‘Winston has gone mad’: Churchill, the British Admiralty, and the Rise of Japanese Naval Power

Abstract

As Chancellor of the Exchequer during the late 1920s, Winston Churchill was at the center of British strategic decision making about how to respond to the naval challenge posed by Japan's rise as a rival sea power. Churchill downplayed the likelihood of war with Japan. The leadership of the Royal Navy disagreed: they saw Japan as a dangerous threat to the security of the British Empire. Examining this dispute between Churchill and the Admiralty highlights the awkward political, economic, and strategic tradeoffs confronting British leaders between the world wars.

Key Words:

• Churchill
• Britain between the World Wars
• Royal Navy
• Japanese Navy
• Strategic Assessments

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Erratum

Notes

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²Churchill memorandum, ‘Navy Estimates’, 29 Jan. 1925, Gilbert, Companion, vol. 5, 366.

³Roy Jenkins, The Chancellors (London: Macmillan 1998), 306.

⁴Beatty to his wife, 26 Jan. 1925, B. McL. Ranft (ed.), The Beatty Papers, Vol. 2: 1916–1927 (Aldershot: Scolar Press for the Navy Records Society 1993), 277.

⁵Lord Robert Boothby, from ‘Personality and Power,’ BBC Broadcast, 24 Nov. 1970. Churchill actually served as Chancellor from 1924 until 1929.

⁶Secretary Robert M. Gates, ‘Remarks to the Heritage Foundation,’ 13 May 2008, <www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1240>.

⁷Fareed Zakaria examines the ‘rise of the rest’ in The Post-American World (New York: Norton 2008).

⁸Michael Mandelbaum, The Frugal Superpower: America's Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era (New York: Public Affairs 2010).

⁹Ian H. Nish, Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908–23 (London: Athlone Press 1972); Erik Goldstein and John Maurer (eds), The Washington Conference, 1921–22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (London: Frank Cass 1994).

¹⁰Keith Neilson, ‘“Unbroken Thread”: Japan, Maritime Power and British Imperial Defence, 1920–32,’ in Greg Kennedy (ed.), British Naval Strategy East of Suez 1900–2000 (London: Frank Cass 2005), 62–89.

¹¹Notes by the Naval Staff, ‘Consequences of Suspending Work at Singapore’, 28 April 1924, Beatty Papers, Vol. 2, 393–7.

¹²Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. 5: Prophet of Truth, 1922–1939 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1977), 103. Hereafter cited as Gilbert, Prophet.

¹³Minutes of the 26th Meeting of the Standing Defence Sub-Committee, the Committee of Imperial Defence, 30 Nov. 1922, ADM 116/3165, National Archives, hereafter cited as NA.

¹⁴This reference, of course, is to Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster 1996), 102–9, 236–7.

¹⁵Keyes to Churchill, 24 March 1925, Paul G. Halpern (ed.), The Keyes Papers (London: The Navy Records Society 1980), Vol. 2, 112.

¹⁶David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 1997), 199–352.

¹⁷The cruisers Furutaka and Kako were completed in 1926, while the Aoba and Kinugasa (started in 1924) were finished in 1927. The four cruisers of the Nachi-class – Nachi, Myōkō, Haguro and Ashigara – were completed in 1928–29. Eric Lacroix and Linton Wells II, Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 1997), 49–116.

¹⁸This examination of Britain's cruiser requirements draws upon Beatty's testimony before the Naval Programme Committee, headed by Lord Birkenhead, established to investigate cruiser construction. See, in particular, the Record of Proceedings, 8th Meeting, 30 June 1925, CAB 27/273, NA.

¹⁹Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. 1: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919–1929 (London: Collins 1968), 351.

²⁰Admiral Beatty's testimony before the Naval Programme Committee, Record of Proceedings, 8th Meeting, June 30, 1925, CAB 27/273, NA. Christopher M. Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy between the Wars (London: Macmillan 2000), 59–98.

²¹‘10-Year Building Programme’, P.D.02171/25, 6 March 1925, ADM 1/8685/152, NA.

²²Lord Beatty's presentation, 27 Feb. 1924, Beatty Papers, Vol. 2, 377–8.

²³‘10-Year Building Programme’, P.D.02171/25, 6 March 1925, ADM 1/8685/152, NA.

²⁴John H. Maurer, ‘The “Ever-Present Danger”: Winston Churchill's Assessment of the German Naval Challenge before the First World War,’ in John H. Maurer (ed.), Churchill and Strategic Dilemmas Before the World Wars (London: Frank Cass 2003), 7–50.

²⁵At the Admiralty, J.C.C. Davidson did his utmost to belittle Churchill's strategic acumen and impugn his character. See Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Memoirs of a Conservative: J.C.C. Davidson's Memoirs and Papers, 1910–37 (London: Weidenfeld 1969), 212.

²⁶Diary Entry, Sunday, 19 July 1925, Geoffrey Dawson Papers, Vol. 29, Bodleian Library, Oxford University.

²⁷Pound to Keyes, 10 Aug. 1927, Pound to Keyes, 9 Nov. 1927, Pound to Keyes, 19 Dec. 1927, Halpern, Keyes Papers, Vol. 2, 227, 231, 234.

²⁸Churchill to Baldwin, 15 Dec. 1924, Gilbert, Companion, Vol. 5, 305–6.

²⁹Churchill to Baldwin, 15 Dec. 1924, Gilbert, Companion, Vol. 5, 306.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Churchill to Sir Roger Keyes, 22 March 1925, Gilbert, Companion, Vol. 5, 443–4.

³²Churchill memorandum, undated but approximately Feb. 1912, Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Winston S. Churchill, Vol. 2, Companion Part 3: 1911–1914 (London: Heinemann 1969), 1511–14.

³³CID 134th Meeting, 14 Dec. 1920, CAB 2/3, NA.

³⁴Churchill to Austen Chamberlain, 15 Dec. 1924, Gilbert, Companion, Vol. 5, 303.

³⁵Austen Chamberlain to Sir Charles Eliot, 17 Dec. 1924, quoted in B.J.C. McKercher, ‘A Sane and Sensible Diplomacy: Austen Chamberlain, Japan, and the Naval Balance of Power in the Pacific Ocean, 1924–1929’, Canadian Journal of History 21/2 (Aug. 1986), 188.

³⁶‘The Improbability of War in the Pacific’, 3 Jan. 1925, FO 371/10958, NA.

³⁷Minute by F. Ashton-Gwatkin, 28 April 1925, on Sir C. Eliot to Austen Chamberlain, 26 March 1925, FO 371/10634, NA.

³⁸Eliot to Chamberlain, 6 Nov. 1925 (received 2 Dec. 1925), with F. Ashton-Gwatkin minute, dated 4 Dec. 1925, FO 371/10965/5787, NA.

³⁹Wellesley to Austen Chamberlain, 1 Jan. 1925, ‘The Improbability of War in the Pacific’, 3 Jan. 1925, FO 371/10958, NA.

⁴⁰McKercher, ‘Sane and Sensible Diplomacy’, 203.

⁴¹Bridgeman memorandum, ‘Admiralty Arguments Against Postponement’, undated but 11–12 July 1925, Philip Williamson (ed.), The Modernisation of Conservative Politics: The Diaries and Letters of William Bridgeman, 1904–1935 (London: Historians' Press 1988), 186.

⁴²Bridgeman memorandum, ‘Political Case for the Admiralty’, undated but 11–12 July 1925, Williamson, Bridgeman, 186.

⁴³Stephen King-Hall, Western Civilization and the Far East (London: Methuen 1924), 297–311. Admiral Keyes recommended this book to Churchill. See Keyes to Churchill, 21 March 1925, Gilbert, Companion, Vol. 5, 442.

⁴⁴Memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty, ‘Political Outlook in the Far East’, 5 March 1925, CAB 24/172, NA.

⁴⁵Eugene Edward Beiriger, Churchill, Munitions and Mechanical Warfare: The Practice of Supply and Strategy (New York: Peter Lang 1997).

⁴⁶Churchill to Keyes, 22 March 1925, Gilbert, Companion, Vol. 5, 443–4.

⁴⁷Churchill to Baldwin, 15 Dec. 1924, Gilbert, Companion, Vol. 5, 306.

⁴⁸This memo shows that Churchill envisioned what would become known as Force Z, the ‘decisive deterrent’ sent to Singapore on the eve of war with Japan. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 3: The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1950), 578–624.

⁴⁹Churchill to Hankey, ‘Singapore’, 31 March 1925, Gilbert, Companion, Vol. 5, 451–2.

⁵⁰Churchill memorandum. ‘Navy Estimates’, 7 Feb. 1925, Gilbert, Companion, Vol. 5, 384.

⁵¹Churchill memorandum, ‘Navy Estimates’, 29 Jan. 1925, Gilbert, Companion, 359–68.

⁵²Churchill to Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, 20 Jan. 1925, Gilbert, Companion, 350.

⁵³Churchill to Keyes, 22 March 1925, Gilbert, Companion, 443–4.

⁵⁴Churchill to Barstow, 27 Nov. 1924, Gilbert, Companion, 267.

⁵⁵Churchill to P.J. Grigg, 16 April 1925, Gilbert, Companion, Vol. 5, 459–60.

⁵⁶Churchill Cabinet Note, 29 Dec. 1924, quoted Gilbert, Prophet of Truth, 77.

⁵⁷Eliot to Chamberlain, 7 April 1925 (received 12 May 1925), enclosing report by Captain Royle on Japanese naval estimates for the year 1925–26, FO 371/10965/1677, NA.

⁵⁸Eliot to Chamberlain, 7 May 1925 (received 3 June 1925), providing a report by Mr Macrae on the Japanese budget for 1925–26, FO 371/10965/2030, NA.

⁵⁹Eliot to Chamberlain, 7 April 1925 (received 12 May 1925), enclosing report by Captain Royle on Japanese naval estimates for the year 1925–26, with F. Ashton-Gwatkin minute, dated 13 May 1925, FO 371/10965/1677, NA.

⁶⁰Churchill to Keyes, 6 Jan. 1928, Halpern, Keyes Papers, Vol. 2, 236–7.

⁶¹Winston Churchill, ‘Japan Guesses Wrong’, Collier's 102/5 (30 July 1938), 45.

⁶²Note by Churchill to Barstow, 16 Dec. 1924, T 161/243/S.25613, NA.

⁶³Churchill memorandum, ‘Navy Estimates’, 7 Feb. 1925, Gilbert, Companion, Vol. 5, 385.

⁶⁴Churchill to Sir Douglas Hogg, 14 Nov. 1927, Gilbert, Companion, Vol. 5, 1101–3.

⁶⁵Churchill to David Lloyd George, 29 Dec. 1918, Gilbert, Companion, Vol. 4, 448.

⁶⁶Churchill to Sir Samuel Hoare, 12 Dec. 1924, Gilbert, Companion, Vol. 5, 300.

⁶⁷John Robert Ferris, Men, Money, and Diplomacy: The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919–26 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1989).

⁶⁸Naval Programme Committee, 10 Nov. 1927, CAB 27/355, NA.

⁶⁹Roskill, Naval Policy, Vol. 1, 400.

⁷⁰Churchill's speech, ‘The Causes of War’, 16 Nov. 1934, Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Churchill Speaks, 1897–1963: Collected Speeches in Peace and War (New York: Barnes and Noble 1980), 586.

⁷¹Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911–1914 (London: Thornton Butterworth 1923), 9–69, 94–120, 192–213.

⁷²Churchill's speech, ‘Their Finest Hour’, 18 June 1940, James, Churchill Speaks, 720.

⁷³Churchill memorandum, ‘Navy Estimates’, 7 Feb. 1925, Gilbert, Companion, Vol. 5, 384.

⁷⁴Churchill sent a prescient warning to the Japanese government before the war's outbreak, underscoring the danger Japan would confront by provoking Britain and the United States. Churchill to M. Yosuke Matsuoka, 2 April 1941, Churchill, Second World War, Vol. 3, 189–90.

⁷⁵Churchill to Sir Roger Keyes, 22 March 1925, Gilbert, Companion, Vol. 5, 443–4.

⁷⁶215th Meeting of the CID, 22 July 1926, CAB 2/4, NA.

⁷⁷Churchill's speech, ‘A Long and Hard War’, 26 Dec. 1941, James, Churchill Speaks, 784–5.

⁷⁸Churchill, Second World War, Vol. 3, 602–3.