Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls

Abstract

Despite all the talk of ‘hearts and minds’ being the key to counterinsurgency, local public opinion is rarely studied and when it is, it often yields surprising conclusions. Through analyzing polling data from Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, this article shows that public opinion is less malleable, more of an effect rather than a cause of tactical success, and a poor predictor of strategic victory. As a result, modern counterinsurgency doctrine’s focus on winning popular support may need to be rethought.

Key Words:

• Counterinsurgency
• ‘Hearts and Minds’
• Public Opinion
• Polling

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Daniel Byman, David Edelstein, Christine Fair, Rebecca Gibbons, Gabriel Scheinmann and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

Notes

¹ Richard L. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger 1966), 3.

² Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Dec. 2006), 1–1.

³ One area were there has been significant work on local public opinion and insurgency has been in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region, see Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, ‘Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan’, International Security 34/3 (Winter 2009/2010), 79–118; Andrew Beath, Christia Fotini and Ruben Enikolopov, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds through Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan’, MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2011-14 (13 April 2012); Graeme Blair, Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra and Jacob Shapiro, ‘Poverty and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan’, American Journal of Political Science 57/1 (Jan. 2013), 30–48; Jason Lyall, Graeme Blair and Kosuke Imai, ‘Explaining Support for Combatants in Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan,’ American Political Science Review 107/4 (Nov. 2013), 679–705.

⁴ David W.P. Elliott, The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta 1930–1975, Concise Edition (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe 2007) 255.

⁵ See Karl Hack, ‘British Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in the Era of Decolonisation: The Example of Malaya’ Intelligence and National Security 14/2 (Summer 1999), 124–55; Karl Hack, ‘The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 32/3 (June 2009), 383–414; Huw Bennett, ‘“A Very Salutary Effect”: The Counter-Terror Strategy in Early Malayan Emergency, June 1948 to December 1949’, Journal of Strategic Studies 32/3 (June 2009), 415–44; Paul Dixon, ‘“Hearts and Minds”? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq’, Journal of Strategic Studies 32/3 (June 2009), 353–81; Bruno C. Reis, ‘The Myth of British Minimum Force in Counterinsurgency Campaigns during Decolonisation (1945–1970),’ Journal of Strategic Studies 34/2 (April 2011), 245–79.

⁶ David J. Kilcullen, ‘“Twenty-Eight Articles”: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency’, Military Review (May–June 2006), 103.

⁷ Robin Wright, ‘US Lauds Voter Turnout in Iraq’, Washington Post, 16 Oct. 2005.

⁸ Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American War of War (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster 2013), 326–27.

⁹ Army, FM 3-24,1–20

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., 3–16.

¹² Army, FM 3-24, 1–20.

¹³ Ibid., 5–2.

¹⁴ Jonathan J. Schroden, ‘Measures for Security in a Counterinsurgency,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 32/5 (Oct. 2009), 733–5.

¹⁵ See Ethan B. Kapstein, ‘Measuring Progress in Modern Warfare,’ Survival 54/1 (Feb./March 2012), 137–58.

¹⁶ See David J. Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford: OUP 2010), 58.

¹⁷ For a similar critique, see Schroden, ‘Measures’, 736.

¹⁸ ABC News, the BBC, ARD and NHK, ‘Iraq Poll’ (March 2008), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_03_08iraqpollmarch2008.pdf>, Q26, p.15.

¹⁹ DOD (2006a), 32.

²⁰ ABC News, BBC, ARD and The Washington Post. ‘Afghanistan: Where Things Stand’, 6 Dec. 2010, Q25c, Q25d, Q33, pp.31, 33.

²¹ Exact percentages ranged from 20–25 per cent depending on location. College Park, MD, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) RG 472, A1 474, Box 9, ‘Summary of Post Tet Attitudes of General Public in Saigon and Six Provincial Capital Cities as Expressed in Sample Surveys Conducted Between March and June 1968,’ 23 Aug. 1968, Table 49.

²² For example, see ibid. Also RG 472, A1 474, Box 5, ‘Summary of Attitudes of Saigon General and Elite Publics as Expressed in a Sample Survey Conducted During the Last Week of May and First Week of June 1968’, 30 June 1968.

²³ NARA RG 472, A 462, Box 2, ‘Pacification Attitude Analysis System Preliminary Survey #1,’ 1.

²⁴ NARA RG 472, A462, Box 2, ‘Additional Questions from the Fulbright Committee,’ 14 Mar. 1970.

²⁵ NARA RG 472, A1 462, Box 42, ‘Year End Summary (PAAS) – 1971’, 4 Jan. 1972, 1; NARA RG 472, A1 462, Box 30, ‘Pacification Attitude Analysis System (PAAS)’, 1 May 1971, B3–B5.

²⁶ NARA RG 472, A1 474, Box 9, ‘Summary of Post Tet Attitudes,’ 23 Aug. 1968, 3.

²⁷ Ibid., 7–9.

²⁸ Ibid., 8.

²⁹ ABC News et al., ‘Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,’ 3.

³⁰ Ibid., 53–6.

³¹ Nancy Hopkins (ed.), Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of Afghan People (Washington DC: Asia Foundation 2012), 179–83.

³² Of note, D3 Systems also has ties to the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research. ABC News et al., ‘Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,’ 19.

³³ See ABC News et al., ‘Iraq Poll’ (2008); ABC News, the BBC and NHK, ‘Iraq Poll’ (Feb. 2009), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/640pdfs/13_03_09_iraqpollfeb2009.pdf>.

³⁴ From 70 per cent to 32 per cent NARA RG 472, A 462, Box 2, ‘Preliminary Survey #1,’ Q16; NARA RG 462, Box 7, ‘Pacification Attitude Analysis System Preliminary Survey 3,’ Dec. 1969, p. 3; NARA RG 472, A1 462, Box 19, ‘Pacification Attitude Analysis System,’ Dec. 1970; NARA RG 472, A1 474, Box 83 ‘Public Attitude Analysis System,’ Feb. 1971; NARA RG 472, A1 462, Box 42 ‘Pacification Attitude Analysis System,’ Dec. 1971.

³⁵ From 83 per cent saying life was ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ good in 2005 to 62 per cent in 2009. ABC News et al., ‘Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,’ Q3a, p.21.

³⁶ From 54 per cent saying ‘more prosperous’ recorded in 2006 and 2009, to a low of 39 per cent in 2008. Hopkins, Afghanistan in 2012, Q13, table 5.2, p.65.

³⁷ From 71 per cent saying their lives were ‘good’ or ‘very good’ in 2005 to 39 per cent in 2007. ABC News et al., ‘Iraq Poll’ (2009), Q1, p.1.

³⁸ From 20.2 per cent rating the South Vietnamese Army as ‘very effective’ or ‘effective’ in Dec. 1969 to 82 per cent of rural and 93 per cent urban respondents by Nov. 1972. In Dec. 1969, only 17.3 per cent and 31 per cent of respondents rated the Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF) as ‘very effective’ or ‘effective’ respectively. By Nov. 1972, these numbers had grown to 66 per cent rural and 69 per cent urban for the RFs, and 67 per cent of both rural and urban respondents for the PFs. Confidence in the National Police also rose from 12 per cent saying they were ‘effective’ or ‘very effective’ in Oct. 1969 to 35 per cent of rural and 59 per cent of urban respondents by Nov. 1972. The gap between urban and rural residents is likely partially due to the National Police’s concentration in urban centers. NARA RG 462, Box 7 ‘Preliminary Survey 3’, Dec. 1969, 4–5; NARA RG 472, A1 462, Box 40, ‘Airgram for Nov. PAAS,’ 2 Dec. 1972, 3, 7–8, 9; NARA RG 472, A 462, Box 2, ‘Preliminary Survey #1,’ 6.

³⁹ From 87 per cent to 95 per cent for the Afghan National Army and from 79 per cent to 86 per cent for the Afghan National Police. Hopkins, Afghanistan in 2012, Table 7.1, Q42a, Q42b, p.81.

⁴⁰ From 79 per cent in 2006 to 67 per cent in 2007. ABC News et al., ‘Afghanistan: Where Things Stand’, Q40c, p.38.

⁴¹ From 61 per cent in Feb. 2007 to 73 per cent in Feb. 2009. ABC News et al., ‘Iraq Poll’ (2009), Q16, p.12. Of note, the 2003 and 2004 responses – before the Iraqi Army was operational – were 38 per cent and 56 per cent respectively.

⁴² From 64 per cent in Feb. 2007 to 74 per cent in Feb. 2009. ABC News et al., ‘Iraq Poll’ (2009), Q16, p.12. Of note, the 2003 number was 46 per cent, but was excluded here, because after the invasion, the Iraqi police fell into disarray.

⁴³ From 44 per cent in Jan. to 69 per cent in Dec. 1970. NARA RG 472, A1 462, Box 19 ‘Pacification Attitude Analysis System’, Dec. 1970, Chart 7, Q54.

⁴⁴ From 80 per cent saying a ‘very good’ or ‘good’ job in 2007 to 67 per cent in 2008. Hopkins, Afghanistan in 2012, Figure 7.1, Q45, p.85.

⁴⁵ ABC News et al., ‘Afghanistan: Where Things Stand’, Q40a, Q40b, pp.37-8.

⁴⁶ From 80 per cent saying ‘good’ or ‘excellent’ in 2005 to 58 per cent in 2010. Ibid., Q7A, p.24.

⁴⁷ From 51 per cent to 40 per cent expressing ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in their local leaders. ABC News et al., ‘Iraq Poll’ (2009), Q16, p.12.

⁴⁸ From 19 per cent to 39 per cent saying effective. Data from: NARA RG 472, A 462, Box 2 ‘Preliminary Survey #1,’ Q25; NARA RG 462, Box 7 ‘Preliminary Survey 3,’ Dec. 1969, Q23; NARA RG 472, A1 462, Box 19 ‘Pacification Attitude Analysis System’, Dec. 1970, chart 3; NARA RG 472, A1 474, Box 83 ‘Public Attitude Analysis System’, Feb. 1971, chart 2.

⁴⁹ ABC News et al., ‘Afghanistan: Where Things Stand’, 1. Of note, in Asia Foundation polling from 2004, American favorability started off lower, so decline may be less significant. See Michael O’Hanlon and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 23 Feb. 2005), 13.

⁵⁰ Early anecdotal estimates of popular support range from 50 per cent to 90 per cent, Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York, NY: The Penguin Press 2006), 177. According to the polling data, however, only 18 per cent to 37 per cent of the Iraqi public thought the Coalition was doing a ‘good’ or ‘very good’ job in five polls from 2005 to 2009; between 15 per cent and 26 per cent of the Iraqi public had ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in ‘US occupation forces’ in seven polls from 2003 to 2009; support for the Coalition’s invasion ranged from 37 per cent to 49 per cent saying ‘somewhat’ or ‘absolutely’ right in six surveys from 2004 to 2009. ABC News et al., ‘Iraq Poll’ (2009), Q8, Q16, Q21, pp.5, 12, 15.

⁵¹ ABC News et al., ‘Afghanistan: Where Things Stand’, Q40e, Q41e, Q49e, pp.8, 40, 44. Also see a 2004 Asia Foundation survey. O’Hanlon and Albuquerque, Afghanistan Index, 13.

⁵² ABC News et al., ‘Afghanistan: Where Things Stand’, Q25c, Q40g, Q49a, p.31, 38, 44.

⁵³ From 8 per cent to 30 per cent supportive. Ibid., Q33, p.33.

⁵⁴ See Lyall, Blair and Imai, ‘Explaining Support for Combatants in Wartime’; Beath, Christia and Enikolopov, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds Through Development.’

⁵⁵ NARA RG 472, A1 474, Box 9, ‘Summary of Post Tet Attitudes’ 23 Aug. 1968, Table XXIV. The six cities were Vinh Long, Sadec, Dalat, Quinhon, Hue and Danang.

⁵⁶ NARA RG 472, A1 462, Box 19, ‘Pacification Attitude Analysis System’, Dec. 1970, Q18, MW17.

⁵⁷ NARA RG 462 A1 462, Box 15, ‘WIEU/PAAS Briefing,’ Dec. 1970, 5856.

⁵⁸ ‘Number of Attacks’ CENTCOM’s FOIA Reading Room; DOD (2007b), 26.

⁵⁹ By then, over 70 per cent of Anbar’s residents reported feeling that their neighborhood was secure. DOD (2007d), 24.

⁶⁰ See DOD (2007d), 24; DOD (2008a), 27; DOD (2008b), 30; DOD (2008c), 29.

⁶¹ DOD (2008b), 31.

⁶² DOD (2008d), 27.

⁶³ Of note, the 2010 polls, particularly those in Baghdad, Salah ad Din, and Diyala, were sharply higher than previous ones. Since the data cuts off afterwards, it is impossible to tell whether this was a momentary spike in optimism or a lasting trend. Excluding the 2010 polls, there is little or no progress in these areas.

⁶⁴ Trends for all the provinces are drawn from the quarterly ‘Measuring Stability in Iraq’ reports – DOD (2006d), 26; DOD (2007b), 27; DOD (2007c), 25; DOD (2008b), 31; DOD (2008c), 30; DOD (2008d), 27; DOD (2009a), 29; DOD (2009b), 32; DOC (2009c), 32; DOD (2009d), 33; DOD (2010a), 38; DOD (2010b), 38. Of note, the Aug. 2006 through the July 2007 reports and the Jan. and March 2010 surveys asked the respondents about the Government of Iraq’s ability to protect their families. By contrast, those reports in the intervening years asked whether the Government of Iraq was effective at maintaining security.

⁶⁵ Peter R. Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander’s War in Iraq (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 2008), 51, 347; James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007 (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies 2011), 147; Bob Woodward, State of Denial (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster 2006), 291; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York, NY: Pantheon Books 2012), 49.

⁶⁶ Samantha L. Quigley, ‘Iraqis Fed Up With Insurgency, General Says,’ Armed Forces Press Service, 9 March 2006; also see Elliot Blair Smith, ‘Tipsters Boost Forces’ Security Intelligence’, USA Today, 19 April 2005.

⁶⁷ DOD (2006b), 45; DOD (2007c), 21.

⁶⁸ DOD (2007c), 21.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Anthony H Cordesman, Marissa Allison and Jason Lemieux, IED Metrics for Afghanistan: January 2004 – September 2010 (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies 11 Nov. 2010), 2–3.

⁷¹ Scott A. Cuomo and Brandon J. Gorman, ‘CSIS’s Afghanistan IED Metrics Report Does Not Tell the Whole Story’, Small Wars Journal (26 Oct. 2010), 1.

⁷² In 2011 alone, Regional Commands South and Southwest, which included Helmand province, accounted for approximately 54 per cent of the violence in the country. DOD (2011), 61–2, 76.

⁷³ UNDP, Police Perception Survey, 2011: The Afghan Perspective (2011), 11, 38, <www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/2011/PPS-Eng%20Version-2011%t20Final%20Lowest%20Res.pdf>, as of 30 Sept. 2013.

⁷⁴ Hopkins, Afghanistan in 2012, 59.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 85.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 93, 95.

⁷⁷ Exact numbers vary and the 270,000 full-time soldiers by 1967 is a conservative estimate. See Military History Institute of Vietnam (MHIV), Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam 1954-1975. trans. Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence: UP of Kansas 2002), 174, 182, 191, 211.

⁷⁸ For food consumption estimates, see Lewis Sorley, Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968–1972 (Lubbock: Texas Tech UP 2004), 92, 414.

⁷⁹ Robert A. Pape, Bombing To Win (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1996), 74.

⁸⁰ Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 1986) 60, 187; Robert McNamara and Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: the Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York, NY: Vintage Books 1996), 152; H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York, NY: HarperCollins 1997), 148.

⁸¹ MHIV, Victory in Vietnam, 67, 82.

⁸² Ibid., 46, 138; Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory, trans. John Spragens, Jr (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press 1977) 76; Aung Cheng Guan, Ending the Vietnam War: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective (London, UK: RoutledgeCurzon 2004), 52.

⁸³ See NARA RG 472, A1 474, Box 16 ‘Viet Cong Tax System’, 29 May 1971; NARA RG 472, A1 462, Box 10, ‘I CTZ, Quang Ngai Province, Son Tinh District’, 5 Jan. 1969, 2; NARA RG 472, A1 462, ‘Long Dien Village’, 9 Jan. 1969; Sorley, Vietnam Chronicles, 501.

⁸⁴ Sorley, Vietnam Chronicles, 667.

⁸⁵ Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Dec. 2006), 1–1.

⁸⁶ NARA RG 472, A1 462, Box 42, ‘Highlights of the Rural 1972 PAAS Survey’, 3 July 1972, 3.

⁸⁷ NARA RG 472, A1 462, ‘PAAS: Pacification Attitude Analysis System’, Oct. 1972, 0586/18, 0586/20.

⁸⁸ See DOD (2012a), 111, 118–19; DOD (2012b), 23–5; DOD (2013), 20–1.

⁸⁹ ABC News et al., ‘Iraq Poll’ (2009), Q21, p.15.

⁹⁰ Ibid., Q16, p.12.

⁹¹ Ibid., Q30, p.19.

⁹² See Anthony H. Cordesman and Sam Khazi, Violence in Iraq in Mid 2013: The Growing Risk of Serious Civil Conflict (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies 22 Aug. 2013).

⁹³ Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield [1513] (Univ. of Chicago Press 1998), 72.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Raphael S. Cohen

Raphael S. Cohen is a pre-doctoral fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution and a PhD candidate in Government at Georgetown University, both in Washington DC. He can be reached at [email protected].