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ABSTRACT
This article examines the effects the drone strike campaign in Pakistan is having on Al Qaeda Central. To that end, it constructs a theoretical model to explain how the campaign is affecting Al Qaeda’s capacity to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States and Western Europe. Although the results of one single empirical case cannot be generalised, they nonetheless constitute a preliminary element for the construction of a broader theoretical framework concerning the use of armed drones as part of a counterterrorism strategy.
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments on the previous version of the article and to the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for hosting a research visit which enabled the article to be completed. The content of this article is part of the research project CSO2010-17849, ‘International Terrorism’s Organizational Structure: Analysis of its Evolution and Implications for the European Security’, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation
Notes
1 Jenna Jordan, ‘When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation’, Security Studies 18/4 (2009), 719–55; Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton UP 2009); Aaron Mannes, ‘Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group’s Activity?’, Journal of International Policy Solutions 9 (2008), 40–9.
2 Bryan C. Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism’, International Security 36/4 (2012), 9–46; Patrick B. Johnston, ‘Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns’, International Security 36/4 (2012), 47–79; Daniel L. Byman, ‘Do Targeted Killings Work?’, Foreign Affairs 85/2 (2006), 95–112.
3 Mohammed M. Hafez and Joseph M. Hatfield, ‘Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel’s Controversial Tactic during the Al Aqsa Uprising’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29/4 (2006), 359–82.
4 Stephanie Carvin, ‘The Trouble with Targeted Killing’, Security Studies 21/3 (2012), 529–55.
5 Ibid., 553.
6 Scott Shane ‘Election spurred a move to codify US drone policy’, New York Times, 24 Nov. 2012.
7 National Security Studies Program, The Drone War in Pakistan, New America Foundation, <http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis>.
8 Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2012).
9 Brian M. Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Santa Monica: RAND 1975), 5.
10 Lindsay Heger, Danielle Jung and Wendy H. Wung, ‘Organizing for Resistance: How Group Structure Impacts the Character of Violence’, Terrorism and Political Violence 24/5 (2012), 743–68.
11 Rohan Gunaratna and Aviv Oreg, ‘Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and its Evolution’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33/12 (2010), 1045.
12 Fernando Reinares, ‘The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism’, Survival 52/2 (2010), 83–104. Bruce Hoffman, ‘Radicalization and Subversion: Al Qaeda and the 7 July 2005 Bombings and the 2006 Airline Bombing Plot’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32/12 (2009), 1100–16.
13 Bruce Hoffman, ‘The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism’, Foreign Affairs 87/3 (2008), 133–8, 134.
14 Dongil Don Jung, Anne Wu and Chee W. Chow, ‘Towards Understanding the Direct and Indirect Effects of CEOs’ Transformational Leadership on Firm Innovation’, Leadership Quarterly 19/5 (2008), 582–94.
15 Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists’, 17.
16 Bernard M. Bass, ‘Two Decades of Research and Development in Transformational Leadership’, European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology 8/1 (1999), 9–32.
17 Peter Neumann, Ryan Evans and Raffaello Pantucci, ‘Locating Al Qaeda’s Center of Gravity: The Role of Middle Managers’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34/11 (2011), 825–42.
18 Petter Nesser, ‘How did Europe’s Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes?’, Terrorism and Political Violence 20/2 (2008), 234–56; Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia UP 2002), 7–8.
19 Brian A. Jackson and David R. Frelinger, ‘Rifling Through the Terrorists’ Arsenal: Exploring Groups’ Weapon Choices and Technology Strategies’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31/7 (2008), 583–604.
20 Greg Miller and Julie Tate, ‘CIA shifts focus to killing targets’, Washington Post, 1 Sept. 2011.
21 For a review of drone casualty estimates provided by various organizations, see Human Rights Clinic, Counting Drone Strike Deaths (New York: Columbia Law School 2012).
22 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism web site: <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/>.
23 Mathew Aid, Intel Wars: The Secret History of the Fight against Terror (New York: Bloomsbury P 2012), 109.
24 Mark Mazzetti, ‘How a single spy helped turn Pakistan against the United States’, New York Times, 9 Apr. 2013.
25 Aid, Intel Wars, 124.
26 Seth Jones, Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of Al Qa’ida Since 9/11 (New York: W.W. Norton 2012), 223–32.
27 Liam Collins, ‘The Abbottabad Documents: Bin Ladin’s Security Measures’, CTC Sentinel 5/5 (May 2012), 1–4.
28 Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, ‘Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why Al-Qaida May be Less Threatening than Many Think’, International Security 33/2 (2008), 29.
29 Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, ‘Al Qaeda on the Ropes: One Fighter’s Inside Story’, Newsweek, 2 Jan. 2012.
30 Michael Georgy and Saud Mehsud, ‘Al Qaeda Down, But Not Out in Pakistan’, Reuters, 10 June 2012.
31 Nigel Inkster, Afghanistan: To 2015 and Beyond (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011), 141–66.
32 For actualized list of Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders killed by drone attacks, see National Security Studies Program, The Year of the Drone; Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer, ‘Senior Al Qaeda and Taliban Leaders Killed in US Airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004–2013’, Long War Journal, <http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php>.
33 Barbara Sude, Al Qaeda Central: An Assessment of the Threat Posed by the Terrorist Group Headquartered on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border (New American Foundation Feb. 2010), 2.
34 Peter Bergen, ‘Afghanistan and Pakistan: Understanding a Complex Threat Environment’, Testimony before the House of Representatives, Oversight and Government Reform Committee, 4 Mar. 2009, 17.
35 Gunaratna and Oreg, ‘Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and its Evolution’, 1055.
36 Roggio and Mayer, ‘Senior Al Qaeda and Taliban Leaders Killed in US Airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004–2013’; National Security Studies Program, The Year of the Drone.
37 BBC News, ‘Profile: key US terror suspects’, 11 Feb. 2008.
38 Don Rassler, Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Liam Collins, Muhammad al-Obaidi and Nelly Lahoud, Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Document SOCOM-2012-0000015, 2012, 2.
39 Paul Cruickshank, ‘The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline’, CTC Sentinel 2/4 (2009), 4–8.
40 Paul Cruickshank, ‘Investigations shed new light on Toulouse terrorist shootings’, CNN, 13 June 2012.
41 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 117.
42 Magnus Ranstorp, ‘Terrorist Awakening in Sweden?’, CTC Sentinel 4/1 (2011), 1–5; Duncan Gardham, ‘“Suicide bomb plotter” told wife it was best they split up’, Telegraph, 16 Nov. 2011.
43 Europol, ‘TE-SAT EU Terrorism and Trend Report’, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_publications/37>.
44 Javier Jordan, ‘Analysis of Jihadi Terrorism Incidents in Western Europe, 2001–2010’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 35/5 (2012), 391–2.
45 Raffaello Pantucci, ‘Manchester, New York and Oslo: Three Centrally Directed Al Qa’ida Plots’, CTC Sentinel 3/8 (2010), 10–13.
46 Mitchell D. Silber, ‘Al-Qa`ida’s Center of Gravity in a Post-Bin Ladin World’, CTC Sentinel 4/11–12 (2011), 1–4.
47 Georgy and Mehsud, ‘Al Qaeda Down, but Not Out in Pakistan’.
48 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 22 July 2004, 251.
49 Bill Roggio, ‘Top Al Qaeda Leader Mustafa Abu Yazid Confirmed Killed in Airstrike in North Waziristan’, Long War Journal, 31 May 2010.
50 Georgy and Mehsud, ‘Al Qaeda Down, but Not Out in Pakistan’.
51 Ibid., 1.
52 Warren Strobel and Peter Cooney, ‘Strikes on Al Qaeda Leave Only “Handful” of Top Targets’, Reuters, 22 June 2012.
53 Aaron Y. Zelin, ‘Dodging the Drones: How Militants have Responded to the Covert US Campaign’, Foreign Policy, 31 Aug. 2012.
54 and and have been elaborated with information compiled by the author and based partially on: Jordan, ‘Analysis of Jihadi Terrorism Incidents in Western Europe, 2001–2010’; Risa A. Brooks ‘Muslim “Homegrown” Terrorism in the United States: How Serious is the Threat?’, International Security 36/2 (2011), 7–47; Erik J. Dahl, ‘The Plots that Failed: Intelligence Lessons Learned from Unsuccessful Terrorist Attacks against the United States’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34/8 (2011), 621–48.
55 Raffaello Pantucci, A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorist (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence 2011), 35–6.
56 Raffaello Pantucci ‘Deep Impact: The Effect of Drone Attacks on British Counter- terrorism’, RUSI Journal 154/5 (2009), 72–6.
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Javier Jordan
Javier Jordan is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science in the University of Granada (Spain). He is director of the MA in Strategic Studies and International Security in the University of Granada. He leads the research project CSO2010-17849, ‘International Terrorism’s Organizational Structure: Analysis of its Evolution and Implications for the European Security’, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. He is collaborator of the Spanish Army Training and Doctrine Command.