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Abstract
In contemporary counter-insurgency campaigns de-escalation is typically achieved by obtaining the local population's collaboration. The rationale underlying this approach is that such collaboration spawns control over the population and therefore weakens the insurgent's position. This article seeks to understand how this approach is practised in the reality of contemporary counter-insurgency warfare. In Iraq as well as Afghanistan counter-insurgents were confronted with fragmented indigenous societies in which the various local segments were dominated by local power-holders. Consequently, obtaining the local population's collaboration required co-option of these agents. As such a strategy of co-option is a highly localized approach, this article focuses on Afghanistan's Uruzgan province and analyzes the implementation of co-option by the Netherlands' Task Force Uruzgan (TFU), which operated there from 2006 to 2010. The analysis discusses how the counter-insurgents obtained a profound understanding of Uruzgan's societal landscape and how co-option of local power-holders became part of the counter-insurgency routine. In the end, co-option was successfully implemented as TFU even succeeded in obtaining the collaboration of previously marginalized elements of the population. However, as the methods employed for co-option were mainly of a persuasive nature, the TFU co-option strategy was less effective in containing the influence of notorious spoilers. Thus this case study provides an insight into the dynamics and limitations of co-option as a tool for de-escalation in contemporary counter-insurgency warfare.
Notes
1David Kilcullen, ‘Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency’, Remarks delivered at the US Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington DC, 28 Sept. 2006, 3, italics by author.
2Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008), 111.
3Ibid., 145, italics by author.
4Martin van Creveld, The Changing Face of War (New York: Ballantine Books 2006) and Edward Luttwak, ‘Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice’, Harper's Magazine (Feb. 2007).
5Isabelle Duyvesteyn, ‘Escalation Processes in Irregular War’, remarks delivered at the expert workshop on Escalation Processes in Irregular War, Utrecht, 17 Sept. 2010, 5–8.
6Although this straightforward depiction of local ruler collaboration is highly simplified, the limited scope of this article does not permit a wider elaboration on the background of this logic. A theoretical exploration of the validity of the local power-holder collaboration hypothesis is included as part of my forthcoming doctoral dissertation.
7D. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Pall Mall Press 1964), 9, italics in original.
8The term 3D (defence, development, diplomacy) approach is also commonly used. Kilcullen refers to this as three pillars of counterinsurgency (David Kilcullen, ‘Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency’).
9Dan Zaytoonian et al., ‘Intelligent Design, COIN Operations and Intelligence Collection and Analysis’, Military Review (Sept.–Oct. 2006), 32.
10David Kilcullen, ‘Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency’, Military Review (May–June 2006), 103.
11Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations. Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping (London: Faber 1971), 201.
12David Kilcullen, ‘Intelligence’, in Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (eds), Understanding Counterinsurgency, Doctrines, Operations and Challenges (London: Routledge 2010), 142–3, 157.
13Martine van Bijlert, ‘Unruly Commanders and Violent Power Struggles’, in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New Taliban, Insights from the Field (New York: Columbia UP 2009), 155.
14Susanne Schmeidl, The Man Who Would Be King: The Challenges to Strengthening Governance in Uruzgan (The Hague: Cingendael 2010), 10.
15The Liaison Office, The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan: 2006–2010 (Kabul: TLO 2010), 3. The percentages are estimates in relation to the total provincial population.
16Susanne Schmeidl, The Man Who Would be King, 10.
17Van Bijlert, ‘Unruly Commanders and Violent Power Struggles’, 156–7, Martine van Bijlert interviewed by author, Tirin Kot, 16 Nov. 2008.
18This is an example of the strategy of force leading to escalation of the conflict.
19Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia UP 2008), 56–8. See also van Bijlert, ‘Unruly Commanders and Violent Power Struggles’, 156–8, and Bette Dam, Expeditie Uruzgan: De weg van Hamid Karzai naar het paleis (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij de Arbeiderspers 2009), 37–40.
20Susanne Schmeidl, The Man Who Would Be King, 51.
21Van Bijlert, ‘Unruly Commanders and Violent Power Struggles’, 158.
22Tweede Kamer, Kamerstuk 2005–2006, 27925, no. 213, see also The Liaison Office, The Dutch engagement in Uruzgan, 29.
23Tweede Kamer, Kamerstuk 2005–2006, 27925, no. 221, see also Antoinette de Jong, ‘Het Schijngevecht met de Taliban’, NRC Handelsblad (Maandblad M, 7 April 2007), and Anonymous, ‘A Survey of Uruzgan Province’, unpublished report (Kabul 2006).
24See Royal Netherlands Embassy in Kabul, Civil Assessment (Kabul 2006) and Royal Netherlands Embassy in Kabul, Context Analysis Uruzgan Province (Kabul 2006).
25MIVD, ‘SupIntrep Afghanistan, Stamverhoudingen in Uruzgan’, unpublished report (The Hague 2006).
26See Anonymous, ‘Leven in het Oude Testament’, in Wiebren Tabak (ed.), 3D, de Nederlandse militaire inzet in Afghanistan (The Hague: Ministerie van Defensie 2010), 15–16, and Belinda Smeenk et al., ‘Effect gebaseerde aanpak in Uruzgan, van het schaakbord naar een bord Spaghetti’, Militaire Spectator 176/12 (Dec. 2007), 555.
27Hans Ariëns, ‘Dutch Approach klinkt nogal zelfvoldaan’, Internationale Samenwerking 2010–01.
28Tweede Kamer, Kamerstuk 2005–2006, 27925, no. 201, 46.
29Anonymous tribal adviser interviewed by author, The Hague, 1 March 2010.
30Commander PRT-3, Colonel Gino van der Voet interviewed by author, The Hague, 9 March 2010, and Anonymous PRT-3 staff officer interviewed by author, Wezep, 21 Sept. 2009.
31Ariëns, ‘Dutch Approach klinkt nogal zelfvoldaan’, 28–9.
32Tweede Kamer, ‘Tussentijdse Evaluatie ISAF 2008’, annex of Kamerstuk 2008–2009, 27925, no. 357, 33–4.
33Hans Ariëns, ‘Interview Michiel Rentenaar’, Internationale Samenwerking 2010–03.
34It has to be mentioned that throughout the mission there was only one dedicated military human factors analyst in the TFU staff's vast intelligence section. Typically this would be an academically schooled junior officer. When the awareness on the importance of population-centric intelligence grew, also other intelligence officers became involved with so-called ‘white plate’ (population-centric) intelligence.
35The Liaison Office, The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan, 55.
36Bette Dam, ‘Afghaanse petitie tegen vertrek Nederlanders’, <www.rnw.nl>.
37See Tweede Kamer, Kamerstuk 2005–2006, 27 925, nr. 214; Tweede Kamer, Kamerstuk 2005–2006, 27 925, nr. 221; and Marten de Boer, ‘New Perspectives for Conflict Transformation, Development and Diplomacy: Implementing a Cautious and Fully Balanced Approach against the Odds in Uruzgan’, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, A Rich Menu for the Poor (The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008), 229–40.
38Brigadier Theo Vleugels interviewed by author, Utrecht, 12 Nov. 2009.
39de Boer, ‘New Perspectives for Conflict Transformation, Development and Diplomacy’, 235–7. De Boer has adopted the term ‘Track 2’ from conflict theory.
40Colonel Nico Tak, ‘PRT Briefing’ (unpublished presentation, Amersfoort, 2009), Anonymous PRT-3 staff officer interviewed by author, Wezep, 21 Sept. 2009, and Anonymous tribal adviser interviewed by author, The Hague, 1 March 2010.
41Various interviews and discussion seem to indicate that ‘Track 2’ was continued by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development Aid, despite not being actively used by the TFU staff.
42Marloes de Koning, ‘Trage opbouw verspilt militair succes in Uruzgan’, Nederlands Dagblad, 12 Jan. 2008.
43Bette Dam, ‘Wie was Rozi Khan?’, <www.rnw.nl>.
44The Liaison Office, The Dutch engagement in Uruzgan (Kabul: TLO 2010), 44.
45Lieutenant-Colonel Hans van Dalen, ‘Key Leader Engagement, Influence by Proxy’ (unpublished thesis, The Hague 2010), 60.
46de Koning, ‘Trage opbouw verspilt militair succes in Uruzgan’.
47See van Dalen, ‘Key Leader Engagement, Influence by Proxy’, 139–47.
48The author assisted in designing and implementing the TFU key-leader engagement programme and was responsible for writing a TFU Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on the subject.
49See van Dalen, ‘Key Leader Engagement, Influence by Proxy’, 139–47, and Lieutenant-Colonel Hans van Dalen and Martijn Kitzen, ‘Key Leader Engagement Briefing’ (Unpublished Presentation 2009).
50Martijn Kitzen, ‘Uruzgan Field Notes’ (Unpublished Personal Record, Tirin Kot, 2008), 156–157, 167.
51Jan Mohammed, interviewed by Bette Dam, Kabul, 4 Aug. 2008.
52Kitzen, ‘Uruzgan Field Notes’, 241. Anonymous TFU intelligence officer 1 & 2, interviewed by author (telephonically), 27 May 2011.
53Tweede Kamer, Kamerstuk 2008–2009, 27925, nr. 330, 12–13.
54Bette Dam, ‘Afghanistan: How to talk your way out of a conflict’, <www.rnw.nl>.
55See ‘Grote Operatie in Uruzgan’, <www.depers.nl>, and Bette Dam, ‘I had no guarantee the sons would not fight’, <www.rnw.nl>.
56The Liaison Office, The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan, 44.
57Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber 1977), 303.
58Major General Michael T. Flynn et al., Fixing Intell: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan (Washington DC: Center for a New American Security 2010), 7.
