The Rise of Special Operations Forces: Generalized Specialization, Boundary Spanning and Military Autonomy

ABSTRACT

The special operations forces (SOF) of the industrial democracies have suddenly and rapidly grown in numbers and resources during the past decades. Most explanations for this growth focus on factors external to the armed forces. We argue that the enlargement of SOF is also the result of internal organizational dynamics. First, we compare SOF to other units and military appendages that have grown over the past 30 years in order to delineate what is unique to their development and the special adaptive potential they bring to the armed forces: generalized specialization, boundary spanning roles, and enlargement of military autonomy. Second, we analyze the actions of internal military entrepreneurs and their organizational mentors to show how they use this adaptive potential to “sell” the use of SOF to key policy-makers and decision-makers.

KEYWORDS:

• Special Operations Forces
• SOCOM
• Adaptation
• IDF

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for excellent comments on a previous version of this article and the participants in a workshop on “Special Forces Around the World: A Social Scientific Perspective” held at the Dan Shomron Center for Society, Security and Peace of Kinneret Academic College (June 2015), for their comments as well.

Notes

¹ Ami Pedahzur, Military Entrepreneurs and the Evolution of Special Operations Forces (Austin: The University of Texas at Austin, Working Paper, 2015). DOI:10.13140/RG.2.1.3485.0647.

² Fernando M. Luján, Light Footprints: The Future of American Military Intervention (Washington: Center for a New American Security 2013), 21–25, 27; Homer W. Harkins, “What Is Old Is New Again: The Reemergence of Special Warfare,” Special Operations Journal 1/2 (2015), 112–18.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare (London: Frank Cass 1998), 7; Robert G. Spulak, A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities and Use of SOF (Hurlbert Field FL: Joint Special Operations University 2007); Jessica Glicken Turnley, “Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF Are the Way SOF Are,” Joint Special Operations University Report 11/1 (2011), <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jsou/why_sof_are_the_way_sof_are_turnley_mar2011.pdf>.

⁵ Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marine Corps Gazette 83/1 (1999), 18–23.

⁶ Pedahzur, Military Entrepreneurs.

⁷ David Last, “Special Operations Forces in Conventional Armies: ‘Salvation Army’ or ‘Dirty Dozen’?” in Bernd Horn, J. Paul de B. Taillon, and David Last (eds), Forces of Choice (Toronto and Montreal: School of Public Policy, Queens University and McGill-Queens University Press, 2004), 35–59.

⁸ Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington: Brookings Institution Press 1996), 6, 57.

⁹ Ibid., 48–55; Luján, Ligth Footprints, 24–25 .

¹⁰ Gordon Williamson, German Special Forces of World War II (Oxford: Osprey 2009), 6–20.

¹¹ Mark Seaman (ed.), Special Operations Executive: A New Instrument of War (London: Routledge 2006).

¹² Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces (New York: Public Affairs 2004).

¹³ Gad Shimron, Special Units in Foreign Armies (Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Ministry of Defense Press 2007), 52–57, 207–10, 220–23, 191–94.

¹⁴ Andrew Exum, “Special Operations Forces’ Expanding Global Role,” World Politics Review, 30 May 2012, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12005/abu-muqawama-special-operations-forces-expanding-global-role#>; Mike Ryan, Alexander Stilwell, and Chris Mann, The Encyclopaedia of the World’s Special Forces (Stroud: History Press 2003).

¹⁵ Elie Tenenbaum, “Beyond National Styles: Towards a Connected History of Cold War Counterinsurgency,” in Beatrice Heuser and Eitan Shamir (eds), Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming 2016); Tim Jones, Postwar Counterinsurgency and the SAS 1945–1952 (London: Frank Cass 2001), 138–57.

¹⁶ Linda Robinson, “The Future of US Special Operations Forces,” Council on Foreign Relations. Council Special Report no. 66, 2013, 8–9; Nick Turse, “The Rise of the Military’s Secret Military,” Salon, 8 January 2014, <http://www.salon.com/2014/01/08/the_rise_of_the_militarys_secret_military_partner/>.

¹⁷ James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism (London: Routledge 2007).

¹⁸ Paul McLeary, “Life after Wartime: SOCOM Focuses on Global Partnership, Troop Mobility,” Defense News, 8 October 2013, <http://www.w54.biz/showthread.php?2177-SPecOps-only&p=41028&viewfull=1#post41028>.

¹⁹ Bernd Horn, “Special Men, Special Missions: The Utility of Special Operations Forces – a Summation,” in Bernd Horn, J. Paul de B. Taillon, and David Last (eds), Forces of Choice (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command School of Public Policy, Queens University and McGill–Queens University Press, 2004), 9; USSOCOM, Joint Publication 3-05: Special Operations (Tampa: 2011), II-5–II-19.

²⁰ Colin Jackson and Austin Long, “The Fifth Service: The Rise of Special Operations Command,” in Harvey M. Sapolsky, Benjamin H. Friedman, and Brendan Rittenhouse Green (eds), US Military Innovation since the Cold War: Creation without Destruction (New York: Routledge 2009), 139.

²¹ Richard H. Shultz, Jr, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr, and W. Bradley Stock, eds., Special Operations Forces: Roles and Missions in the Aftermath of the Cold War (Collingdale PA: Diane 1996), 161, 203, 210.

²² Horn, “Special Men, Special Missions;” Last, “Special Operations Forces in Conventional Armies.”

²³ Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 69–73.

²⁴ Ibid., 91–106.

²⁵ Ibid., 124–26.

²⁶ Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 133.

²⁷ Jackson and Long, “The Fifth Service,” 142–43.

²⁸ USSOCOM, FY 2015 Budget Highlights (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command 2011), <http://www.socom.mil/News/Documents/FY%202015%20USSOCOM%20Budget%20Highlights.pdf>

²⁹ USSOCOM, United States Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007, 6th edn (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command 2008), 22–28.

³⁰ The US defense budget rose accordingly during the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Defense expenditure was as follows: 2000: US$384.5 billion; 2006: US$534.5 billion; 2008: US$665.9 billion; 2012: US$645.5 billion; 2013: US$557.6 billion; 2014: US$581.4 billion. See Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Chief Financial Officer, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request: Overview (Arlington VA: Department of Defense 2015), 5, <http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY2016_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf>; Congressional Budget Office, Growth in DoD’s Budget from 2000 to 2014 (Washington: 2014), 4, <https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/49764-MilitarySpending.pdf>.

³¹ USSOCOM, United States Special Operations Command History, 8–22; Robinson, “The Future of US Special Operations Forces,” 17–18.

³² McLeary, “Life after Wartime.”

³³ Marcus Weisgerber, “Peeling the Onion Back on the Pentagon’s Special Operations Budget,” Defense One, 27 January 2015, <http://www.defenseone.com/business/2015/01/peeling-onion-back-pentagons-special-operations-budget/103905/>.

³⁴ Joe Gould, “R&D Request Rises for US Special Operations,” Defense News, 27 May 2015, <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/show-daily/sofic/2015/05/19/budget-request-rises-special-operations/27607107/>; Stew Magnuson, “Despite Wider Cuts, Special Operations Command Budget Outlook Remains Rosy,” National Defense, May 2015, <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2015/May/Pages/DespiteWiderCuts,SpecialOperationsCommandBudgetOutlookRemainsRosy.aspx>.

³⁵ House of Commons Defense Committee. A New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Report: Sixth Report of Session 2002–03, Vol. I (London: The Stationary Office Ltd. 2003), 16–17, 45, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmdfence/93/93.pdf>.

³⁶ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Stockholm: 2013), 187.

³⁷ UK Ministry of Defence, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 (London: 2010), 27, 60, <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62482/strategic-defence-security-review.pdf>.

³⁸ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Military Balance 2013,” 186.

³⁹ Ibid., 153.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 66–68.

⁴¹ Ministère de la Défense, The French White Book on Defence and National Security 2013, 91, 130 (Paris: 2013), <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/content/download/206186/2393586/file/White%20paper%20on%20defense%20%202013.pdf>.

⁴² IISS, “Military Balance 2013,” 95.

⁴³ Yoaz Hendel, “IDF Special Units: Their Purpose and Operational Concept” (Hebrew), Strategic Assessment 10/2 (2007), 32.

⁴⁴ Moshe Zonder, The Elite Unit of Israel (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Keter 2000), 22–25.

⁴⁵ Amos Harel, “The new ‘habitat’ for generals: Shaldag” (Hebrew), Ha’aretz, 18 July 2003, <http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.896872>.

⁴⁶ IDF Human Resource Online, “Unit Duvdevan” (Hebrew), <https://www.aka.idf.il/Main/giyus/general.aspx?catId=58615&docId=65548>.

⁴⁷ Chen Kotas-Bar, “The rocket hunters” (Hebrew), Ma’ariv, 12 September 2007, <http://www.fresh.co.il/vBulletin/showthread.php?t=350437>.

⁴⁸ See Amos Harel, “The soldiers who came of age during the fighting will not forget Lebanon” (Hebrew), Ha’aretz, 12 November 2005, <www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1057282>; Ofer Shelah and Yoav Limor, Captives of Lebanon (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Miskal-Yediot Aharonot 2007), 195–96; Eitan Rabin, “The IDF uncovers a unit solely derived at fighting Hezbollah” (Hebrew), Ha’aretz, 12 December 1996, <http://2015.uploaded.fresh.co.il/2015/05/11/27558108.pdf>; Moshe Tamir, Undeclared War (Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Ma’arachot 2005), 116, 141–42, 164–65.

⁴⁹ Lihi Vigodsky, “Sabotage Angels” (Hebrew), MAZI Online, April 2007,<mazi.idf.il/3850-5216-he/IGF.aspx>.

⁵⁰ Idan Sonsino, “Six Feet Under: The IDF continues Training for Subterranean Combat” (Hebrew), IDF Online, 16 July 2012, <www.idf.il/1133-16580-he/Dover.aspx>.

⁵¹ Tal Ariel-Amir, “A training day with Sayeret Rimon men” (Hebrew), Ma’ariv, 28 September 2015, <http://www.maariv.co.il/news/israel/Article-499640>.

⁵² Shay Levi, “Orev, PALSAR, PALHAN: the IDF’s deadly tip of the spear” (Hebrew), Mako PZM, 3 October 2011, <http://www.mako.co.il/pzm-soldiers/Article-a6700266c15c231006.htm>.

⁵³ Amir Oren, “What is behind the recent establishing of the Depth Corps Command in the IDF” (Hebrew), Ha’aretz, 16 December 2011, <http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1593122>.

⁵⁴ IISS, “Military Balance 2013,” 324–25.

⁵⁵ Yoav Zitun, “A Commando Brigade has been established” (Hebrew), Ynet, 6 July 2015, <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4676843,00.html>.

⁵⁶ Judah Ari Gross, “IDF goes commando with formation of new elite brigade,” Times of Israel, 28 December 2015, <http://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-goes-commando-with-formation-of-new-elite-brigade/>.

⁵⁷ Ben Caspit, “Commando Eisenkot,” Al-Monitor, 8 July 2015, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/contents/articles/originals/2015/07/israel-idf-new-commando-unit-gadi-eizenkot-is-hamas.html#>; Or Heller, “The new Commando Brigade” (Hebrew), Israel Defense, 10 October 2016, <http://www.israeldefense.co.il/he/content/חטיבת-הקומנדו-החדשה>.

⁵⁸ Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge MA: Polity 1998); Herefried Münkler, New Wars (Malden MA: Polity 2005).

⁵⁹ Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Marine Corps Gazette 52/1 (2009), 34–39.

⁶⁰ Spulak, “A Theory of Special Operations;” Turnley, “Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups,” 48; Ohad Leslau, “Worth the Bother? Israeli Experience and the Utility of Special Operation Forces,” Contemporary Security Policy 31 (2010), 513.

⁶¹ Edward Luttwak, “Toward Post-heroic Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 74/3 (1995), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50977/edward-n-luttwak/toward-post-heroic-warfare>.

⁶² Martin Shaw, The New Western Way of War (London: Polity 2005).

⁶³ The literature shows that sensitivity is contingent upon various conditions but it continues to be a factor in democratic decision-making. See: Hugh Smith, “What Costs Will Democracies Bear? A Review of Popular Theories of Casualty Aversion,” Armed Forces & Society 31/4 (2005), 487–512; Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare (London: Routledge 2002); Yagil Levy, “An Unbearable Price: War Casualties and Warring Democracies,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 22/1 (2009), 69–82; Shaw, The New Western Way of War; Avi Kober, “From Heroic To Post-heroic Warfare: Israel’s Way of War in Asymmetrical Conflicts,” Armed Forces & Society 41/1 (2015), 97–98.

⁶⁴ John Arquilla,”The New Rules of War,” Foreign Policy, 11 February 2010, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/02/11/the-new-rules-of-war/#>.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Anthony King, “The Special Air Service and the Concentration of Military Power,” Armed Forces & Society 35 (2009), 646–66; Robinson, “The Future of US Special Operations Forces,” 5–6.

⁶⁷ Turnley, “Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups.”

⁶⁸ Hendel, “IDF Special Units,” 36.

⁶⁹ Benny Gantz (Chief of Staff, IDF), “2020 Vision: Israel’s Perils and Prospects” (paper presented at the BESA Conference, Wohl Center, Ramat Gan, Israel, October 13 2013) but for criticisms see Eitan Shamir and Ido Hecht, “Neglect of IDF Ground Forces: A Risk to Israel’s Security,” BESA Center Perspectives Paper 225, 2013, <http://besacenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/perspectives225.pdf>.

⁷⁰ Shaw, The New Western Way of War.

⁷¹ Boaz Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari, “Hybrid Wars, Complex Environments and Transformed Forces: Leadership in Contemporary Armed Forces,” in G.A.J. van Dyk (ed.), Strategic Challenges for African Armed Forces for the Next Decade (Stellenbosch, South Africa: Sun Press 2009), 1–16; Anthony Forster, “The Military Covenant and British Civil–Military Relations: Letting the Genie out of the Bottle,” Armed Forces and Society 38/2 (2012), 273–90; Gerry R. Rubin, “United Kingdom Military Law: Autonomy, Civilianisation, Juridification,” Modern Law Review 65 (2002), 36–57; Koen Verhoest, B. Guy Peters, Geert Bouchaert, and Bram Vershuere, “The Study of Organisational Autonomy: A Conceptual Review,” Public Administration and Development 24/2 (2004), 101–18.

⁷² Horn, “Special Men, Special Missions,” 5–6.

⁷³ Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, “Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq,” International Security 30/3 (2006), 7–46; Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts (Princeton NJ: Princeton UP 2009).

⁷⁴ We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.

⁷⁵ Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action; Bernd Horn and Bill Knarr, “By, With, Through: A Historical Success Story,” in Emily Spencer (ed.), By, With, Through: A SOF Global Engagement Strategy (Kingston ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press 2014), 1–38.

⁷⁶ Jim Fisher-Thompson, “U.S. Defense Scholars Tout Gendarmerie as Peacekeeping Model,” IIP Digital, 21 December 2005, <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2005/12/200512191840021ejrehsif0.6361048.html#axzz3L2AvQ1TC>; Michiel De Weger, The Potential of the European Gendarmerie Force (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael 2009).

⁷⁷ James S. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgences (Washington: Strategic Studies Institute 2006).

⁷⁸ United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations, Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: 2009), 32; Hikaru Yamashita, “Specialized Units for International Peace Cooperation: Concept and Practice,” NIDS Security Reports 8 (2007), 1–16.

⁷⁹ Bernd Horn, More than Meets the Eye: The Invisible Hand of SOF in Afghanistan (Kingston ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press 2011).

⁸⁰ Mark Urban, Task Force Black (London: Abacus 2011).

⁸¹ Emily Spencer, “Stepping out of the Shadows: Canadian Special Operations Forces and Media Relations,” in Emily Spencer (ed.), Special Operations Forces: A National Capability (Kingston ON: Canada Defence Academy Press, 2011), 205–36.

⁸² Dan Parsons, “Worldwide, Drones Are in High Demand,” National Defense 97/714 (2013), <https://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-329607869/worldwide-drones-are-in-high-demand>; Paul J. Springer, Military Robots and Drones: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara CA: ABC-CLIO 2013).

⁸³ Thomas Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35/1 (2012), 5–32; Shmuel Even and David Siman-Tov, “Cyber Warfare: Concepts, Trends and Implications for Israel,” INSS Memorandum 109 (2011), 15–34.

⁸⁴ Anna Forrester, “ODNI, DoD update proposed budget for FY 2015 intelligence programs,” ExecutiveGov, 24 November 2014, <http://www.executivegov.com/2014/11/odni-dod-update-proposed-budget-for-fy-2015-intelligence-programs/>; Eyal Pecht and Asher Tishler, “The Value of Military Intelligence,” Defence and Peace Economics 26/2 (2015), 179–211.

⁸⁵ Amichai Cohen and Eyal Ben-Ari, “Legal-Advisors in the Armed Forces: Military-Lawyers in the Israeli Defence Forces as Mediators, Interpreters and Arbitrators of Meaning during Operations,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 42 (2014), 125–48; Laura A. Dickinson, “Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International Law Compliance,” American Journal of International Law 104/1 (2010), 1–28; David Luban, “Military Lawyers and the Two Cultures Problem,” Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works, Paper 12-057, 2012, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2054832_code238438.pdf?abstractid=2054832&mirid=1>.

⁸⁶ Ilana Bet-El, “Media and Conflict: An Integral Part of the Modern Battlefield,” in Kobi Michael, David Kellen, and Eyal Ben-Ari (eds), The Transformation of the World of War and Peace Support Operations (Westport CT: Praeger Security International 2009), 65–80.

⁸⁷ Brad W. Johnson, “Consulting in the Military Context: Implications of the Revised Training Principles,” Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research 54/4 (2002), 233–41.

⁸⁸ Hilary Footit, “Introduction: Languages and the Military: Alliances, Occupation and Peace Building,” in Hilary Footit and Michael Kelly (eds), Languages and the Military: Alliances, Occupation and Peace Building (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2012), 1–11.

⁸⁹ Grant S. Fawcett, Cultural Understanding in Counterinsurgency: Analysis of the Human Terrain System (Fort Leavenworth KS: School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009).

⁹⁰ Gary Lloyd and Gielie van Dyk, “The Challenges, Roles and Functions of Civil Military Coordination Officers in Peace Support Operations: A Theoretical Discussion,” Scientia Militaria 35/2 (2007), 68–94.

⁹¹ Eyal Ben-Ari, “From a Sociology of Units to a Sociology of Combat Formations: Militaries in Urban Combat,” in Anthony King (ed.), Frontline: Combat and Cohesion in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford UP 2015), 73–92.

⁹² Shaw, The New Western Way of War.

⁹³ Kober, “From Heroic to Post-heroic,” 97–109; Kevin S. Woods, Limiting Casualties: Imperative or Constraint (Fort Leavenworth KS: School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College 1997), 4, 7, 11–15; Edward Luttwak, “‘Post-heroic Warfare’ and Its Implications,” in Jun’ichiro Shoji et al. (eds), Proceedings of NIDS International Symposium on Security Affairs–War and Peace in the 21st Century: Reflections upon the Century of War (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies 1999), 134–36; Luján, Light Footprints, 8.

⁹⁴ See Timothy M. Bonds, Myron Hura, and Thomas-Durell Young, Enhancing Army Joint Force Headquarters Capabilities (Arlington VA: Rand Arroyo Center 2010), 15–33, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG675-1.html>.

⁹⁵ Hendel, “IDF Special Units,” 35–36; Boaz Zalmanovich, “The Ballooning of Staff and Headquarters – a Clear and Present Danger” (Hebrew) Ma’archot 425 (2009), 40–48; Robinson, “The Future of US Special Operations Forces,” 4, 17–18; Eaglen Mackenzie, “The Pentagon’s growing army of bureaucrats,” Wall Street Journal, 29January 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/article_email/mackenzie-eaglen-the-pentagons-growing-army-of-bureaucrats-1422577501-lMyQjAxMTE1NTM4MDUzMDA3Wj>.

⁹⁶ Brandon Webb, “The Conventionalization of US Special Operations,” SOFREP, 25 September 2013, <http://sofrep.com/27836/the-conventionalization-of-us-special-operations/>.

⁹⁷ Spulak, “A Theory of Special Operations.”

⁹⁸ Jessica Glicken Turnley, “Retaining Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream,” Joint Special Operations University Report 8/2 (2008), <http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/JSOU08-2turnleyRetainingPrecariousValue_final.pdf=; Turnley, “Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups.”

⁹⁹ Eyal Ben-Ari, Zeev Lerer, Uzi Ben-Shalom, and Ariel Vainer, Rethinking Contemporary Warfare: A Sociological View of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (Albany: State University of New York Press 2010); Anna Simons, “The Evolution of the SOF Soldier: An Anthropological Perspective,” in Bernd Horn, J. Paul de B. Taillon, and David Last (eds), Force of Choice: Perspectives on Special Operations (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press 2004), 79–91.

¹⁰⁰ Edward Burke, Leaving the Civilians Behind: The “Soldier-Diplomat” in Afghanistan and Iraq (Madrid: FRIDE 2009); Turnley, “Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups;” Luján, Light Footprints, 5, 30.

¹⁰¹ Robinson, “The Future of US Special Operations Forces,” 12.

¹⁰² Leslau, “Worth the Bother?” 520–21.

¹⁰³ King, “The Special Air Service and the Concentration of Military Power,” 660.

¹⁰⁴ Robinson, “The Future of US Special Operations Forces,” 16–17.

¹⁰⁵ The capability to eliminate terrorist leaders (decapitation) and “ticking bombs” is dependent upon close collaboration between Shabak, the Military Intelligence Directorate – AMAN (Agaf Ha’Modi’in) and its SOF unit Sayeret Matakal (officially subordinate to AMAN), and the Israeli Air Force – the main execution arm (delivering munition to target). This required breaking traditional organizational molds and developing an intra-organizational process for rapid information sharing and joint consultation. See Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff, The Seventh War (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Aharonot 2004), 349.

¹⁰⁶ Erik De Waard and Eric Hans-Kramer, “Expeditionary Forces and Modular Organizational Design,” in Joseph Soeters, Paul C. van Femema, and Robert Beers (eds), Managing Military Organizations: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge 2010), 71–82.

¹⁰⁷ Jonathan Stevenson, “Special Forces: A Corps Deployed Too Broadly,” The National Interest 86 (2006), 73.

¹⁰⁸ Ben-Ari, “From a Sociology of Units to a Sociology of Combat Formations;” Anthony C. King “Close Quarters Battle: Urban Combat and ‘Special Forcification’,” Armed Forces & Society 42/2 (2015), 276–300.

¹⁰⁹ Spulak, “A Theory of Special Operations,” 2; Sergio Miller, “Is There a Future for Special Operations Forces?” Ma’archot 341(1995), 38.

¹¹⁰ Anthony King, “Military Command in the 21st Century through the Eye of Two Generals,” War on the Rocks, 22 January 2015, <http://warontherocks.com/2015/01/military-command-in-the-21st-century-through-the-eyes-of-two-generals/>.

¹¹¹ Tamar Barash and Yotam Amitai, “Special Operations Forces in the IDF Past and Present” (Hebrew), Ma’archot 411 (2007), 19; Zonder, The Elite Unit of Israel, 10.

¹¹² Eyal Ben-Ari, “The Continued Enchantment with Conventional War: Soldiering, Militaries and Social Imaginaries” (Paper presented at the IUS Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL October 23–25, 2009).

¹¹³ Zonder, The Elite Unit of Israel, 9–10; Anna Simons, The Company They Keep (New York: Free Press 1997), 118; Barash and Amitai, “Special Operations Forces in the IDF Past and Present,” 15.

¹¹⁴ Horn, “Special Men, Special Missions.”

¹¹⁵ Rune Henriksen, “Warriors in Combat – What Makes People Actively Fight in Combat?” London School of Economics and Political Science, 2007, 207, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390701248707>.

¹¹⁶ Alastair Finlan, “The (Arrested) Development of UK Special Forces and the Global War on Terror,” Review of International Studies 35/4 (2009), 980–81.

¹¹⁷ Laura A. Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace: Protecting Public Values in an Era of Privatized Foreign Affairs (New Haven: Yale UP 2011); Guy Seidman, “From Nationalization to Privatization: The Case of the IDF,” Armed Forces & Society 36/4 (2010), 716–49.

¹¹⁸ James Kitfield, “The Great Draft Dodge,” National Journal, 13 December 2014, para. 38, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-great-draft-dodge-20141212>.

¹¹⁹ Fabien Mathieu and Nick Dearden, “Corporate Mercenaries: The Threat of Private Military & Security Companies,” Review of African Political Economy 34/114 (2007), 745, 748.

¹²⁰ Pratap Chatterjee, “Ex-SAS Men Cash in on Iraq Bonanaza,” Corpwatch, 9 June 2004, <http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11355>; Christian Jennings, “Special forces quitting to cash in on Iraq,” Scotsman, 21 February 2004, <http://www.sandline.com/hotlinks/Scotsman_Spec-forces.html>.

¹²¹ Mathieu and Dearden, “Corporate Mercenaries,” 748–49; Leslau, “Worth the Bother?” 526; Luján, Light Footprints, 8.

¹²² Mathieu and Dearden, “Corporate Mercenaries,” 749; Samuel P. Cheadle, “Private Military Contractor Liability under the Worldwide Personal Protective Services II Contract,” Public Contract Law Journal 38/3 (2009), 690.

¹²³ Katherine McCoy, “Uncle Sam Wants Them,” Contexts 8/1 (2009), 16–17.

¹²⁴ Kitfield, “The Great Draft Dodge,” paras 40, 43.

¹²⁵ Spulak, “A Theory of Special Operations,” 2; Hendel, “IDF Special Units,” 32; Anthony King, The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries (Oxford: Oxford UP 2013).

¹²⁶ Turnley, “Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups,” 45.

¹²⁷ Leslau, “Worth the Bother?” 526.

¹²⁸ David Last and Hugh Thorburn, “Elite Opinion about Special Operations,” in Bernd Horn and David Last (eds), Choice of Force: Special Operations for Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press 2005), 2.

¹²⁹ Horn, “Special Men, Special Missions,” 8.

¹³⁰ Andy McNab, Bravo Two Zero, trans. Naomi Carmel (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Keter 1993), 110–38.

¹³¹ Kenneth Allard, “Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned,” National Defense University – CCRP (Command and Control Research Program) 1995, <http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Allard_Somalia.pdf>.

¹³² Marcus Luttrel and Patrick Robinson, Lone Survivor, 4th edn (New York: Little, Brown 2007), 307.

¹³³ Mark Thompson, “U.S. Hostage Killed during Failed Rescue Attempt in Yemen,” Time, 6 December 2014, <http://time.com/3621599/u-s-hostage-killed-during-failed-rescue-attempt-in-yemen/>.

¹³⁴ Yaniv Barzilai, “How Bin Laden escaped in 2001 – the lessons of Tora Bora,” Daily Beast, 15 December 2013, paras 13–15, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/12/15/how-bin-laden-escaped-in-2001-the-lessons-of-tora-bora.html>; Peter Bergen, “The Account of How We Nearly Caught Osama Bin Laden in 2001,” New Republic, 30 December 2009, paras 28–33, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/the-battle-tora-bora>.

¹³⁵ Shamir and Hecht, “Neglect of IDF Ground Forces.”

¹³⁶ Leslau, “Worth the Bother?” 513, 526; Hendel, “IDF Special Units,” 36; Niccolo Petrelli, “The Mission Dimension: IDF Special Operations Forces and Strategy in the Second Lebanon War,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 23/1 (2012), 56–73.

¹³⁷ Horn, “Special Men, Special Missions,” 6–7.

¹³⁸ “Nato ‘Unprepared’ for Russia Threat, Say MPs,” BBC News, 31 July 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-28577904>.

¹³⁹ Christian Mölling, “Europe without Defence,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Comments 38, 2011., <https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2011C38_mlg_ks.pdf>

¹⁴⁰ Steven Earlanger, “Shrinking Europe military spending stirs concern,” New York Times, 22 April 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/world/europe/europes-shrinking-military-spending-under-scrutiny.html?_r=0>.

¹⁴¹ Spulak, “A Theory of Special Operations,” 31.

¹⁴² Turnley, “Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups,” 54.

¹⁴³ Last, “Special Operations Forces in Conventional Armies,” 37.

¹⁴⁴ Horn, “Special Men, Special Missions,” 16.

¹⁴⁵ David Axe, “American Commando Brought His Girlfriend to Afghanistan and Armed Her,” War Is Boring, 25 March 2014, <https://medium.com/war-is-boring/american-commando-brought-his-girlfriend-to-afghanistan-and-armed-her-b25209f58e8>.

¹⁴⁶ King, “Military Command in the 21st Century through the Eye of Two Generals.”

¹⁴⁷ Henriksen, “Warriors in Combat,” 202–03, 207.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Eitan Shamir

Eitan Shamir is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Bar Ilan University and Research Associate with the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA). Prior to his academic position, Shamir was in charge of the National Security Doctrine Department at the Ministry of Strategic Affairs, Office of the Prime Minister (Israel). Prior to joining the government, Shamir was Senior Fellow at the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies (CIMS) in the IDF. He has been teaching at the IDF Command and Staff College, IDF Operational Art Course, and the IDF Junior Officers academic program. He holds a PhD from the Department of War Studies at King's College London. Shamir is the author of Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies (Stanford University Press, 2011). Email: [email protected]

Eyal Ben-Ari

Eyal Ben-Ari is the chairman of the Kinneret Research Center on Peace, Security, and Society. He received his BA and MA in sociology and anthropology from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and PhD in social anthropology from the University of Cambridge, England. Prior to joining the Center, he taught at the Hebrew University for 26 years. Ben-Ari has carried out field research in Israel, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Sweden. In Israel, he has studied various social and cultural aspects of the Israel Defense Forces. During 2004–2007, Ben-Ari was the director of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, has participated in numerous committees dealing with the Israeli military, and has acted as a research consultant to the Behavioral Sciences Department of the Israeli Forces. His books include Mastering Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit (1998) and Rethinking the Sociology of Combat: Israel’s Combat Units in the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2010, with Zev Lehrer, Uzi Ben-Shalom, and Ariel Vainer). Email: [email protected]