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ABSTRACT
After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, several thousand Afghan Taliban forces fled across the border to Pakistan, and the area became a safe haven for Afghan insurgents. In 2014, the transnational dimension of the insurgency is still highly prominent. Although regional support for insurgents is not uncommon, how to counter this aspect is mostly ignored in counterinsurgency (COIN) theory and doctrines. In this article, a regional counterinsurgency framework is developed, using the regional counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan as an example. The framework will facilitate the systematic inclusion of regional COIN measures in theory and doctrine.
Notes
1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency Operations (2009); NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN): AJP-3.4.4 (2011); Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual, Volume 1, Part 10: Countering Insurgency (London: Ministry of Defence 2009).
2 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-24, I-2.
3 Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, ‘Transnational Dimensions of Civil War, Journal of Peace Research 44/3 (2007), 295.
4 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International 1964), 25; Jason Lyall, ‘Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy’s Impact on War Outcomes and Duration’, International Organizations 64 (2010), 186; Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, ‘Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars’, International Organization 63/1 (2009), 87, 90; Idean Salehyan, Transnational Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional Conflict: Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2010); Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, ‘Refugees and the Spread of Civil War’, International Organization 60/2 (2006); Barbara F. Walter, ‘Bargaining Failures and Civil Wars’, Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009), 255.
5 Paul F. Diehl, ‘Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace’, Political Science Quarterly 103/3 (1988), 500; Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press 1993), 81–5; Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War (Princeton UP 2008), 105, 107; Darya Pushkina, ‘A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission’, International Peacekeeping 13/2 (2006), 140.
6 In the US Joint doctrine on counterinsurgency, for example, it is included as one of the eight dynamics of an insurgency. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-24, II-11 – II-12.
7 Idean Salehyan, ‘Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups’, World Politics 59 (Jan. 2007), 239.
8 See, for example, Eric Jardine and Simon Palamar, ‘From Medusa Past Kantalo: Testing the Effeectiveness of Canada’s Enemy-Centric and Population-Centric Counterinsurgency Operational Strategies’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36/7 (2013).
9 Mark Moyar, ‘Leadership in Counterinsurgency’, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 34/1 (2010), 135.
10 James A. Russell, ‘Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (Aug. 2010), 603–6. For some examples at the operational level, see Christopher Griffin, ‘Major Combat Operations and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Plan Challe in Algeria, 1959–1960’, Security Studies 19/3 (2010), 555–89; Niccolò Petrelli, ‘Deterring Insurgents: Culture, Adaptation and the Evolution of Israel Counterinsurgency, 1987–2005’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36/5 (Oct. 2013), 666—91.
11 See, for example, Eric Jardine, ‘Population-Centric Counterinsurgency and the Movement of Peoples’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 23/2 (2012), 268; Andrew Mumford, The Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare (London and New York: Routledge 2012), 8. For a discussion on different interpretations, see Paul Dixon, ‘“Hearts and Minds”? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 32/3 (June 2009), 363–66.
12 Dixon, ‘“Hearts and Minds?”’, 362; Michael Fitzsimmons, ‘Hard Hearts and Open Minds? Governance, Identity and the Intellectual Foundations of Counterinsurgency Strategy’, Journal of Strategic Studies 31/3 (June 2008), 337–65; Austin Long, On ‘Other War’: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2006), 21–30; Michael Shafer, ‘The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency’, Political Science Quarterly 103/1 (1988), 57–80; Richard Shultz, ‘Breaking the Will of the Enemy during the Vietnam War: The Operationalization of the Cost-Benefit Model of Counterinsurgency Warfare’, Journal of Peace Research 15/2 (1978), 109–29.
13 Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter, ‘Can Hearts and Minds be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq’, Journal of Political Economy 119/4 (2011), 766–819.
14 Constantin Melnik quoted in Long, On ‘Other War’, 27 (emphasis in original).
15 Long, On ‘Other War’, 24–6; Shafer, ‘The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency’, 72–3; Shultz, ‘Breaking the Will of the Enemy during the Vietnam War’, 110–11.
16 Charles Wolf quoted in Long, On ‘Other War’, 25 (emphasis in original). See also Shafer ‘The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency’, 72.
17 For an exception, see Bruno C. Reis, ‘The Myth of British Minimum Force in Counterinsurgency Campaigns during Decolonisation (1945–1970)’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/2 (April 2011), 245–79.
18 For a discussion on different forms of external support, see Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau and David Brannan, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2001), 84–100; Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 25–8; Gleditsch, ‘Transnational Dimensions of Civil War’, 296; Lyall and Wilson, ‘Rage Against the Machines’, 82.
19 Although there are some detailed descriptions of different forms of enemy centric strategies and tactics against transnational insurgents in the counterinsurgency literature, these studies do not develop a more general theory or framework. Yoav Gortzak, ‘Using Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations: The French in Algeria, 1954–1962’, Journal of Strategic Studies 32/2 (April 2009), 307–33; Angel Rabasa, Lesley Anne Warner, Peter Chalk, Ivan Khilko and Paraag Shukla, Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2007); Shultz, ‘Breaking the Will of the Enemy during the Vietnam War’.
20 ICG, LRA: A Regional Strategy Beyond Killing Kony, Africa Report No. 157 (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group 2010).
21 At the time, Namibia was called South West Africa and was annexed by South Africa.
22 Kenneth W. Grundy, Soldiers without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 1983), 253–4; Francis Toase, ‘The South African Army: The Campaign in South West Africa/Namibia since 1966‘, in Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott (eds), Armed Forces of Modern Counter-Insurgency (Beckenham, UK: Croom Helm 1985), 210; Lieneke Eloff de Visser, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds in the Namibian Border War’, Scientia Militaria 39/1 (2011), 93–4; Tony Weaver, ‘The South African Defence Force in Namibia’, in Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan (eds), War and Society: The Militarization of South Africa (New York: St Martin’s Press 1989), 97.
23 Richard Shultz, ‘Coercive Force and Military Strategy: Deterrence Logic and the Cost-Benefit Model of Counterinsurgency Warfare’, Western Political Quarterly 32/4 (1979), 455. For a discussion on different technical approaches to borders surveillance, see James Igoe Walsh, ‘Intelligence Sharing for Counter-Insurgency’, Defense and Security Analysis 24/3 (2008), 282.
24 Gortzak, ‘Using Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations’, 313–14.
25 Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca, NY/ London: Cornell UP 2008), 255.
26 Stanley A. McChrystal, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment (Kabul, Afghanistan: Headquarters International Security Assistance Force 2009), 2–6.
27 Richard H. Shultz and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat (New York: Columbia UP 2006), 180–2; Tim Youngs, Paul Bowers and Mark Oakes, The Campaign against International Terrorism: Prospects after the Fall of the Taliban, Research Paper 01/112 (London: House of Commons Library 2001), 9.
28 Anne Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan: Organization, Leadership and Worldview, FFI-report 2010/00359 (Oslo: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 2010), 30.
29 Rod Nordland, ‘Study Finds Sharp Rise in Attacks by Taliban’, New York Times, 19 April 2013; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 18.
30 Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2008), 41; Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond, 261; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 20.
31 Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 41.
32 Jefferey A. Dressler, The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan, Afghanistan Report 6 (Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War 2010), 7–11; Thomas Ruttig, ‘Loya Paktia’s Insurgency: (I) The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity’, in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (London: Hurst 2009), 62–72; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 19.
33 BBC, ‘In Quotes: Excerpts from NATO Report on Taliban’, 1 Feb. 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16829368> Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 54–61; Austin Long, ‘Small is Beautiful: The Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan’, Orbis 54/2 (2010), 200; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency, 40; Marvin G. Weinbaum, ‘Hard Choices in Countering Insurgency and Terrorism along Pakistan’s North-West Frontier’, Journal of International Affairs 63/1 (2009), 76.
34 Seth G. Jones, ‘Pakistan’s Dangerous Game’, Survival 49/1 (2007), 18–21. See also Ruttig, Loya Paktia’s Insurgency, 75–7.
35 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, ‘No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier’, International Security 32/4 (2008), 43–6; Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 54.
36 Johnson and Mason, ‘No Sign until the Burst of Fire’, 44.
37 Jeffery A. Dressler, Securing Helmand: Understanding and Responding to the Enemy, Afghanistan Report 2 (Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War 2009), 10; Johnson and Mason, ‘No Sign until the Burst of Fire’, 44; Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 58; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 38.
38 Shultz and Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, 152–3.
39 Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban (Seattle/ London: Univ. of Washington Press 2001), 31–2.
40 Nassim Majidi and Eric Davin, Study on Cross Border Population Movements between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Commissioned by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Kabul, June 2009, 19.
41 Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, 29.
42 Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 58, 46; Gretchen Peters, How Opium Profits the Taliban, Peaceworks 62 (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace 2009), 26–7; Qandeel Siddique, Teherik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for its Growth in Pakistan’s North-East, DIIS-Report 2010:12 (Copehagen: Danish Institute for International Studies 2010), 7.
43 Ashok Behuria, ‘Fighting the Taliban: Pakistan at War with Itself’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 61/4 (2007), 531–2; Jones, ‘Pakistan’s Dangerous Game’, 18–21; Weinbaum, ‘Hard Choices in Countering Insurgency and Terrorism along Pakistan’s North-West Frontier’; Youngs, Bowers and Oakes, The Campaign against International Terrorism, 9.
44 Barnett R. Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate, Special Report 176 (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace 2006), 3. See also Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency, 38.
45 Astri Suhrke, ‘A Contradictory Mission? NATO from Stabilization to Combat in Afghanistan’, International Peacekeeping 15/2 (2008), 220–1. See also: Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 41; Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond, 261; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 20; Weinbaum, ‘Hard Choices in Countering Insurgency and Terrorism along Pakistan’s North-West Frontier’, 74.
46 Dressler, Securing Helmand, 7; Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency, 2004–2012’, International Affairs 89/4 (2012), 855; Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 59. For a detailed discussion on the Quetta leadership, see Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 41–7.
47 Dressler, Securing Helmand, 8–9.
48 Dressler, The Haqqani Network, 7–11; Ruttig, ‘Loya Paktia’s Insurgency’, 62–72; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 19.
49 Foreign fighters are mainly individuals from the Caucasus and Central Asia (such as Chechens, Uzbeks, and Tajiks), and Arabs (such as Saudis, Egyptians and Libyans). Their objective is broader than that of the Taliban. Apart from launching jihad against Western forces and eradicating them from the region, their aim is also the return of the Islamic caliphate in the Middle East. They are often better equipped, trained and motivated than Afghan insurgents, and they typically carry out more sophisticated attacks. They also play a key role as trainers, shock troops and surrogate leaders for the Taliban in the field. They take guidance from senior commanders at the strategic level, but they often have autonomy at the tactical level. Dressler, Securing Helmand, 10; Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 43–6; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 21.
50 Dressler, Securing Helmand, 10, 13; Farrell and Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban at War’, 857–8; Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 59; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 19–20, 30, 38.
51 Dressler, Securing Helmand, 9–13; Farrell and Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban at War’, 866; Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 44, 57; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 38; Suhrke, ‘A Contradictory Mission?’, 232.
52 Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 46, 59; Ruttig, ‘Loya Paktia’s Insurgency’, 77.
53 Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 39–40.
54 Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 62.
55 NATO, ‘ISAF: Key Facts and Figures’, 6 Jan. 2012, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/2012-01-06%20ISAF%20Placemat.pdf>.
56 Warren Chin, ‘Colonial Warfare in a Post-Colonial State: British Military Operations in Helmand Province, Afghanistan’, Defence Studies 10/1-2 (2010), 232–5; Robert Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand, Afghanistan: What Now for British Counterinsurgency?’, International Affairs 87/2 (2011), 303-5; Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon, ‘COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan’, Orbis (Fall 2009), 674; Anthony King, ‘Understanding the Helmand Campaign: British Military Operations in Afghanistan’, International Affairs 86/2 (2010), 315–18.
57 Chin, ‘Colonial Warfare in a Post-Colonial State’, 235; Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand’, 307.
58 Chin, ‘Colonial Warfare in a Post-Colonial State’, 235; Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand’, 308; Farrell and Gordon, ‘COIN Machine’, 675, 682.
59 Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand’, 311.
60 See, for example, Sergio Catignani, ‘”Getting COIN” at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (Aug. 2012); Chin, ‘Colonial Warfare in a Post-Colonial State’; Robert Egnell, ‘Winning “Hearts and Minds”? A Critical Analysis of Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan’, Civil Wars 12/3 (2010), 282–303; Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand’; Farrell and Gordon, ‘COIN Machine’; Lisa Hultman, ‘COIN and Civilian Collaterals: Patterns of Violence in Afghanistan, 2004–2009’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 23/2 (2012), 245–63; King, ‘Understanding the Helmand Campaign’; Adam Lockyer, ‘Evaluating Civil Development in Counterinsurgency Operations. The Case for a Field Experiment in Afghanistan’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 66/1 (2012), 1–19.
61 Brian Glyn Williams, ‘The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33/10 (2010), 874.
62 Long, ‘Small is Beautiful’, 212; Mark Mazzetti, and Eric Schmitt, ‘CIA Steps Up Drone Attacks on Taliban in Pakistan’, New York Times, 28 Sept. 2010, A1; Weinbaum, ‘Hard Choices in Countering Insurgency and Terrorism along Pakistan’s North-West Frontier’, 85.
63 Mazzetti and Schmitt, ‘CIA. Steps Up Drone Attacks on Taliban in Pakistan’, A1.
64 Declan Walsh, ‘WikiLeaks Cables: US Special Forces Working Inside Pakistan’, The Guardian, 30 Nov. 2010.
65 Long, ‘Small is Beautiful’, 201; Omar Waraich and Andrew Buncombe, ‘Pakistan Readies for New Assault on Bin Laden Lair’, The Independent (UK), 6 Oct. 2009; Report to Congress, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Citation2010, <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/November_1230_Report_FINAL.pdf>.
66 For a detailed discussion on Pakistan military operations in the border areas between 2001 and 2010, see Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2010), 41–75.
67 Weinbaum, ‘Hard Choices in Countering Insurgency and Terrorism along Pakistan’s North-West Frontier’, 83.
68 EUPOL, ‘EUPOL assists the Afghan Border Police to build a “Rule of Law” police service’, July 2012, <http://www.eupol-afg.eu/?q=node/195> NATO, ‘Training Courses Celebrate Graduates in Afghanistan’, 20 Aug. 2010, <http://aco.nato.int/page27220124.aspx> NATO, ‘NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A)’, 2012, <http://www.aco.nato.int/page2083144846.aspx> Reuters, ‘NATO Races to Secure Violent, Porous Afghanistan-Pakistan Border’, 2 Sept. Citation2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/02/us-afghanistan-pakistan-border-idUSTRE7814QY20110902> UNODC, ‘The Remote Frontier: UNODC Assistance to Afghanistan’s Border Patrol’, 4 Jan. 2010, <http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/frontpage/2009/December/border-control.html> USACE, ‘Afghan Border Police have a new facility at Chah Sangar’, 2 March 2012, <http://www.usace.army.mil/Media/NewsArchive/tabid/204/Article/372/afghan-border-police-have-a-new-facility-at-chah-sangar.aspx> Chris Woods and Declan Walsh, ‘Pakistan Expels British Trainers of Anti-Taliban Soldiers’, The Guardian, 26 June 2011.
69 Government of Canada, ‘Afghanistan-Pakistan border’, Citation2011, <http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/priorities-priorites/border-frontiere.aspx?view=d>.
70 Department of State, ‘Pakistan Border Security Program: Fact Sheet’, 23 Nov. 2011, <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/177706.htm>.
71 Report to Congress, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 50–1; NATO, ‘NATO Cooperation with Pakistan’, 2011, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50071.htm?selectedLocale=en>.
72 Report to Congress, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 50–1; NATO, ‘NATO Cooperation with Pakistan’.
73 Department of State, Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Updated Feb. 2010, 25.
74 Department of the State, Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, 25–30.
75 Paul D. Miller, ‘How to Exercise US Leverage Over Pakistan’, Washington Quarterly 35/4 (2012), 40–2.
76 Jeffrey A. Friedman, ‘Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine’, Security Studies 20/4 (2010), 556–91; Lyall and Wilson III, ‘Rage Against the Machines’; Carter Malkasian, ‘Did the United States Need More Forces in Iraq? Evidence from Al Anbar’, Defence Studies 8/1 (2008), 78—104.
77 House of Commons, Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ and the Conflict in Afghanistan: An Update, Research Paper 01/81 (London: House of Commons Library 2001), 63–5.
78 Salehyan, ‘Transnational Rebels’, 239.
79 ICG, Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU’s Lost Rebellion, Policy Briefing/Africa briefing No. 93 (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group 2012); Hans Romkema, Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament and Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The Cases of the FDLR, FNL and ADF/NALU (Washington DC: The World Bank 2007); Lindsay Scorgie, ‘Peripheral Pariah or Regional Rebel? The Allied Democratic Forces and the Uganda/Congo Borderland’, The Round Table 100/412 (2011), 79–93.
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Kersti Larsdotter
Kersti Larsdotter is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden. She was previously a postdoctoral fellow at the Security Studies Program at the Political Science Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA. Her current research interests include the role of state borders in counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations.
