![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
Russian Special Forces saw significant changes to both organization and doctrine in the years after 2008. The special forces of the General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate were reduced in number, the organization’s institutional autonomy and rationale were changed, and an entirely new Special Operations Command was established in March 2013. This article seeks to assess the nature, scope and purpose of these changes, and to explain them by drawing on scholarship on military innovation. In particular, the article looks at military innovation in the context of a non-democratic political regime.
Notes
1 One important exception here is Aleksei Nikolskii, ‘The Olympic Reserve: Why Russia Has Created Special Operations Command’, Moscow Defence Brief, No. 4 (2013).
2 See footnote 28, page 10. Theo Farrell, Sten Rynning and Terry Terriff, Transforming Military Power Since the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2013), for a representative list. An important exception to this trend is Kimberly Marten-Zisk’s Engaging the Enemy – Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation 1955–1991. However, in this otherwise excellent study, regime type is not an important issue. Marten-Zisk uses Western organization theory to analyse processes in the non-democratic Soviet context without a specific discussion of how regime type may affect policy outcomes.
3 In particular, the following works have been important: Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine – France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984), Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/5 (2006), 905–34, Farrell, Rynning and Terriff, Transforming Military Power Since the Cold War, and Kimberly Marten-Zisk’s Engaging the Enemy – Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation 1955-1991 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1993).
4 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine.
5 Sergeii Kozlov and others (eds.), Spetsnaz GRU – Ocherki istorii (Moscow: Russkaia Panorama 2009), 14.
6 Interview with former spetsnaz officer Vladislav Surygin at ≤http://3mv.ru/publ/vladislav_shurygin_ehra_specnaza/7-1-0-14898>.
7 See for example Ståle Ljøterud ‘Spesialoperasjoner – med kløkt og mot’ in Harald Høiback and Palle Ydstebø (eds.), Krigens vitenskap – en innføring i militærteori (Oslo: Abstrakt forlag 2012), 318.
8 See Vladimir Kuzar, ‘Pravo na vystrel’, Krasnaia Zvezda, 8 July 2006.
9 Spetsnaz is the Russian terms for special operations forces. It is short for spetsialnoe naznachenie.
10 Simon Anglim, ‘Special Forces – Strategic Asset’, Infinity Journal, No. 2 (2011), 17.
11 Ståle Ljøterud ‘Spesialoperasjoner – med kløkt og mot’, 315.
12 Ståle Ljøterud ‘Spesialoperasjoner – med kløkt og mot’, 302, and Simon Anglim, ‘Special Forces – Strategic Asset’, 15.
13 Sergei Kanchukov, ‘Komandovanie spetsialnykh operatsii Rossii: kontseptsia sozdania’, 12 Dec. 2012, ≤http://specnaz.org/articles/analytics/komandovanie_spetsialnykh_operatsiy_rossii_kontseptsiya_sozdaniya_ot_sergeya_kanchukova_/>, a website for spetsnaz veterans.
14 JP 3-05, p.10, ≤https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-05.pdf>. 2014.
15 Ljøterud ‘Spesialoperasjoner – med kløkt og mot’,., 316.
16 Vladimir Kvachkov, Spetsnaz Rossii (Moscow: Voennaia Litteratura 2004), subchapter 3.2.1 Klassifikatsia spetsialnykh operatsii, book accessed from http://militera.lib.ru/science/kvachkov_vv/index.html.
17 Ibid.
18 Ljøterud ‘Spesialoperasjoner – med kløkt og mot’, 302.
19 VDV is short for Vozdushno-Desantnye Sily, which is the Russian name for the airborne forces.
20 Officially, total manpower in the Russian military is 1 million, but a 2013 report by the Russian Audit Chamber claimed that the real manpower is no more than 766, 000. Ria-Novosti, 24 Oct. 2013.
21 Roger McDermott, ‘Russian Military Intelligence: Shaken but not stirred’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 7 Feb. 2012.
22 Vladimir Mukhin, ‘Bystroe reagirovanie Vladimira Shamanova’, Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 18 Nov. 2013.
23 Interview with Konstantin Bushuiev at the radio station Ekho Moskvy, 5 Nov. 2011.
24 Sergei Breslavskii, ‘Kakoi spetsnaz nuzhen Rossii’, in Sergei Kozlov and others, Vol. IV, 368.
25 Ibid.
26 Igor Vetrov, ‘Spetsnaz GRU: istoria s prodolzheniem’, article published 24 Aug. 2011 at the spetsnaz website specnaz.org. http://spec-naz.org/articles/analytics/specnaz_gru_istoriya_s_prodolzhenijem/>.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Sergei Kozlov and others, Vol. I, 14.
30 Vladimir Kvachkov, ‘Nekotorye polozhenia teorii spetsialnoi operatsii i neobkhodimost Sil Spetsialnogo naznachenia v sostave VDV’ in Sergei Kozlov and others, Vol. IV, op. cit., 391.
31 Interview with Roman Polko at the Russian military blog run by Denis Mokrushin, ≤http://twower.livejournal.com/1261734.html>, accessed 8 May 2014.
32 Sergei Kozlov and others, Vol. I, 14.
33 Grissom, 907.
34 Denis Telmanov, ‘Nachalnika GRU uvoliat po vykhodu s bolnichnogo’, Izvestia, 27 Sept. 2011 and unidentified author, ‘Pod nozh Serdiukova popali spetsnaz I zarubezhnaia agentura GRU’, Svobodnaia Pressa, 8 Nov. 2012.
36 Author’s interview with Aleksei Nikolskii, military correspondent for the Vedomosti newspaper, Moscow 19 February 2013.
37 Anatolii Yermolin, ‘Razrushitely otechestvo’, New Times, No. 6, 21 February 2011.
38 Irina Kusenkova, ‘Minoborony GRUshnikov okolatshivaiet’, Moskovskii Komsomolets, 22 March 2011.
39 Sergei Kozlov and others, Vol. IV, 364.
40 Ibid.
41 Theo Farrell, Sten Rynning and Terry Terriff, Transforming Military Power Since the Cold War, 8.
42 Aleksey Nikolsky, ‘Little, Green and Polite – The Creation of Russian Special Operations Forces’ in Colby Howard and Ruslan Pukhov (eds.), Brothers Armed – Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine (Minneapolis: East View Press 2014), 125.
43 Anatolii Yermolin, ‘Razrushitely otechestvo’,
44 Alena Ledenova explains how both personal and institutional importance in Russia is measured by the proximity to the ‘body of the tsar’, in Alena Ledenova, Can Russia Modernise? (Cambridge: CUP 2013), 133.
45 Interview with anonymous spetsnaz source in Soldaty Rossii
46 Aleksey Nikolsky, ‘Little, Green and Polite…’, 124–5.
47 Ibid., 128.
48 Aleksey Nikolsky, ’Russian Special Operations Forces: Further Development or Stagnation?”, Moscow Defence Brief, No.2 2014, 25.
49 Aleksei Nikolskii, ‘The Olympic Reserve: Why Russia Has Created Special Operations Command’, op. cit., 23.
50 Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, 908–19.
51 It is likely, however, that former GRU-agent and defence intellectual Vitalii Shlykov, and the then Chief of the General Staff, Nikolai Makarov, were probably two of them.
52 Sergeii Kozlov and others (eds.), Spetsnaz GRU – Ocherki istorii, Vol. IV, 332.
53 Author not identified, ‘Spetsnaz unichtozhen’, <http://blyg.ru/archives/2927≥. 2013.
54 Sergeii Kozlov and others, Vol. IV, 332.
55 Colin Gray, Another Bloody Century – Future Warfare (London: Phoenix 2005), 249.
56 ‘Minoborony proigryvaet GRU’, Moskovskii Komsomolets, 23 Jan. 2009.
57 Anatolii Yermolin, ‘Razrushitely otechestvo’, op.cit.
58 Anatolii Yermolin, ‘Razrushitely otechestvo’t.
59 Soldatov quoted in Ivan Konovalov, ‘Generala Korabelnikova ne puskaiut iz razvedki”, Kommersant-Daily, 19 March 2009.
60 Denis Telmanov, ‘Nachalnika GRU uvoliat po vykhodu s bolnichnogo’, Izvestia, 27 Sept.r 2011.
61 Sergei Kozlov and others, Vol. IV, 308.
62 Roger McDermott, ‘Moscow Plans Rapid Reaction Forces and Professional Soldiers—Again’, Jamestown Eurasia Daily Monitor, 12 March 2013, and Aleksey Nikolsky, ‘Little, Green and Polite…’, 125.
63 See for example Ruslan Pukhov, ‘Predislovie’ in Mikhail Barabanov (ed.), Novaia armia Rossii (Moscow: Tsentr Analiza Strategii I Tekhnologii 2010), 5; Mark Galeotti, ‘Reform of the Russian Military and Security Apparatus: An Investigator’s Perspective’, in Stephen J. Blank (ed.), Can Russia Reform? Economic, Political and Military Perspectives (Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2012), 62, Mikhail Barabanov, ‘Hard Lessons Learned’, in Colby Howard and Ruslan Pukhov (eds.) Brothers Armed – Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine (Minneapolis: East View Press 2014), 86–7 and Roger N. McDermott, The Reform of Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces (Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation 2011), 16–17.
64 Andrei Sidorchik, ‘Poyaviatsia li v Rossii svoi kommandos?’, Argumenty I Fakty, 27 Nov. 2012.
65 Derek Leebaert, To Dare & To Conquer (New York: Little, Brown 2006), 37.
66 Sergei Kozlov and others, Vol. IV, 329.
67 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 222–28.
68 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine,., 223.
69 See for example Ronald Wintrobe, ‘How to understand, and deal with dictatorship: an economist’s view’, Economics of Governance, No. 2 (2001), Stephen Haber, ‘Authoritarian Government’, in Donald A. Wittman and Barry R. Weingast, The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (Oxford: OUP 2008), 693–707, Ronald Wintrobe, ‘Dictatorship: Analytical Approaches’, in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (Oxford: OUP2009), 363–94, Jeff Carter, ‘Butter, Guns and Money: Leadership Survival and Government Spending in Democratic and Authoritarian Regimes’, Doctoral dissertation, Pennsylvania State University (2011), and Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook (New York: Public Affairs 2011).
70 On the greater capacity of action for autocratic compared to democratic leaders, see Ronald Wintrobe, ‘How to understand…’ 42, and Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook, 43.
71 Olga Romanova, ‘Nastoiashchii polkovnik’, New Times, 29 Aug. 2011.
72 Zoltan Barany, Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military (Princeton UP 2007), 78–110.
73 Carolina Vendil Pallin, Russian Military Reform – A failed exercise in defence decision making (London: Routledge 2009), 146 and Roger N. McDermott, The Reform of Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces, 133.
74 Brian D. Taylor, State Building in Putin’s Russia (Cambridge: CUP 2011), 54.
75 Oleg Fochkin, ‘Berdsk vstupilsia za spetsnaz-GRU’, Moskovskii Komsomolets, 10 March 2009.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Tor Bukkvoll
Tor Bukkvoll is a Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. He is the author of books, academic articles and book chapters on Russian and Ukrainian foreign, security and defence policy.
