How the High North became Central in NATO Strategy: Revelations from the NATO Archives

Abstract

From the late 1970s and until the end of the Cold War, the ‘High North’ constituted a central theatre for military forces. Extensive NATO preparations were made, a solid infrastructure developed in northern Norway, and frequent and large-scale exercises were carried out. These developments, from the late 1970s, were much discussed by scholars and strategists. However, the change of perception, laying the foundation for the military build-up, had actually occurred a decade earlier, in the late 1960s. This change has not yet been given its rightful attention, partly because the relevant documents have only recently become available. This essay takes the chronology of events back into the 1960s and to NATO's secret discussions between the national Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff. The most significant turning-points were the Flexible Response strategy of 1967; SACLANT's concern over increased Soviet naval activity and his ‘Maritime Strategy’ studies of 1965 and 1967; NATO's awakening to the Soviet SSBN threat in 1967; and the concept of ‘External Reinforcement of the Flanks’ of 1968 – finally followed by the ‘Brosio Study’ (named after the then NATO Secretary-General) of 1969. As a consequence of these developments NATO's ‘tactical northern flank’ was set to become an independent strategic theatre.

Key Words:

• High North
• NATO Strategy
• Soviet Navy and Air Force Developments

Acknowledgement

The research material is from the ‘NATO Archives’ in Brussels. Thanks go to the kind support from the staff.

Notes

¹Some of the best known of this ‘contemporary strategy’ category of literature includes: Marian K. Leighton, The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank (New York: National Strategy Information Centre Inc. 1979); Gregory Flynn (ed.), NATO's Northern Allies (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld 1985); Paul Cole and Douglas Hart (eds), Northern Europe: Security Issues for the 1990s (London Westview Press 1986); Clive Archer and David Scrivener (eds), Northern Waters (London: Croom Helm 1986); Sverre Jervell and Kare Nyblom, The Military Buildup in the High North (London: UP of America 1986); Walter Goldstein (ed.), Clash in the North (Washington DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers 1988); Eric Grove (ed.), NATO's Defence of the North (London: Brassey's 1989); Ola Tunander, Cold Water Politics The Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics of the Northern Front (London: SAGE Publications 1989); Kirsten Amundsen, Soviet Strategic Interests in the North (London: Pinter Publishers 1990); John Skogan and Arne Brundtland (eds), Soviet Sea Power in Northern Waters (New York: St Martin's Press 1990); T.D. Bridge and A.K. Slade (eds), Defence Forces of Norway (Devon, UK: AQ & DJ Publications 1992). In addition, Michael MccGwire's edited book Soviet Naval Developments (New York: Praeger 1973) and Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till's The Sea in Soviet Strategy (1983/1989) were important works of the time for the wider Western perceptions of the Soviet naval developments, the Northern Fleet included.

²Gustav Schmidt (ed.), A History of NATO, Vols.1–3 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 2001).

³John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 1995).

⁴G. Pedlow, ‘The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949–1969’, in NATO Strategy Documents 1949–1969 (Brussels: NATO Publication 1997), 21.

⁵Especially: Arne Wenger, Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher (eds), Transforming NATO in the Cold War. Challenges beyond Deterrence in the 1960s (Abingdon, UK: Routledge 2007); Vojtech Mastny, Sven Holtsmark and Arne Wenger, War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West (London: Routledge 2006). For an overview of the work of the PHP, see <www.php.isn. ethz.ch>

⁶Odd Arne Westad, Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London: Frank Cass 2000).

⁷Michael MccGwire, ‘Interpreting Soviet Military Behaviour’, in Gustav Schmidt (ed.), A History of NATO, Vol.2 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 2001), 179–97.

⁸E.g. Olav Riste (ed.), Western Security – The Formative Years (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1985).

⁹Mats Berdal, The United States, Norway and the Cold War, 1954–60 (London: Macmillan Press 1997).

¹⁰Kjetil Skogrand, Norsk forsvarshistorie, 1940-1970: Alliert i krig og fred (Bergen: Eide forlag 2004).

¹¹Rolf Tamnes, ‘The Strategic Importance of the High North during the Cold War’, in Gustav Schmidt (ed.), A History of NATO, Vol.3 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 2001), 257–75: Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North (Cambridge, UK: CUP 1991).

¹²K. Bjerga and K. Skogrand, ‘Securing Small-state Interests. Norway and NATO’, in Mastny, Holtsmark and Wenger, War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War, 230–3.

¹³This concept-study is discussed later in the article.

¹⁴The USA was largely preoccupied with the difficulties of the war in Vietnam in the early 1970s, and simultaneously the general trend of détente (which in reality was also largely a result of Vietnam) halted any military build-up. In the perspective of Brosio, the Secretary–General of NATO, these questions were closely linked. However, this is another story which should be elaborated upon in a further study. (For further reading, see for instance: Manilio Broso, ‘The Function of the Atlantic Alliance’, in Vital Speeches of the Day 2/2 (11 Jan. 1965), 41–6; Bruno Bagnato, ‘NATO in the mid-1960s: The View of Secretary-General Manilio Brosio’, <http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=7&fileid=1B5D791A-39DB-2E06-2C04-ED948B1911E9&Ing=en>.

¹⁵The NATO Archives in Brussels, Belgium, are accessible to researchers by appointment. See the NATO Archives web homepage for information. Currently, NATO issued documents up to 1974 are declassified. The Archives also have some of the most central strategy documents available online <www.nato.int/archives/>.

¹⁶Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill 1979), 122; for relevant reading on NATO and BOP theory, see Duffield's study of NATO's conventional forces, Power Rules. For a broader treatment of the Balance of Power theories, see Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power (London: Routledge 1996).

¹⁷Duffield, Power Rules, 4–5.

¹⁸See for instance K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall 1995), 76.

¹⁹The Military Committee (MC) is the highest military authority, and was/is the principal adviser to the North Atlantic Council. The Military Committee also gave/gives directives and guidance on military strategic issues to the subordinate authorities (NATO Handbook, 239–40).

²⁰Standing Group (SG): a parallel body to the Military Committee in the 1950s–1960s. It comprised one representative of each of the Chiefs of Staff of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. It acted as the executive body of the Military Committee. The SG ended in 1966, as did much other French participation. The SG authority was transferred to the Military Committee, and executed by the International Military Staff (IMS).

²¹The International Military Staff (IMS) comprises military and civilian expert personnel from the member nations. The personnel primarily work for NATO, rather than for their individual nations. The IMS is ‘responsible for planning, assessing and recommending policy on military matters for consideration by the Military Committee, as well as ensuring that the policies and decisions of the Committee are implemented as directed’ (NATO Handbook, 241–2).

²²See for instance: Berdal, The United States, Norway and the Cold War, 1954–60; Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North.

²³SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

²⁴In Norwegian politics, many argued for a policy towards getting Norway under SACLANT. With the sole focus on the Central Front and the land battles, Norway felt left out in the periphery by NATO strategy. SACLANT (as well as USAF Strategic Air Command) was naturally more concerned with the Norwegian region. See for instance: K. Eriksen and H. Pharo, Kald krig og internasjonalisering, 1949–1965 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1997), 86–7.

²⁵See for instance: Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan 1988); Pedlow, ‘The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949–1969’, 21, <www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng >.

²⁶Duffield, Power Rules, 233.

²⁷A comparison of structured land forces of the Cold War and flexible maritime forces is anyhow very difficult to conduct. It cannot directly be based on numbers of soldiers, but must take into account capability and intentions. However, downplaying the impact of the Flexible Response strategy cannot be done based solely on a land forces comparison.

²⁸US National Security Action Memorandum of April 1961.

²⁹Pedlow, ‘The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949–1969’, 21, <www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/>.

³⁰Ibid.; NATO Archives/C-M(62)55, Statement by US Secretary McNamara on ‘Defence Policy’ (5 May 1962), 1. See also Stromseth, Origins of Flexible Response; A.Wenger, ‘Evolution of NATO's Strategy’, in Mastny, Holtsmark and Wenger, War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War, 165–92.

³¹NATO Archives: MC 100/Mil Dec, incl. complete MC 100, ‘The Long Term Threat Assessment’ (24 Jan 1963); MC 100 (Final), ‘The Long Term Threat Assessment’ (7 March 1963).

³²Pedlow, NATO Strategy Documents, 1949–1969, 24.

³³NATO Archives: C-M(62)79, Note by Chairman of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group Hooper, ‘Basic Assumptions for an Assessment of the Long Term Threat to NATO’ (11 July 1962), 7.

³⁴NATO Archives: SGM-487–63, Memorandum for the Secretary-General, NATO (28 Oct. 1963).

³⁵A. Wenger, ‘NATO's Transformation in the 1960s and the Ensuing Political Order in Europe’, in Wenger, Neunlist and Locher, Transforming NATO in the Cold War, 226.

³⁶NATO Archives: C-M(64)120, Progress Report on ‘NATO Force Planning’ (27 Nov. 1964).

³⁷NATO Archives: C-R(65)27, Summary Record (25 June 1965).

³⁸NATO Archives: C-R(65)27.

³⁹NATO Archives: C-R(65)27.

⁴⁰SACLANT: Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

⁴¹NATO Archives: Record MC/CS 30, p.44.

⁴²The documents per se were from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and SACLANT's organisation, and are thus still not declassified, but the main content is known from various NATO HQ documents.

⁴³NATO Archives: IMSM-64–67, Status Report on ‘NATO Strategy and Defence Planning’ (24 April 1967): Record MC 252, Summary Record (15 Feb. 1967).

⁴⁴NATO Archives: IMSWM-64–68, Memorandum on ‘Revision of ‘Facts about NATO’ (5 March 1968).

⁴⁵Admiral Sir Varyl Begg (UK) was Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel till 21 Jan. 1966, by when Admiral Sir John Frewen (UK), Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic Area assumed Adm. Begg's responsibilities. Admiral Sir John Bush (UK) relieved Adm. Frewen as Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel and Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic Area on 6 Oct. 1967. NATO Archives: IMSWM-64–68.

⁴⁶NATO Archives: IMSWM-64–68.

⁴⁷NATO Archives: Record MC 252, Summary Record (15 Feb. 1967).

⁴⁸NATO Archives: MC 252–67.

⁴⁹This was a great debate both within NATO and among scholars at the time; intentions versus capability focus in studies of the Soviet military forces.

⁵⁰It was political prestige that pushed the early deployment of K-19, which nearly ended in a nuclear meltdown off the Norwegian coast after a collision with the US Gato submarine.

⁵¹E. Miasnikov in P. Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge: MIT Press 2004) 238–9.

⁵²Ibid., 237–8.

⁵³NATO Archives: SG 161–67, ‘The Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities’ (1967).

⁵⁴Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine.

⁵⁵The ‘Yankee’-class was/is the NATO classification name of the Soviet Navaga and Nalim classes, first called the Project 667 submarines.

⁵⁶S.Chernyavskii, ‘The Era of Gorshkov: Triumph and Contradictions’, Journal of Strategic Studies28/2 (April 2005), 292–4.

⁵⁷For an interesting discussion on the use of terminology and definition of the High North's position; a tactical or strategical flank, or a independent front, see: J. Børresen, ‘Flanke eller front – nordområdene i den maritime strategi’, in E. Ellingsen, NATO and US Maritime Strategy (Oslo: Norwegian Atlantic Committee 1987). See also: T. Nieminen, Flank or Front: An Assessment of Military-Political Developments in the High North (Helsinki: War College 1991).

⁵⁸NATO Archives: MCM-76–68, Memorandum on ‘Maritime Contingency Forces Atlantic’ (24 Sept. 1968).

⁵⁹NATO Archives: MCM-45–67 (Rev), Memorandum on ‘Military Intelligence Appreciation (on Standing Naval Force Atlantic)’ (8 Dec. 1967).

⁶⁰NATO Archives: MCM-76–69, Memorandum for the Secretary General on ‘The Standing Naval Force Atlantic’ (25 Sept. 1969).

⁶¹NATO Archives: MCM-45–67 (Rev), Memorandum on ‘Military Intelligence Appreciation (on Standing Naval Force Atlantic)’ (8 Dec. 1967). The ‘Matchmaker’ series were started as long-duration NATO ASW exercises in 1965.

⁶²NATO Archives: Record MC/CS 38, Summary Record (26 July 1967).

⁶³NATO Archives: IMSM-212–68, Memorandum on ‘Maritime Contingency Concept’ (4 May 1968).

⁶⁴Admiral Ephraim P. Holmes (US); SACLANT from June 1967.

⁶⁵NATO Archives: IMSM-483–68 (Rev), Memorandum on ‘Status Reports’ (12 Nov. 1968), and IMSWM-362–68, Memorandum on ‘Status Report’ for DPC in Ministerial Session (23 Dec. 1968).

⁶⁶Admiral H.P. Smith (US), April 1963 – May 1965, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer (US), May 1965 – June 1967.

⁶⁷Making preparatory work for the Defence Planning Committee (DPC). The DPC is made up of the defence ministers, and is the principal decision-making authority on matters relating to the integrated military structure of NATO (NATO Handbook).

⁶⁸NATO Archives: Record MC 252, Summary Record (15 Feb. 1967).

⁶⁹NATO Archives: Record MC/CS 38, Summary Record (26 July 1967).

⁷⁰NATO Archives: MCM-23–68, Memorandum on ‘A Concept for External Reinforcement of the Flanks’ (16 April 1968); IMSM-217–68, Memorandum on ‘A Concept for External Reinforcement of the Flanks’ (14 May 1968).

⁷¹NATO Archives: IMSM-217–68.

⁷²First lined out in NATO Archives: MC-73–66 and finally made into implementing plans with the main document; ‘A Concept for External Reinforcement of the Flanks’: NATO Archives: MCM-23–68, Memorandum on ‘A Concept for External Reinforcement of the Flanks’ (16 April 1968).

⁷³NATO Archives: MCM-76–68, Memorandum on ‘Maritime Contingency Forces Atlantic’ (24 Sept. 1968).

⁷⁴NATO Archives: Record MC/CS-40, Summary Record (20 June 1968).

⁷⁵Italian diplomat Manilio Brosio was Secretary-General of NATO from 1964 till 1971.

⁷⁶NATO Archives: PO/68/117, 13 Feb 68, referred to in MCM-103–69, Memorandum for the Secretary-General on ‘Relative Maritime Strategies and Capabilities of NATO and the Soviet Bloc’ (21 Nov. 1969).

⁷⁷NATO Archives: Record MC/CS 42, Summary Record (20 Dec. 1968).

⁷⁸NATO Archives: IMSM-211–68, Memorandum on ‘Status of the Studies of NATO/Soviet Bloc Maritime Capabilities’ (4 May 1968).

⁷⁹Understanding the Brosio Study of 1969: still today this historically important document is classified as NATO secret and withheld. I traced the document (SACLANT 3800/C-16, 18 March 1969) (Cosmic Top Secret, with strictly limited circulation). However, it is quite possible to reconstruct the document's main focus and conclusions from other de-classified and closely related documents (mainly from NATO HQ documents; IMSM-211-68 of May 1968, Record MC 334 of September 1968, Record MC/CS 42 of Dec. 1968, Record MC/CS 43 of February 1969 (first complete draft of the Brosnio Study) and Record MC/CS 44 of June 1969).

⁸⁰There were surprisingly few debates on the Arab–Israeli War of 1967 and the Vietnam War in my research of the NATO archives. The reason was probably also here the great concentration on the Central Front and Europe, as previously discussed up against SACLANT's attempt to get the High North and the Soviet Naval build-up on to the agenda.

⁸¹Brosio was personally occupied with the ‘unchanging greater course’ for NATO in the period 1965 till 1969. See for instance: M. Brosio, ‘The Function of the Atlantic Alliance’, in Vital Speeches of the Day 2/2 (11 Jan. 1965), 41–6; B. Bagnato, ‘NATO in the mid-1960s: The View of Secretary-General Manilio Brosio’, <http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=7&fileid=1B5D791A-39DB-2E06-2C04-ED948 B1911E9&Ing=en>.

⁸²NATO Archives: Record MC/CS 42, Summary Record (20 Dec. 1968).

⁸³NATO Archives: Record MC/CS 42.

⁸⁴NATO Archives: IMSM-211–68.

⁸⁵NATO Archives: IMSWM-277–68, Memorandum on ‘Release of Unclassified Briefings on the Soviet World Wide Maritime Challenge’ (4 Oct. 1968).

⁸⁶NATO Archives: IMSWM-277–68.

⁸⁷NATO Archives: Record MC/CS 42.

⁸⁸A final draft of the study was ready shortly after this status report by SACLANT and the content of the still classified original document is accordingly not expected to differ much.

⁹¹NATO Archives: Record MC/CS 43, Summary Record (18 Feb. 1969) and Record MC/CS 44.

⁸⁹SACLANT 3800/C-16, 18 March 1969 (still classified Top Secret in 2007).

⁹⁰NATO Archives: IMSWM-196–69, Memorandum on ‘Relative Maritime Strategies and Capabilities of NATO and the Soviet Bloc’ (7 Aug. 1969). Record MC/CS 44, Summary Record (20 June 1969). MCM-103–69, ‘Relative Maritime Strategies and Capabilities of NATO and the Soviet Bloc’, including attachment Ser 3800/C-16 and Ser 3800/C-8–69 Vol. 1–3 of 10 March 1969 (1969). This latter SACLANT document is what is popularly known as the ‘Brosio Study’. The study is still classified (originally CTS, but downgraded to NATO Secret in 1977). Therefore nothing is drawn directly from this document, but the reference may be useful for others as it becomes declassified in the future.

⁹²NATO Archives: Record MC/CS 44.

⁹³NATO Archives: Record MC/CS 42, Summary Record (20 Dec. 1968). In addition; the Soviet ‘global’ strategy was also underlined in several other NATO documents of the late 1960s, e.g. MCM-39–67, Memorandum on ‘Force Proposals 1969–73’ (14 Nov. 1967). MCM-44–67, Memorandum on ‘Overall Military Suitability of the 1968–72 Force Plans and the Associated Degree of Risk’ (5 Dec. 1967). MCM-017–68, Memorandum on ‘Force Proposals 1969–73’ (27 March 1968). IMSWM-196–69, Memorandum on ‘Relative Maritime Strategies and Capabilities of NATO and the Soviet Bloc’ (7 Aug. 1969).

⁹⁴NATO Archives: Record MC/CS 44.

⁹⁶From this we see the origin of the strong focus on NATO interceptor aircraft to operate from bases in Northern Norway to stop the Soviet bomber aircraft from breaking out into the Norwegian Sea.

⁹⁵NATO Archives: Record MC/CS 42, Record MC/CS 43, Record MC/CS 44.

⁹⁷The study is still classified in NATO, but its brief content has been suggested previously by Eric Grove (E. Grove, with G. Thomson, Battle for the Fiords (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 1991); E. Grove, ‘The Superpowers and Secondary Navies in Northern Waters during the Cold War’, in R. Hobson and T. Kristiansen (eds), Navies in Northern Waters, 1721–2000 (London: Frank Cass 2004); and Joel J. Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age, The United States Navy and NATO 1949–80 (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press 1991)). The released documents from NATO used in this article confirm, and further elaborate on Grove and Sokolsky's work. The importance of the study has also been briefly mentioned by Geoffrey Till (G. Till, ‘Holding the Bridge in Troubled Times: The Cold War and the Navies of Europe’, Journal of Strategic Studies 28/2 (April 2005), 329), referring to the previously mentioned book by Sokolsky.

⁹⁸Well covered by the semi-official Norwegian books: Norsk Forsvarshistorie, books 4 and 5, as well as Norsk Utenrikspolitikks Historie, books 5 and 6 (see bibliography for details). As well as O. Riste, Norways's Foreign Relations. A History (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 2001), 216.

⁹⁹R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1976), 28–9.

¹⁰⁰NATO Archives: LOCOM 7775, Presentation on ‘Maritime Strategy’ (20 Feb 1967).