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ABSTRACT
Traditionally, policy and planning have been institutionally weak in the Naval Staff (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations – OPNAV). In their place, the N8 (Programming) has dominated resource decision-making, and, by default, decisions relating to policy and planning. Recent uncertainty over defense authorization and appropriations has resulted in calls for a greater role to be played by the N3/5, Policy and Plans Directorate. The article argues that reform of the Department of the Navy’s planning process is urgently needed. OPNAV’s weak planning and overly dominant programming practices are compared with those of the Departments of the Army and Air Force and are shown to be out of conformance with them. The article concludes with specific and detailed recommendations for reform of both the current planning and programming processes.
Notes
1 The views expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the policy or views of the Naval Postgraduate School, Department of the Navy, or Department of Defense.
2 Arthur Barber, “Rethinking the Future Fleet,” USNI Proceedings 140/5 (2014), 49.
3 Sam LaGrone, “Randy Forbes to CNO Greenert: ‘The Navy desperately needs a strategy,’” USNI News, 1 October 2014, <http://news.usni.org/2014/10/01/randy-forbes-cno-greenert-navy-desperately-needs-strategy>.
4 Harry Kazianis, “The A2/AD challenge: interview with Rep. J. Randy Forbes,” Real Clear Defense, 23 February 2015, <http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/02/23/the_a2ad_challenge_interview_with_rep_j_randy_forbes.html>.
5 For a recent and sober assessment of the financial outlook for the Navy see Ronald O’Rourke, “Naval Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” RL32665, Congressional Research Service, Washington, 4 November 2015.
6 Peter D. Haynes, “American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era: The U.S. Navy and the Emergence of a Maritime Strategy, 1989–2007,” doctoral dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013, passim.
7 Cited in ibid., 36.
8 US Department of the Army, “Planning Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System,” Army Regulation (AR) 1-1, 9 July 1986; US Department of the Air Force, “Strategic Planning System,” Air Force Policy Directive 90-11, 26 March 2009.
9 US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Strategic Planning System,” CJCSI 3100.01B, 12 December 2008.
10 US Department of the Navy, “Force Structure Assessments,” OPNAVINST 3050.27, N81, 12 February 2015.
11 Haynes, “American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era,” 227–28.
12 See Charles Johnston Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense (Berkeley: University of California Press 1965); Charles Johnston Hitch et al., The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (New York: Athenum 1975).
13 Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense, 25–26.
14 Haynes, “American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era,” 7.
15 Tiffany F. Hill, “An Analysis of the Organizational Structures Supporting PPPB within the Military Departments,” master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008, 100, 113.
16 Haynes, “American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era,” 182.
17 According to Rosenberg, this is an outcome of the Navy’s institutional consensus-driven and multi-layered policy-making process that produces “strategy” as a reflection of the institution, as opposed to senior leadership. David A. Rosenberg, “American Naval Strategy in the Era of the Third World War: An Inquiry in the Structure and Process of General War at Sea, 1945–90,” in N.A.M. Rodger (ed.), Naval Power in the Twentieth Century (New York: Macmillan 1996), 243.
18 Deep Blue was created in 2001 to assist senior naval leadership to come up with innovative means to fight terrorism at the strategic level. It was disestablished in 2008.
19 According to Swartz and Duggan, the VCNO’s PLANORDS for the development of the POM ignored the inputs of the Navy’s strategic planning process. See Peter Swartz with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (2001–2010: Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents) (Alexandria: Center for Naval Analysis 2011), 319.
20 For a comprehensive description and analysis of OPNAV planning initiatives see Swartz with Duggan, “U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts.”
21 Steve Kelley, “Linking Strategy to POM Development: The Navy Strategic Plan in Support of POM-12 (NSP-12),” undated unclassified briefing, slide #6.
22 US Department of the Army, “Planning Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System.” To be revised in light of revisions to TAP.
23 See US Department of the Army, “Revisions to The Army Plan,” 16 October 2014. Note that this memorandum was signed by both the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff.
24 US Department of the Army, The Army Vision: Strategic Advantage in a Complex World (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army 2015).
25 US Department of the Army, “Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters Department of the Army,” General Order 2012-01, 11 June 2012, <http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/go1201.pdf>.
26 See Jeremiah Gertler, “The Air Force Aviation Investment Challenge,” R44305, Congressional Research Service, Washington, 11 December 2015.
27 US Department of the Air Force, “Strategic Planning System.” To be revised.
28 US Department of the Air Force, America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future (Washington: 2014). The document outlines how the Air Force is to act, vice what it plans to buy.
29 Sarah Sicard, “Air Force Chief reveals parts of the new master plan,” National Defense, 16 September 2014, <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1608>.
30 US Air Force, USAF Strategic Master Plan (Washington: 2015).
31 US Department of the Air Force, “Strategic Planning System.” 3.
32 Previously approved by a three-star, in the new system it will no longer be issued. Criticism of the document included that it was vague to the point of being unhelpful. The way the Strategic Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs (A8X) approached developing the document was consensus based. This process took too long and it rarely was issued in a timely fashion to influence decision-making.
33 Aaron Mehta, “Lt General Michael Moeller: USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Plans and Programs,” DefenseNews, 24 April 2014.
34 US Army War College, How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2015–2016 (Carlisle Barracks PA: 2015), 31.
35 See Peter Swartz’s ambitious outline of what a naval strategy should consider comprised in Swartz with Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts.
36 See Tripp Barber, “Joint Warfare Analysis: The Key to Shaping DoD’s Future,” Phalanx 47/1 (2014).
37 This initiative establishes an N51-chaired Strategy Oversight Group (SOG) to meet monthly and is composed of two/one-star-level flag officers or Senior Executive Service civilians. Its mandate is to “coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the individual efforts of all stakeholders involved in the development, engagement, and assessment of Navy strategy into a single, unified effort.” Above the SOG is the Senior Executive Group which will meet on a quarterly basis to “review, approve, and transmit to the CNO an annual plan on the development, engagement, and assessment of Navy strategy and recommendations for improving the development, engagement, and assessment of Navy Strategy.” These fora are to be supported by weekly captain-level Action Officer Group (AOG) meetings: Strategy Development AOG, Strategy Engagement AOG, and Strategy Assessment AOG. Scott Swift, “Charter for Navy Strategic Enterprise,” Navy Staff, 30 May 2014.
38 To the point, the first NSP 2006 was critiqued for lacking costings, i.e., that it was no more than a strategic vision without a resource plan. Haynes, “American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era,” 335.
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Thomas-Durell Young
Thomas-Durell Young is an academic associate for comparative defense planning curriculum in the Department of National Security Affairs, and Program Manager Europe, Center for Civil–Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.