A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation: The German Army, 1916–1918

Abstract

Using the German Army from 1916 to 1918 as a case study, this article demonstrates a different form of military innovation than has hitherto been analysed by literature on the subject. During World War I, the German Army innovated by spreading knowledge between units rather than up and downthe chain of command. Thus, this army used ‘horizontal innovation’, rather than vertical innovation to change how it fought in the midst of battle. Although combat in World War I is significantly different from operations today, horizontal innovation offers armed forces a means by which to transform themselves much more rapidly than the traditionally recognised forms of military innovation.

Key Words:

• World War I
• Military Innovation
• Military Doctrine
• German Army
• Organisational Learning

Notes

¹William Balck, Tactics Vol. I: Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry, 4th ed. (trans. Walter Krueger) (Ft Leavenworth, KS: US Cavalry Association 1915), 14.

²Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984), 232–5. For other examples, see Deborah Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1994).

³Stephen P. Rosen, ‘New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation,’ International Security 13/1 (Summer 1988), 134–68; and idem, Winning the Next War: Innovation in the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991).

⁴Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, ‘The Sources of Military Change’, in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (eds), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002). See also among others, Theo Farrell, ‘The Dynamics of British Military Transformation,’ International Affairs 84/4 (2008), 777–807; Terry Terriff, ‘“Innovate or Die”: Organizational Culture and the Origins of Manoeuvre [sic] Warfare in the United States Marine Corps,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 29/3 (June 2006), 475–503; and Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton UP 1997).

⁵Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/5 (Oct. 2006), 919–30.

⁶For example, see Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps' Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915–1940 (Boulder, CO: Westview 2000); and Robert T. Foley et al., ‘“Transformation in Contact”: Learning the Lessons of Modern War’, International Affairs 87/2 (March 2011), 253–70.

⁷Three editions of this book exist: A first edition that was heavily censored, G.C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West (London: Faber 1940); a facsimile edition of this (New York: Greenwood Press 1976); and a final, unexpurgated edition based on Wynne's original manuscript (ed. Robert T. Foley) (London: Tom Donovan 2008). (Subsequent references will be to this unexpurgated edition.)

⁸Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Change in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute 1981).

⁹Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918 (New York: Praeger 1989).

¹⁰David Zabecki, Steel Wind: Colonel Georg Bruchmüller and the Birth of Modern Artillery (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1994).

¹¹Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (Aug. 2010), 567–94. See also, James Russell, ‘Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (Aug. 2010), 595–624; and Gian Gentile, ‘Learning, Adapting and the Perils of the New Counter-Insurgency’, Survival 51/6 (Dec. 2009–Jan. 2010), 189–93.

¹²Grissom, ‘Military Innovation Studies’, 906–7.

¹³Contrary to previous interpretations, recent literature has demonstrated the extent to which the French and British armies employed new tactics and technologies over the course of World War I. See Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack 1916–18 (London: Yale UP 1994); Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War: Myths and Realities (London: Headline 2001); Michel Goya, La chair et l'acier: L'armee française et l'invention de la guerre moderne (1914–1918) (Paris: Tallandier 2004); and Mark Grotelueschen, The A.E.F. Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2007).

¹⁴In this article, doctrine is understood by the definition given by the US Department of Defense: ‘fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.’ JP 1-02: DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/index.html>.

¹⁵While Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld envisioned the US armed forces being in a state of ‘continuous transformation.’ Donald H. Rumsfeld, Transformation Planning Guidance, April 2003, 3.

¹⁶This is perhaps closest to Theo Farrell's idea of ‘adaptation’, though in the German Army's case, it is a case of more far-reaching ‘innovation’ than narrow ‘adaptation’. Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 568–73.

¹⁷These two ‘knowledge cycles’ might be seen as representing the formation of ‘tactics, techniques and procedures’ (TTPs) and ‘doctrine’ today. (E.J. Degen, ‘Knowledge Management by the Generating Force’, Military Review (July–Aug. 2008), 102–10) However, the case study below shows that it is possible to create what we would today term ‘doctrine’ using a shorter ‘knowledge cycle’.

¹⁸This article make use of analysis of reports from the Army Group Kronprinz Rupprecht, 1st and 2nd Armies, 15 army corps, 32 divisions, and 23 brigades or below, as well as a number of technical specialists found in four archives in Germany. This amounts to 71 per cent of the army corps and almost 33 per cent of the divisions deployed in the battle.

¹⁹William Phillpott, Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme and the Making of the Twentieth Century (London: Little Brown 2009), 167–9. Although the battle has been the subject of numerous books, Phillpott's book brings the French contribution to the offensive back into the picture and provides perhaps the most balanced account of the battle.

²⁰Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, ‘Munitionsverbrauch bei 1. und 2.Armeen,’ July-December 1916, Bayerisches Hauptsstaatsarchiv – Kriegsarchiv, Munich (HStA-KA), HGKPR/574.

²¹The actual numbers of divisions is smaller – 52 British, 44 French, and 96 German. However, many of these were deployed more than once, so I have given the ‘equivalent’ number here reflecting this. The British and French numbers are from Phillpott, Bloody Victory, 438. The German from Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg Bd. XI: Die Kriegführung im Herbst 1916 und im Winter 1916/17 (Berlin: Mittler 1938), 102–3.

²²Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, Iab Nr. 2222, ‘Erfahrungen aus der Somme-Schlacht für die Heeres-Gruppen-Führung,’ 10 Feb. 1917, 2, Generallandesarchiv (GLA) – Karlsruhe, 456 F1/521.

²³The number here is taken from German 10-day casualty reports from 24 June to 10 November 1916 compiled by Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht. Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht to Oberste Heeresleitung, Ie Nr. 5249, 26 January 1918, HStA-KA, HGKPR/189. The question of calculating German casualties has been the subject of much debate. For the most recent examination, see James McRandle and James Quirk, ‘The Blood Test Revisited: A New Look at German Casualty Counts in World War I’, Journal of Military History 70 (July 2006), 667–702.

²⁴Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, Nr.7563r, ‘Gesichtspunkte für den Stellungskrieg,’ Oct. 1915, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg (BA/MA), PHD7/1.

²⁵For a good understanding of the nature of the German defensive position, see Jack Sheldon, The German Army on the Somme 1914–1916 (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword 2005).

²⁶Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg Bd.X: Die Operationen des Jahres 1916 bis zum Wechsel in der Obersten Heeresleitung (Berlin: Mittler 1936), 348.

²⁷Ibid., 352–55.

²⁸I. Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 29, ‘Erfahrungen und Beobachtungen aus der Somme-Schlacht,’ 17 Sept. 1916, GLA-Karlsruhe 456 F1/530. See also, I. Bayerisches Reservekorps, ‘Erfahrungen aus der Somme-Schlacht im August/September. 1916’, 18Sept. 1916, GLA Karlsruhe 456 F1/527; 16.Infanterie-Division, I Nr. 5750, ‘Bericht über die Erfahrungen aus der Schlacht an der Somme’, 11 Sept. 1916, GLA-Kalrsruhe, 456 F1/530; 111.Infanterie-Division, I Nr.154, ‘Erfahrungen aus den Somme-Schlacht’, 29 Sept. 1916, HStA-KA, HGKPR/216.

²⁹The combined arms tactics of the Entente armies on the Somme has not been well examined. The British official history of the war in the air remains useful. H.A. Jones, The War in the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force, Vol.II (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1928), 203ff.; and Peter Hart, Somme Success: The Royal Flying Corps and the Battle of the Somme, 1916 (London: Pen & Sword 2001) provides a more recent interpretation of the air war from the British perspective.

³⁰On the development of artillery tactics, see Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, The Somme (London: Yale UP 2005).

³¹German aircraft were both behind the Entente in numbers and performance and lacked the ability to work closely with German artillery. Erich von Hoeppner, Deutschlands Krieg in der Luft: Ein Rückblick auf die Entwicklung und die Leistung unserer Heeres-Luftstreitkräfte im Weltkriege (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang 1921), 71–6; Georg Neumann, Die deutschen Luftstreitkräfte im Weltkriege (Berlin: Mittler 1920), 472–3. The lessons-learned reports are replete with testimony on the poor cooperation between the different German arms. For example, see I. Bayerisches Reserve-Korps, Ia Nr. 2351, ‘Erfahrungen aus der Somme-Schlacht im August/September 1916’, 18 Sept. 1916, GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/527; 1st Battalion, Reserve Infantry Regiment 28, ‘Bericht über das Zusammenartbeiten der verschiedenen Truppengattungen in der Schlacht an der Somme’, 6 Oct. 1916, GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/530; 5.Batterie, Feld-Artillerie-Regiment 185, ‘Erfahrungen aus den Schlachten and der Somme, 3.9. bis 26.9.1916’, 9 Oct. 1916, GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/530.

³²Bayerisches Ersatz-Division, ‘Bericht über die Erfahrung in der Somme-Schlacht’, 26 November 1916, GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/530.

³³53.(Sächs.) Reserve-Division, I Nr. 2310/X, ‘Erfahrungen der 53.Res.-Div. in der Somme-Schlacht’, 20 Oct. 1916, HStA-KA, 14.bay.ID, Bd. 11.

³⁴214.Infanterie-Division, Ib Nr.2391, ‘Erfahrungen in der Somme-Schlacht’, 30 Oct. 1916, HStA-KA, HGKPR/216; III.Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 27, ‘Bericht: Erfahrungen aus dem Stellungskrieg’, 30 Nov. 1916, GLA-Kalrsruhe, 456 F1/530.

³⁵183. Infanterie-Division, ‘Erfahrungen über die Sommeschlacht’, July 1916, HStA-KA/216; I.Bataillon, Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 28, ‘Bericht über das Zusammenartbeiten der verschiedenen Truppengattungen in der Schlacht an der Somme’, 6 Oct. 1916, GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/530; II. Bataillon, Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 212, ‘Bericht über Erfahrungen aus der Sommeschlacht,’ 8 Oct. 1916, GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/530.

³⁶IV.Armeekorps, Ia Nr.1357, ‘Erfahrungen des IV.A.K. aus der Somme-Schlacht im Juli 1916,’ 22 August 1916, p.7, HStA-KA, HGKPR/216; 208. Infanterie-Division, ‘Erfahrungen aus der Somme-Schlacht’, 10 Dec. 1916, GLA Karlsruhe, 456 F7/849.

³⁷22.Reserve-Division, Ia Nr.2839, ‘Erfahrungen aus der Schlacht an der Somme’, 2Oct. 1916, HStA-KA, HGKPR/216.

³⁸Heeresgruppe Gallwitz, Ia Nr.115, 27 July 1916, HStA-KA, HGKPR/216.

³⁹Hermann Cron, Geschichte des deutschen Heeres im Weltkriege 1914–1918 (Berlin: Siegismund 1937), 99–100.

⁴⁰Division Frentz, ‘Bericht über die Kämpfe der zusammengesetzten Division Frentz ander Somme vom 30.6.–9.7.1916’, 9 July 1916, GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/530; Anonymous liaison officer from Armee-Oberkommando 6, ‘Eindrücke an der Sommefront’, no date, but probably mid-Aug. 1916, HStA-KA, AOK 6, Bd. 21.

⁴¹XXVI.Armeekorps, Ia Nr.2/24.10, ‘Erfahrungen in der Sommeschlacht. Richtlinien für zukünftige derartige Kämpfe’, 24 Oct. 1916, 7, GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/521; 28.Infanterie-Division, I Nr. 10/16, ‘Erfahrungen an der Somme’, 16 Oct. 1916, HStA-KA, HGKPR/216.

⁴²Wynne, If Germany Attacks, 84; and Martin Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888–1916 (London: Frank Cass 1995), 176.

⁴³Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, Iab Nr. 2222, ‘Erfahrungen aus der Somme-Schlacht für die Heeres-Gruppen-Führung’, 10 Feb. 1917, 2, GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/521. For the rotation of units throughout the battle, Weltkrieg X, Anlage 3: Verzeichnis der vom 1.Juli bis Ende August auf dem Kampfelde eingesetzen Generalkommandos und Divisionen, ihrer Ablösungen, Verschiebungen und Verluste.

⁴⁴III. Bayerische Armeekorps, Ia Nr. 16,000, ‘Erfahrungen aus der Somme-Schlacht’, 30 Oct. 1916, HStA-KA, MKr.2924.

⁴⁵For this process in action in 1917, see Robert T. Foley, ‘The Other Side of the Wire: The German Army in 1917’, in Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (eds), 1917: Tactics, Training and Technology (Canberra: Australian History Military Publications 2007), 169–76.

⁴⁶See for example, Alfred von Boguslawski, ‘Strategisch-taktischer Meinungsstreit’, Militär-Wochenblatt Nr.36 (1902), 965.

⁴⁷William Balck, Entwickelung der Taktik im Weltkriege, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Eisenschmidt 1922), 7.

⁴⁸This was emphasized from the earliest officer training. See General-Inspektion des Militär-Erziehungs- und Bildungswesens, Leitfaden für den Unterricht in der Taktik auf den Königlichen Kriegsschulen, 15th ed. (Berlin: Mittler 1909), 80–3; Albert Dilthey, Der Einjährig-Freiwillige, der Reserve-Offizieraspirant und der Offizier des Beurlaubstandes der Infanterie, 52nd ed. (Berlin: Mittler 1917), 209–11.

⁴⁹Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, Nr.7563r, ‘Gesichtspunkte für den Stellungskrieg,’ Oct. 1915, BA/MA, PH3/295.

⁵⁰Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, Vorschriften für den Stellungskrieg für alle Waffen: Teil 8: Grundsätze für die Führung in der Abwehrschlacht im Stellungskriege (Berlin: Reichsdruckerie 1 Dec. 1916), BA/MA, PHD7/16. On the development of this doctrine, see Oberstleutnant Engelmann, ‘Die Grundsätze für die Führung in der Abwehrschlacht im Stellungskriege’, unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, RH61/291.

⁵¹ Abwehrschlacht was reissued in March and Sept. 1917 and additions were added in May 1917.

⁵²For example, see Armee-Oberkommando 7, Ia Nr. 30 Dez., ‘Auszug aus den vom III.A.K. zusammengestellten Erfahrungen bei den Angriffen auf Vailly-Chavonne-Soupir’, 5 Dec. 1914, BA/MA, PH8/II/154; and Armee-Oberkommando 2, Ia Nr. 290 geh., ‘Erfahrungen aus den Septemberkämpfen bei der 6. und 3.Armee’, 5 Nov. 1915, US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), RG120, Case 13–2, Box 5371, Folder 19.

⁵³Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, Nr. 22657, 27 Jan. 1916, BA/MA, RH61/1145.

⁵⁴Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, Ic. Nr 2881, 25 April 1917, HStA-Stuttgart, M33/2/25.

⁵⁵The importance of a learning culture in war has been explored by John Nagl in his Learning To Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (University of Chicago Press 2002).

⁵⁶Gen. Julius Verdy du Vernois is generally seen as the father of this method in the German Army. For his approach, see his Studien über Truppenführung, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Mittler 1873), 1–3.

⁵⁷For examples, see the staff rides and staff problems of Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen in Robert T. Foley, Schlieffen's Military Writings (London: Frank Cass 2003). For other examples, see Erich Ludendorff, Brigade- und Divisionsmanöver in Anlage und Leitung (Berlin: Mittler 1908); Ludwig Freiherr (Baron) von Falkenhausen, Flankenbewegunf und Massenheer: Der Gedanke von Leuthen in Anwendung auf die Gegenwart (Berlin: Mittler 1911); and Otto von Moser, Die Führung des Armeekorps im Feldkriege, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Mittler 1913).

⁵⁸Indeed, even the Kaiser's decisions during wargames were critiqued, though being too honest is said to have been detrimental to Alfred Graf (Count) von Waldersee's position as Chief of the General Staff. Lamar Cecil, Wilhelm II: Prince and Emperor, 1859–1900 (Chapel Hill: University of N. Carolina Press 1989), 184–7.

⁵⁹Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning (Oxford: Berg 1991); and Robert T. Foley, ‘Institutionalized Innovation: The German Army and the Changing Nature of War, 1871–1914’, RUSI Journal 147/2 (April/May 2002), 84–9.

⁶⁰Annika Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2001), 34.

⁶¹Herbert Rosinski, The German Army (New York: Praeger 1966), 107–9.

⁶²When the German Crown Prince took command of the 5th Army at the outbreak of war in 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm II told him that he would do exactly as he was told by his chief of staff. Kronprinz Wilhelm, Meine Erinnerungen an Deutschlands Heldenkampf (Berlin: Mittler 1923), 4. A similar situation existed with the Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht. Hermann von Kuhl, ‘Der Feldherr,’ Süddeutsche Monatshefte 30/4 (Jan. 1933), 225–30. By the end of 1916, both men ‘commanded’ large army groups that dominated the Western Front to the end of the war.

⁶³This motto was coined by the father of the modern German staff system, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder. See Alfred von Schlieffen, ‘Helmuth von Moltke’, in Schlieffen's Military Writings, 227–33.

⁶⁴Theo Schwarzmüller, Zwischen Kaiser und ‘Führer’: Generalfeldmarschall August von Mackensen (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh 1996); and Jesko von Hoegen, Der Held von Tannenberg: Genese und Funktion des Hindenburg-Mythos (Cologne: Böhlau 2007).

⁶⁵Wynne, If Germany Attacks, 109–11.

⁶⁶When chief of staff to the 4th Army during the Battle of Passchendaele, Lossberg embraced the defence in depth. Fritz von Lossberg, Meine Tätigkeit im Weltkrieg (Berlin: Mittler 1939), 308–10.

⁶⁷Commanders often complained about this ‘Generalstabsdienstweg’. See Otto von Moser, Ernsthafte Plaudererien über den Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Chr.Belser 1925), 429–31; and Walter Görlitz, Hindenburg: Ein Lebensbild (Bonn: Athenaum 1953), 127.

⁶⁸Chef des Stabes des Kriegsministers im Grossen Hauptquartier, Nr.2841, 14 Nov. 1914, BA/MA, W10/50755.

⁶⁹XVIII.Armeekorps, Ia Nr.8, ‘Rekrutenausbildung hinter der Front’, 20 Nov. 1914; I.bayerische Armeekorps, Nr.1659, ‘Ausbildung der Rekruten im Operationsgebiet’, 23 Nov. 1914; and Armee-Oberkommando 1, Ia Nr.1520, 15 May 1915, in BA/MA, W10/50755.

⁷⁰Wilhelm Solger, ‘Ausbau des Heeres,’ p.19, unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, RH61/1858.

⁷¹Wihelm Solger, ‘Die Massnahmen der Obersten Heeresleitung zur Wiederherstellung der Kampfkraft und zur Erstellung einheitlicher Vorschriften’, unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, RH61/1089.

⁷²Oberste Heeresleitung, 23 Oct. 1916, reprinted in Helmuth Gruss, Aufbau und Verwendung der deutschen Sturmbataillone im Weltkrieg (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt 1939), 156–7.

⁷³See Armee-Oberkommando 6, Ia Nr.76899, ‘Besondere Anordnungen zur Errichtung der Sturmlehrabteilung der 6.Armee’, 14 Nov. 1916, HStA-KA, AOK6/21.

⁷⁴Armee-Oberkommando 6, Ia Nr.87847, ‘Übungsdivision,’ 23 Jan. 1917, HStA-KA, AOK6/21.

⁷⁵III.Bayerische Armeekorps, IIb Nr.37320, ‘Unterführerschule III.b.A.K.’, 17 Jan. 1917, HStA-KA, III.Bay.A.K., Bund 54; Armee-Oberkommando 6, Ia Nr.75457, ‘Unterführerschule’, 5 Nov. 1916, HStA-KA, AOK6/21.

⁷⁶Kriegsminsterium, Nr.545/17, ‘Übungsplatz für Feldartillerie hinter der Front der 6.Armee’, HStA-KA, I.b.A.K., Bd.97.

⁷⁷Otto von Moser, Feldzugsaufzeichnungen als Brigade-, Divisionskommandeur und als kommandierender General 1914–1918, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Chr.Belser 1923), 244–55.

⁷⁸Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, Nr.33825, 31 Aug. 1916, reprinted in Erich Ludendorff (ed.), Urkunden der Obersten Heeresleitung über ihre Tätigkeit 1916/18 (Berlin: Mittler 1922), 63–5. On the effectiveness of this programme, see Gerald Feldman, Army, Industry and Labor in Germany, 1914–1918 (Oxford: Berg 1992).

⁷⁹Ernst von Wrisberg, Wehr und Waffen (Leipzig: Koehler 1922), 6–12.

⁸⁰‘Kurzer Überblick über die Entwicklung der deutschen Luftstreitkräfte bis zum 7.August 1918 und ihre Kriegsgliederung zu Beginn der Operationen’, (6.Entwurf), 21, unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, RL2/IV/317.

⁸¹Ernst von Wrisberg, Heer und Heimat 1914–1918 (Leipzig: Koehler 1921), 30–1.

⁸²Cron, Geschichte des deutschen Heeres, 100–1.

⁸³Foley et al., ‘Transformation in Contact,’ passim.

⁸⁴Department of the Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3–33.5: Counterinsurgency (Washington DC: Dept. of the Army December 2006). See also Stuart Griffin, ‘Iraq, Afghanistan and the Future of British Military Doctrine: From Counterinsurgency to Stabilization’, International Affairs 87/2 (March 2011), 317–33.

⁸⁵Ministry of Defence, JDP 3–40: Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution (Shrivenham, UK: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre November 2009).

⁸⁶A recent survey of British company-grade officers who had served in Afghanistan showed that only 31 per cent had any knowledge of British or US counterinsurgency doctrine. Claudia Harvey and Mark Wilkinson, ‘The Value of Doctrine’, RUSI Journal 154/6 (Dec. 2009), 29.

⁸⁷Major Steve Schweitzer, ‘Communities of Practice in the US Army’, Center for the Advancement of Leader Development and Organizational Learning, US Military Academy, West Point, <www.csci.psu.edu/seminars/fallnotes/cop1.pdf>. See also Nancy M. Dixon et al., CompanyCommand: Unleashing the Power of the Army Profession (West Point: Center for the Advancement of Leader Development & Organizational Learning 2005).

⁸⁸See <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/archives.asp>; and ‘Welcome to the AKX – The Army Knowledge Exchange’, <www2.armynet.mod.uk/akx/index.htm>.

⁸⁹Bill Ackerly, ‘US Army Announces Test of Wikis to Revise Tactics, Techniques and Procedures’, 30 June 2009, <www.army.mil/-newsreleases/2009/06/30/23722-us-army-announces-test-of-wikis-to-revise-tactics-techniques-and-procedures/>.