Introduction

ABSTRACT

This special issue contains articles contributing to the understanding of the role military doctrine plays in strategic theory and practice. The authors scrutinize the function and development of doctrine, the use of force and the role of doctrine, alliances and doctrine, and small states and doctrine. The contributions are related to the wider scholarly and practical context of how doctrine is developed and implemented. The authors use functional, cultural and institutional explanations in their articles. They also give practical recommendations regarding how to increase the effectiveness of the doctrine development process, and the effectiveness of doctrine itself in relation to the use of force.

KEYWORDS:

• Doctrine
• strategy
• use of Force
• functional
• cultural

Introduction

What is the character of military doctrine? How is it developed and implemented? Why does it matter, if it matters at all? Military doctrine, not least counter insurgency doctrine, has been a central element in the debate about the use of force during the last ten years. The reason for that is, to a large extent, that the long-term engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan have tended to focus on how to fight rather that why to fight, on doctrine rather than strategy, on the military level rather than the political level. That, in turn, has created a new interest for the content, logic, and implications of military doctrine in the policy debate as well as in the scholarly literature.¹ The topic is, however, still understudied, and the aim of this edition of the Journal of Strategic Studies, based on papers presented at a conference on military doctrines in Oslo at the Norwegian Defence University College in June 2014,² is to contribute to a better understanding of the role of military doctrine in a wider context.

The conference was initially planned to present and launch the second revision of the Norwegian Joint Operational Doctrine (NJOD), but during the preparation it became clear that the purpose and scope of the conference should be connected to the wider scholarly discussion on military doctrines. The program was therefore structured in four main parts, which reflect central themes in the discussion about doctrine – the function and development of doctrine, the use of force and the role of doctrine, alliances and doctrine, and small states and doctrine – and it ended with a presentation of the NJOD.

In the following we will provide short summaries of each article and after that make a couple of general reflections on the main results of the articles and this special issue as a whole, related to research and development of military doctrine.

The content of the articles

Høiback, Angstrom and Widén, and Jensen contribute articles discussing the function and development of doctrine. Høiback deals with what a doctrine is and can be – the ‘anatomy’ of doctrine – and with the challenges of developing doctrine. Doctrine is, according to Høiback, ‘institutionalised beliefs about what works in war and military operations’, the ‘software of military power’, and it consist of three essential elements: theory, culture, and authority. Doctrine needs an element of theory, Høiback argues, because ‘doctrine has to be based on assumptions about what works and what leads to victory’. It also needs an element of culture, because it has to ‘tie into the current military discourse’. Finally, it needs an element of authority, because it cannot be ‘just one of many voices on the military marketplace of ideas and concepts’ if it is going to have an integrating effect.

The balancing of the three elements can be done in different ways, according to Høiback, ‘and by doing so produce three “ideal types” of doctrine: doctrine as a tool of command, doctrine as a tool of change, and doctrine as a tool of education. As a tool of command, doctrine says authoritatively what to do; as a tool of change, it says authoritatively what to be; and, as a tool of education, it says what we do, and why, and who we are for the time being’. Høiback’s view of the anatomy of doctrine is used by several of the author’s in this volume, and it brings analytical clearness to the study of doctrine in general.

Høiback also discusses the challenges with developing doctrines, and gives suggestions to doctrine makers to overcome these challenges. He especially points at a more straightforward and well-functioning civil–military dialogue and team work around doctrine making; ‘verbal and rhetorical pollution’, and ‘too long range screw driving’ will make doctrine useless.

Angstrom and Widén argue that doctrine should be understood ‘less as a force-multiplier and more as religious texts spelling out articles of faith’, and that the quality of a doctrine should be measured against that background: ‘On the one hand, this applies to perceptions of the task and role of the armed forces, how the armed forces ought to behave, and the identity of the armed forces. On the other hand, it also applies to perceptions of the doctrine writers about quality of doctrines.’ In itself, Angstrom and Widén continue, the doctrine is not sacred or divine, ‘but it still alludes to such logic’, because it provides ‘ontological security’ for the military and ‘provides strength and comfort’ in hardship. However, according to Angstrom and Widén, there is a danger that doctrine – seen as religion – can make practitioners ‘indoctrinated in the negative sense of the word, i.e. not capable of thinking independently’.

Jensen explores institutional mechanisms that enable doctrine development. Rather than focusing on organizational and strategic culture, Jensen focuses on the impact of ‘incubators’ and ‘advocacy networks’. The articles traces the institutional origins of the US counterinsurgency doctrine between 2003 and 2006, and highlight the role of special study groups and cross-cutting bureaucratic coalitions in creating a space to deliberate over how to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. ‘The process that resulted in the published manual reveals’, according to Jensen, ‘the importance of incubators and advocacy networks in helping otherwise rigid organizations innovate’. In this respect, Jensen continues, the role of military journals – such as Parameters and Military Review – was quite important in circulating ideas within the Army.

Echevarria and Zapfe contribute articles on the use of force and the role of doctrine. Echevarria deals with the connections between forecasting, strategy, and doctrine. He argues that US doctrine development after the end of the Cold War has failed because of too little strategy and too much forecasting. Doctrine, Echevarria argues, is no cure for the absence of a grand strategy, but it can learn from strategy and history. Historical insights are not directly transferable to the present, they cannot be portrayed as ‘silver bullets’, but rather as possibilities, according to him.

Echevarria is quite sceptical to the ‘culture of anticipation’, as he calls it, developed after the end of the Cold War, again since it only considers the future and not the past; and in addition ‘devalues the past’. Like Høiback, Echevarria gives suggestions to doctrine makers:

In short, contemporary doctrine writers would do well to emulate Clausewitz’s use of theory, that is, to describe or to enhance knowledge, rather than to prescribe. The principal caveat to keep in mind, however, is this – when taken too far, description can lead to the same outcome as prescription.

Zapfe asks himself why the country of Carl von Clausewitz has not developed a joint operational doctrine for nearly 60 years. The reason is, he argues, functional and cultural. The German Bundeswehr simply did not have the functional need for a joint doctrine during the Cold War, since it was so integrated into and directed by NATO’s doctrines and command structure. And the German strategic culture imposed tight constraints on how the Bundeswehr could (and still can) be used that were impossible to combine with a joint operational doctrine ‘where the line between the political and military sphere blurs’.

In short, Samuel Huntington’s concept of ‘subjective civilian control’ created a civil–military climate that limited (and still limits) the development of a German joint operational doctrine, according to Zapfe: ‘The strategic and operational implications of uneasiness with military force as political means have an influence on whether military should plan for war, and how it should plan for it,’ which has been demonstrated lately in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan.

Honig and Kronvall and Petersson contribute articles on small states and doctrine. Honig argues that small states today do not lack power in contemporary conflicts: ‘Just as the risks and conflicts are smaller in scale and intensity, so the responses can be modest in scale as well and nonetheless be effective,’ and in that context even small states can play a role. Furthermore, he argues, small states with their smaller militaries and political establishments, have the potential to be more innovative and adaptable than great powers, and thus better placed to take the lead in doctrine development processes.

However, Honig is not entirely optimistic whether these opportunities will be seized by the small states, because there are also ‘powerful structures’ working in the other direction: both practical reasons – such as bureaucratic politics – and ‘outmoded ideas of how war and strategy work’. But in that sense, great powers and small states are in the same boat he argues, when politicians and militaries ‘no longer understand war, war loses its political utility’.

Kronvall and Petersson scrutinize the connection between doctrine and defence transformation in small states. Following Høiback three functions of a doctrine – a tool of operations, a tool of education, and a tool of change – they argue that doctrine has affected and driven defence transformation – which they define as ‘a rapid, intentional, re-shaping of central mental and physical structures’ – in Sweden and Norway in all three ways.

First, NATO’s COIN focused approach in Afghanistan from 2009 influenced the way Norwegian and Swedish forces operated in the area. Second, the role of doctrines in military education has increased from almost no role at all to a central element in all military education about operations at all levels in the defence forces in both countries. Third, doctrine has been intentionally and systematically used by both the politicians and the military leadership to achieve organizational change in both countries, not least the US ‘RMA paradigm’. Kronvall and Petersson point out, however, that other factors than doctrine – such as threat perception and defence spending – have also played an important role in the transformation process, and that it also remains to be seen whether the rapid changes are ephemeral or of a more permanent nature.

Finally, regarding the new Norwegian Joint Operational Doctrine (NJOD), Slensvik and Ydstebø contribute with an insiders’ perspective of the heritage, content, and the development process of the NJOD. In their article, they briefly present the previous Norwegian joint doctrines of the past two decades and the background for initiating a revision in 2010. They continuously discuss the direction this revision took and the mandate from the Chief of Defence that stated the main topics for the doctrine. They conclude that the current revision is more ‘doctrinal’ than the two previous ones in that it is more focused towards the practical planning and conduct of joint operations, and less a textbook of military theory.

The presentation of the process and development of the NJOD is very interesting and useful, not least since the Norwegian Armed Forces has a relative short history of joint doctrine, and Slensvik and Ydstebø conclude that the structure and process of doctrinal development has finally been institutionalized. They argue that the development has been a combination process, where the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College provided the writing team as the main driving force of the process. This way of organizing the revision also included the necessary top level guidance and approval from the Ministry of Defence, and contributions from below at the specialist level, thus ensuring a coherent doctrine and development progress without having any permanent doctrine development manpower available.

The wider relevance of the results

When Barry Posen’s classical book The Sources of Military Doctrine was published in 1984, military doctrine had gained a momentum in Western military thinking following the US Army doctrinal renaissance after the Vietnam War, especially the publishing of the Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations in 1982 (also known as the AirLand Battle Doctrine). The 1982 FM 100-5 was preceded by a debate in the US Army over the 1976 FM 100-5 ‘Active Defence’, and there was a lively debate within academia as well, and during this debate terminology such as operational art and the operational level of war was introduced in the West. Back then, the operational art was already well established within Soviet thinking, as the intermediate function between military strategy and tactics that was to plan and conduct operations. Much of the writings on these issues were therefore based on the Soviet sources and many of these were translated into English and published with commentaries to provide a context.³

During the 1980s, operational level doctrines were then developed in the West. Even in small NATO member states, such as Norway and Sweden, doctrine-like publications that reflected this debate and development were published.⁴

The scholarly debate on doctrine also developed during these years; theory was interacting with practice. A main feature of the scholarly debate has been whether to approach the concept of doctrine from a rationalist or a constructivist perspective; whether doctrine is an outcome of objective factors, for example a response to threats, or an outcome of subjective factors, such as a military culture.⁵

This debate is further developed in the articles in this volume. Posen’s view is perhaps the most rationalist, since he states that ‘Military organizations that face the prospect of actual combat need a set of institutionalized principles about how to fight. Modern militaries call this set of principles doctrine.’ Angstrom and Widén’s view is perhaps the most constructivist since they suggest that it is most fruitful to approach doctrine from a constructivist perspective, which implies that ‘doctrine can be understood as religion – a set of beliefs’. But the metaphysical character of doctrine does not make doctrine useless in practice, according to them, since shared beliefs, ‘shared feelings of devotion’, are also considered important for the cohesion and success of military units.

Zapfe places himself between, or perhaps more correctly within, both of these interpretations when he argues that doctrine is both functionally and culturally created. According to him, the development of German doctrine during the ISAF operation shows that functional and cultural reasons ‘can, and do, exist and work at the same time’:

The closer the military unit to the functional pressure in the theatre of operations [in Afghanistan], the more likely it was to adapt; the closer it was to the political sphere of Berlin [i.e. cultural pressure], the more reluctant it was to codify these adaptions.

Jensen contributes to a third main approach in the literature on the development of doctrines; the institutional approach. In the literature, this approach is based on the delegation of power within organizations and the importance of civil–military interaction to explain change. Its focus is the logic of, and interaction within and between, domestic institutions.⁶ Thus, Jensen argues that innovation requires ‘creating new forums or subunits free from the normal push and pull of the bureaucratic hierarchy where professional military officers are free to visualize new theories of victory’. According to Jensen, incubators enable officers to search for new ways to understand a problem, and advocacy networks diffuse and legitimate new ideas. New ideas require a degree of elite protection, and in exchange for protecting officers, senior defence officials gain prestige and influence within the profession.

Other aspects of how doctrines are developed and implemented are also high-lightened in this issue; for example, to what degree do states ‘receive’ doctrines from other states (through external forces) and to what degree do they ‘produce’ their own doctrines (through internal forces). That issue is especially interesting in a great power–small state perspective. Traditionally, small states have, to a large extent, received doctrine from great powers, in particular great powers that they have been allied to. For example, during the 1950s, the US was developing the doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’ to deter the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe, a doctrine that was implemented even at the tactical level in small states such as Denmark and Norway.⁷ Today it might be different. Honig’s view is that small states have considerable room for manoeuvre in this respect, and that the different choices made by Denmark, Norway and Sweden in the ISAF operation underpin that argument.

On the other hand, Kronvall and Petersson argue that the US focus on COIN doctrine in Afghanistan from 2008–2009 was ‘forcing’ Norway and Sweden to act in accordance with that doctrine in the area of operation, although Norwegian and Swedish politicians explicitly denied that such a doctrine was applied. Furthermore, they argue that the US ‘RMA paradigm’ influenced Norwegian and Swedish defence transformation, including doctrinal transformation, at the beginning of the 2000s.

The importance of a sound civil–military relation and dialogue when developing and implementing doctrines is high-lightened by Echevarria and Zapfe. Echevarria argues that the military cannot blame the politicians for not guiding them enough: ‘The lack of clear policy guidance is not sufficient reason for failure.’ On the other hand, the absence of a grand strategy ‘capable of restoring perspective to the problem’ in Afghanistan made the coalition strategy shift several times. In such a situation, doctrine can ‘help prepare military practitioners to operate in the absence of a grand strategy, and to appreciate a broader array of military strategies, their advantages and disadvantages, and how to reconcile them’. According to Echevarria, doctrine ‘must rediscover what strategy is and how it differs from a mere plan.’

Zapfe’s argument is that German military doctrine has to fit into German strategic culture. Otherwise it becomes irrelevant at best; ‘at worst it creates dynamics to push the armed forces away from society’ contributing to a civil–military disconnect. If allied doctrine differs too much from German strategic culture, if it is used ‘as a substitute for political context’, it can have serious civil–military consequences for Germany.

A third aspect of how doctrines are developed and implemented is the more practical side of it. As already mentioned, Høiback, Echevarria and Zapfe go into these issues, high-lightening well-functioning civil–military relations as a key to developing useful doctrine. In addition, Slensvik and Ydstebø contribute a concrete case; their own experiences with developing the latest Norwegian Joint Operational Doctrine. They focus more on the ‘military–military’ relations, i.e. the interplay within the defence forces rather than the interaction between the government and the armed forces.

In particular, Slensvik and Ydstebø focus on jointness versus the branches and the operational level of war, which they, as well as the doctrine, see as ‘the bridge between military strategy and tactics’. The new doctrine ‘will not alter the way the Norwegian Armed Forces conduct operations’, they claim, ‘but it does provide a comprehensive framework to describe and explain the process from policy to military action’. In addition, the NJOD 2014 has an operational focus and has, compared with former versions of the doctrine, ‘moved away from the more educational and transformational roles of its predecessors’.

Slensvik and Ydstebø also discuss the doctrine development process against the background of the relations within the armed forces. In a top-down model, the defence staff and the joint level have a lot of influence on the process, pushing their will downwards in the organization. In a bottom-up model, the branches have that role, pushing their will upwards in the organization. In a third, ‘delegated’ model, a relatively autonomous writing team defines the content of the doctrine and pushes its will upwards and downwards. In a fourth ‘combination’ model, lastly, the writing team interacts systematically with the branches and the leadership of the armed forces to develop a doctrine that is acceptable to everyone.

As mentioned, the development of the NJOD followed the combination model, given Scandinavian consensus culture and limited resources to develop doctrines, but the fact is – as Slensvik and Ydstebø show – it is actually the first time Norway chose this model, after testing first the top down model, then the bottom up model, and finally the delegated model. Slensvik and Ydstebø’s results again point at the potential differences between great powers, that often have permanently organized units dealing with doctrinal development on a daily basis and have institutionalized forms for how to develop doctrine, and small states, that normally develop doctrine on a more ad hoc basis. And as Honig also points out, that potentially makes small states more adaptable and innovative.

The future of doctrine and doctrine studies

The previous doctrinal renaissance was a result of the US experience from the Vietnam War and reorientation towards the collective defence on the European mainland. Now, the US and NATO have withdrawn their combat troops from Afghanistan. The lack of obvious operational success is similar to the 1975 US withdrawal from South East Asia, and may be an opportunity critically to examine military affairs.⁸ Doctrine studies should be a useful tool in that respect, to analyse and explain the outcome of military operations the last two decades.

To try to answer the fundamental question raised initially of how doctrine matters (if it matters at all), Barry Posen’s four tasks of a doctrine – prioritization, communication, guidance, and meaning – outlined in the foreword (which is based on his presentation at the conference) provides a natural point of departure. The first task is that doctrine ‘sets priorities and directs effort’. Traditional military doctrine has related itself to the operational level of war, but within NATO, in the last decade, we have has seen the emergence of a strategic doctrinal phenomenon known as the comprehensive approach (CA). To what degree should ‘all instruments of power’ be directed by doctrine? Has doctrine done itself a disservice in claiming ownership of operations, strategy and policy through the comprehensive approach?

Posen’s second task is about communication to society and doctrine’s explanatory role in what the military does. The US and NATO’s counterinsurgency doctrines are the prime examples of that role the last decade, and could be used as an excellent case study regarding how doctrine relates to society.

Doctrine’s third task, according to Posen, is providing ‘useful guidance to military leaders on how to fight’. The obvious contradiction between the past (best practice) and the future (the changing character of war) is in itself a wide open space for studies here. Posen claims doctrine ‘creates a fictive certainty about an inherently uncertain activity’ and in that there is a huge challenge to the methods used for developing and implementing doctrine. The way wars in the past decades have changed the character of doctrine, and the process of developing doctrine, can be useful when studying if, and how, doctrine can guide military leaders.

Posen’s fourth and last task for doctrine is that it ‘helps to provide the individual members of the organization with reasons to work for the organization’s purposes’. This perspective is broader and can also contain military sociological perspectives such as the development of the military profession, as well as civil–military relations.

Notes

¹ See, for example, James A. Russel, ‘Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 33/4 (August, 2010); Hew Strachan, ‘Strategy or Alibi: Obama, McCrystal, and the Operational Level of War’, Survival 52/5 (October November 2010), and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, ‘The Use and Abuse of the “Dutch Approachˮ to Counter-Insurgency’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 36/6 (2013).

² The conference was arranged and sponsored by the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College, in cooperation with The Journal of Strategic Studies and the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. The NATO Standardization Office and the Allied Joint Operational Doctrine Community also became a part of the conference and provided presentations on the development and role of doctrine in NATO.

³ The two-volume collection of texts edited by Harold S. Orenstein is a typical example: Harold S. Orenstein, (ed.), The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, 1927–91: The Documentary Basis. – Vol. 1: Operational Art, 1927–64 (London, Frank Cass 1995) and The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, 1927–91: The Documentary Basis. – Vol. II: Operational Art, 1965–1991 (London, Routledge 1995). Influential books were also translated and published, such as Alexander A. Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis, East View 2004 [1927]).

⁴ Sverre Diesen Reform or Defeat. The Landdefence’s Operative Idea at a Crossroad [Reform eller nederlag. Landforsvarets operative idé ved skilleveien] (Oslo, Forsvarsstudier 1988). Sverre Diesen was later to become Chief of Defence in Norway. See also Torgeir E. Sæveraas and Kjetil Henriksen A Military Universal Means? American “Maneuver Warfare” and Norwegian Doctrine Development [Et militært universalmiddel? Amerikansk “Maneuver Warfare” og norsk doktrineutvikling (Oslo, Oslo Files 01/2007) 112-124

⁵ See, for example, Elisabeth Kier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars’, International Security, 19/4 (Spring, 1995).

⁶ Deborah D. Avant, ‘The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemones in Peripheral Wars’, International Studies Quarterly, 37/4 (1993), pp. 409–30.

⁷ See, for example, Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North (Oslo: Ad Notam, 1991).

⁸ See, for example, Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, ‘NATO’s Vietnam? Afghanistan and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance’, Contemporary Security Policy, 30/3 (December 2009).