‘Death Solves All Problems’: The Authoritarian Model of Counterinsurgency

ABSTRACT

Authoritarian states are often surprisingly successful counterinsurgents. In particular, authoritarians often repress on a vast scale and inhibit insurgent organization, transfer populations, have excellent intelligence penetration, and can counter war weariness in ways not available to democracies. Authoritarians, however, come to counterinsurgency with many disadvantages. They cannot rely on many of their conscripts. Corruption creates numerous problems, and authoritarian system often inhibits learning. Similarly, the politicized command structure often produces poor officers and discourages initiative. The repression they use often makes future unrest more likely. Finally, authoritarian regimes may find it harder to cut peace deals and win over pro-insurgent populations.

KEY WORDS:

• Authoritarianism
• counterinsurgency
• insurgency
• democracy

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Rafi Cohen, Janine Davidson, Chad Edwards-Kuhn, Marc Meyer, Renanah Miles, Alex Orleans, Erin Simpson, and the participants in a RAND Insurgency Board meeting for their help on earlier versions of this manuscript.

Notes

¹ Yuri Zhukov, ‘Counterinsurgency in a Non-Democratic State: The Russian Example,’ in P. Rich and I. Duyvesteyn (eds), The Routledge Companion to Insurgency and Counter Insurgency (London: Routledge 2010), 2.

² Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, ‘The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,’ Journal of Democracy 13/2 (2002), 53–4; Milan W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (New York: CUP 2012), 22–5. For a non-academic definition that jives with these academic ones, see ‘Authoritarianism,’ Encyclopedia Britannica, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/44640/authoritarianism>

³ Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, ‘Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946–2013,’ <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>.

⁴ For important distinctions and contrasts with democracies, see José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland, ‘Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited,’ Public Choice 143/1-2 (2010), 84–7.

⁵ Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2010), 125, Table 4.6. Note that authoritarian regimes that allow token legislatures or other show-forms of democracy should be not be considered anocracies if these institutions have no true power. For more detail see James Raymond Vreeland, ‘The Effects of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 52/3 (2008), 401–25.

⁶ Erica Chenoweth, ‘Terrorism and Democracy,’ Annual Review of Political Science 16 (May 2013), 355–78.

⁷ For one such study, see Erin Simpson, ‘The Perils of Third Party Counterinsurgency Campaigns,’ unpublished dissertation, Harvard Univ. 2010. Lyall, Blair, and Imai compare ISAF-inflicted civilian casualties with those of the Taliban and find that Afghans are less supportive of ISAF for comparable casualties – but this comparison does not include the Afghan government. Jason Lyall, Graeme Blaire, and Kosuke Imai, ‘Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan,’ American Political Science Review 107/4 (Nov. 2013), 679–705.

⁸ For more on some of these distinctions, see David Edelstein, Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2011).

⁹ Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of a New Way of War (New York: Cambridge UP 2013), 27.

¹⁰ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,’ International Organization 52/4 (1998), 887–917 and Neta Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Cambridge UP 2002).

¹¹ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,’ American Political Science Review 97 (Feb. 2003), 75 (footnote 6). I have excluded ‘from rural base areas’ as much of modern insurgency is from urban or more mixed areas.

¹² Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (n.d.), 2. The pamphlet was published in the 1980s.

¹³ Using the RAND dataset, I code anti-Taliban Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Cambodia in the struggles against the Khmer Rouge, the Communist insurgency in China, the struggles in Congo, the war in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, and Yemen as involving significant direct outside military help. I consider the South African and Rhodesian cases to be anocracies: democratic for a small white elite and brutally repressive for the majority of the population.

¹⁴ Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, 125, Table 4.6.

¹⁵ Ibid. 196, Table C.1.

¹⁶ Fearon and Laitin, 84; Jason Lyall, ‘Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy’s Impact on War Outcomes and Duration,’ International Organization 64/1 (Winter 2010), 173, 188. This finding is based on a category – democracies as third party interveners – that I do not focus on for authoritarian regimes in this article.

¹⁷ The democratic model has come under considerable criticism since the publication of the COIN Manual. In particular see Raphael Cohen, ‘Beyond ‘Hearts and Minds,’ PHD Dissertation, Georgetown Univ. 2014; Raphael Cohen, ‘Just How Important Are “Hearts and Minds” Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls’ Journal of Strategic Studies 37/4 (30 May 2014), 609–36; Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (New York: The New Press 2013); Porch, Counterinsurgency. Cohen in particular argues that many of the times that democracies won counterinsurgencies, particularly in colonial campaigns, they did not fight as democracies are supposed to fight.

¹⁸ The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24; Univ. of Chicago, 2008), 1-1.

¹⁹ David J. Kilcullen, ‘’Twenty-Eight Articles’: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,’ Military Review May-June 2006 86:3 (March-April 2006), 103.

²⁰ General Stanley McChrystal, as quoted in Celeste Ward Gventer, ‘Review Essay: Counterinsurgency and Its Critics,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies 37/4 (August 2014), 642.

²¹ I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for expressing this distinction.

²² For an excellent discussion of the problems Britain found in following its traditional doctrine in Iraq, see Robert Egnell and David H. Ucko, Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare (New York: Columbia UP 2013).

²³ Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task (New York: Portfolio 2014).

²⁴ Among many works, see Alexander B. Downes, Targeting Civilians in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2011); Darius Rejali, Torture and Democracy (Princeton UPs 2009); Daniel Byman, A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (Oxford: OUP 2011); Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals (New York: Anchor 2009); and Mark Urban, Big Boys’ Rules: The SAS and the Secret Struggle against the IRA (London: Faber 2012).

²⁵ Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books 1971), 71.

²⁶ Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, ‘Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea,’ International Security 35/1 (2010), 44–74, and Daniel Byman, ‘The Enigma of Stability in the Persian Gulf Monarchies,’ MERIA Journal 3/3 (Sept. 1999), < http://www.rubincenter.org/1999/09/byman-and-green-1999-09-03/ >.

²⁷ Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press 1993); also Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2003). Mishler and Rose, ‘Comparing Regime Support in Non-democratic and Democratic Countries,’ Democratization 9/2 (2002), 1–20.

²⁸ Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1977); Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton University Press 1988); Eva Bellin, ‘The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,’ Comparative Politics (2004) 139–57; Levitsky and Way, ‘The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,’ 51–65; and Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski. ‘Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats,’ Comparative Political Studies 40/11 (2007).

²⁹ Gandhi and Przeworski, ‘Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.’.

³⁰ Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,’ American Political Science Review 53/1 (March 1959), 86.

³¹ Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy,’ 86–8. For other valuable work, see David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London: MacMillan 1991).

³² Michael Fitzsimmons, ‘Hard Hearts and Open Minds? Governance, Identity, and Intellectual Foundations of Counterinsurgency Strategy,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 31/3 (June 2008), 337–65. Ethnic voting, of course, is not unique to authoritarian states.

³³ See Alexandre Debs and H.E. Goemans, ‘Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War’, American Political Science Review 104/3 (Aug. 2010) and Jessica Weeks, ‘Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,’ International Organization 62/1 (Winter 2008), 35–64 for more on this issue.

³⁴ See Edward Luttwak, Coup D’Etat: A Practical Handbook (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1969); S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview 1988); and Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1977).

³⁵ James T. Quinlivan, ‘Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East,’ International Security 24/2 (Fall 1999),131-65; and Mehran Kamrava, ‘Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,’ Political Science Quarterly 115/1 (Spring 2000), 67–92.

³⁶ Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam III, Democracies at War (Princeton UP 2002), 73.

³⁷ Daniel L. Byman, ‘Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism,’ International Security 31/2 (2006), 79–115.

³⁸ Pavel K. Baev, ‘Instrumentalizing Counterterrorism from Regime Consolidation in Putin’s Russia,’Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27/4 (2004), 337–52.

³⁹ See Cohen, ‘Beyond ‘Hearts and Minds’ for more on this.

⁴⁰ Omar Ashour, ‘What the CIA report tells us about Arab torturers,’ Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 17 Dec.er 2014, < http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/e0f3054f-92df-4fe4-8eec-dc3269d991c3 >.

⁴¹ See, for example, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric S. Dickson, ‘The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization’, American Journal of Political Science 51/2 (March 2007), 364-381; Alex Braithwaite, ‘Resisting infection: How state capacity conditions affect contagion,’ Journal of Peace Research 47/3 (2010), 311–19; Christian Davenport, ‘State Repression and Political Order,’ Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007), 1–23; Ronald Francisco, ‘After the Massacre: Mobilization in the Wake of Harsh Repression,’ Mobilization: An International Journal 9/ 2 (2004), 107–26.

⁴² U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual I-150.

⁴³ Francisco, ‘After the Massacre’ 108. This study, however, focuses on unarmed dissidents and relatively small numbers of casualties. It also leaves out rural massacres and large-scale killings.

⁴⁴ Stathis N. Kalyvas, ‘The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War,’ Journal Of Ethics 8/1 (2004), 97–138.

⁴⁵ Decades later, its Russian successor (more of an anocracy) would turn parts of Chechnya into a wasteland. Mark Kramer, ‘Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Terrorism in the North Caucasus: The Military Dimension of the Russian-Chechen Conflict,’ Europe-Asia Studies 57/2 (2005), 210.

⁴⁶ Michael J. Engelhardt, ‘Democracies, Dictatorships, and Counterinsurgency: Does Regime Type Really Matter?’ Conflict Quarterly 12/3 (Summer 1992), 56.

⁴⁷ Ofra Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2012), 129–30.

⁴⁸ Kelsey Lilley, ‘A Policy of Violence: The Case of Algeria’ (Davidson, NC: Master’s Thesis Davidson College 2011), < http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/12/a-policy-of-violence-the-case-of-algeria/#_edn93 >; Ed Blanche, ‘Algerian Bloodletting Resumes,’ Middle East 313 (June 2001), 13–15.

⁴⁹ Daniel Byman, ‘Forever Enemies? The Manipulation of Ethnic Identities to End Civil Wars,’ Security Studies 9/3 (2000), 149–90; Stathis N. Kalyvas, ‘Ethnic Defection in Civil War,’ Comparative Political Studies 41/8 (April 2008), 1043–68.

⁵⁰ International Crisis Group, “The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet,” Africa Report no. 24 (20 Oct.r 2000) < http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/algeria/024-the-algerian-crisis-not-over-yet.aspx >.

⁵¹ Zhukov, ‘Counterinsurgency in a Non-Democratic State,’ 13.

⁵² Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars (New York: Cambridge UP 2006), 158. See also Jason Lyall, ‘Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (June 2009), 331–62.

⁵³ Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1970); Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Indianapolis, IN: Addison-Wesley 1978), 100.

⁵⁴ For a perspective that emphasizes opportunity over grievance, and thus the importance of a strong state over a benign one, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War,’ Oxford Economic Papers 56/4 (2004), 563–95 and Paul Collier, ‘Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 44/6 (Dec. 2000), 839–53.

⁵⁵ Joseph Holliday, ‘The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War,’ Institute for the Study of War (March 2013), 23.

⁵⁶ Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster 2000).

⁵⁷ Yuri Zhukov, ‘Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-insurgency: The Soviet Campaign Against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army,’ Small Wars and Insurgencies 18/3 (Sept. 2007), 448.

⁵⁸ See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, ‘Democracy and Development,’ Foreign Affairs 84/5 (Sept./Oct. 2005), 82-84.

⁵⁹ Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press 1999), 290.

⁶⁰ Holliday, ‘The Assad Regime,’ 7.

⁶¹ David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger 1964), 20.

⁶² Zhukov, ‘Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-insurgency,’ 441.

⁶³ Raphael S. Cohen, ‘Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway?,’ 613; Daniel Byman, ‘The Intelligence War on Terrorism,’ Intelligence and National Security 29/6 (2014), 837–63.

⁶⁴ Lilley, ‘A Policy of Violence’; Zhukov, ‘Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-insurgency,’ 449.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 451.

⁶⁶ Scott Snyder, ‘Is North Korea’s Information Seal Starting to Break?’ The Atlantic (17 May 2012), <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/05/is-north-koreas-information-seal-starting-to-break/257333/http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/05/is-north-koreas-information-seal-starting-to-break/257333/>.

⁶⁷ For an excellent assessment, see Kelly M. Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2010).

⁶⁸ Cohen, ‘Beyond “‘Hearts and Minds”.

⁶⁹ Ivan Arreguín-Toft, ‘How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,’ International Security 26/1 (Summer 2001), 102.

⁷⁰ Christina J. M. Goulter, ‘The Greek Civil War: A National Army’s Counter-insurgency Triumph,’ Journal of Military History 78/3 (July 2014), 1039.

⁷¹ Authoritarians, of course, are not alone in this. The Briggs Plan in Malaya moved the Chinese minority from areas near the jungle, where they could support rebels, to controlled villages. Gventer, ‘Counterinsurgency and Its Critics,’ 647.

⁷² Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London: Zed Books 1991).

⁷³ Monica Duffy Toft and Yuri M. Zhukov, ‘Denial and Punishment in the North Caucasus: Evaluating the effectiveness of coercive counter-insurgency,’ Journal of Peace Research 49/6 (2012), 787; Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (New York: Cambridge UP 2005).

⁷⁴ Zhukov, ‘Counterinsurgency in a Non-Democratic State,’ 13.

⁷⁵ Ibid.,,’ 7–10.

⁷⁶ Paul Huth, and Dylan Bach-Lindsay and Benjamin Valentino, ‘’Draining the Sea’: Massing Killing and Guerrilla Warfare,’ International Organization 58/2 (Spring 2004), 394–400; Alexander B. Downes, ‘Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War,’ International Security 30/4 (2006), 152–95.

⁷⁷ Holliday, ‘The Assad Regime,’ 19.

⁷⁸ Erik Claessen, ‘Discouraging Hearts and Minds: Democracies and Insurgencies,’ Military Review (May-June 2007), 97–103.

⁷⁹ Engelhardt, ‘Democracies, Dictatorships, and Counterinsurgency,’ 55.

⁸⁰ David Ucko, ‘’The People Are Revolting.’ Forthcoming. On the Moscow attacks, see John Dunlop, The Moscow Bombings of September 1999: Examinations of Russian Terrorist Attacks at the Onset of Vladimir Putin’s Rule (Stuttgart: Ibidem 2014).

⁸¹ Zhukov, ‘Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counterinsurgency,’ 169.

⁸² Kramer, ‘Guerrilla Warfare,’ 257–8.

⁸³ John Bellows and Edward Miguel, ‘War and Institutions: New Evidence from Sierra Leone,’ American Economic Review 96/2 (May 2006), 394–9.

⁸⁴ Zhukov, ‘Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-insurgency,’ 456.

⁸⁵ ‘Putin’s Proposition,’ The Economist, 25 May 2003, <www.economist.com/node/1651376?zid=307&ah=5e80419d1bc9821ebe173f4f0f060a07>

⁸⁶ Gilles Keppel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris 2006), 276–98.

⁸⁷ Benjamin Schwartz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: the Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of National Building (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1991).

⁸⁸ Not all authoritarian regimes have strong security forces, and often they lack the manpower necessary to suppress an insurgency. To offset this weakness, some work with local militias to fight insurgents. The Indonesian military raised local militias in Aceh, which over time became effective. The Algerian government did a ‘massive campaign of militia formation,’ both bullying and bribing Algerian youth to join the government side. Perhaps 200,000 Algerians were encouraged, or coerced, into joining ‘Patriot’ militias, and several hundred thousand more also participated in anti-Islamist activities. To prevent defection and discourage government recruiting, Algerian insurgents used extreme violence in an attempt, largely unsuccessful, to intimidate the population. David J. Kilcullen, ‘Globalization and the Development of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Tactics,’ Small Wars and Insurgencies 17/1 (March 2006), 52; Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence, (Cambridge: CUP 2006), 317–18; Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua (New York: Praeger 1988), 27.

⁸⁹ Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press 2002), 335–7.

⁹⁰ Holliday, ‘The Assad Regime,’ 15.

⁹¹ Ibid., 16.

⁹² Ibid., 13.

⁹³ Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War, 70.

⁹⁴ Kramer, ‘Guerrilla Warfare,’ 219; Quinlivan, ‘Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East,’ 131–65.

⁹⁵ Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, III, ‘Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 42/3 (June 1998), 259–77.

⁹⁶ Ashour, ‘What the CIA report tells us about Arab torturers.’

⁹⁷ Zhukov, ‘Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-insurgency,’ 441.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 452.

⁹⁹ Kramer, ‘Guerrilla War,’ 260.

¹⁰⁰ See Zhukov, ‘Counterinsurgency in a Non-Democratic State,’ 4.

¹⁰¹ Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars, 143–4.

¹⁰² Lyall, Blaire, and Imai, ‘Explaining Support for Combatants During Wartime.’

¹⁰³ Zhukov, ‘Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-Insurgency,’ 446.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Barbara Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton UP 2002), 10–11, also T.D. Robert Gurr, Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in a New Century (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace 2000), 204.

¹⁰⁶ Ucko, “The Peasants Are Revolting.”

¹⁰⁷ For a more complete review, see Daniel Byman, ‘Talking with Insurgents,’ Washington Quarterly 32/2 (April 2009), 125–37.

¹⁰⁸ For data over the years, see the Corruption Perceptions Index at Transparency International, available at <www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2007/0/>. For many of the countries, there was no available data or the insurgency in question predated Transparency International’s creations. So the data given is for only 11 of the cases in question.

¹⁰⁹ As quoted in Kramer, ‘Guerrilla Warfare,’ 221.

¹¹⁰ William Quandt, Between Bullets & Ballots: Algeria’s Transition from Authoritarianism (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 1998), 63.

¹¹¹ On control, see in particular Cohen, ‘Beyond Hearts and Minds,’ Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel’s Control of a National Minority (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press 1980); and Ian Lustick, ‘Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism Versus Control,’ World Politics 31/3 (April 1979), 325–44.

¹¹² The literature on nationalism is vast. For a sample, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso 1983); Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2003); Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton UP 1994); and Stephen Van Evera, ‘Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,’ International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994), 5–39.

¹¹³ Lyall, Blaire, and Imai, ‘Explaining Support for Combatants During Wartime’

¹¹⁴ Christian Davenport, State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace (New York: Cambridge UP 2007).

Additional information

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Daniel Byman

Daniel Byman is a professor in the security studies program at Georgetown University and the research director of the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement (Oxford, 2015). Follow him @dbyman.