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Abstract
This article highlights a pattern of military adaptation and tactical problem-solving utilized by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) while engaged in protracted conflict with the Lebanese militant group Hizballah. It discusses the IDF’s recent attempts to institutionalize their historically intuitive process of ad-hoc learning by developing a formal tactical-level mechanism for ‘knowledge management’. The diffusion of this battlefield lesson-learning system that originated at lower-levels of the organization is examined, as well as its implementation and effectiveness during the 2006 Lebanon War. A nuanced analysis of IDF adaptation illustrates the dynamic interplay between both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes of military innovation.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Prof. Theo Farrell and Dr Eitan Shamir for their constructive feedback on earlier versions of this article. I would also like to thank my supervisors Dr David Betz and Prof. Sir Lawrence Freedman for their helpful comments. I am indebted to all interviewees who candidly spoke with me for my research purposes, especially Col. Meir Finkel for his time and sharing invaluable insights during discussions. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the annual conference of the International Studies Association in San Francisco, California, on 3 April 2013, and at the annual conference of the International Society of Military Sciences, hosted by the Royal Danish Defence College in Copenhagen on 13 November 2013.
Notes
1 For other examples, Brian A. Jackson et al., Aptitude for Destruction (Vol. 2): Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2005).
2 Author interview with Col. (ret.) Ronen Cohen, Deputy-Head, Research Division, IDF Military Intelligence (2006–07), 27 Jan. 2013.
3 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984); Deborah Avant, ‘The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars’, International Studies Quarterly 37/4 (Dec. 1993), 409–30.
4 Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991); Kimberly M. Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation (Princeton UP 1993), 8–9.
5 Theo Farrell, ‘The Dynamics of British Military Transformation’ International Affairs 84/4 (July 2008), 777–807; For an IDF case study, Chris Demchak, ‘Coping, Copying, and Concentrating: Organizational Learning and Modernization in Militaries (Case Studies of Israel, Germany, and Britain)’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 5/3 (July 1995), 345–76.
6 Theo Farrell, ‘Culture and Military Power’, Review of International Affairs 24/3 (July 1998), 407–16; Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation (Stanford UP 2010); Meir Finkel, On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield (Stanford UP 2011).
7 Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/5 (Oct. 2006), 905–34.
8 The literature on bottom-up adaptation is small but growing fast. For example, Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (Aug. 2010), 567–94; James Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007 (Stanford UP 2011); Robert Foley et al., ‘Transformation in Contact: Learning the Lessons of Modern War’, International Affairs 87/2 (March 2011), 253–70; Sergio Catignani, ‘“Getting COIN” at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (Aug. 2012), 513–39.
9 Benjamin Lambeth, ‘Israel’s War in Gaza: A Paradigm of Effective Military Learning and Adaptation’, International Security 37/2 (Fall 2012), 81–118
10 Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, 907.
11 Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, ‘Sources of Military Change’, in idem (eds), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002), 6.
12 Theo Farrell, ‘Introduction: Military Adaptation in War’, in Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga and James Russell (eds), Military Adaptation in Afghanistan (Stanford UP 2013), 6–7.
13 Russell, ‘Innovation in War’, 619–22; Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 568–70.
14 Farrell, ‘Introduction: Military Adaptation in War’, 7.
15 This definition draws from Jeffrey Legro, ‘Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II’, International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994), 109; Farrell, ‘Culture and Military Power’, 410–11; Farrell, ‘The Dynamics of British Military Transformation’, 783.
16 Avi Kober, ‘What Happened to Israeli Military Thought?’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/5 (Oct. 2011), 707–32; Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, 110–25.
17 Yaakov Hasdai, ‘“Doers” and “Thinkers” in the IDF’, Jerusalem Quarterly 24 (Summer 1982), 13–25.
18 For example, Ariel Levite, Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine (Boulder, CO: Westview 1990), 156–60.
19 Quoted in Uzi Ben-Shalom and Eitan Shamir, ‘Mission Command between Theory and Practice: The Case of the IDF’, Defence and Security Analysis 27/2 (June 2011), 105.
20 Terry Terriff, ‘Warriors and Innovators: Military Change and Organizational Culture in the US Marine Corps’, Defence Studies 6/2 (June 2006), 217–18.
21 Based on Zeev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army (London: Sidgwick & Jackson 1987), 73–5; Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (London: Allen Lane 1975), 104–18.
22 Quoted in Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army, 76.
23 For details on Sharon’s tactical innovations with the Paratroopers, see Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army, 111–17.
24 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 59–62; Theo Farrell, ‘World Culture and Military Power’, Security Studies 14/3 (July–Sept. 2005), 457–60.
25 Hasdai, ‘“Doers” and “Thinkers” in the IDF’, 23.
26 Rosen defines a maverick as ‘an outsider, who may have brilliant ideas, but who has rejected the system, and been rejected by the system’, as mavericks are ‘isolated and masterless men … [who] “buck the chain of command” and appear over the heads of their military supervisors in order to use an outside force to bring about the innovation they desire’. However, because IDF mavericks are supported by the system and act without major influence from civilian leadership, explanations of Rosen and Posen that focus on the civil-military interaction are not helpful for this study. For the debate, Rosen, Winning the Next War, 11–21.
27 Author interview with Col. Meir Finkel, Head of Concept Development and Doctrine Department, IDF Ground Forces, 1 July 2012.
28 For example, Anshel Pfeffer, ‘Nurturing Sharon’s Rimon Legacy’, Haaretz, 17 Oct. 2011.
29 Terry Terriff, ‘Innovate or Die: Organizational Culture and the Origins of Maneuver Warfare in the United States Marine Corps’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/3 (June 2006), 477–8
30 For example, the ‘Special Operations Engineering Unit’ (Yahalom).
31 Gavin Rabinowitz, ‘IDF Unveils New Unit to Run West Bank, Gaza Checkpoints’, Associated Press, 16 Dec. 2004.
32 ‘Israeli Army Mobilizes Camels to Help Patrol Border’, Associated Press, 23 April 2004.
33 Eliot Cohen et al., Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israel’s Security Revolution (Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy 1998), 125.
34 Gil-li Vardi, ‘Pounding Their Feet: Israeli Military Culture as Reflected in Early IDF Combat History’, Journal of Strategic Studies 31/2 (April 2008), 295–324.
35 Author interview with Eitan Shamir, Former Head of National Security Doctrine Department, Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs, 25 June 2013.
36 Author interview with Lt. Col. (ret.) E., Northern Command, 2 July 2012.
37 Author interview with Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Giora Eiland, Head of IDF Operations Branch (1999–2001), 10 July 2012.
38 Author interview with Maj. (res.) Ehud Eiran, Golani Brigade, 30 Jan. 2013.
39 Author interviews with IDF officers, Jan.–July 2012; For a first-hand account, Moshe ‘Chico’ Tamir, Undeclared War (Tel Aviv: Maarachot 2005) [Hebrew].
40 Quoted in Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God (New York: Random House 2011), 148.
41 Author interview with Brig. Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Brom, Head of IDF Strategic Planning Division (1995–98), 18 Jan. 2012.
42 Amir Rapaport, ‘The IDF’s Secret Weapon against Hizbullah’, Yediot Ahronot, 5 Dec. 1996.
43 Quoted in Jerusalem Post, 5 Dec. 1996.
44 Gen. Moshe Kaplinski, Golani Brigade Commander, was tasked to reform Egoz (which had become defunct after originally being created in the 1950s to deal with threats from Syria). The reformed unit was initially led by (then) Lt. Col. Erez Zuckerman, succeeded by maverick officer Moshe ‘Chico’ Tamir. For a personal account, see Tamir’s memoir, Undeclared War, 141–216 [Hebrew].
45 For the military loss ratios, Avi Kober, ‘Has Battlefield Decision Become Obsolete? The Commitment to the Achievement of Battlefield Decision Revisited’, Contemporary Security Policy 22/2 (Aug. 2001), 112.
46 Tamir Libel, ‘Crossing the Lebanese Swamp: Structural and Doctrinal Implications on the Israeli Defense Forces Engagement in the Southern Lebanon Security Zone, 1985–2000’, Marine Corps University Journal 2/1 (Spring 2011), 72–3.
47 Author interview with Col. (ret.) Ronen Cohen.
48 For tactical learning between the IDF and Palestinian militant groups, Brian Jackson et al., Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist Efforts to Overcome Defensive Technologies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2007), 13–37.
49 Personal discussions with senior IDF officers.
50 Gil Ariely, ‘Operational Knowledge Management in the Military’, in David Schwartz (ed.), Encyclopedia of Knowledge Management (Hershey, PA: Ideas Group 2006), 716.
51 Steven Mains and Gil Ariely, ‘Learning While Fighting: Operational Knowledge Management that Makes a Difference’, Prism 2/3 (June 2011), 170.
52 For example, Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War, passim.
53 Lt.Gen. Shaul Mofaz, ‘The IDF Toward the Year 2000’, Strategic Assessment 2/2 (Oct. 1999).
54 This section draws from Mains and Ariely, ‘Learning While Fighting’, 169–71.
55 Author interview with Col. Meir Finkel.
56 Mains and Ariely, ‘Learning While Fighting’, 170.
57 Ibid.
58 Nancy Dixon et al., Company Command: Unleashing the Power of the Army Profession (West Point, NY: CALDOL 2005), 2–5; Nancy Dixon, ‘Company Command: A Professional Community that Works’, NASA Ask Magazine 27 (Summer 2007), 13–17.
59 Personal discussions with senior IDF officers.
60 Mains and Ariely, ‘Learning While Fighting’, 170.
61 Personal discussions with senior IDF officers.
62 Mains and Ariely, 171; On ‘hybrid’ warfare, see Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 2007).
63 This is echoed in Israel’s post-war inquiry, The Winograd Commission, Chapter 7, (paragraph 4), 267–8.
64 Gil Ariely, ‘Knowledge Management, Terrorism, and Cyber-Terrorism’, in L.J. Janczewski and A.M. Colarik (eds), Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism (Hershey, PA: IGI Global 2008), 12; Gil Ariely, Learning to Digest During Fighting - Real Time Knowledge Management (Herzliya: Institute for Counterterrorism 2006).
65 Personal discussions with senior IDF officers.
66 Ariely, Learning to Digest During Fighting – Real Time Knowledge Management.
67 Ibid.
68 Personal discussions with senior IDF officers.
69 Based on Mains and Ariely, ‘Learning While Fighting’, 171.
70 Clausewitz, On War, 77.
71 Gil Ariely, Knowledge – The Thermonuclear Weapon for Terrorists in the Information Age (Herzliya: Institute for Counterterrorism 2003).
72 Mains and Ariely, ‘Learning While Fighting’, 171.
73 For several similar incidents that occurred in a number of Lebanese villages, see Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2008), 39–40.
74 Josh Brannon, ‘What Happened at the “House of Death”?’, Jerusalem Post, 1 Nov. 2006.
75 For the specific incident, Amos Harel, ‘Missile Strike Kills 9 IDF Soldiers in Debel House’, Haaretz, 10 Aug. 2006; Hanan Greenberg, ‘15 Reservists Killed in Lebanon Battles’, Yediot Ahronot, 10 Aug. 2006.
76 See statements on the Hizballah Official Website, 3 July 2008; 13 Aug. 2009; 11 Aug. 2010
77 Gil Ariely, ‘Learning While Fighting’, Maarachot 412 (May 2007), 10 [Hebrew].
78 Winograd Commission, Chapter 11, (paragraph 32), 402 [emphasis added].
79 Winograd Commission, Chapter 11, (paragraph 19), 398 [emphasis added].
80 Winograd Commission, Chapter 12, (paragraphs 5–6), 415–16 [emphasis added].
81 Winograd Commission, Chapter 18, (paragraph 33), 583.
82 Author interview with Col. (ret.) Gabi Siboni, former Deputy-Head, IDF Force Utilization and Buildup Experimentation Laboratory, 17 Jan. 2012.
83 Lt. Col. Abe Marrero, ‘The Tactics of Operation Cast Lead’, in Lt. Col. Scott Farquhar (ed.), Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute 2009), 83–102; David Johnson, Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2011), 123–40; Lambeth, ‘Israel’s War in Gaza’, passim; Gil Ariely, ‘Learning During Fighting in Operation Cast Lead’, Maarachot 425 (June 2009), 12–21 [Hebrew].
84 Author interview with Col. Meir Finkel.
85 Robert Foley, ‘A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation: The German Army, 1916–1918’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/6 (Dec. 2012), 799–827; Meir Finkel, ‘Flexible Force Structure: A Flexibility Oriented Force Design and Development Process for Israel’, Israel Affairs 12/4 (Oct. 2006), 792–5; Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 572–3.
86 Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, 926–7.
87 Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command (Stanford UP 2011), 82–95.
88 Dan Horowitz, ‘Flexible Responsiveness and Military Strategy: The Case of the Israeli Army’, Policy Sciences 1/2 (Summer 1970), 191–2.
89 Finkel, On Flexibility, 12.
90 For example, US Department of the Army, Field Manual 6-01.1, ‘Knowledge Management Operations’ (Washington DC: Army Headquarters July 2012); For a British example, Foley et al., ‘Transformation in Contact’, 259–65; For an Australian perspective, Lt. Gen. K.J. Gillespie, ‘The Adaptive Army Initiative’, Australian Army Journal 6/3 (Summer 2009), 7–19.
91 Terriff, ‘Warriors and Innovators’, 238.
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Raphael D. Marcus
Raphael D. Marcus is currently completing his PhD in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where his doctoral research focuses on military innovation and insurgency adaptation in the Israel-Hizballah conflict. He is also a member of the Insurgency Research Group at King’s College London. His research interests include Middle East security issues, military affairs, terrorism, and organizational learning.