Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia

Abstract

In recent years, headline grabbing increases in the Indian defense budget have raised concerns that India’s on-going military modernization threatens to upset the delicate conventional military balance vis-à-vis Pakistan. Such an eventuality is taken as justification for Islamabad’s pursuit of tactical-nuclear weapons and other actions that have worrisome implications for strategic stability on the subcontinent. This article examines the prospects for Pakistan’s conventional deterrence in the near to medium term, and concludes that it is much better than the pessimists allege. A host of factors, including terrain, the favorable deployment of Pakistani forces, and a lack of strategic surprise in the most likely conflict scenarios, will mitigate whatever advantages India may be gaining through military modernization. Despite a growing technological edge in some areas, Indian policymakers cannot be confident that even a limited resort to military force would achieve a rapid result, which is an essential pre-condition for deterrence failure.

Key Words:

• India
• Pakistan
• Conventional Deterrence
• Military Modernization
• Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Stephen Rosen, Paul Staniland, Vipin Narang, Christopher Clary, Nina Silove, Gaurav Kampani, Anit Mukherjee, Srinath Raghavan and the participants at the workshop on Indian Security at the Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania for helpful comments on a prior draft of this article.

Notes

¹ Frank Daniel, ‘Kashmir Shelling, Spat Over Pak Aid Mar Run-up to Kerry Trip,’ Reuters, 6 Jan. 2015.

² The phrase ‘ugly stability’ comes from Ashley J. Tellis, Stability in South Asia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), 5.

³ Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation,’ in Henry D. Sokolski, (ed.), Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Jan. 2008), 131–2.

⁴ Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), <www.sipri.org/databases/milex>.

⁵ Rahul Bedi, ‘No Guns, No Glory,’ Tehelka 9/ 14 (7 April 2012); Brahma Chellaney, ‘India’s Missing Hard Power,’ Mint, 21 April 2010; Siddharth Srivastava, ‘Indian Arms Spree on the Fast Track,’ Asia Times, 4 June 2009.

⁶ Musharraf quoted in ‘No-Win Situation Vital to Peace Says Musharraf,’ The News, 12 Aug., 2003; ‘Pak’s Conventional Deterrence Averted War: Musharraf,’ Rediff, 22 June 2002. See also, M. V. Ramana and Zia Mian, ‘The Nuclear Confrontation in South Asia,’ in SIPRI Yearbook 2003 (Oxford: OUP 2003), 201.

⁷ Malik Qasim Mustafa, ‘Pakistan’s Military Security and Conventional Balance of Power,’ Strategic Studies 29/ 1 (Spring 2009), 36.

⁸ ‘Countries Should Commit to No-First-Use Policy,’ Express Tribune, 16 May 2014; Mansoor Ahmed, ‘Security Doctrines, Technologies and Escalation Ladders: A Pakistani Perspective’ (paper presented at the US-Pakistan Strategic Partnership: A Track II Dialogue, Phuket, Thailand, 18–19 Sept. 2011), 1, 5; Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘Perilous Indian Military Buildup,’ Weekly Pulse, 2 Nov. 2012; Zulfqar Khan, India-Pakistan Nuclear Rivalry: Perceptions, Misperceptions, and Mutual Deterrence, (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Jan. 2005). An alternate argument not explored here is that an asymmetry of military power in India’s favor actually enhances stability in South Asia. Raju Thomas, ‘The South Asian Security Balance in a Western Dominant World,’ in (eds), Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. (Stanford UP 2004), 317–18. This logic is rooted in the belief that as a status quo power India is not likely to initiate military operations against its neighbor and that revisionist states like Pakistan only mount a challenge when the capabilities of the two sides converge. A.F.K. Organiski, World Politics (New York: Knopf 1968), 364–6.

⁹ Several studies summarized in Daniel S. Geller and J. David Singer, Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict (Cambridge: CUP 1998), 147.

¹⁰ Air Vice-Marshal Shahzad Chaudhry in Rachel Oswald, ‘Pakistan-India Arms Race Destabilizing Strategic Balance, Experts Say,’ Global Security News Wire, 20 July 2011; Maleeha Lodhi, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Compulsions,’ The News, 6 Nov. 2012; Munir Akram, ‘Gambling Against Armageddon,’ Dawn, 26 Oct. 2014; Feroz Khan, ‘Minimum Deterrence: Pakistan’s Dilemma,’ RUSI Journal 156/ 5 (Oct. 2011), 48. See also, Agha Umer Farooq, ‘Deterrence Stability, Security Doctrines & Escalation Control in South Asia,’ (paper presented at the US-Pakistan Strategic Partnership: A Track II Dialogue, Phuket, Thailand, 18–19 September 2011), 5.

¹¹ Quoted in Baqir Sajjad Syed, ‘Minimum N-Deterrence Will Be Maintained: FO,’ Dawn, 21 May 2009.

¹² Air Commodore Khalid Banuri communication to the Congressional Research Service cited in Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 10 May 2012), 8.

¹³ Lavoy, ‘Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture,’ 158.

¹⁴ Rodney W. Jones, ‘Conventional Military Imbalance and Strategic Stability in South Asia,’ (Univ. of Bradford: South Asian Strategic Stability Unit, March 2005), 5.

¹⁵ Ibid., 4.

¹⁶ Paul Bracken, ‘The Problem from Hell: South Asia’s Arms Race,’ The Diplomat, 29 Nov. 2012.

¹⁷ Tom Hundley, ‘Pakistan and India: Race to the End,’ Foreign Policy, 5 Sept. 2012, <www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/race_to_the_end>.

¹⁸ Michael Krepon, ‘Tac Nukes in South Asia,’ Arms Control Wonk, 18April 2012, <http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/3419/tac-nukes-in-south-asia>. See also, Toby Dalton and Jaclyn Tandler, ‘Understanding the Arms ‘Race’ In South Asia’ (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sept. 2012), 4; Kerr and Nikitin, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,’ 3; Gregory Koblentz, Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age (Washington DC: the Council on Foreign Relations 2014), 27–8; Richard Weitz, ‘South Asia’s Nuclear Arms Racing,’ The Diplomat, 1 Oct. 2011. For a discussion of Pakistani thinking on tactical nuclear weapons, which does not share the alarmism regarding India’s military modernization, see Shashank Joshi, ‘Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear: Nightmare: De´ja` Vu?’ The Washington Quarterly 36/ 3 (Summer 2013), 159–72.

¹⁹ Gurmeet Kanwal, India’s Military Modernization: Plans and Strategic Underpinnings (Washington DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, Sept 2012), 2.

²⁰ See the comments of Maj. Gen. G.D. Bakshi, SM, VSM (Retd) and Maj. Gen. Dhruv Katoch (Retd) quoted at ‘Pakistan Army: Modernization, Arms Procurement and Capacity Building,’ Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, India, 21 Feb. 2011. For similar views, see Shekhar Gupta, ‘No First-Use Options,’ Indian Express, 17 Jan. 2009; Harsh V. Pant, ‘India in Afghanistan: A Rising Power or a Hesitant Power?’ (paper presented at the CIPSS Speaker Series on International Security and Economy, McGill Univ., 5 April 2012),. 23.

²¹ Comptroller and Auditor General, Report No. 24: Union Government (Defence Services) Army and Ordnance Factories, Dec. 2011, 12; G.D. Bakshi, ‘Restructuring the Indian Armed Forces,’ Journal of Defence Studies. 5/ 2 (April 2011), 26; ‘Indian Army Summer Battle Exercise in Rajasthan,’ DefenceNow, 28 April 2012; Kanwal, ‘India’s Military Modernization: Plans and Strategic Underpinnings,’ 3; Lt. Gen. B.S. Pawar, ‘Indian Army Aviation Corps: Today and Tomorrow,’ Defence and Security Alert, Oct. 2012; Kartikeya Sharma and Gautam Datt, ‘Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence Admits Shortage of Ammunition,’ India Today, 23 April 2012; Gary Schmitt and Sadanand Dhume, ‘Can India’s Military Be Fixed?’ Weekly Standard. 19/ 40 (June 2014).

²² Arun Sahgal and Vinod Anand, ‘Revolution in Military Affairs and Jointness,’ Journal of Defence Studies 1/ 1 (Aug. 2007), 114.

²³ Sandeep Unnithan, ‘Not Ready for War,’ India Today, 29 Oct. 2011. See also, Siddharth Srivastava, ‘Indian Army “Backed Out” Of Pakistan Attack,’ Asia Times, 21 Jan. 2009.

²⁴ Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2010), xii.

²⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1983), 15. With respect to conventional forces, denying an opponent their objectives is generally considered to be more effective than threats to punish them. The main advantage of conventional weapons over nuclear weapons for deterrence is the credibility of their use in defense of less-than-vital interests. John Stone, ‘Conventional Deterrence and the Challenge of Credibility,’ Contemporary Security Policy. 33/ 1 (April 2012), 119. The primary drawback is that their less than ‘absolute’ nature means opponents can hold out the prospect of overcoming them with ‘technical, tactical, or operational solutions.’ Richard Harknett, ‘The Logic of Conventional Deterrence and the End of the Cold War,’ Security Studies 4/1 (Autumn 1994), 88–9.

²⁶ Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence,. 23–24.

²⁷ Ibid. For evidence from prospect theory to support these claims, see Jack S. Levy, ‘Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems,’ Political Psychology 13/2 (June 1992), 279–312. For arguments by both academics and elected officials that politicians are risk adverse, see Jay Newton-Small, ‘Next Stop, Sacramento?’ Time, 23 April 2009; D. Michael Shafer, ‘The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency,’ Political Science Quarterly 103/ 1 (Spring 1988), 66.

²⁸ Vipin Narang, ‘Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,’ International Security 34/. 3 (Winter 2009/10), 64. Among the factors traditionally believed to constitute Pakistan’s nuclear ‘red lines’ is the conquest of a large part of its territory or the destruction of a large portion of its armed forces. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, ‘Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan: A Concise Report of a Visit by Landau Network-Centro-Volta’ (Como, Italy: Landau Network, Jan. 2001), 5. For arguments that even advances in sensors, stealth, precision strike and other ‘revolutionary’ military technologies will not reverse the effects of nuclear weapons, see Colin S. Gray, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Military Affairs,’ in T.V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett, and James J. Wirtz (eds) The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press 1998), 124; Bradley A. Thayer, ‘The Political Effects of Information Warfare: Why New Military Capabilities Cause Old Political Dangers,’ Security Studies 10/ 1 (Autumn 2000), 65.

²⁹ Manjeet S. Pardesi, ‘The Impact of RMA on Conventional Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis’ (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Dec. 2005), 23.

³⁰ Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1996).

³¹ Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 23–4.

³² Michel Fortmann and Stefanie von Hlatky, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs: Impact of Emerging Technology on Deterrence,’ in T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (eds.), Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age (Univ. of Chicago Press 2009), 316.

³³ Eliot A. Cohen, ‘Change and Transformation in Military Affairs,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 27/3 (Sept. 2004), 404; Michael Sheehan, ‘The Changing Character of War,’ in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds), The Globalization of World Politics (New York: OUP 2007), 217.

³⁴ Stephen Biddle, ‘Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare,’ Foreign Affairs (March/April 2003), 31–46; Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton UP 2004), 147–9; Stephen Biddle et al., ‘Toppling Saddam: Iraq and American Military Transformation’ (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute April 2004), 22–31.

³⁵ See the various simulation results reported in Biddle, Military Power, 183–8.

³⁶ Joseph Fitchett, ‘NATO Misjudged Bombing Damage,’ International Herald Tribune, 23 June 1999; Paul Richter, ‘US Study of War on Yugoslavia Aimed at Boosting Performance,’ Los Angeles Times, 10 July 1999. The USAF’s interim report on the Kosovo air effort expressly conceded that ‘shortfalls remain … in the USAF’s ability to locate and attack moving armor and other ground forces in poor weather. The Air Force needs to continue to develop and improve its ability to do this.’ ‘The Air War over Serbia: Aerospace Power in Operation Allied Force’ (Washington DC: United States Air Force, 1 April 2000), 53.

³⁷ Stephen Biddle, ‘Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq,’ International Security 30/ 3 (Winter 2005/06), 169–70.

³⁸ Stephen Biddle, ‘Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy,’ (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Nov. 2002), 27–8.

³⁹ Biddle, Military Power, 68–9.

⁴⁰ Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 43.

⁴¹ Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince [1513] (Oxford: OUP 1984), 50–1; Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles (El Paso, TX: Norte Press 2009), 33–6; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton UP 1984), 142.

⁴² Joseph Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2014), 42.

⁴³ Michael C. Desch, Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press 2010), 40–1. In addition to surprise, Trevor Dupuy finds that the geography of the conflict zone has a significant impact on military effectiveness, with the potential to give ‘combat power superiority to an apparently inferior force.’ T.N. Dupuy, Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War (Falls Church, VA: Nova Publications 1995), 108.

⁴⁴ Dupuy, Attrition, 110.

⁴⁵ William A. Owens, Lifting the Fog of War (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 2001), 203.

⁴⁶ Clausewitz, On War, 119; Barry D. Watts, The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs,’ (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 2011), 11, 34.

⁴⁷ Virander Kumar and P.K. Gautam, ‘Back to the Basics: Foot and Hoof Mobility in the Mountains,’ IDSA Policy Brief (14 Oct. 2011), 3.

⁴⁸ Gurmeet Kanwal, ‘Military Dimensions of the 2002 India-Pakistan Standoff–Planning and Preparations for Land Operations,’ in Zachary S. Davis (ed.), The India-Pakistan Military Standoff: Crisis and Escalation in South Asia (New York: Palgrave MacMillan 2011), 72.

⁴⁹ John H. Gill, ‘Military Operations in the Kargil Conflict,’ in Peter R. Lavoy (ed.), Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (Cambridge: CUP 2009), 116.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 123.

⁵¹ V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, ‘Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 2003), 150–1.

⁵² Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 54.

⁵³ Ibid., 56.

⁵⁴ John Arquilla, ‘Nuclear Weapons in South Asia: More May Be Manageable,’ Comparative Strategy 16/ 1 (Jan.–March 1997), 16.

⁵⁵ Kanwal, ‘Military Dimensions of the 2002 India-Pakistan Standoff,’ 84.

⁵⁶ ‘War in a Wind Blown Waste,’ Life, 11 June 1965, 33.

⁵⁷ Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 (New York: Columbia UP 2001), 128.

⁵⁸ James J. Wirtz and Surinder Rana, ‘Surprise at the Top of the World: India’s Systemic and Intelligence Failure,’ in Lavoy, Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia, 212–13.

⁵⁹ Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, Assessing the Terrorist Threat (Washington DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 10 Sept. 2010), 13; Daniel Markey, ‘Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation,’ Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 6 (Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations, Jan. 2010), 1.

⁶⁰ For example, at a recent conference on strategic stability in South Asia held in Islamabad, seven of the nine ‘wargames’ examining aspects of a future Indo-Pak war posited that conflict began with a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack within India. In the other two scenarios, violence attributed to Hindu nationalists and a deterioration of internal stability in Gujarat were the pretext for an Indian attack on Pakistan. Conference Report, ‘Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and its Implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia,’ (Islamabad, Pakistan: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, 20–22 July 2010), 30, 31, 34, 40, 44, 46, 52, 57, 62.

⁶¹ Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,’ International Security 32/ 3 (Winter 2007/08), 160–1.

⁶² Gill, ‘Military Operations in the Kargil Conflict,’ 97; Benjamin S. Lambeth, ‘Airpower in India’s 1999 Kargil War,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 35/ 3 (June 2012), 293.

⁶³ Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, ‘Doctrine, Capabilities, and (In)Stability in South Asia,’ in Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson (eds.), Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia (Washington DC: The Stimson Center 2013), 97–8.

⁶⁴ Pranab Dhal Samanta, ‘New Pak Doctrine: Deploy at Border If Terror Strike in India,’ Indian Express 8 Jan. 2012.

⁶⁵ ‘Pakistan Has Quality Army, India Has Quantity, Say Experts,’ Agence France-Presse, 22 May 2002.

⁶⁶ John E. Peters et al, War and Escalation in South Asia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2006), 36–7.

⁶⁷ Author interview with John H. Gill, Associate Professor, Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, Washington DC, Nov. 2012.

⁶⁸ For example, Grauer and Horowitz judge that in the 1971 war, the Indian Army employed cover, concealment, dispersion, small-unit maneuver, and combined arms operations –which are a hallmark of sophisticated conventional militaries and essential for exploiting the potential of ‘revolutionary’ military technology –’at a very high level.’ Pakistani forces, in contrast, were found to have skillfully employed these tools at the tactical level, but failed to do so operationally. Ryan Grauer and Michael C. Horowitz, ‘What Determines Military Victory? Testing the Modern System,’ Security Studies 21/1 (2012), 100. More recently, in Kargil in 1999, irrespective of the strategic wisdom of the incursion, Pakistani forces were also found to demonstrate great tactical prowess in preparing their fighting positions, employing artillery, and conducting small-unit operations. Gill, ‘Military Operations in the Kargil Conflict,’ 120. In contrast, during the ten-month ‘twin peaks’ crisis in 2001–2002, the Indian Army suffered 798 casualties, mainly due to ‘mishaps in minefields, mishandling of ammunition and explosives and traffic accidents,’ which some observers suggested illustrated the ‘inexperience’ of the Army. Keith Flory, ‘Military Muscle,’ Statesman, 20 May 2002; ‘Parakram Killed More Than Kargil,’ Times of India, 2 Aug. 2003.

⁶⁹ See, for example, Paul Huth, Standing Your Ground (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press 1996), 258; Allan C. Stam, Win, Lose or Draw (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press 1996), 94–5. This measurement has a number of recognized shortcomings in cross-country comparisons since the results can be distorted by the costs of capital intensive services (such as the Air Force and Navy) which ‘spend’ significantly more per combatant than land elements due to the exorbitant costs of their platforms, as well as the difference in cost structures between professional and conscript-based militaries. However, these problems are reduced for a comparison of extremely similar militaries, like India and Pakistan, and the measure is only employed here to generate rough order of magnitude estimates.

⁷⁰ Author’s calculations based on defense spending figures collected by SIPRI and the force sizes reported in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012 (London: Routledge for IISS 2012).

⁷¹ Author’s calculations based on figures drawn from SIPRI, the IISS Military Balance 1990, 1991, and Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraqi Military Forces Ten Years After the Gulf War (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Aug. 2000). The range of estimates arises from discrepancies among these sources as to Iraqi defense spending in 1990 –the year before the conflict.

⁷² Author calculations based on figures drawn from SIPRI, the IISS Military Balance 2003, and the 2002 CIA World Fact Book.

⁷³ James Jay Carafano, ‘Measuring Military Power,’ Strategic Studies Quarterly 8/ 3 (Fall 2014), 15–16; Ashley J. Tellis et al., Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2000), 138–41; Congressional Budget Office, Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance (Washington DC: US GPO 1978), 53.

⁷⁴ Prior study has found that so-called symmetrical counting of military forces greatly affects public assessments of military balances. CBO, Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance, 54.

⁷⁵ For a similar assessment, see Christopher Clary, ‘Deterrence Stability and the Conventional Balance of Forces in South Asia,’ in Krepon and Thompson, Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia, 143–5.

⁷⁶ John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton 2001), 88–9.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 89.

⁷⁸ Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘Drivers of Indian Naval Expansion,’ in Harsh V. Pant (ed.), The Rise of the Indian Navy: Internal Vulnerabilities, External Challenges (Farnham, UK: Ashgate 2012), 33.

⁷⁹ James Holmes et al., Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge 2009), 86–7.

⁸⁰ Ladwig, ‘Drivers of Indian Naval Expansion,’ 34, 37. On the advantages of land-based air forces versus surface navies, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 89.

⁸¹ On the state of India’s submarine fleet, see Iskander Rehman, ‘The Indian Navy Has a Big Problem: The Subsurface Dilemma,’ The National Interest, 4 Nov. 2014, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-indian-navy-has-big-problem-the-subsurface-dilemma-11598>.

⁸² Sean Mirski, ‘Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 36/ 3 (June 2013), 397.

⁸³ The author thanks Anit Mukherjee for raising this point.

⁸⁴ Michael A. Glosny, ‘Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan,’ International Security 28/ 4 (Spring 2004), 148.

⁸⁵ ‘Pakistan Imports Crude Oil Worth $15 billion,’ The News, 30 Jan. 2014.

⁸⁶ Rajat Pandit, ‘Army’s Ammunition Won’t Last 20 Days of War,’ Times of India, 25 Aug. 2014.

⁸⁷ For a discussion of external crisis-management in recent episodes, see P.R. Chari et al., Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2007); Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, The Unfinished Crisis: US Crisis Management after the 2008 Mumbai Attacks (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center 2012).

⁸⁸ On the questionable effectiveness of blockades historically, see Lance E. Davis and Stanley L. Engerman, Naval Blockades in Peace and War: An Economic History Since 1750 (Cambridge: CUP 2006).

⁸⁹ Robert A. Doughty and Harold E. Raugh, ‘Embargoes in Historical Perspective,’ Parameters 21 (Spring 1991), 28–9. See also, Glosny, ‘Strangulation from the Sea?’ 146–7.

⁹⁰ Jones, ‘Conventional Military Imbalance and Strategic Stability in South Asia,’ 29.

⁹¹ Lambeth, ‘Airpower in India’s 1999 Kargil War,’ 304.

⁹² IISS, The Military Balance 2015, 251, 278.

⁹³ Rajat Pandit, ‘MMRCA Deal: Rafael Negotiations Expected to be Wrapped Up in 3 Months,’ Times of India, 3 June 2014; Rajat Pandit, ‘Amid Sniping by Rivals, France Aims to Close Rafael Deal by Early 2015,’ Times of India, 30 Oct. 2014.

⁹⁴ Ajai Shukla, ‘First Tejas Rolls Out,’ Business Standard, 3 Oct. 2014; ‘Delay in LCA Project,’ Business Standard, 25 Nov. 2014.

⁹⁵ India has pinned its hopes for a next generation fighter aircraft on a joint development project with Russia, but technical problems, disagreements over designs and delays have seen the potential of 220 Perspective Multi-Role Fighters (based on Sukhoi’s PAK-FA) cut to 130. The earliest India would start to take delivery of these aircraft, if the deal comes to fruition, is 2024–25. As a result, they are not included here. Rahul Bedi, ‘Indian Air Force Unhappy at Progress of PAK-FA Fifth-Gen Fighter,’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, 4 Sept. 2014.

⁹⁶ Assuming delays result in an effective ‘loss’ of 30 per cent of aircraft availability.

⁹⁷ Bakshi, ‘Restructuring the Indian Armed Forces,’, 26.

⁹⁸ ‘Need a Fix’ Defense Industry Daily, 21 March 2013, <www.defenseindustrydaily.com/sweden-finalizes-saab-2000-aewc-contract-with-pakistan-02377>.

⁹⁹ IISS, The Military Balance 2015, 251, 279.

¹⁰⁰ Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, ‘What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980,’ World Politics 36/ 4 (July 1984), 496–526; Jack S. Levy, ‘Quantitative Studies of Deterrence Success and Failure,’ in Paul C. Stern et al. (ed.), Perspectives on Deterrence (New York: OUP 1989), 98–133

¹⁰¹ The 1st Armoured Division is based in the Punjab and the 18th and 24th RAPID divisions –which are essentially infantry divisions with an additional mechanized brigade –are based in Rajasthan.

¹⁰² Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars?’ 160.

¹⁰³ Viola Gienger, ‘Pakistan Pledges to Attack Al-Qaeda “Epicenter of Terrorism,” Mullen Says,’ Bloomberg, 14 Oct. 2010.

¹⁰⁴ This was the subject of considerable academic debate in the late 1980s, see for example John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics,’ International Security, 13/ 4 (Spring 1989), 54–89 and T.N. Dupuy, ‘Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule,’ International Security 14/ 1 (Summer 1989), 196.

¹⁰⁵ Paul K. Davis, Aggregation, Disaggregation and the 3:1 Rule in Ground Combat (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1995), 15–16.

¹⁰⁶ For studies reaching a similar conclusion, see Khurshid Khan, Limited War under the Nuclear Umbrella and Its Implications for South Asia (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center May 2005),. 21; Arzan Tarapore, Holocaust or Hollow Victory: Limited War in Nuclear South Asia,’ IPCS Research Papers, No. 6 (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Feb. 2005), 16; and Clary, ‘Deterrence Stability and the Conventional Balance of Forces in South Asia,’ 160.

¹⁰⁷ Pandit, ‘Army’s Ammunition Won’t Last 20 Days of War;’; ‘Only Ten Days of Ammunition Left?’ Zeenews Bureau, 6 April 2012; Sharma and Datt, ‘Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence Admits Shortage of Ammunition.’

¹⁰⁸ This is a count of tanks on active service; it does not include vehicles in long-term storage.

¹⁰⁹ Kanwal, ‘India’s Military Modernization,’ 3; Rahul Bedi, ‘Government Auditor Slams Indian Army for T-90s Air-Conditioning Failures,’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, 24 Feb. 2014.

¹¹⁰ Gurmeet Kanwal, Indian Army Modernization Needs a Major Push (New Delhi: India Strategic, Feb. 2010), 2–3.

¹¹¹ Kanwal, ‘India’s Military Modernization,’ 3.

¹¹² There have not been any procurements of self-propelled artillery since 2005. John H. Gill, ‘India and Pakistan: A Shift in the Military Calculus?’, in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (ed.), Strategic Asia, 2005–06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty (Seattle, WA.: National Bureau of Asian Research 2005), 244.

¹¹³ Comptroller and Auditor General (hereafter CAG), Report No. 24: Union Government (Defence Services) Army and Ordnance Factories, Dec. 2011, 12.

¹¹⁴ Pranav Kulkarni, ‘Manohar Parrikar Greenlights Purchase of 814 Artillery Guns,’ Indian Express, 23 Nov. 2014; ‘Structural Problems and Lack of Transparency Continue to Plague India’s Arms Procurement Policy,’ DNA India, 3 Jan. 2014.

¹¹⁵ CAG, Report No. 24, 12.

¹¹⁶ Unnithan, ‘Not Ready for War.’

¹¹⁷ For evidence that some efforts to implement a proactive strategy are underway, see Cohen and Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming, 61.

¹¹⁸ The primary systems are the Bofors RBS 70, the Crotale 4000, and the MBDA Mistral.

¹¹⁹ Pinaki Bhattacharya, ‘Army and IAF Face Off over New War Plan,’ India Today, 14 Dec. 2009.

¹²⁰ Y. I. Patel, ‘Dig Vijay to Divya Astra – a Paradigm Shift in the Indian Army’s Doctrine,’ Bharat Rakshak Monitor 6/ 6 (May/June 2004).

¹²¹ Lambeth, ‘Airpower in India’s 1999 Kargil War,’ 304.

¹²² Ibid., 298, 308.

¹²³ ‘Indian Army and Air Force Conduct Joint Exercise in Rajasthan,’ DefenceNow, 11 May 2011.

¹²⁴ ‘Indian Army Summer Battle Exercise in Rajasthan,’ DefenceNow, 28 April 2012.

¹²⁵ Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars?’ 182.

¹²⁶ Josy Joseph, ‘Army’s Demand for Attack Choppers Triggers Fresh Turf War with IAF,’ Times of India, 14 July 2012.

¹²⁷ On the inferiority of tactical surprise, see Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 54.

¹²⁸ Historically derived estimates of the impact of surprise, terrain and defensive fortifications in this section are drawn from Dupuy, Attrition, 146–52.

¹²⁹ See, for example, George Friedman, ‘Next Steps in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis,’ Stratfor, 8 Dec. 2008; Markey, ‘Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation,’ 2.

¹³⁰ Vivek Kapur, Transformation of the Indian Air Force over the Next Decade (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies & Analysis, 13 June, 2012), 4.

¹³¹ ‘India Accuses Pakistan of Maintaining ‘Militant Camps’ Along Border,’ The Express Tribune (Pakistan), 4 Dec. 2012.

¹³² B. Raman, ‘Make Them Pay,’ Outlook, 23 Feb. 2010.

¹³³ Michele L. Malvesti, ‘Bombing Bin Laden: Assessing the Effectiveness of Air Strikes as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy,’ The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs26/ 1 (Winter 2002),17–29.

¹³⁴ Dan Markey of the Council on Foreign Relations quoted in Anwar Iqbal, ‘Pakistan’s Response to Attack Will Be Intense, Says Report,’ Dawn, 21 Jan., 2010. See also, Ajaya Kumar Das, ‘Mumbai II? Why India Will Again Show Restraint,’ RSIS Commentary, No. 130/2010 (13 Oct. 2010).

¹³⁵ Quoted in Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, ‘The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,’ Security Studies 14/ 2 (2005), 311.

¹³⁶ Quoted in Pushpindar Singh, Himalayan Eagles: History of the Indian Air Force (New Delhi: The Society for Aerospace Studies 2007), 108–9.

¹³⁷ India and Pakistan, ‘Agreement on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Maneuvers and Troop Movements,’ 6 April 1991, UNTS No. 31420, <http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201843/volume-1843-i-31420-english.pdf>.

¹³⁸ Lambeth, ‘Airpower in India’s 1999 Kargil War,’. 300–1.

¹³⁹ Iibid.,. 297–8.

¹⁴⁰ For an argument that, apart from security concerns, nuclear proliferation can be driven by domestic politics or norms see Scott D. Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,’ International Security. 21/ 3 (Winter 1996–97), 54–86.

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Notes on contributors

Walter C. Ladwig III

Walter C. Ladwig III is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at King’s College, London and a Visiting Fellow in South Asian Security at the Royal United Services Institution.