China and American Seapower in East Asia: Is Accommodation Possible?

Abstract

Debates about the future of American seapower in East Asia turn on the argument that American seapower presents a risky and costly luxury that undercuts the cooperative potential of US–China relations. This article asks whether accommodation between China and the United States on the possession and exercise of American seapower in East Asia is possible. Accommodation on this front could significantly lower the risks of unintended escalation and in turn undermine arguments that favour an American retreat from East Asia. The article outlines how accommodation can be achieved on the exercise of American seapower in the region.

Key Words:

• China
• United States
• Freedom of Navigation
• Accommodation
• Maritime Security

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Studies Association 53rd Annual Convention, 1–4 April 2012, San Diego, California, USA. The author thanks Andrew Erickson, M. Taylor Fravel and Alessio Patalano for comments on previous drafts.

Notes

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² A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Univ. of Chicago Press 1980); Jacek Kugler and Ronald L. Tammen, ‘Regional Challenge: China’s Rise to Power’, in Jim Rolfe (ed.), The Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 2004), 33–53; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: CUP 1981).

³ Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, ‘Grateful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment’, International Security 35/4 (2011), 7–44.

⁴ See Walter Russell Mead, ‘The Tea Party and American Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs 90/2 (2011), 28–44; Barry R. Posen, ‘The Case for Restraint’, American Interest, 3/2 (2007), 7–17: Stephen M. Walt, ‘Keeping the World “Off-Balance”: Self-Restraint and US Foreign Policy’, in G. John Ikenberry (ed.), America Unbridled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca NY: Cornell UP 2002), 121–54; Michael Mandelbaum, ‘Overpowered? Questioning the Wisdom of American Restraint,’ Foreign Affairs 89/3 (2010), 114–119.

⁵ Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. MacDonald, ‘The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward,’ Foreign Affairs 90/6 (2011), 32–47.

⁶ Barrett Tillman, ‘Fear and Loathing in the Post-Naval Era,’ USNI Proceedings, 16 June 2009, 16–21.

⁷ Ted Galen Carpenter, ‘Washington’s Clumsy China Containment Policy’, The National Interest, 30 Nov. 2011; Ted Galen Carpenter, ‘Washington Placates a Rising China’, China–US Focus, 30 Sept. 2011. On the final point see Charles Kupchan, ‘After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity’, International Security 23/2 (1998), 44.

⁸ Bruce Gilley, ‘Not So Dire Straits: How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits US Security’, Foreign Affairs 89/1 (2010), 44–60; Charles Glaser, ‘Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does not Mean Pessimism,’ Foreign Affairs 90/2 (2011), 80–91. For a rejoinder see Nancy Berkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser, ‘Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?’, Washington Quarterly 34/4 (2011), 23–37.

⁹ Christopher Layne ‘From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy’, International Security 22/1 (1997), 118.

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¹¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘Balancing the East, Upgrading the West: US Grand Strategy in an Age of Upheaval,’ Foreign Affairs 91/1 (2012), 97–104.

¹² Ambassador Chas Freeman, ‘Beijing, Washington and the Shifting Balance of Prestige,’ Remarks to the China Maritime Studies Institute, 10 May 2011, Newport RI.

¹³ Brzezinski, ‘Balancing the East, Upgrading the West’.

¹⁴ Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, ‘Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation’, International Security 21/4 (1997), 17–30.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Posen, ‘The Case for Restraint’, 13–17.

¹⁷ Hugh White, ‘Power Shift: Australia’s Future between Washington and Beijing’, Quarterly Essay 39 (Sept. 2010).

¹⁸ Gholz et al., ‘Come Home, America’, 20; Michael G. Gallagher, ‘China’s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea’, International Security 19/1 (1994), 169–94.

¹⁹ Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘China’s Anti-Access Strategy in Historical and Theoretical Perspective’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (June 2011), 313.

²⁰ David Lei, ‘China’s New Multi-Faceted Maritime Strategy’, Orbis 52/1 (2008), 139–57. M. Taylor Fravel and Alex Liebman, ‘Beyond the Moat: The PLAN’s Evolving Interests and Potential Influence’, in Phil Saunders et al. (eds), The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington DC: National Defense UP 2011).

²¹ See Masafumi Iida, Makoto Saito, Yasuyuki Sugiura, and Masayuki Masuda, NIDS China Security Report (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies 2011).

²² Joseph S. Nye Jr, ‘The Case for Deep Engagement,’ Foreign Affairs 74/4 (1995); 90-102. See most recently, Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, The US-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia (Washington DC: CSIS 2012), 8–10.

²³ Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament’, 17 Nov. 2011.

²⁴ Leon Panetta, ‘Address to the 11th Shangri-la Security Dialogue’, 2 June 2012, <www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2012/speeches/first-plenary-session/leon-panetta/>.

²⁵ Ian Clark, ‘Bringing Hegemony Back In: The United States and International Order’, International Affairs 85/1 (2009), 23–36.

²⁶ Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington DC: Dept. of Defense 2012), 6.

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²⁸ Dennis Blair, ‘Military Power Projection in Asia’, in Ashley J. Tellis, Mercy Kuo and Andrew Marble (eds), Strategic Asia 2008: Challenges and Choices (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research 2008).

²⁹ Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb (eds), America’s Asian Alliances (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2000); G. John Ikenberry, ‘American Hegemony and East Asian Order’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 58/3 (2004), 353–67.

³⁰ Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (Washington DC: Dept. of Defense 1995).

³¹ Jae Jeok Park, ‘The US-led Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: Hedge Against Potential Threats or an Undesirable Multilateral Security Order?’, Pacific Review 24/2 (2011), 137–52.

³² James T. Conway, Gary Roughead and Thad W. Allen, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, Oct. 2007, <www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf>. This was echoed forcefully by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the 10th Shangri-la Dialogue.

³³ James E. Auer and Robyn Lim, ‘The Maritime Basis of American Security in East Asia’, Naval War College Review 54/1 (2001), 39–58; John M. Van Dyke, ‘North-East Asian Seas: Conflicts, Accomplishments and the Role of the United States’, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 17/3 (2002), 417–20.

³⁴ Ramses Amer, ‘Towards a Declaration on “Navigational Rights” in the Sea-Lanes of the Asia-Pacfic’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 20/1 (1998), 88–102.

³⁵ See Robert W. Smith and J. Ashley Roach, ‘United States Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims’, Limits of the Seas, No. 112, (Washington DC: Office of Ocean Affairs, US Dept. of State 1992); Robert W. Smith, ‘National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction’, Limits in the Seas, No. 36 (Washington DC: Office of Ocean Affairs, US Dept. of State 2000).

³⁶ Compiled from Dept. of Defense, Excessive Maritime Claims Manual 2005, <www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/20051m.htm> and Peter A. Dutton, ‘Caelum Liberam: Air Defense Identification Zones Outside Sovereign Airspace’, American Journal of International Law 103/4 (2009), 697–9.

³⁷ Robert S. Ross, ‘Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century’, International Security 23/4 (1999), 106–8.

³⁸ David G. Muller, China as a Maritime Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1983).

³⁹ Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2000).

⁴⁰ Wu Xinbo, ‘The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the US–Japanese Alliance’, Washington Quarterly 29/1 (2005–06), 119–30; Victor D. Cha, ‘Powerplay Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia’, International Security 34/3 (Winter 2009/10), 158–96.

⁴¹ On the first point see Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, China and the Law of the Sea Convention: Follow the Sea (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press 1995). On the second see Alan Tonelson, A Necessary Evil? Current Chinese Views of America’s Military Role in East Asia (Washington DC: Stimson Center 2003); Hugh White, ‘Why War in Asia Remains Thinkable’, Survival, 50/6 (2008), 89.

⁴² Shen Dingli, ‘A Chinese Assessment of China’s External Security Environment’, China Brief 11/5 (March 2011).

⁴³ Zhang Jingwei, ‘China Adjusts Its Maritime Power Strategy at the Right Moment’, Ta Kung Pao, 29 Dec. 2008.

⁴⁴ For older work in this vein see David Winterford, ‘Chinese Naval Planning and Maritime Interests in the South China Sea: Implications for US and Regional Security Policies,’ Journal of American-East Asian Relations 2/4 (1993), 369–98; Shee Poon Kim, ‘The South China Sea in China’s Strategic Thinking’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 19/4 (1998), 369–87. The most outspoken advocate of this perspective is Luo Yuan. See Luo Yuan, ‘PLA General: US engaging in gunboat diplomacy’, People’s Daily, 12 Aug. 2010.

⁴⁵ Zhang Wenmu, ‘Sea Power and China’s Strategic Choices’, China Security 2/2 (2006), 25.

⁴⁶ Yang Yi, ‘Navigating Stormy Waters: The Sino-American Security Dilemma at Sea’, China Security 6/3 (2010), 3–11.

⁴⁷ See for instance, Robert Kaplan, ‘The Geography of Chinese Power’, Foreign Affairs 89/3 (2010); Jae-hyung Lee, ‘China’s Expanding Maritime Ambitions in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 24/3 (2002), 549–68.

⁴⁸ Dan Blumenthal, ‘Networked Asia’, The American Interest (May/June 2011); Robert J. Art, ‘The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul’, Political Science Quarterly 125/3 (2010), 379–81; Dean Cheng, ‘Seapower and the Chinese State: China’s Maritime Ambitions,’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 2576, 11 July 2011; James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, ‘China’s “Caribbean” in the South China Sea’, SAIS Review 26/1 (2006), 79–92.

⁴⁹ The incident raised many of the same issues as the 2001 collision between a Chinese fighter and an American reconnaissance plane. See John M. Van Dyke, ‘Military Ships and Planes Operating in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Another Country’, Marine Policy 28 (2004), 29–39.

⁵⁰ James Kraska, ‘The Legal War Behind the Impeccable Incident’, World Politics Review, 16 March 2009.

⁵¹ Cheng Xizhong, ‘A Chinese Perspective on Operational Modalities’, Marine Policy 28 (2004), 25–7.

⁵² R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd ed. (Manchester UP 1999), chapters 9 and 13.

⁵³ Ian Townsend-Gault and Clive Schofield, ‘Hardly Impeccable Behaviour: Confrontations between Foreign Ships and Coastal States in the EEZ’, International Zeitschrift 5 (April 2009), <www.zeitschrift.co.uk/indexv5n1.html>.

⁵⁴ Sam Bateman, ‘Hydrographic Surveying in the EEZ: Differences and Overlaps with Marine Scientific Research’, Marine Policy 29 (2005), 163–74.

⁵⁵ Zhang Haiwen, ‘The Conflict between Jurisdiction of Coastal States on MSR in EEZ and Military Survey’, in Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore and Kuen-chen Fu (eds), Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea and China, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 2006), 317–31.

⁵⁶ Mark J. Valencia, ‘The South China Sea Brouhaha: Separating Substance from Atmospherics’, Policy Forum 10-044, 10 Aug. 2010, <www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/policy-forums-online/security2009-2010/the-south-china-sea-brouhaha-separating-substance-from-atmospherics>.

⁵⁷ Ren Xiaofeng and Cheng Xizhong, ‘A Chinese Perspective’, Marine Policy 29 (2005), 139–46.

⁵⁸ Ji Guoxing, ‘The Legality of the ‘Impeccable Incident’, China Security 5 (2009), 18.

⁵⁹ Zhang Haiwen, ‘Is It Safeguarding the Freedom of Navigation or Maritime Hegemony of the United States? – Comments on Raul (Pete) Pedrozo’s Article on Military Activities in the EEZ’, Chinese Journal of International Law 9 (2010), 45.

⁶⁰ Scot Marciel, Testimony at the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Maritime Issues and Sovereignty Disputes in East Asia, 15 July 2009.

⁶¹ Michael Richardson, ‘Steering a Fine Line in the Yellow Sea,’ Straits Times, 23 Aug. 2010.

⁶² Ralph Cossa, ‘Not China’s Coastal Waters’, Japan Times, 1 Sept. 2010. The USS George Washington thus returned to the Yellow Sea in Nov. 2010 to conduct a second exercise with South Korean forces. ‘S. Korea, US conduct joint drill amid NK’s threats of rockets’, Korea Herald, 28 Nov. 2010.

⁶³ James Manicom, ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes: Understanding the Nature of China’s Challenge to Maritime East Asia’, Harvard Asia Quarterly 12/3&4 (2010), 46–53.

⁶⁴ Peter Dutton, ‘Cracks in the Global Foundation: International Law and Instability in the South China Sea’, in Patrick Cronin (ed.), Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea(Washington DC: Center for a New American Security 2012), 74.

⁶⁵ It remains to be seen whether recent Chinese admissions to conducting military intelligence activities off the coast of Guam amount to a change in China’s legal perspective. Surveys of the Chinese EEZ remain illegal under Chinese law for instance. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (Washington DC: Dept. of Defense 2013), 39; Kimberly Hsu and Craig Murray, ‘China’s Expanding Military Operations in Foreign Exclusive Economic Zones’. US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Backgrounder, 19 June 2013.

⁶⁶ Thomas J. Christensen, ‘The Advantages of an Assertive China’, Foreign Affairs 90/2 (2011), 60–1.

⁶⁷ Michael Auslin, Security in the Indo-Pacific Commons: Towards a Regional Strategy (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute 2010), 24–5.

⁶⁸ Dan Blumenthal with Randall Schriver, Mark Stokes, L.C. Russell Hsiao and Michael Mazza, Asian Alliances in the 21st Century (Washington DC: Project 2049 Institute 2010), 31–2.

⁶⁹ Abraham M. Denmark and James Mulvenon (eds), Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World (Washington DC: Center for a New American Security 2010), 9.

⁷⁰ See David Griffiths, US-China Maritime Confidence Building: Paradigms, Precedents, and Prospects, China Maritime Studies No. 6 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College 2010).

⁷¹ I am indebted to Andrew Erickson for this point.

⁷² Mark Valencia, ‘Foreign Military Activities in Asian EEZs: Conflict Ahead?’, NBR Special Report, No. 27 (2011), 17–18.

⁷³ One such failed effort was made by the Ocean Policy Research Foundation in concert with regional states. See Ocean Policy Research Foundation, Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone, EEZ Group 21, Oct. 2005.

⁷⁴ Auslin, Security in the Indo-Pacific Commons, 20–2.

⁷⁵ Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander, US Pacific Command, Testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee, 28 Feb. 2012.

⁷⁶ Shirley A. Kan, ‘US-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress’, CRS Reports for Congress, RL32496 (Washington DC2012), 17-23.

⁷⁷ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’sRepublic of China 2010, (Washington DC: Dept. of Defense 2010); Willard, Testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee, 9.

⁷⁸ However, some analysts maintain that China is deliberately engaging in risky behaviour to pressure the United States. See Bill Gertz, ‘Chinese Naval Vessel Tries to Force US Warship to Stop in International Waters’, Washington Free Beacon, 13 Dec. 2013, <http://freebeacon.com/chinese-naval-vessel-tries-to-force-u-s-warship-to-stop-in-international-waters/>.

⁷⁹ Brian Flemming, Canada-US Relations in the Arctic: A Neighbourly Proposal (Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute 2008).

⁸⁰ Takakazu Kuriyama, ‘Both Sides Need to Make Efforts to Maintain Status Quo’, Asahi Shimbun, 26 Dec. 2012.

⁸¹ Chien-peng Chung, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China’s Territorial Disputes (London: RoutledgeCurzon 2004), 58.

⁸² For details see Manicom, ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes’, 46–53.

⁸³ ‘China Boats Enters Waters of Senkakus’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 25 Aug. 2011; ‘Chinese Ships Cross Into Japanese Waters’, Japan Update, 11 Dec. 2008.

⁸⁴ International Crisis Group, ‘Dangerous Waters: China–Japan Relations on the Rocks’, Asia Report, No. 245 (April 2013), 45.

⁸⁵ Chinese Coast Guard vessels did cut the towed seismic monitoring cable of the Bin Minh 02 operated by PetroVietnam in May 2011. There have been no confrontations between government enforcement vessels in the South China Sea either. See Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea and Southeast Asian Responses’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 30/2 (2011), 77–107.

⁸⁶ Alan Wachman, ‘Playing By or Playing with the Rules of UNCLOS?’, in Peter Dutton (ed.), Military Activities in the EEZ: A US-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons, China Maritime Study No. 7 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College 2010), 108.

⁸⁷ Michael S. Chase, ‘Chinese Suspicions and US Intentions’, Survival 53/3 (June–July 2011), 135.

⁸⁸ Oriana Skylar Mastro, ‘Signaling and Military Provocation in Chinese National Security: A Closer Look at the Impeccable Incident’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/2 (April 2011), 241.

⁸⁹ Robert Axelrod, and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions’, in Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton UP 1986), 226–54.

⁹⁰ Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, ‘Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?’, International Security 35/1 (2010), 7–43; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton 2001), 114–28.

⁹¹ Nan Li, ‘The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From “Near Coast” to “Near Sea” to “Far Sea”’, Asian Security 5/2 (2009), 144–69.

⁹² For an analysis of Sino-US restraint in other areas of ‘commons’ see David C. Gompert and Philip C. Saunders, The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability (Washington DC: National Defense UP 2011).

⁹³ Dan Blumenthal and Michael Mazza, ‘Why Not Forget UNCLOS’, The Diplomat, 17 Feb. 2012, <http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/02/17/why-to-forget-unclos/>.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

James Manicom

James Manicom is Research Fellow in Global Security and Politics at the Centre for International Governance Innovation in Waterloo, Canada.