Managing Global Counterinsurgency: The Special Group (CI) 1962–1966

Abstract

The contemporary American counterinsurgency discourse has emphasised a particular historical narrative of Vietnam to justify large-scale military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Absent from this narrative is any reference to the broader Cold War context in which Vietnam existed alongside numerous other small-scale counterinsurgencies and was therefore the exception, not the rule. This article seeks to redress this shortcoming by examining the way counterinsurgency was conceived and managed at the level of ‘grand strategy.’ Specifically, it focuses on the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) to demonstrate that senior policymakers under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson understood ‘counterinsurgency’ as involving ‘indirect’ assistance to foreign governments, rather than taking ‘direct’ military action with American ground forces.

Key Words:

• Counterinsurgency
• Special Group
• Grand Strategy

Acknowledgements

Sincerest thanks to Colonel James W. Dingeman (US Army Rtd), Marcus Faulkner, Matthew Ford, and David Ucko for their guidance and assistance.

Notes

¹For Keane reference, see: Gen. David H. Petraeus, Lt. Gen. James F. Amos, Lt. Col. John A. Nagl, and Sarah Sewall, The US Army/Marine Corps Counter-insurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2007), xiv. The case of El Salvador in the 1980s is an obvious omission. Moreover, a review of the voluminous counterinsurgency literature in the post-Vietnam era provides ample evidence that this topic was hardly ‘abandoned’ by the US military. For a discussion of this point, see: Jeffrey H. Michaels and Matthew Ford, ‘Bandwagonistas: Rhetorical Re-description, Strategic Choice and the Politics of Counter-insurgency’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 22/3 (2011).

²Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 1986). John Nagl admits that he ‘stole from it shamelessly’ when writing his own doctoral thesis that later became the key ‘counterinsurgency’ text during the Iraq War – ‘Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counter-insurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam’. See Greg Jaffe, ‘As Iraq War Rages, Army Re-Examines Lessons of Vietnam’, Wall Street Journal, 20 March 2006. While the authors of FM 3–24 examined many conflicts other than Vietnam, and also make a brief reference to El Salvador in the 1980s, there is an underlying assumption not only in the manual, but also in the policy prescriptions these authors advocated in Iraq and Afghanistan, that large numbers of US forces were required and that the US military as a whole had to innovate for this purpose. See Michaels and Ford ‘Bandwagonistas’.

³Krepinevich makes a similar argument in relation to the Iraq conflict. See Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., ‘How to Win in Iraq’, Foreign Affairs 84/5 (Sept./Oct. 2005), 87–104.

⁴Although not usually stated, this idea is implicit precisely because the duration of the conflict is unknown. It is assumed, in FM 3–24 for instance, that most insurgencies last many years and that when the US plans for a counterinsurgency, large numbers of US forces may be needed for this period. Krepinevich's 2005 article is also explicit on this point.

⁵Hereafter the ‘Special Group (Counterinsurgency)’ will be referred to as the ‘Special Group (CI)’ or simply the ‘Group’. In the footnotes, the abbreviation ‘SGCI’ will be used. Referring to the men who made up the Group, Krepinevich notes ‘one wonders why a president so intent on forcing the Army to develop a new approach to this form of warfare would opt for so conventional group of men to bring about this change’. (Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam, 35) He also insists that the ‘Army would have to bear the brunt of administration efforts to counter insurgencies’ (29).

⁶Several of the main texts on US counterinsurgency make limited references to the Group. See, for instance, Douglas Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era (New York: The Free Press 1977). This book showcases the role of the Group, but at the time of writing, the amount of declassified sources available was limited. One recent study that provides useful insight into the Group's activities, though only covers a limited time span, is: Frank L. Jones, ‘The Guerrilla Warfare Problem: Revolutionary War and the Kennedy Administration Response, 1961–1963’ in J. Boone Bartholomees (ed.), US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. II: National Security Policy and Strategy, 4th Edition (Strategic Studies Institute, July 2010), 381–95, <www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=871>.

⁷William Beecher, ‘US Effort to Counter Red Insurgency Guided by Little Known Group’, Wall Street Journal, 27 June 1963.

⁸For example, see Walt W. Rostow, View From the Seventh Floor (New York: Harper and Row 1964), 117.

⁹Robert M. Mages, ‘Without the Need of a Single American Rifleman: James Van Fleet and his Lessons Learned as Commander of the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group During the Greek Civil War, 1948–1949’, in Richard G. Davis (ed.), The US Army and Irregular Warfare 1775–2007, Selected Papers from the 2007 Conference of Army Historians, 195–212, <www.history.rmy.mil/catalog/pubs/70/70–111.html>; Maj. Lawrence M. Greenberg, ‘The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946–1955’, Historical Analysis Series, US Army Center of Military History, Washington DC, 1987.

¹⁰Several examples include: William Rosenau, US Internal Security Assistance to South Vietnam: Insurgency, Subversion, and Public Order (New York: Routledge 2005); Dennis M. Rempe, ‘An American Trojan Horse? Eisenhower, Latin America, and the Development of US Internal Security Policy 1954–1960’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 10/1 (Spring 1999), 34–64; Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: US Guerrilla Warfare, Counter-Insurgency, and Counter-Terrorism 1940–1990 (New York: Pantheon Books 1992), 188–9.

¹¹In summer 1960 an interdepartmental study group consisting of State, DoD, and the CIA produced a report that argued for improving US capabilities in counter-guerrilla and anti-guerrilla operations. Referred to in: ‘Internal Defense of Less Developed World’, Department of State, 16 June 1961, 5–6. Accessed via D[eclassified] D[ocuments] R[eference] S[ystem] on 1 Oct. 2010.

¹²Memo from Komer to Rostow, 4 May 1961. N[ational] S[ecurity] F[iles]/R[obert] W. K[omer], Box 414, SGCI 7/61–5/63 White House Memoranda, J[ohn] F. K[ennedy] L[ibrary], Boston, MA.

¹³For more elaboration on the importance of ‘modernization theory’ under Kennedy, see: Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and ‘Nation Building’ in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: Univ. of N. Carolina Press 2000).

¹⁴Memo of Conference with President Kennedy, F[oreign] R[elations] of the U[nited] S[tates], 1961–1963, Vol. VIII, Doc. 18.

¹⁵Memo for the Record, Subject: Background Information on the Establishment of the SGCI, NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, L[yndon] B. J[ohnson] L[ibrary], Austin, Texas.

¹⁶‘Internal Defense of Less Developed World’, Department of State, 16 June 1961. Accessed via DDRS on 1 Oct. 2010.

¹⁷Ibid., 3–4.

¹⁸Ibid., 9.

¹⁹Bissell served as chairman of the NSC Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task Force that produced the report. The other members of the task force were Edward Lansdale, Walt Rostow and Henry Ramsey.

²⁰Memo for the Record, Subject: Background Information on the Establishment of the SGCI, NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

²¹NSAM 124 in FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. II, Doc. 26.

²²The head of the US Information Agency (USIA) would be added to this list on 13 Aug. 1962 as required by NSAM 180.

²³U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power: The Memoirs of an American Diplomat (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1984), 340.

²⁴Interestingly, Taylor noted that Laos need not be looked at by the Group since action was ‘being taken elsewhere’. This was most likely a reference to the original Special Group, otherwise known as the 5412 Committee, which was responsible for oversight of covert operations. Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 17 May 1962. NSF/M[eetings] and M[emoranda], Box 319, SGCI, 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

²⁵Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 7 June 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI, 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

²⁶Memo from Komer to Bundy, 18 June 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI, 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

²⁷Memo from U.A. Johnson to SGCI, 29 Aug. 1962 and Memo from Cottrell to SGCI, 5 Sept. 1962, NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 7/62–11/63, JFKL; Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 30 Aug. 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI, 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

²⁸Memo from Forrestal to Harriman, 20 May 1963, NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 7/62–11/63, JFKL.

²⁹Memo from Taylor to SGCI, 27 Oct. 1962, NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 7/62–11/63, JFKL.

³⁰Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 331.

³¹The 12 countries were Thailand, Iran, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Guatemala, Saudi Arabia, Honduras, Jordan, Peru and Iraq. See attachment to Memo from Harriman to President Johnson, 16 Dec. 1964, NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

³²Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 17 Sept. 1965, NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

³³Memo of the SGCI Meeting, 16 Jan. 1964 in FRUS, 1964–1968 Vol. I, Doc. 12.

³⁴As early as March 1962, the Group's oversight of Vietnam included several areas. According to one report: ‘Special attention has been focused on: improvement of the military command structure; prisoner of war interrogation; provincial surveys; and Border Ranger Forces. The economic programs in South Vietnam have been under review to assure that they are properly oriented toward counter-insurgency’. Memo from Parrott to Kennedy, 22 March 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. VIII, Doc. 74.

³⁵According to one high-level document: ‘“Internal defense” is used interchangeably with “internal security” in this paper in an effort to suggest a more psychologically palatable term then “internal security”’. See: ‘Internal Defense of Less Developed World’, Policy Planning Council, Dept. of State, 16 June 1961, p. 1.

³⁶Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 15 March 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

³⁷Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 330.

³⁸Memo from Maechling to Harriman, 29 July 1963 in FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. VIII, Doc. 139.

³⁹Memo from Saunders to Komer, 13 April 1965, NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

⁴⁰Letter from Taylor to President Johnson, 17 Jan. 1966 in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXXIII, Doc. 50.

⁴¹Memo from Komer to Bundy, 21 Jan. 1966, NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

⁴²Interestingly, a similar assessment had been prepared several years earlier in reference to the Group. It was noted that ‘To the extent that counterinsurgency programs are effective, the Communists will concentrate gaining power through other means’. Therefore it was suggested that the Group should become interested in developing administrative training facilities to provide trained administrative personnel especially at the provincial and district levels of underdeveloped countries. See: Memo from Davis to RFK and Dungan, 7 Jan. 1963, NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 7/62–11/63, JFKL.

⁴³Maechling discusses his role in drafting the OIDP in his ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: The Role of Strategic Theory’, Parameters 14/3 (Autumn 1984), 33–34.

⁴⁴See for instance: Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 12 July 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

⁴⁵Memo from Komer to Bundy, 6 Aug. 1962, NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

⁴⁶NSAM 182, 24 Aug. 1962.

⁴⁷Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 331.

⁴⁸NSAM 182.

⁴⁹Maechling, ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: The Role of Strategic Theory’, 34.

⁵⁰This was broken down as follows: State Department/Office of Politico-Military Affairs, DoD/International Security Affairs, JCS/SACSA, CIA/Deputy Director for Plans, Special Group Office, USIA/Office of Policy, AID/AID-PC, Special Assistant for Internal Defense.

⁵¹OIDP, 13. Can be found in: NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

⁵²Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 332.

⁵³Among the areas of support to a local government that are listed include: land reform, civic action, community development, social projects, education, labor and youth, leader groups, police (referred to as ‘the first line of defense against subversion and insurgency’), and diplomatic. OIDP, 14–18.

⁵⁴OIDP, 28. When discussing an insurgency of ‘serious proportions’, the document is referring specifically to a Phase II or III level insurgency. A Phase II level insurgency is reached ‘when the subversive movement has gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority.’ A Phase III level insurgency is defined as the stage reached ‘when the insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority.’ (20–1).

⁵⁵Telegram from Embassy in Saigon to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. II, Doc. 153.

⁵⁶David J. Kilcullen, ‘Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency’, Remarks delivered at the US Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington DC, 28 Sept. 2006.

⁵⁷Paper Approved by the Senior Interdepartmental Group. FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. X, Doc. 204.

⁵⁸Seven countries were listed as having internal defense plans. Thirty-six other countries were also receiving US internal defense assistance. Memo from Farley to Katzenbach, 26 March 1969, DDRS, accessed 12 Oct. 2010.

⁵⁹For further elaboration on this point, see McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft.

⁶⁰Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 332.

⁶¹Memo from Goldberg to Taylor, 31 Jan. 1962 and Memo from Freeman to Taylor, 14 Feb. 1962 in NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 4/6/61–6/7/62, JFKL.

⁶²Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 18 Jan. 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

⁶³Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 22 March 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

⁶⁴This academy was later merged with a new International Police Academy based in Washington DC.

⁶⁵Taylor memo to SGCI, 13 Feb. 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 4/6/61–6/7/62, JFKL.

⁶⁶Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 31 May 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

⁶⁷Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 332.

⁶⁸Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, 72.

⁶⁹Ibid., 73.

⁷⁰See for instance: Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 22 Jan. 1965. NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

⁷¹See for instance: ‘Castro's Subversive Capabilities in Latin America’, Special National Intelligence Estimate 85–4–62, 9 Nov. 1962, CIA. Accessed via CIA website on 8 Nov. 2010.

⁷²In relation to Africa, for example, there was considerable discussion of China's role in the Congo. See: State/INR memo from Denney to Harriman, 11 Aug. 1964. Accessed via DDRS on 15 Nov. 2010.

⁷³Memo for the Record, Discussion with Secretary Rusk at Breakfast Meeting, 18 March 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXXIII, Doc. 30.

⁷⁴Memo from Komer to Bundy and Taylor, 18 April 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 4/6/61–6/7/62, JFKL.

⁷⁵Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 338.

⁷⁶Rosenau, US Internal Security Assistance to South Vietnam, 94–5.

⁷⁷Memo from Bell to SGCI, 5 April 1965 with attached AID report on Public Safety Programs. Accessed via DDRS on 8 Nov. 2010.

⁷⁸Minutes of Meeting of the SGCI, 8 Aug. 1963. NSF/RWK, Box 414, SGCI 9/62–11/63, JFKL.

⁷⁹Memo from Bell, 5 April 1965.

⁸⁰Memo from Komer to Bundy, 6 Feb. 1962. NSF/RWK, Box 414, SGCI 7/61–5/63 White House Memoranda, JFKL.

⁸¹Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 21 June 1962. See also memo from McCone to the SGCI, 25 June 1962. Both documents can be found in NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

⁸²Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 27 Sept. 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

⁸³Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 13 Sept. 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

⁸⁴Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 19 April 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL. The report requested by the Group in April 1962 was not just for Southeast Asian countries, but also for Iran, Pakistan, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Venezuela.

⁸⁵McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft, 152–5.

⁸⁶Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 6 June 1963. NSF/RWK, Box 414, SGCI 9/62–11/63, JFKL; Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 10 May 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

⁸⁷Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 12 Aug. 1965. NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

⁸⁸Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 6 June 1963. NSF/RWK, Box 414, SGCI 9/62–11/63, JFKL.

⁸⁹Memo from Lemnitzer to SGCI, 3 July 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 7/62–11/63, JFKL.

⁹⁰Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 3 May 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI, 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

⁹¹Minutes of the SGCI Meetings, 10 May 1962 and 21 June 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

⁹²Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 6 Sept. 1963. NSF/RWK, Box 414, SGCI, 9/62–11/63, JFKL.

⁹³Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 9 Sept. 1965. NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

⁹⁴Memo from Komer to Taylor, 26 Jan. 1962. NSF/RWK, Box 414, SGCI, White House Memoranda, 7/61–5/63, JFKL.

⁹⁵Examples include: Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1964); Lucian W. Pye ‘Armies in the Process of Political Modernization’ in John J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1962).

⁹⁶Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 333–4.

⁹⁷Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 3 June 1965. NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

⁹⁸Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 10 Oct. 1963. NSF/RWK, Box 414, SGCI 9/62–11/63, JFKL.

⁹⁹Jack Raymond, ‘Vietnam Gives US “War Laboratory”; Pentagon Studies Results of its Tactics in Combat’, New York Times, 3 May 1965.

¹⁰⁰Memo from Taylor to President, 2 June 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 4/6/61–6/7/62, JFKL.

¹⁰¹Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 17 May 1962 in FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. II, Doc. 196; Minutes of the SGCI Meetings, 5 April 1962 and 31 May 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI, 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

¹⁰²Memo from Komer to Bundy, 6 Feb. 1962. NSF/RWK, Box 414, SGCI 7/61–5/63, White House Memoranda, JFKL.

¹⁰³Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 19 April 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 6/8/61–11/2/62, JFKL.

¹⁰⁴Seymour Hersh, The Dark Side of Camelot (London: HarperCollins 1997), 278.

¹⁰⁵Beecher, ‘US Effort to Counter Red Insurgency Guided by Little Known Group’.

¹⁰⁶Memo from Krulak to Gilpatric, 26 March 1962 in FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. II, Doc. 132.

¹⁰⁷Memo from Maechling to Harriman, 29 July 1963 in FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. VIII, Doc. 139.

¹⁰⁸Memo from Harriman to President Johnson, 16 Dec. 1964. NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

¹⁰⁹Memo from Davis to RFK and Dungan, 7 Jan. 1963. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 7/62–11/63, JFKL; Memo from Taylor to President, 2 June 1962. NSF/MM, Box 319, SGCI 4/6/61–6/7/62, JFKL; Memo from Taylor to Kennedy, 30 July 1962 in FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. VIII, Doc. 102.

¹¹⁰Memo from Johnson to Kennedy, 14 March 1963 in FRUS, 1961–1963 Vol. VIII, Doc. 128.

¹¹¹Memo from Davis to RFK and Dungan, 7 Jan. 1963.

¹¹²Referred to in Memo from Harriman to President Johnson, 16 Dec. 1964. NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

¹¹³The ‘internal defense’ equipment included small arms, vehicles, helicopters, and communications gear. Memo from Harriman to President Johnson, 16 Dec. 1964. NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

¹¹⁴Minutes of the Meeting of the SGCI, 15 Jan. 1965. NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

¹¹⁵Memo from Rowen to Bundy, 5 April 1965. NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

¹¹⁶Memo from Komer to Bundy, 23 Sept. 1965. NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

¹¹⁷Memo for the Record, 18 March 1965. FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXXIII, Doc. 30.

¹¹⁸Memo from Saunders to Komer, 13 April 1965. NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

¹¹⁹Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 17 Sept. 1965. NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

¹²⁰Minutes of the SGCI Meeting, 5 Nov. 1965. NSF/RWK, Box 15, SGCI, 1964–1966, LBJL.

¹²¹Memo from Taylor to Johnson, 19 Jan. 1966. FRUS, 1964–1968 Vol. XXXIII, Doc. 50.

¹²²‘Counterinsurgency programs for Thailand should be given the same treatment at the Washington level as is being contemplated in the new approach for the management of Vietnam pacification policy and programs.’ Report from Chester L. Cooper to SGCI, 28 Feb. 1966 in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXVII, Doc. 310.

¹²³Memo from Harriman to Ball, 7 March 1966 in FRUS, 1964–1968 Vol. XXXIII, Doc. 63.

¹²⁴Minutes of First Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, 8 March 1966 in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXXIII, Doc. 64.

¹²⁵Memo from Taylor to Johnson, 17 May 1967 in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXXIII, Doc. 120.

¹²⁶This is to distinguish from other forms of ‘direct’ military support, such as air support, which in the Vietnam case is usually believed to have begun in 1962.