China's Military Procurement Approach in the Early 21^st Century and Its Operational Implications

Abstract

This article attempts to lay out a conceptual framework for evaluating the actual military value of China's newly developed weaponry. Its basic assumption is that technological military progress is not sufficient to increase military strength. Therefore an alternative approach is adopted that studies the adaptability of the new technologies to the country's strategic situation. To this end, the study assumes that the value of a weapon system is measured by its suitability to the country's military, economic and technological conditions. The country's ability to meet these requirements depends to a large extent on the procurement process. Exploring China's recent military procurement approach, the study finds that under the prevailing conditions, China's military procurement process could reduce the actual military value of the newly developed weaponry.

Key Words:

• China
• PLA
• Military Procurement
• Military Power

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the generous support of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Also, I am indebted to Richard Bitzinger, Lee Dongmin, and the anonymous reviewers of the Journal of Strategic Studies for their helpful comments and insights. This article is an updated and expanded version of a working article written at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, issued on 10 December 2010.

Notes

¹On China's military modernization, see Richard D. Fisher, China's Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (Westport: Praeger Security International 2010); Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (New York: Routledge 2006); Keith Crane et al., Modernizing China's Military: Opportunities and Constraints (Santa Monica: RAND 2005); David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: California UP 2002). For a most recent evaluation of China's defense science and technology, see the Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (June 2011), which has been devoted to this subject.

²Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘China's Anti-Access Strategy in Historical and Theoretical Perspective’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (June 2011), 307.

³Aaron L. Friedberg and Robert S. Ross, ‘Here Be Dragons: Is China a Military Threat’, The National Interest (Sept.–Oct. 2009), 28.

⁴David Jablonsky, ‘National Power’, in J. Boone Bartolomees (ed.), US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. 1 (Carlisle, PA: SSI, US Army War College 2010), 131.

⁵Lauren Holland, ‘Explaining Weapons Procurement: Matching Operational Performance and National Security Needs’, Armed Forces and Society 19/3 (Spring 1993), 355–6.

⁶Stefan Markowski and Peter Hall, ‘Challenges of Defence Procurement’, Defence and Peace Economics 9/1 (1998), 25–6.

⁷For alternative conceptualizations, see Ashley J. Tellis et al., Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age (Santa Monica: RAND 2000), 133–76; Risa A. Brooks, ‘Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness’, in Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (eds), Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness (Stanford: Stanford UP 2007), 9–22.

⁸Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution 1995), 39.

⁹Ka Po Ng, Interpreting China's Military Power: Doctrine Makes Readiness (New York: Frank Cass 2005), 152.

¹⁰Betts, Military Readiness, 40–3.

¹¹Ibid., 43–53.

¹³Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984), 30.

¹⁴Holland, ‘Explaining Weapons Procurement’, 362.

¹⁵For example, Ronald J. Fox, The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition (Boston: Harvard Business School Press 1988), 300–8.

¹²The analysis of military procurement decision making is based on Holland, ‘Explaining Weapons Procurement’, 353–76; Markowski and Hall, ‘Challenges of Defence Procurement’, 3–37.

¹⁶On the realist approach to military procurement, see Dagobert L. Brito and Michael D. Intriligator, ‘Arms Races and Proliferation’, in Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (eds), Handbook of Defense Economics, Vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Elsevier 1995), 114–17. On the liberalist approach to military procurement, see William P. Rogerson, ‘Incentive Models of the Defense Procurement Process’, in Hartley and Sandler (eds), Handbook of Defense Economics, 339–40. On constructivist explanations to military procurement, see James L. Payne, Why Nations Arm (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1989), 95–6.

¹⁷Matthew A. Evangelista, ‘Why the Soviets Buy the Weapons They Do’, World Politics 36/4 (July 1984), 610.

¹⁸‘President Ma Ying-jeou says Taiwan will not enter arms race with China’, AFP, 19 May 2010, Open Source Center (OSC) 201005191477.1_348a005c3e689870.

¹⁹For example, see Huang Haixia, ‘From Obama's China visit to Hu Jintao's US visit’, Liaowang, 31 Jan. 2011, OSC 201101311477.1_4582081f113c422c.

²⁰Shen Dingli, ‘A Chinese Assessment of China's External Security Environment’, China Brief 11/5 (25 March 2011), 5–8. For a comprehensive analysis of China's security threats, see Susan L. Craig, Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats (Carlisle, PA: SSI, US Army War College 2007).

²¹Yuan Peng, ‘“Strategic Reassurance” and the Future of China-U.S. Relations', Contemporary International Relations 20/5 (Sept./Oct. 2010), 27.

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²⁴Yan Xuetong, ‘How assertive should a great power be?’ New York Times, 31 March 2011.

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²⁶In late Aug. 2010, the Chinese Navy conducted its first-ever port call to Myanmar. For assessment of this move, see B. Raman, ‘A Chinese Call for Naval Trust-Building in Asia’, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper no. 4014 (1 Sept. 2010), <www.southasiaanalysis.org/articles41/article4014.html>.

²⁷M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China's Search for Military Power’, Washington Quarterly 31/3 (Summer 2008), 127.

²⁸Ellis Joffe, ‘The Chinese Army in Domestic Politics: Factors and Phases’, in Nan Li (ed.), Chinese Civil-Military Relations (London: Routledge 2006), 8–24.

²⁹Hua Di, ‘Threat Perception and Military Planning in China: Domestic Instability and the Importance of Prestige’, in Eric Arnett (ed.), Military Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan and Iran (New York: OUP 1997), 26.

³⁰Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military, 18.

³¹Bin Yu, ‘The Fourth-Generation Leaders and the New Military Elite’, in David M. Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness (eds), Civil-Military Relations in Today's China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe 2007), 74–95.

³²Joseph Fewsmith, ‘China's Defense Budget: Is There Impending Friction between Defense and Civilian Needs?’ in David M. Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness (eds), Civil-Military Relations in Today's China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe 2007), 202.

³³For the data mentioned in this section, see: China's National Defense in 2010 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, The People's Republic of China, March 2011), Ch. 8; United States Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, 2010 (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense 2010), 42.

³⁴Fewsmith, ‘China's Defense Budget’, 209.

³⁵Teng Ssu-yu and John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey 1839–1923 (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 64–5.

³⁶Deng Xiaoping, ‘China Must Take its Place in the Field of High Technology’, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1982–1992) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press 1994), 273.

³⁷Yu Yongbo, China Today: Defense Science and Technology, Vol. 1 (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press 1993), 13–15, 21–22.

³⁸Nie Rongzhen, Inside the Red Star: The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen (Beijing: New World Press 1988), 666–71.

³⁹Yu, China Today, 118–19.

⁴⁰United States Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009 (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense 2009), 15; Kevin Pollpeter, ‘Towards an Integrative C4ISR System: Informationization and Joint Operations in The People's Liberation Army’, in Roy Kamphausen et al. (eds), The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China's Military (Carlisle, PA: SSI, US Army War College 2010) 199–201, 206–7.

⁴¹Liu Shenyang, ‘Major ways to realize scientific development concept in army building’, Jiefangjun Bao, 1 Nov. 2006, OSC 200611011477.1_c96203af84cadbad.

⁴²Andrew Scobell, ‘Discourse in 3-D: The PLA's Evolving Doctrine, Circa 2009’, in Roy Kamphausen et al. (eds), The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China's Military (Carlisle, PA: SSI, US Army War College 2010), 104–5, 110–17.

⁴³Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 24–5.

⁴⁴Zhang Zhaoyin, ‘Make ceaseless efforts to strengthen core military capacity building – important experience from 30 years of reform, opening up’, Jiefangjun Bao Online, 11 Dec. 2008, OSC 200812111477.1_cab71eflclc2d30f.

⁴⁵Chen Hui and Wang Jingguo, ‘Promoting an active defense military strategy’, Liaowang, 19 Aug. 2008, OSC 200808191477.1_b310069f0d41f768.

⁴⁶Sui Junqin, Liu Qinghua and Chang Xianqi, ‘China Characteristic Military Revolution and the Development of Weaponry’, Zhuangbei Zhihui Jishu Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command Technology] 16/4 (Aug. 2005), 2–4.

⁴⁷ China's National Defense in 2008 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, Jan. 2009), Ch. 2.

⁴⁸ China's National Defense in 2010, Ch. 2.

⁴⁹For example, anti-access weapons, and especially various types of short range ballistic missiles (SRBM). Mahnken, ‘China's Anti-Access Strategy’, 313–14. See also Tai Ming Cheung, ‘The Chinese Defense Economy's Long March from Imitation to Innovation’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (June 2011), 353.

⁵⁰‘PRC Defense Minister touts PLA's achievements under CPC in past 60 years', Xinhua, 21 Sept. 2009, OSC 200909211477.1_860b00adef8d198b.

⁵¹Liu Yueshan, ‘Air force combat strength boosted to adapt to three-dimensional operations’, Wen Wei Po, 3 Dec. 2009, OSC 200912031477.1_26c10d58d1e412ba.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³For example, Ling Shengyin, ‘Some Questions about the Development of Military High-Technology in China’, Zhongguo Gongcheng Kexue [Engineering Science] 9/1 (Jan. 2007), 15–22.

⁵⁴For example, see Sun Zian, ‘Strategies to Minimize High-Tech Edge of Enemy’, Xiandai Bingqi 8/8 (Aug. 1995), in FBIS-CHI-96-045, 6 March 1996, 63–5.

⁵⁵Robert S. Ross, ‘China's Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the US Response’ International Security 34/2 (Fall 2009), 64–5.

⁵⁶‘China plans for high-tech army', China Daily, 26 May 2006, <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-05/26/content_600631.htm>.

⁵⁷Evan A. Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 2003), 3.

⁵⁸In March 2008, COSTIND was dissolved and many of its functions were shifted to a new State agency, called Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND), operated under the newly created Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MII). For the above quote, see ‘Vice Premier calls for innovation in defense industry’, Xinhuanet, 4 Jan. 2006, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-01/04/content_4009370.htm>.

⁵⁹'China sets 2006–2010 targets for defense industry’, PLA Daily, 6 Jan. 2006, <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/news-channels/2006-01/06/content_377935.htm>.

⁶⁰Christopher Bodeen, ‘China says domestic armaments are world-class', Washington Post, 13 April 2009.

⁶¹Sun Zifa, ‘Military expert: not all new weapons in national day military parade have been officially deployed on large scale’, Zhongguo Xinwen She, 25 Oct. 2009, OSC 200910251477.1_4a6201675d84b346.

⁶²Liu Erqi, ‘The pioneer of aerospace defense of the republic’, Liaowang, 9 Oct. 2009, OSC 200810091477.1_77e309f501da3e4.

⁶³‘PRC Defense Minister.’

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Tai Ming Cheung, ‘Dragon on the Horizon: China's Defense Industrial Renaissance’, Journal of Strategic Studies 32/1 (Feb. 2009), 62–3.

⁶⁶Ibid., 62.

⁶⁷For example, Richard A. Bitzinger, ‘China's Defense Technology and Industrial Base in a Regional Context: Arms Manufacturing in Asia’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (June 2011), 447–8; Cheung, ‘The Chinese Defense Economy's Long March’, 325−54; Arthur S. Ding, ‘Civilian-Military Relationship and Reform in the Defence Industry’, Working Paper No. 82 (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, June 2005); Evan S. Medeiros et al., A New Direction for China's Defense Industry (Santa Monica: RAND 2005), 10.

⁶⁸On COSTIND's organizational transformation, see note 58. On the aforementioned reforms, see Cheung, ‘The Chinese Defense Economy's Long March’, 333−51; Richard A. Bitzinger, ‘Reforming China's Defense Industry: Progress in Spite of Itself?’ Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 19/3 (Fall 2007), 108–9; Ding, ‘Civilian-Military Relationship’, 24–6; Eric Hagt, ‘Emerging Grand Strategy for China's Defense Industry Reform’, in Kamphausen et al., The PLA at Home and Abroad, 488–91.

⁶⁹Yu Chunguang, Zhao Bo and Zou Fanggen, ‘What private enterprise enlistment has brought to the table?’ Jiefangjun Bao, 24 Dec. 2008, OSC 200812241477.1_511316516adbbfac; Hagt, ‘Emerging Grand Strategy’, 491–2, 494–6.

⁷⁰SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, <http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php>.

⁷¹‘Chinese time-out for Russian weapons', Vlasti.net, 6 June 2008, OSC 200806061477.1_37b901869ab0b1e1; ‘The total of VTS between Russia and China has amounted to 416 billion in the last eight years', RIA-Novosti, 17 April 2009, OSC 200904171477.1_e3460070b9c5cc46; ‘Russia downplays Chinese J-15 fighter capabilities', Rianovosti, 4 June 2010, <http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100604/159306694.html>.

⁷²Stephen Blank, ‘Turning a New Leaf in Relations: Russia's Renewed Arms Sales to China’, China Brief 11/2 (28 Jan. 2011), 6–8.

⁷³Ibid., 6–7.

⁷⁴Ibid., 8.

⁷⁵SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.

⁷⁶Pinkov, ‘Development of Chinese Air Force Early Warning Aircraft’, Kanwa Defense Review, 24 Nov. 2006, OSC 200611241477.1_14a2175428654c9f.

⁷⁷Chang Hsin, ‘China cautious allowing foreign capital access to military industry’, Wen Wei Po, 14 Aug. 2007, OSC 200708141477.1_1f4b02507c03c455.

⁷⁸Holland, ‘Explaining Weapons Procurement’, 356.

⁷⁹Sun, ‘Military Expert.’

⁸⁰On the PLA's problems of equipment assimilation, see Dennis J. Blasko, ‘“Technology Determines Tactics”: The Relationship between Technology and Doctrine in Chinese Military Thinking’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (June 2011), 379–80.

⁸¹Ma Hengru, ‘Current Status and Development of Reliability Engineering in China Defense Science and Technology Industry’, Hangkong Fadongji [Aviation Engine] 32/3 (2006), 1–4.

⁸²See also Fan Junmei, ‘PLA evolves over 30 years’, Zhongguo Wang, 15 Oct. 2008, OSC 200810151477.1_ce5800f6d54aba07.

⁸³‘LM WS10A Tai Hang’, Jane's Aero-Engines, 26 Jan. 2010; Sinodefence.com, ‘Jian-10 Multirole Fighter Aircraft’, 21 March 2009, <www.sinodefence.com/airforce/fighter/j10.asp>.

⁸⁴Liu, ‘Air Force Combat Strength’.

⁸⁵Cheung, ‘The Chinese Defense Economy's Long March’, 331–2.

⁸⁶Ibid., 332; David A. Fulghum et al., ‘Stealthy Chinese J-20 Vulnerable’, Aviation Week & Space Technology online, 18 Jan. 2011, <www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/awst/2011/01/17/AW_01_17_2011_p20-281824.xml&channel=defense>.

⁸⁷Markowski and Hall, ‘Challenges of Defence Procurement’, 356.

⁸⁸On the relations between the human factor and technology in large and prolonged ground operations, see for example Frederick W. Kagan, ‘Protracted Wars and the Army Future’, in Gary Schmitt and Tom Donnelly (eds), Of Men and Materiel: The Crisis in Defense Spending (Washington DC: AEI Press 2007), 37–9.