From the Editors

Before introducing the content of our first issue of Volume 39, the editors are delighted to announce that the 2014 Impact Factor for the Journal of Strategic Studies as listed in the Thomson Reuters 2015 Journal Citation Reports is 0.944. That number ranks the Journal as number 57 out of 161 in Political Science journals, and 31 out of 85 in International Relations journals. We would like to thank our authors, referees, and editorial board for their continued support of the journal.

This issue begins with an important contribution on the evolution of China’s air force. In ‘China’s Search for a “Strategic Air Force”’, Michael S. Chase and Cristina L. Garafola of the RAND Corporation assess the impressive transformation of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) over the past two decades. Often overlooked or undervalued in assessments of Chinese military power, PLAAF is playing an increasingly important role in Chinese national security, a trend that will continue into the future.¹

Although discussion of insurgency and counterinsurgency have dominated the field of strategic studies over the past decade,² to date the practice of counterinsurgency by authoritarian regimes has received much less attention.³ This issue seeks to begin to rectify that. In ‘“The People are Revolting”: An Anatomy of Authoritarian Counterinsurgency’, David H. Ucko of the US National Defense University seeks to deepen scholarly understanding of how authoritarian regimes counter insurgencies. He argues that, like their democratic counterparts, authoritarian regimes engage in mobilisation, create narratives, and turn military advantage into political gain. The means they use to do so differ from those employed by democratic regimes, however. In ‘“Death Solves All Problems”: The Authoritarian Model of Counterinsurgency’, Daniel Byman of Georgetown University argues that authoritarian states are often surprisingly effective in counterinsurgency. They repress on a massive scale, move populations, utilise domestic intelligence agencies, and have other options not available to democracies. He also notes, however, that authoritarian regimes face disadvantages, including an inability to rely on conscripts, corruption, politicised command structures, as well as the negative effects of repression that can make unrest more likely and hamper war termination.

The role of private security contractors continues to garner attention.⁴ In ‘Bridging the Gap: Mobilisation Constraints and Contractor Support to US and UK Military Operations’, Eugenio Cusumano of the University of Leiden analyses contractor support to American and British operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, emphasising that domestic political constraints on deploying conventional forces have increased the propensity to use contractors. In ‘Impediments to Fighting the Islamic State: Private Contractors and US Strategy’, Thomas C. Bruneau of the US Naval Postgraduate School discusses the vital but largely unmentioned role of private security contractors in US military operations in Iraq.

The issue concludes with a review essay by Sumit Ganguly of Indiana University of four new works on civil–military relations in India and Pakistan.

Notes

¹ On Chinese military capabilities, see also Thomas J. Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Modernization and US–China Security Relations’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (2012), 447–87; Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, ‘Space, China’s Tactical Frontier’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/5 (2011), 733–61; Sangkuk Lee, ‘China’s “Three Warfares”: Origins, Applications, and Organizations’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/2 (2014), 198–221.

² See, for example, Martijn Kitzen, ‘Close Encounters of the Tribal Kind: The Implementation of Co-option as a Tool for De-escalation of Conflict – the Case of the Netherlands in Afghanistan’s Uruzgan Province’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/5 (2012), 713–34; Kersti Larsdotter, ‘Regional Support for Afghan Insurgents: Challenges for Counterinsurgency Theory and Doctrine’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/1 (2014), 135–62; Jorge E. Delgado, ‘Colombian Military Thinking and the Fight against the FARC-EP Insurgency, 2002–2014’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/6 (2015), 826–51; Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, ‘The Use and Abuse of the “Dutch Approach” to Counter-Insurgency’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/6 (2013), 867–97; Karl Hack, ‘The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm’, Journal of Strategic Studies 32/3 (2009), 383–414; Celeste Ward Gventer, ‘Counterinsurgency and Its Critics’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/4 (2014), 637–63; Raphael Cohen, ‘Just How Important Are “Hearts and Minds” Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/4 (2014), 609–36.

³ Emil A. Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev, ‘Asymmetry of Values, Indigenous Forces, and Incumbent Success in Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Chechnya’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/5 (2015), 678–703; Eugene Miakinkov, ‘The Agency of Force in Asymmetrical Warfare and Counterinsurgency: The Case of Chechnya’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/5 (2011), 647–80.

⁴ Thomas C. Bruneau,‘Contracting out Security’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36/5 (2013), 638–65.