‘Technology Determines Tactics’: The Relationship between Technology and Doctrine in Chinese Military Thinking

Abstract

Does ‘doctrine drive technology’ or does ‘technology drive doctrine’? For the United States with its advanced industrial and technological base, many examples of ‘doctrine driving technology’ can be found. For the People's Liberation Army (PLA), however, most evidence from military sources indicates that ‘technology drives doctrine’ or, as the Chinese say, ‘technology determines tactics’ (but not necessarily strategy). Within an overarching Chinese strategic framework, tactics and doctrine will be developed appropriate for (a) the weapons and technologies that are actually in the Chinese armed forces and (b) the people who must operate and maintain them. The Chinese civilian and military leadership has designated 2049 for completion of the modernization of the Chinese armed forces, a date selected in conjunction with the target for achieving China's main strategic priority, national economic modernization. Barring a major change in the strategic or domestic environment, we can expect that Beijing will continue to pursue the development of new weapons and technology in a manner consistent with the larger goal of national economic development. Exactly how China fights in the future will be dependent upon the weapons and technologies available – and they will be employed within the parameters defined by active defense and People's War.

Key Words:

• China
• Technology
• Tactics

Notes

¹US 2010 enacted defense budget figures are summarized at p. 8-1 of the Overview: FY 2011 Defense Budget, <http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf>. Another $104.8 billion was included for equipment procurement in 2010. The 2010 Chinese budget numbers are from ‘China's Defense Budget to Grow 7.5 Percent in 2010: Spokesman,’ Xinhua, 4 March 2010, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-03/04/c_13196769.htm>. In the Chinese defense budget, R&D and equipment procurement both are part of the roughly one-third dedicated to ‘equipment’. The central government also is believed to provide some amount of military-related R&D funding to the civilian defense industries. No reliable figures are available for the total amount dedicated to military-related R&D.

²Zheng Wenhan, ‘Categories of Military Science,’ in Chinese Views of Future Warfare, Michael Pillsbury (ed.), (Washington DC: National Defense UP 1997), 212.

³Mao Zedong, Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War (Dec. 1936), Ch.1, transcription by the Marxist Documentation Project (2004), <www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_12.htm>.

⁴China's National Defense, July 1998, Section II. National Defense Policy. Minor word changes have occurred in subsequent White Papers, but the thrust of the concept has remained constant.

⁵For a discussion of ‘Red’ versus ‘Expert,’ see Harlan W. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945–1981 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1982), 54–6.

⁶Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye (eds), On Military Campaigns (Beijing: National Defense University Press May 2000), translated by the Language Doctors. This book is also known as The Science of Campaigns. The same quote about the relationship of man and weapons is found in the 2006 update of the book.

⁷Jiang Zemin, Book on Technology, Army Building Viewed CPP20010221000077 Guangzhou Yangcheng Wanbao (Internet Version-WWW) in Chinese 13 Feb. 2001, translated by the Open Source Center (OSC).

⁸China's National Defense in 2006, Dec. 2006, Section IV. The People's Liberation Army.

⁹China's National Defense in 2008, Jan. 2009, Section II. National Defense Policy.

¹⁰Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi (eds), The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House 2005), 454–5. The major concepts found in The Science of Military Strategy are reinforced in other books, such as The Science of Campaigns, as well as in numerous articles in military newspapers and journals.

¹¹China's National Defense in 2008, Section XII. Defense Expenditure.

¹²In his ‘Adhere to the Four Basic Principles’ speech of 30 March 1979, Deng Xiaoping stated, ‘China's scientific and technological forces are very inadequate, and overall its level of science and technology lags between 20 and 30 years behind that of the advanced countries of the world.’

¹³Army Daily Editorial Urges Grasping Guidelines for Defense, Army Building CPP20060102501001 Beijing Jiefangjun Bao (Internet Version-WWW) in Chinese 1 Jan. 2006, translated by OSC.

¹⁴PRC: JFJB Article Promotes Scientific Development of Military Training CPP20081204710007 Beijing Jiefangjun Bao Online in Chinese 4 Dec. 2008, 10, translated by OSC.

¹⁵JFJB Commentator on Hu Jintao Summing Up Scientific Development Concept Campaign (3) CPP20100412710005 Beijing Jiefangjun Bao Online in Chinese 12 April 10, 1, translated by OSC; PRC: JFJB Commentator on Learning-Oriented Party Organization Building (3) CPP20100602710001 Beijing Jiefangjun Bao Online in Chinese, 2 Jun 1010, 1, translated by OSC. It may be noteworthy that the timeframe given in this latest iteration of the evaluation once again was only ‘at present’ and did not include ‘for a long period to come.’ Since its initial use in 2006, variations on the themes found in the ‘Two Incompatibles’ assessment have been observed in dozens of Chinese political, military, and defense-related publications.

¹⁶ The Science of Military Strategy, 439.

¹⁷CCTV-13 Video: PLAAF Deputy Commander Says PRC Developing 4th Generation Fighters CPP20091113004002 Beijing CCTV-13 in Mandarin 1330 GMT 8 Nov. 2009, translated by OSC.

¹⁸F-22A Raptor Advanced Tactical Fighter Aircraft,’ <www.airforce-technology.com/projects/f22/>.

¹⁹‘Transcript of Joint Press Conference with Secretary Gates and General Liang from Beijing, China’, 20 Jan. 2001, <www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4750>.

²⁰China's National Defense in 2006, Section II. National Defense Policy.

²¹Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, as quoted in Debra E. Soled (ed.), China: A Nation in Transition, (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly 1995), 357.

²²China's National Defense in 2008, Section II. National Defense Policy.

²³For a discussion of the ‘Two Transformations,’ see David M. Finkelstein, ‘China's National Military Strategy: An Overview of the ‘Military Strategic Guidelines’, in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell (eds), Right Sizing The People's Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China's Military, (Carlisle, PA: SSI 2007), 124, <www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB784.pdf>.

²⁴China's National Defense in 2008, Section II. National Defense Policy.

²⁵‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010’, 45; ‘Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009’, 36; ‘Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008’, 34. ‘Modern systems’ are defined as follows:

For surface combatants ‘modern’ is defined as multi-mission platforms with significant capabilities in at least two warfare areas. ‘Modern’ for submarines is defined as those platforms capable of firing an anti-ship cruise missile. For air forces, ‘modern’ is defined as 4th generation platforms (Su-27, Su-30, F-10) and platforms with 4th generation-like capabilities (FB-7). ‘Modern’ SAMs are defined as advanced Russian systems (SA-10, SA-20), and their PRC indigenous equivalents (HQ-9).

The 2009 report does not explain why the percentage of modern surface ships dropped eight percentage points from 2007 to 2008.

²⁶International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge for IISS 2010), 45, 404.

²⁷ The Science of Military Strategy, 135–6. While the US armed forces do emphasize ‘strength and technology,’ this Chinese interpretation of US doctrine appears to undervalue America's use of stratagem and deception, as well as non-kinetic information operations, demonstrated in recent campaigns. The Science of Military Strategy was written in 2001 before the Iraq War, which provided some excellent American examples of real-world deception operations.

²⁸Ibid., 136.

²⁹Ibid., 451.

³⁰Ibid., 428.

³¹Ibid., 453.

³²This observation is consistent with Andrew Ross, who states, ‘transformations in war feature a combination of (1) new weapons and new weapons systems (technology), (2) new ways of fighting (doctrine/operational art), and (3) new organizational structures.’ Andrew L. Ross, ‘On Military Innovation: Toward an Analytical Framework,’ paper presented at the Conference on China's Defense and Dual-Use Science, Technology, and Industrial Base, University of California, San Diego, 1–2 July 2010.

³³ The Science of Military Strategy, 432.

³⁴Ibid., 431–2.

³⁵Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Toward Contextualizing the Concept of a Shashoujian (Assassin's Mace)’, unpublished MS (Aug. 2002), <www.people.fas.harvard.edu/∼johnston/shashoujian.pdf>.

³⁷Ibid., 456–7.

³⁶ The Science of Military Strategy, 168, states, ‘Strategic direction means the direction of action that is decisive to the whole war.’ There may be multiple strategic directions, but one is designated as the ‘main’ strategic direction with others as ‘important’ or ‘auxiliary.’

³⁸PLA's Fu Quanyou on High-Tech Local War FTS19990701001913 Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue in Chinese, 20 Feb. 1999, 6–14, translated by OSC. The Science of Military Strategy (102), also credits Engels with the concept of People's War.

³⁹Quoted in Kenneth W. Allen, ‘PLA Air Force Logistics and Maintenance: What Has Changed?’, in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang (eds), The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1999), 82.

⁴⁰He Lei, ‘Travel the Road of Initiative and Innovation’ (‘’), PLA Daily (Chinese), 8 April 2010, <www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-04/08/content_24914.htm>.

⁴¹Fu Wenwu, ‘A Group Army Conducts a Live Fire Systems Attack Exercise’ (‘’), PLA Daily (Chinese), 7 Dec. 2009, <http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/2009jbzsc/2009-12/07/content_4090889.htm>.

⁴²Wang Xudong, ‘The Fundamental Way for the PLA to Defeat the Raptor Fighter: Increase Systems Combat Effectiveness’ (), China Review Press, 12 May 2008, <http://cn.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1006/4/2/3/100642384.html?coluid=4&kindid=16&docid=100642384&mdate=0512095304>.

⁴³ On Military Campaigns, 36; The Science of Military Strategy, 433.

⁴⁴Pauline Jelinek, ‘Pentagon: Chinese Vessels Harassed Unarmed Ship’, Associated Press, 9 March 2009, <www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D96QJ2S00&show_article=1>.

⁴⁵Wu Minwen, ‘New Interpretation of ‘Wolfpack’ Tactics,’ (‘’), PLA Daily (Chinese), 1 Dec. 2009, <http://news.mod.gov.cn/action/2009-12/01/content_4108406.htm>.

⁴⁶PRC Journal Article on CPC ‘Creative Military Theory’ ‘Innovation, Development’ CPP20080619436003 Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue in Chinese, 20 Jan. 2008, 13–21, translated by OSC.

⁴⁷John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 1988), 210–12. The Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, 16 Oct. 1964, says, ‘China is conducting nuclear tests and developing nuclear weapons under compulsion … . It is the people, and not any weapons, that decide the outcome of a war … . China is developing nuclear weapons for defense and protecting the Chinese people from US threats to launch a nuclear war.’ (Appendix A, 241–2).

⁴⁸Within the last year many articles have been published on the ASBM. Among them is Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, ‘On the Verge of a Game-Changer’, Proceedings Magazine, May 2009, <www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=1856>. A good summary is found in Ronald O'Rourke, ‘China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Service, 9 April 2010, 5–6.

⁴⁹A minor problem with such a description is that the Chinese do not use the term ‘anti-access strategy’ to describe their naval strategy or campaigns to be conducted within that strategy. See Office of Naval Intelligence, China's Navy 2007, 24–7, which identifies a ‘sea blockade campaign’ and ‘anti-ship campaign’ that have ‘anti-access’ characteristics, and Office of Naval Intelligence, A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics (Aug. 2009), 5–11. See also Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘China's Anti-Access Strategy in Historical and Theoretical Perspective', The Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (June 2011), 299–323.

⁵⁰O'Rourke, ‘China Naval Modernization’, 6.

⁵¹Defense Writer's Group, Transcript of interview with Vice Adm. David J. Dorsett, Deputy CNO for Information Dominance, 5 Jan. 2011,<www.airforce-magazine.com/DWG/Documents/2011/January%202011/010511dorsett.pdf>.

⁵²Erickson and Yang, ‘On the Verge of a Game-Changer’.

⁵³ The Science of Military Strategy, 464.

⁵⁴Ibid., 231.

⁵⁵A general graphic illustration of the relationship among these organizations is found at Figure II-4 in Ed Francis and Susan M. Puska, ‘SASTIND, CMIPD, and GAD: Contemporary Chinese Defense Industry Reform’, paper presented at the Conference on China's Defense and Dual-Use Science, Technology, and Industrial Base, Univ. of California, San Diego, 1–2 July 2010.

⁵⁶See Francis and Puska, ‘SASTIND, CMIPD and GAD’, for a more detailed discussion of GAD and its relationship with the other General Departments, SASTIND, and the defense industries.

⁵⁷Francis and Puska, ‘SASTIND, CMIPD, and GAD’.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Dennis J. Blasko

This work was authored as part of the Contributor's official duties as an Employee of the United States Government and is therefore a work of the United States Government. In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 105, no copyright protection is available for such works under US Law.