Council (formed in 1964) here refers to its predecessor the Defence Board, both high level committees for discussion of defence policy.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵DEFE 13/557, Chemical Warfare and Biological Warfare – The Future of MRE and CDEE Porton, J.P. (initialled) to Minister, Ministry of Defence, 22 Aug. 1967. See also DEFE 13/557, MO 26/14, Research Programme on Chemical and Biological Warfare, A.H. Cottrell, CA (Studies), 8 Feb. 1967.

⁴⁶DEFE 13/557, MO 26/14, ibid.

⁴⁷DEFE 13/557, Roy Mason to CA (S), Chemical Warfare and Biological Warfare – Future of MRE and CDEE Porton, 29 Aug. 1967.

⁴⁸DEFE 13/557, A.H. Cottrell, CA (studies) to Minister (E), Chemical Warfare, 13 Sept. 1967.

⁴⁹DEFE 13/997, Chemical and Biological Warfare and the Future of MRE and CDEE Porton, Note by Roy Mason, 18 Jan. 1968.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹DEFE 13/557, Chief of Defence Staff to Minister (E), 31 Jan. 1968.

⁵²Brian Balmer, ‘Opening Up Porton Down: From Top Secret Memos to TV Broadcasts', paper presented at the Centre for the Study of War, State and Society, Univ. of Exeter, UK, 6 Nov. 2008.

⁵³This specific focus should be seen as a component of the increase of more broadly targeted protests against chemical and biological weapons research at Porton. See Peter Hammond and Gradon Carter, From Biological Warfare to Healthcare: Porton Down, 1940–2000 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 2002), 211–35.

⁵⁴Select committees are established by Parliament to look into particular issues, take evidence and issue reports.

⁵⁵L. Marks and J. Slaughter, ‘Porton Names Germ War Scientists', The Observer, 26 May 1968, 1–2.

⁵⁶The MRE was the site of Britain's biological research programme, also located at Porton Down.

⁵⁷There is an account of Dalyell's appearance before the committee in his biography: Russell Galbraith, Inside Outside: The Biography of Tam Dalyell – The Man They Can't Gag (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing 2000).

⁵⁸DEFE 11/672, Select Committee on Science & Technology – Porton Evidence, 11 June 1968.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹[Kew, The National Archives], FCO [Foreign & Commonwealth Office papers] 10/180, Sydney Bailey (Conference on Christian Approaches to Defence and Disarmament) to Lord Chalfont (Foreign Office), 29 May 1968.

⁶²FCO 10/181, Chalfont to S.D. Bailey, 11 June 1968.

⁶³FCO 10/181, D.L. Benest to Mr Wright, Letter about CBW to Mr Bailey, 2 July 1968.

⁶⁴FCO 10/181, Chalfont to D.L. Benest (3 July 1968), handwritten at end of D.L. Benest to Mr Wright. Letter about CBW to Mr Bailey, 2 July 1968.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶DEFE 11/672, R.C. Hope-Jones (Foreign Office) to K.T. Nash (AUS(Pol)), Stockpiles of Chemical Weapons, 9 July 1968.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸FCO 10/181, Note from C.S. Rycroft, 26 July 1968.

⁶⁹DEFE 11/672, From K.T. Nash, 26 July 1968.

⁷⁰DEFE 11/672, K.C. MacDonald (Head of DS12) to Private Secretary to Minister(E), Stockpile of Chemical Weapons, 9 Aug. 1968.

⁷¹DEFE 11/672, Stockpile of Chemical Weapons, 12 Aug. 1968.

⁷²FCO 10/182, Fred Mulley, 14 Aug. 1968, handwritten at bottom of R.C. Hope-Jones to Mr Wright, 13 Aug. 1968.

⁷³DEFE 11/672, Letter from Fred Mulley Minister of State, Foreign Office, to Denis Healey, 14 Aug. 1968.

⁷⁴DEFE 11/672, From AVM Neil Cameron, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Policy), Stockpile of Chemical Weapons, 22 Aug. 1968.

⁷⁵DEFE 11/672, Denis Healey to Frederick Mulley, 16 Sept. 1968.

⁷⁶CAB 168/169, Select Committee on Science and Technology, Defence Research, Minutes of Evidence (Monday 6 May 1968) Session 1967–68. Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 8 July 1968.

⁷⁷A former civil servant described these approaches to me as the difference between the card games of Poker (where one reveals nothing) and Bridge (where one wishes to conceal but also send subtle signals).

⁷⁸Likewise in more contemporary cases of suspected possession of a CBW capability, where intelligence and other information is far from robust. For examples of BW in Iraq and the former USSR, see Gregory D. Koblenz, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2009); Kathleen Vogel, ‘“Iraqi Winnebagos™ of Death”: Imagined and Realized Futures of US Bioweapons Threat Assessments', Science and Public Policy 35/8 (Oct. 2008), 561–73.

⁷⁹Julian Perry-Robinson, personal communication, 18 Sept. 2008.