Coping with Knowledge: Organizational Learning in the British Army?

Abstract

This article – based on data that employs interviews conducted with British Army personnel – adopts a social theory of learning in order to examine how both formal and informal learning systems have affected organizational learning within the Army in relation to the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan. It argues that while the Army has adopted new, or reformed existing, formal learning systems, these have not generated a reconceptualization of how to conduct counter-insurgency warfare. It, furthermore, argues that while informal learning systems have enabled units to improve their pre-deployment preparations, these have created adaptation traps that have acted as barriers to higher-level learning.

KEY WORDS:

• Organizational Learning
• Organizational Adaptation
• British Army
• Counter-insurgency
• Afghanistan

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the following for their feedback on earlier drafts: Col. Alex Alderson, Stefan Elbe, Colin Elman, Victor Olivieri, and the two blind reviewers of this article. I would also like to thank Lt. Gen. Paul R. Newton, former Commander Force Development and Training (Land), and the two former Directors General Land Warfare, Maj. Gen. Andrew Kennett and Maj. Gen. Nick Carter for having sponsored my research on and given me access to the British Army. The work on this article was funded and made possible through the 2010–11 Research Fellowship granted to me by the Leverhulme Trust.

Notes

1. Author interview with Lt. Gen. Paul R. Newton, Commanding Officer (CO), Force Development and Training (Land), London, 8 March 2011.

2. British Army, henceforth, Army.

3. See Bente Elkjaer, ‘Social Learning Theory: Learning as Participation in Social Process’, in Mark Easterby-Smith and Majory Lyles (eds), The Blackwell Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management (Malden, MA: Blackwell 2005), 38–53; Paddy O’Toole and Steven Talbot, ‘Fighting for Knowledge: Developing Learning Systems in the Australian Army’, Armed Forces and Society 37/1 (Jan. 2011), 42–67.

4. The distinction between higher-level and lower-level learning is elaborated below.

5. See Pablo M. De Holan and Nelson Phillips, ‘Remembrance of Things Past? The Dynamics of Organizational Forgetting’, Management Science 50/11 (Nov. 2004), 1603–13.

6. Serena has shown, in his recent study of the US Army’s adaptation during Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’, that the collection, transfer and integration of knowledge, which together enable the institutionalization of knowledge throughout the whole organization, are essential in facilitating organizational learning. See Chad C. Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The US Army in the Iraq War (Washington DC: Georgetown UP 2011), 15–17.

7. In a House of Commons Defence Committee hearing Theo Farrell has also attested that this process of learning from, but then again continually repeating, mistakes has led the British to ‘go through … cycles of constantly rebooting [their] memory and relearning’. Cited from: The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace – Seventh Report of Session 2009–10, 9 June 2009 (London: Stationery Office 18 March 2010), 33.

8. See Robert E. Stake, ‘Qualitative Case Studies’ in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (London: Sage 2005), 443–66.

9. Cited in O’Toole and Talbot, ‘Fighting’, 48.

10. See O’Toole and Talbot, ‘Fighting’, 49.

11. See Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984), 233–4.

12. See Deborah Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons From Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1994); Kimberly M. Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955–1991 (Princeton UP 1993).

13. In this article, a military’s organizational culture is defined as the mental models, ‘embedded beliefs and attitudes … that shape [an] organization’s preference on when and how the military instrument should be used’. Cited from: Robert M. Cassidy, Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice after the Cold War (Westport, CT: Praeger 2004), 75.

14. Elizabeth Kier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars’, International Security 19/4 (Spring 1995), 65–93. See also Theo Farrell, ‘Culture and Military Power’, Review of International Studies 24/3 (July 1998), 407–16.

15. Victoria Nolan, Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency: The British Army and Small War Strategy since World War II (London: I.B. Tauris 2012), 12.

16. Ibid.

17. Richard D. Downie, Learning from Conflict: The US Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War (London: Praeger 1998), 7.

18. De Holan and Phillips, ‘Remembrance?’, 1604.

19. See Richard L. Daft and Karl E. Weick, ‘Toward a Model of Organizations as Interpretation Systems’, Academy of Management Review 9/2 (April 1984), 284–95.

20. De Holan and Phillips, ‘Remembrance?’, 1604.

21. See Mary M. Crossan et al., ‘Organizational Learning: Dimensions for a Theory’, International Journal of Organizational Analysis 3/4 (Oct. 1995), 337–60.

22. Barbara Levitt and James G. March, ‘Organizational Learning’, Annual Review of Sociology 13/3 (Aug. 1988), 319–40.

23. James G. March, ‘Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning’, Organization Science 2/1 (Feb. 1991), 71–87.

24. Downie, Learning from Conflict, 23.

25. See O’Toole and Talbot, ‘Fighting’, 42–67.

26. Ibid. Bickel, for example, has shown in his study how information shared through informal processes among personnel enabled units within the US Marine Corps (USMC) to adapt to small wars challenges before the USMC developed new training courses and disseminated institutionally sanctioned lessons. See Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915–1940 (Boulder, CO: Westview 2001).

27. Downie, Learning from Conflict, 24.

28. Ibid.

29. See Elkjaer, ‘Social Learning’, 38–53; O’Toole and Talbot, ‘Fighting’, 42–67.

30. James P. Walsh and Gerardo R. Ungson, ‘Organizational Memory’, Academy of Management Review 16/1 (Jan. 1993), 73.

31. De Holan and Phillips, ‘Remembrance?’, 1604.

32. Daniel A. Levinthal and James G. March, ‘The Myopia of Learning’, Strategic Management Journal 14 (Winter 1993), 106.

33. See Levitt and March, ‘Organizational Learning’, 327.

34. See James B. Thomas et al., ‘Understanding “Strategic Learning””: Linking Organizational Learning, Knowledge Management, and Sensemaking’, Organization Science 12/3 (May–June 2001), 331–45.

35. O’Toole and Talbot, ‘Fighting’, 47.

36. Daft and Weick, ‘Toward a Model’, 286.

37. O’Toole and Talbot, ‘Fighting’, 45.

38. James G. March, A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen (London: Free Press 1994), 210.

39. See George P. Huber, ‘Organizational Learning: The Contributing Processes and the Literatures’, Organization Science 2/1 (Feb. 1991), 102–3.

40. Ibid., 103.

41. Daft and Weick, ‘Toward a Model’, 286. Ucko develops a comparable framework in order to examine three co-related stages of learning, which enable him to gauge the extent to which the US Army has been able to learn how to conduct COIN warfare. These, he argues, capture ‘the various manifestations of institutional learning’ and are: (1) achieving an ‘understanding of what counterinsurgency entails and requires’; (2) ‘prioritizing counterinsurgency as a mission’; and (3) ‘developing a capability to conduct such missions through various institutional adjustments and reforms’. Cited from: David Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the US Military for Modern Wars (Washington DC: Georgetown UP 2009), 18.

42. See Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schön, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1978); Ernst Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 1990), 17–49.

43. See Karl E. Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 1995).

44. Chris Argyris, ‘Single-Loop and Double-Loop Models in Research on Decision Making’, Administrative Science Quarterly 21/3 (Sept. 1976), 367.

45. See Gunnar Hedlund and Ikijuro Nonaka, ‘Models of Knowledge Management in the West and Japan’, in Peter Lorange (ed.), Implementing Strategic Processes, Change, Learning and Cooperation (London: Basil Blackwell 1998), 117–44.

46. C. Marlene Fiol and Marjorie A. Lyles, ‘Organizational Learning’, Academy of Management Review 10/4 (Oct. 1985), 807. On the distinction between military adaptation and military innovation, see Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (Aug. 2010), 569.

47. Ikujiro Nonaka, ‘A Dynamic Theory of Knowledge Creation’, Organization Science 5/1 (Feb. 1994), 14–37.

48. See O’Toole and Talbot, ‘Fighting’.

49. Levinthal and March, ‘The Myopia’, 97.

50. See De Holan and Phillips, ‘Remembrance?’, 1603–13.

51. Markus C. Becker, ‘Organizational Routines: A Review of the Literature’, Industrial and Corporate Change 13/4 (Aug. 2004), 650.

52. Anthony King, ‘Understanding the Helmand Campaign: British Military Operations in Afghanistan’, International Affairs 86/2 (March 2010), 311–32.

53. Ibid.

54. See Robert Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand, Afghanistan: What Now for British Counterinsurgency’, International Affairs 87/2 (Mar. 2011), 305–6.

55. See Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon, ‘COIN Machine’, RUSI Journal 154/3 (June 2009), 18–25; The Comprehensive Approach; Daniel Korski, ‘British Civil-Military Integration’, RUSI Journal 154/6 (Dec. 2009), 14–24. See also updates regarding the UK-led Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team’s activities: Afghanistan, <http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/about-us/where-we-work/afghanistan.html>.

56. By the end of 2006, 86,000 ANSF had been stood up. By March 2009 troop levels had risen to 162,690 and by April 2011 to 286,003. See Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, May 2012), 6.

57. In Helmand US reinforcements were initially provided by an USMC battalion in spring 2008 and subsequently by an 11,000-strong division-sized USMC task force as part of US President Barack Obama’s initial 21,000-troop surge.

58. See Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 567–94; Farrell and Gordon, ‘COIN Machine’, 18–25.

59. King, ‘Understanding the Helmand Campaign’, 322 and 313.

60. Robert T. Foley et al., ‘Transformation in Contact: Learning the Lessons of Modern War’, International Affairs 82/2 (March 2011), 260.

61. Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919–60 (New York: St Martin’s Press 1990), 187.

62. Ibid., 188. In spite of an almost uninterrupted succession of COIN campaigns during the period which Mockaitis analyses Britain’s COIN experiences, the Army still found it difficult to institutionalize such knowledge. French has similarly argued that the British have had a chequered past in institutionalizing their COIN campaign lessons during the two decades following World War II and has mainly ascribed this to the high personnel turnover rates – and, consequently, organizational forgetting – that the Army was subject due to its conscript-based structure. See David French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945–1967 (Oxford: OUP 2011).

63. See Nolan, Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency, 210.

64. Ibid., 223.

65. ‘Afghanistan’, British Army Review 148 (Winter 2009/2010), 3.

66. See ‘Mission Brief: Op Entirety’, Soldier Magazine 67/5 (May 2011), 15.

67. Gen. Sir David Richards, ‘Twenty-first Century Armed Forces: Agile, Useable, Relevant’, 25 June 2009, <http://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E496B737B57852/info:public/#.UOmL2OQ3iSo>.

68. See Sergio Catignani, ‘“Getting COIN” at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing COIN Adaptation in the British Army’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (Aug. 2012), 513–39.

69. See Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, Out of Step: The Case for Change in the British Armed Forces (London: Demos 2007), 30–46.

70. See Andrew Chuter, ‘60% of UK “White Board” Programs Could be Cut’, Defense News, 19 Nov. 2012, <http://mobile.defensenews.com/article/311170001>.

71. Army Doctrine Publication, Operations (Shrivenham, UK: MoD 2010), 2–9.

72. See About the Course, Intermediate Command and Staff Course, <http://da.mod.uk/icscl/about/>.

73. Author email correspondence with Lt. Col. James Heardman, Course Instructor, ICSC-Land, 25 Aug. 2011.

74. Course 7A – Term 2 Planning Programme, ICSC-Land.

75. See Col. David Benest, ‘British Leaders and Irregular Warfare’, British Army Review 139 (Spring 2006), 10; Col. Alex Alderson, ‘COIN: Learn and Adapt? Can We Do Better?’, British Army Review 142 (Summer 2007), footnote 8, 16.

76. Instructional Specification – Stabilisation Operations, ACSC 14, March 2011.

77. Ibid.

78. Hew Strachan, ‘One War, Joint Warfare’, RUSI Journal 154/4 (Aug. 2009), 23

79. Author interview with senior officer of the land doctrine team, DCDC, Shrivenham, 10 Dec. 2010. Similar viewpoint shared in author interview with Col. (RM) Nick Lindley, Assistant Head Joint Functional Doctrine, DCDC, Shrivenham, 10 Dec. 2010.

80. Author interview with Col. Alex Alderson, Director, Afghan COIN Centre, Warminster, 16 Feb. 2011.

81. Strachan, ‘One War’, 23.

82. JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution (Shrivenham, UK: MoD 2009), v.

83. See Stuart Griffin, ‘Iraq, Afghanistan and the Future of British Military Doctrine: From Counterinsurgency to Stabilization’, International Affairs 87/2 (March 2011), 317–33.

84. See Course Structure, Advanced Command and Staff Course, <www.da.mod.uk/colleges/jscsc/acsc>.

85. Author interviews with Brig. James Cowan, former Task Force Helmand Commander (‘Herrick’ 11), London, 5 Nov. 2010 and Maj. Gen. (RM) Gordon Messenger, former Task Force Helmand Commander (‘Herrick’ 9), London, 2 Nov. 2010. See also Higher Command and Staff Course, <http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/jscsc/courses/hcsc>.

86. For a detailed analysis see Tom Dyson, ‘Organizing for Counter-insurgency: Explaining Doctrinal Adaptation in Britain and Germany’, Contemporary Security Policy 33/1 (April 2012), 27–58; Foley et al., ‘Transformation in Contact’, 253–70.

87. Author interview with Lt. Col. Roly Walker, CO, 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards, 26 Jan. 2011, London.

88. Author interview with Brig. Piers Hankinson, Director Doctrine and Lessons, LWDG, Warminster, 15 Feb. 2011. Similar concerns were raised by several officers during a group briefing with the author at OPTAG, Thetford, 4 May 2011.

89. Author interview with Lt. Col. (Ret.) Paddy Clarke, SO1 Lessons, DCDC, Shrivenham, 10 Dec. 2010. Similar points raised in author interview with Ms Amanda Coleman, Assistant Head Development, Analysis & Research, DCDC, Shrivenham, 10 Dec. 2010.

90. Author interview with Maj. Gen. Andrew Kennett, Director LWDG, London, 11 Feb. 2011. This lessons conversion problem has also been raised in Andrew Mackay and Steve Tatham, From General to Strategic Corporal: Complexity, Adaptation and Influence, The Shrivenham Papers No. 9 (Shrivenham: Defence Academy Dec. 2009), 27–8.

91. Author interview with Col. Alex Alderson.

92. The LXC is tasked with capturing, analysing and fusing best practice and lessons from operations in order to deliver the most current operational and tactical knowledge to field units.

93. Author interview with Maj. Dave Hunt, SO2, LXC, Warminster, 16 Feb. 2011.

94. For publications arguing that the Army has learnt to implement an effective COIN campaign in Helmand, see Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 567–94; Farrell and Gordon, ‘COIN Machine’, 18–25. For more recent publications arguing the contrary, see Catignani, ‘Getting COIN’, 513–39; Frank Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 2011).

95. Author interview with Mr Rupert Lescott, Consultant, LXC, Warminster, 15 Feb. 2011.

96. Author interview Maj. (Ret.) John Rye, Consultant, LXC, Warminster, 15 Feb. 2011.

97. Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 583.

98. Levinthal and March, ‘The Myopia’, 97.

99. See Sarah Goldthorpe, ‘Future Fight: Canada Readies Troops for Post-Helmand Combat’, Soldier Magazine 67/8 (Aug. 2011), 25–7.

100. The OPTAG officer responsible for training development had admitted that ‘at OPTAG the scope of our training just gets bigger and bigger, but we don’t have the capacity to do it all’. Author interview with Maj. Gary Wolfenden, SO2 OPTAG, OPTAG, Thetford, 4 May 2011.

101. National Audit Office, Support to High Intensity Operations (London: Stationery Office 14 May 2009), 37.

102. See Richard Long, ‘Storming the Prairie’, Soldier Magazine 66/7 (July 2010), 23–5.

103. Adopted at the NATO Lisbon Summit in Nov. 2010, the transition strategy began being implemented in July 2011. See Louisa Brooke-Holland and Claire Taylor, Afghanistan: The Timetable for Security Transition, SN/IA/5851 (London: House of Commons 9 July 2012).

104. Brig. Richard R. Smith, ‘Delivery of Military Capability – Training, Basing and Living’, RUSI Land Warfare Conference, 1 June 2011, <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Brigadier_R_R_Smith_Speaking_Notes.pdf>.

105. Ibid.

106. Joe Clapson, ‘Plain Schemers: Exercise Showcases Scope of Service Training Unit’, Soldier Magazine 68/1 (Jan. 2012), 32.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid.

109. Joe Clapson, ‘Afghanistan to Anywhere: Paras Prepare for Contingency Tasks’, Soldier Magazine 68/2 (Feb. 2012), 34.

110. ‘Final Word’, Soldier Magazine 68/2 (Feb. 2012), 98.

111. Ibid.

112. OPTAG Training Group Briefing with author, OPTAG, Thetford, 4 May 2011.

113. See Catignani, ‘Getting COIN’, 513–39.

114. Author interview with Col. Neil Wilson, Director, LXC, Warminster, 16 Feb. 2011.

115. Author telephone interview with Lt. Col. Dickie Head, SO1 Education, Afghan COIN Centre, 1 Aug. 2011. See also ‘An Encouraging Development – Force Development and Training’, British Army Review 150 (Winter 2010/2011), 6.

116. Author interview with Col. Alex Alderson. Changing the culture and mindset of personnel becomes all the more difficult given the anti-intellectual culture and ‘course mentality’ many military personnel have in relation to learning beyond what is covered in education and training serials. See Claudia Harvey and Mark Wilkinson, ‘The Value of Doctrine: Assessing British Officers’ Perspectives’, RUSI Journal 154/6 (Dec. 2009), 26–31.

117. See David Betz and Anthony Cormack, ‘Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy’, Orbis 53/2 (Spring 2009), 319–36; Andrew Mumford, The COIN Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare (London: Routledge 2011); David Ucko, ‘Lessons from Basra: The Future of British Counter-Insurgency’, Survival 52/4 (Aug.–Sept. 2010), 131–58.

118. See Warren Chin, ‘British COIN in Afghanistan’, Defense & Security Analysis 23/2 (2007), 201–25; Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand’, 297–315.

119. Author interview with Lt. John Murphy, Platoon Commander, D Company, 1st Battalion The Royal Welsh (1 RWELSH), Chester, 1 Feb. 2011. Similar remarks expressed in author interviews with Lt. Rory Evans, 8 Platoon Commander, A Company, 1st Battalion The Royal Gurkha Rifles (1 RGR), Shorncliffe, 9 Feb. 2011; Sgt Neil Harvey, Section Commander/Platoon Sergeant, 3 Platoon, Right Flank Company, 1^st Battalion The Scots Guards (1 SG), Catterick, 11 March 2011.

120. See Rob Cross et al., ‘Knowing What We Know: Supporting Knowledge Creation and Sharing in Social Networks’, Organizational Dynamics 30/2 (Nov. 2001), 100–20.

121. See O’Toole and Talbot, ‘Fighting’, 54.

122. Author interview with Lt. Col. Roly Walker. This reality was admitted as an ongoing challenge by those interviewed at the LWDG, OPTAG and DCDC.

123. See Catignani, ‘Getting COIN’, 529–30; Bernard Gray, Review of Acquisition for the Secretary of State for Defence (London: MOD 2009), 31.

124. Tactical Ground Reporting is a multimedia reporting system for platoon and company-based patrols, allowing personnel to collate and distribute information to enhance tactical awareness and to enable cooperation and information analysis among junior officers. See Tactical Ground Reporting, <http://www.gdc4s.com/content/detail.cfm?acronym=TIGR>.

125. Author interviews with Capt. John Savage (2 Scots), J5 (Plans), C Company, 3 PARA, Colchester, 27 April 2011. Similar difficulties expressed in author interviews with Maj. Benjamin Birkbeck, SO1 Information Exploitation, 1 RGR, Shorncliffe, 10 Feb. 2011; Capt. Ed Michell.

126. Author interview with Maj. Paul Blakesley.

127. Capt. John Bethell, ‘Accidental Counterinsurgents: Nad E Ali, Hybrid War and the Future of the British Army’, British Army Review 149 (Summer 2010), 12.

128. Author interview with Brig. Piers Hankinson, Director, Doctrine and Lessons, LWDG, Warminster, 15 Feb. 2011.

129. Author email correspondence with Lt. Col. Judith Dando, SO1 Information Management Systems, LWDG, 22 Feb. 2011.

130. Another battalion 2IC commented, ‘It’s absolutely shocking. There’s one terminal here to try and prepare an entire battalion. And of course everything you produce in Afghanistan is mission secret. The problem with it is that a vast majority of it is overly classified and almost impossible to obtain’. Cited from author interview with Maj. Peter Flynn, 2IC, 3 PARA, Colchester, 27 April 2011.

131. Author interviews with Maj. Neil Richardson, 2IC, 1 RGR, Shorncliffe, 9 Feb. 2011; Capt. Hamish Barne, 2IC, Left Flank Company, 1 SG, Catterick, 11 March 2011.

132. Author interview with Maj. Paul Blakesley, 2IC, 1st Battalion The Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment (1 LANCS), Catterick, 15 March 2011. Similar observations raised in author interviews with Maj. Edward Hill, Officer Commanding (OC), B Company, 1 RWELSH, Chester, 1 Feb. 2011 and Maj. Rupert Kitching, OC, Left Flank Company, 1 SG, Catterick, 11 March 2011.

133. The Brent phone is a secure Integrated Services Digital Network telephone, which protects voice and data up to and including ‘top secret’.

134. Author interview with Maj. John Fry, OC, Anzio Company, 1 LANCS, Catterick, 14 March 2011. Similar comments in author interview with Capt. Chris Jaunay, Current Ops Officer, 1 SG, Catterick, 11 March 2011.

135. Author interview with Capt. Stephen Healey. Similar methods were used by other junior officers as noted in author interviews with Lt. James Higginson, Commander, 9 Platoon, C Company, 3 PARA, Colchester, 26 April 2011 and Lt. Oliver Field, Commander, 9 Platoon, Corunna Company, 1 LANCS, Catterick, 14 March 2011.

136. Author interview with Maj. Paul Blakesley. Similar observations expressed in author interviews with Maj. Martin French, 2IC, 1 SG, Catterick, 11 March 2011; Maj. Peter Flynn.

137. Author interview with Capt. Ed Michell. Similar comments were expressed in author interviews with Maj. Giles Murray-Jones, OC, B Company, 3 PARA, Colchester, 27 April 2011; Maj. Andy Garner, OC, Corunna Company, 1 LANCS, Catterick, 14 March 2011.

138. David Betz and Anthony Cormack, ‘Hot War, Cold Comfort: A Less Optimistic Take on the British Military in Afghanistan’, RUSI Journal 154/4 (Aug. 2009), 27.

139. Author interviews with Lt. Oliver Field. Similar remarks conveyed in author interviews with Lt. Col. Gerald Strickland, CO, 1 RGR, Shorncliffe, 10 Feb. 2011; Colour Sergeant Chris Dundon, Platoon Sergeant, Mobility Reconnaissance Force, 1 RWELSH, Chester, 1 Feb. 2011.

140. Author interviews with Capt. John Savage. Similar remarks expressed in author interview with Capt. Rob Reese, Influence Officer, 1 RWELSH, Chester, 31 Jan. 2011; Colour Sergeant Paul Keeble, Influence Officer, 1 LANCS, Catterick, 14 March 2011.

141. Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 568.

142. As noted in author interviews with WO2 Gary Simpson, B Company Sergeant Major and WO2 Christopher Smith, C Company Sergeant Major, 3 PARA, Colchester, 26 April 2011; Colour Sergeant Raji Dura, Battalion Assistant Intelligence Officer and Colour Sergeant Prem Kajiro, Fire Support Commander, A Company, 1 RGR, Shorncliffe, 9 Feb. 2011.

143. Levinthal and March, ‘The Myopia of Learning’, 104.

144. Lt. Gen. Paul R. Newton’s Directive 001 – The Basics of 21st Century Land Warfare: Re-defining and Teaching, FDT/3/4, 1 Oct. 2010 (Restricted) also has highlighted personnel’s over-reliance on anecdotal experience in doctrine training and education and the need for rectifying such a predisposition.

145. ‘Army to lose whole units under cuts, says Philip Hammond’, BBC News, 7 June 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18350358>.

146. The need to improve both was also heavily emphasized in an internal report prepared for the Director of the Land Warfare Development Group and FDT-Land Commander. See Brig. Andrew Sharpe, Future Demand on People, DCDC/DART/56200 LAND (Restricted). See also Maj. Gen. (Ret’d) Mungo Melvin, ‘Educating and training the Army for an uncertain world’, The British Army 2012 (London: MoD 2012), 184–6.

147. Serena, ‘A Revolution in Military Adaptation’, 173.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Sergio Catignani

Sergio Catignani is Senior Lecturer in Security and Strategic Studies in the Strategy and Security Institute, University of Exeter. He was previously a lecturer at the University of Sussex and was also a Leverhulme Research Fellow from 2010--11. Prior to Sussex University, Catignani was a Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute and held lectureships at Leiden University and King’s College London. He has published two books, Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army (Routledge 2008) and Israel and Hizbollah: An Asymmetric Conflict in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Routledge 2009, co-edited with Clive Jones). Catignani has carried out advisory work with several NATO armies on counterinsurgency issues.