A Foregone Conclusion? The United States, Britain and the Trident D5 Agreement

ABSTRACT

Existing studies of the United Kingdom’s purchase of Trident D5 missiles have simplified the Reagan administration’s sale. Using previously classified documentation, this article highlights the potential political and financial ramifications of a sale agreement that led to complex deliberations within the Thatcher government up until the final day of negotiations. The White House viewed the sale as a means to strengthen Western nuclear and conventional forces to counter the perceived Soviet threat. However, even within this conducive environment, US officials still drove a hard bargain with their British counterparts, in order to support US strategic interests. Indeed, the White House utilised the sale to influence British defence policy. In this way, the Trident agreement was not a foregone conclusion but rather a continuation of the friendly, but not preordained, nature of US–UK nuclear relations that has been renegotiated, according to the varying interests of both parties, throughout the partnership's existence.

KEYWORDS:

• Nuclear Weapons
• Thatcher
• Reagan
• Anglo-American
• NATO

Acknowledgements

I am grateful for the comments of Matthew Jones, Leopoldo Nuti, David Milne, Kaeten Mistry, Chris Jones and the anonymous referees on earlier drafts of this article.

Notes

¹ House of Commons Library, ‘Briefing Paper: Replacing the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent’, 8 March 2016, accessed on 20 April 2016, http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7353#fullreport; UK Government White Paper, ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’, December 2006, accessed on 8 June 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27378/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf.

² A. Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: of friendship, conflict and the rise and decline of superpowers (London: Routledge, 1995), 150–52; J. Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 183; R. Aldous, Reagan & Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship (London: Random House, 2013), 56–58; G. Smith, Reagan and Thatcher (London: Bodley Head, 1990), 68–71.

³ In 2014, Kristan Stoddart published the first study of Britain’s decision-making on Polaris replacement using documents from the British National Archives. See K. Stoddart, Facing Down the Soviet Union: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1976-1983 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

⁴ This is in concurrence with the work of Francis Gavin, who questions the centrality of the logic of deterrence within US nuclear decision-making. For example see F. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (New York: Cornell University Press, 2012); F. Gavin, ‘Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation’, International Security 40/1 (2015), 9–46.

⁵ See T. Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: US Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years (Oxford: University of California Press, 1991); P. Kengor, The Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007).

⁶ D.J. Gill, ‘Strength in Numbers: The Labour Government and the Size of the Polaris Force’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/6 (2010), 819–45.

⁷ [Kew, United Kingdom, The National Archives (hereafter TNA)] FCO 46/2751, Thomas to Gillmore, ‘The Trident D-5 Decision’, 25 August 1981.

⁸ TNA, PREM 19/417, Weinberger to Thatcher, 24 August 1981; Reagan asked Weinberger to send this letter to Thatcher on the President’s behalf, see TNA, DEFE 24/2126, Weinberger to Nott, 25 August 1981.

⁹ Ronald Reagan, ‘Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters on the Announcement of the United States Strategic Program’, 2 October 1981, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44333; TNA, PREM 19/417, Reagan to Thatcher, 1 October 1981.

¹⁰ A. Priest, ‘In American Hands: Britain, the United States and the Polaris Nuclear Project 1962-1968’, Contemporary British History 19/3 (2005), 366–67.

¹¹ H. Parr, ‘The British Decision to Upgrade Polaris, 1970-4’, Contemporary European History 22/2 (2013), 253–54.

¹² K. Stoddart, ‘The Wilson Government and British Responses to Anti-Ballistic Missiles 1964-1970’, Contemporary British History 23/1 (2009), 1–33; Priest ‘In American Hands’, 353–76; J. Baylis and K. Stoddart, ‘Britain and the Chevaline Project: The Hidden Nuclear Programme, 1967-82’, Journal of Strategic Studies 26/4 (2003), 124–55; T. Robb, ‘Antelope, Poseidon or a Hybrid: The Upgrading of the British Strategic Nuclear Deterrent’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/6 (2010), 797–817; K. Stoddart, ‘The British Labour Government and the Development of Chevaline, 1974-79’, Cold War History 10/3 (2010), 287–314; Parr, ‘The British Decision’, 253–74; An Official History on Chevaline by Professor Matthew Jones, LSE, is forthcoming.

¹³ See TNA, DEFE 19/275, Duff Mason Report, December 1978; TNA, CAB 130/1222, ‘Most Confidential Record to MISC 7 (81) 1st meeting’, 24 November 1981.

¹⁴ TNA, PREM 19/417, Nott to Thatcher, ‘UK Strategic Nuclear Force’, 14 September 1981.

¹⁵ Hansard, vol. 32, c153w, Polaris HC debate, 16 November 1982.

¹⁶ See TNA, DEFE 19/275, Duff Mason Report, December 1978; G. Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident: The Development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 141–63.

¹⁷ TNA, FCO 46/2751, Defence Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 24 September 1981.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ B. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2000), 3.

²⁰ O. Njølstad, ‘The Collapse of Superpower Détente, 1975-1980’, in M.P. Leffler and O.A. Westad (eds) The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III, Endings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 135–55; N. Mitchell, ‘The Cold War and Jimmy Carter’, in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, 66–88; S. Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008); D.J. Sargent, A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of Foreign Relations in the 1970s (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 261–95.

²¹ Fischer, The Reagan Reversal, 18; R. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 8–10; C.J. Pach, Jr., ‘Sticking to His Guns: Reagan and National Security’, in W.E. Brownlee and H.D. Graham (eds) The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Conservatism and its Legacies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 87.

²² Pach, ‘Sticking to His Guns’, 85; J.L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 354.

²³ P. Sharp, Thatcher’s Diplomacy: The Revival of British Foreign Policy (London: MacMillan Press, 1997); M. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 68–69.

²⁴ See S. Doyle, ‘A Foregone Conclusion? The United States, Britain and the Trident missile agreements, 1977–1982’ (PhD diss., University of East Anglia, 2015).

²⁵ Pach, ‘Sticking to His Guns’, 89; F. Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 111; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 352.

²⁶ [Simi Valley, United States, Ronald Reagan Library (hereafter RRL)], NSC: Meeting Files, Box 3, NSC00021 15 September 1981, Allen to Reagan, ‘National Security Council Meeting September 15 1981 - 4:00 - 5:00 PM’, 14 September 1981.

²⁷ B. Fischer, ‘US Foreign Policy under Reagan and Bush’, in M.P. Leffler and O.A. Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III, Endings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 271; Fischer, The Reagan reversal, 27–28.

²⁸ Ibid., 2.

²⁹ See TNA, FCO 46/2751, Watkins to Gillmore, ‘US/UK Defence Co-operation’, 27 August 1981; TNA, FCO 46/2752, Gainsborough, ‘Draft Trident R&D Levy: Background’, 14 October 1981.

³⁰ R. Vinen, ‘Thatcherism and the Cold War’, in B. Jackson and R. Saunders (eds), Making Thatcher’s Britain, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 202.

³¹ RRL, Sven Kraemer Files, Box 90100, NATO-Countries-UK April 1981 – August 1981, London to Defense, 7 July 1981.

³² RRL, National Security Files (NSC): Country Files, Box 20, United Kingdom Vol. 1 1/20/81 - 8/81 (4 of 6), Weinberger to Reagan, ‘Meetings with John Nott on British Defense Review’, 22 June 1981.

³³ Pach, ‘Sticking to His Guns’, 94.

³⁴ RRL, National Security Files (NSC): Country Files, Box 20, United Kingdom Vol. 1 1/20/81 - 8/81 (4 of 6), Weinberger to Reagan, ‘Meetings with John Nott on British Defense Review’, 22 June 1981.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ See TNA, FCO 46/2751, Watkins to Gillmore, ‘US/UK Defence Co-operation’, 27 August 1981; TNA, FCO 46/2752, Gainsborough, ‘Draft Trident R&D Levy: Background’, 14 October 1981.

³⁷ A. Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and NATO: Britain, America and the Dynamics of the Alliance (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 55–56.

³⁸ Ibid., 56.

³⁹ TNA, FCO 46/2751, Watkins to Gillmore, ‘US/UK Defence Co-operation’, 27 August 1981.

⁴⁰ TNA, FCO 46/2751, Gillmore to Stewart, ‘Defence Collaborations with the Americans: Trident et al’, 18 September 1981.

⁴¹ For details on the setting up of this Cabinet Committee, see TNA, PREM 19/14, Hunt to Thatcher, ‘Nuclear Matters’, 14 May 1979.

⁴² See J. Baylis and K. Stoddart, The British Nuclear Experience: The Role of Beliefs, Culture, and Identity (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015).

⁴³ TNA, CAB 130/1222, ‘Most Confidential Record to MISC 7 (81) 1st meeting’, 24 November 1981.

⁴⁴ TNA, CAB 130/1160’,Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy, United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence’, 17 November 1981.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ TNA, PREM 19/694, Armstrong to Thatcher, ‘The United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent MISC 7 (81) 1’, 23 November 1981.

⁴⁷ TNA, FCO 46/2751, Weston to Acland, ‘C4/D5’, 2 October 1981.

⁴⁸ TNA, PREM 19/694, Armstrong to Thatcher, ‘The United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent MISC 7 (81) 1’, 23 November 1981.

⁴⁹ TNA, FCO 46/2751, Weston to Acland, ‘C4/D5’, 2 October 1981.

⁵⁰ Hansard, vol.977, cols. 681-683, Mr Francis Pym, 24 January 1980.

⁵¹ See K. Stoddart, ‘Creating the “Seamless Robe of Deterrence”‘, in L. Nuti et al. (eds), The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2015), 176–95.

⁵² See M.E. Guasconi, ‘Public Opinion and the Euromissile Crisis’, in The Euromissile Crisis, 273.

⁵³ TNA, FCO 46/2750, Gillmore to Acland, ‘Trident Public Attitudes’, 5 February 1981.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ TNA, FCO 46/2750, From Gillmore, ‘Trident’, 16 July 1981.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ TNA, CAB 130/1160, ‘Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy, United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence’, 17 November 1981.

⁵⁸ TNA, PREM 19/694, Armstrong to Thatcher, ‘The United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent MISC 7 (81)’, 11 January 1982.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid; the records of the meeting do not detail who made this contribution.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ TNA, CAB 130/1109, MISC 7(79) 1st Meeting, ‘Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy’, 24 May 1979.

⁶⁵ See Baylis and Stoddart, The British Nuclear Experience.

⁶⁶ RRL, NSC: Meeting Files, Box 3, NSC00021 15 September 1981, Allen to Reagan, ‘National Security Council Meeting September 15 1981 - 4:00 - 5:00 PM’, 14 September 1981.

⁶⁷ RRL, Edwin Meese Files, Box CF219, United Kingdom - General (February 1901-July 1981), Allen to Reagan, ‘Your meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher’, 24 February 1981.

⁶⁸ Aldous, Reagan & Thatcher, 36.

⁶⁹ RRL, NSC: Country Files, Box 20, United Kingdom Vol.1 1/20/81 - 8/31/81 (4 of 6), Louis to Haig, ‘Britain Drifts’, 31 July 1981.

⁷⁰ See G. Stewart, Bang! A History of Britain in the 1980s (London: Atlantic Books, 2013), 114.

⁷¹ RRL, NSC: Country Files, Box 20, United Kingdom Vol.1 1/20/81 - 8/31/81 (6 of 6), Allen to Bush, ‘Your Meeting with the Earl of Cromer’, 18 February 1981.

⁷² See Stewart, Bang!, 114.

⁷³ RRL, NSC: VIP Visits, Box 91434, Haig to Reagan, Briefing Book Re Visit of British Prime Minister Thatcher February 25 - 28 1981, ‘Visit of Prime Minister Thatcher’, February 1981.

⁷⁴ RRL, NSC: Country Files, Box 20, United Kingdom Vol.1 1/20/81 - 8/31/81 (4 of 6), Louis to Haig, ‘Britain Drifts’, 31 July 1981.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ See TNA, FCO 46/2752, Gillmore to Acland, ‘Trident’, 7 December 1981; TNA, FCO 46/2752, Hastie-Smith to Wade-Gery, ‘The Polaris Successor’, 10 December 1981; TNA, DEFE 24/2123, Hastie-Smith to PS/S of S, ‘Trident Costs’, 10 December 1981; TNA, FCO 46/2752, Cooper to Armstrong, ‘Polaris Succession’, 18 December 1981; TNA, DEFE 24/2123, Weston to Legge, ‘The Polaris Successor’, 7 January 1982.

⁷⁷ The full record of this meeting is currently classified.

⁷⁸ TNA, PREM 19/694, Armstrong to Thatcher, ‘The United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent MISC 7 (81)’, 11 January 1982.

⁷⁹ Ernest Bevin quoted in P. Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 7; Bevin is believed to have made this remark in a meeting of the Attlee government on whether to build a British atomic bomb. This mindset has pervaded UK decision-making since, see Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb; Baylis and Stoddart, The British Nuclear Experience.

⁸⁰ TNA, CAB 130/1182, ‘Most Confidential Record to MISC 7 (82) 1st Meeting’, 12 January 1982.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² TNA, PREM 19/695, Armstrong to Thatcher, 3 March 1982.

⁸³ TNA, CAB 130/1182, ‘Most Confidential Record to MISC 7 (82) 1st Meeting’, 12 January 1982.

⁸⁴ TNA, DEFE 24/2123, ‘Trident Negotiating Strategy: Modalities and Aims’, 5 January 1982.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ RRL, NSC: Country Files, Box 20, UK (01/25/1982 - 02/11/1982 [Too late to file], Haig and Carlucci to Reagan, ‘Discussions with the British Concerning Purchase of the Trident D-5’, 6 February 1982.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ See B. Bernstein, ‘The Uneasy Alliance: Roosevelt, Churchill and the Atomic Bomb, 1940-1945’, The Western Political Quarterly 29/2 (1976), 202–320; Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and NATO, 44–46; T. Robb, A Strained Partnership? US-UK Relations in the Era of Détente, 1969-77 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 73–127; J. Colman, A ‘Special Relationship’? Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American Relations ‘at the Summit’, 1964-68 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 75–99.

⁹⁰ TNA, PREM 19/694, Armstrong to Thatcher, ‘The United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent MISC 7 (81)’, 11 January 1982.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² TNA, PREM 19/694, Wade-Gery to Coles, ‘Trident’, 12 February 1982.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid

⁹⁶ Ibid; Atlanta, United States, Jimmy Carter Library, NLC-17-89-5-25-4, David Aaron to Ambassador Brewster, 15 July 1980.

⁹⁷ RRL, Dennis Blair Files, RAC Box 5, Trident II D-5 1980 - 1982 (8 OF 11), ‘Contingency Q’s and A’s on Press Announcement of British Purchase of Trident II Missile’, no date.

⁹⁸ TNA, PREM 19/694, Wade-Gery to Coles, ‘Trident’, 12 February 1982.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Stoddart, Facing Down the Soviet Union, 192.

¹⁰² RRL, NSC: Country Files, Box 20, UK (01/25/1982 - 02/11/1982 [Too late to file], Haig and Carlucci to Reagan, ‘Discussions with the British Concerning Purchase of the Trident D-5’, 6 February 1982.

¹⁰³ RRL, NSC: Country Files, UK (01/25/1982 - 02/11/1982 [Too late to file], Stoessel and Carlucci to Reagan, ‘Negotiations with the United Kingdom on Possible Purchase of Trident D-5 Missile’, 11 February 1982.

¹⁰⁴ TNA, PREM 19/694, Wade-Gery to Coles, ‘Trident’, 12 February 1982.

¹⁰⁵ RRL, NSC: Country Files, Box 20, UK (01/25/1982 - 02/11/1982 [Too late to file], Haig and Carlucci to Reagan, ‘Discussions with the British Concerning Purchase of the Trident D-5’, 6 February 1982.

¹⁰⁶ RRL, NSC: Country Files, UK (01/25/1982 - 02/11/1982 [Too late to file], Stoessel and Carlucci to Reagan, ‘Negotiations with the United Kingdom on Possible Purchase of Trident D-5 Missile’, 11 February 1982.

¹⁰⁷ TNA, PREM 19/694, Wade-Gery to Coles, ‘Trident’, 12 February 1982.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid; TNA, PREM 19/694, To Wade-Gery, ‘Trident’, 15 February 1982.

¹¹¹ TNA, PREM 19/694, Wade-Gery to Nott, 25 February 1982.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ RRL, NSC: Country Files, Box 20, UK (01/25/1982 - 02/11/1982 [Too late to file], Haig and Carlucci to Reagan, ‘Discussions with the British Concerning Purchase of the Trident D-5’, 6 February 1982.

¹¹⁶ Pach, ‘Sticking to His Guns’, 94.

¹¹⁷ A. Dorman, ‘John Nott and the Royal Navy: The 1981 Defence Review Revisited’, Contemporary British History 15/2 (2010), 109.

¹¹⁸ TNA, DEFE 24/2126, Weinberger to Nott, 25 August 1981.

¹¹⁹ TNA, PREM 19/694, Wade-Gery to Nott, 25 February 1982.

¹²⁰ RRL, NSC: VIP Visits, Box 91434, Briefing Book Re: Visit of British Prime Minister Thatcher 02/25/1981 - 02/28/1981 92 of 2, Department of State Briefing Paper, ‘UK NATO initiative’, 17 February 1981; RRL, Dennis Blair Files, RAC Box 5, Trident II D-5: 02/24/1982 Meeting with UK (1 of 3), ‘UK Presence in Belize’, 28 February 1982.

¹²¹ See Carothers, In the Name of Democracy; Kengor, The Crusader, 190–99.

¹²² RRL, NSC: VIP Visits, Box 91434, Briefing Book Re: Visit of British Prime Minister Thatcher 02/25/1981 - 02/28/1981 (2 of 3), Bremer to Allen, ‘Briefing Materials for the Visit of UK Prime Minister Thatcher’, 25 February 1981.

¹²³ S. Randall and G. Mount, The Caribbean Basin: an International History (London: Routledge, 1998), 145.

¹²⁴ TNA, PREM 19/694, Wade-Gery to Nott, 25 February 1982.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid; Transcript of interview with Robert Wade-Gery, interview conducted by M. McBain, 13 February 2000, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme, 91-92. https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Wade-Gery.pdf.

¹²⁷ TNA, PREM 19/694, Wade-Gery to Nott, 25 February 1982.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ See TNA, DEFE 25/416, Jackling, ‘Belize’, 5 March 1982.

¹³⁰ TNA, PREM 19/694, Wade-Gery to Nott, 25 February 1982.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ See TNA, DEFE 25/325, Henderson to Muskie, 30 September 1980; TNA, DEFE 25/325, Christopher to Henderson, 30 September 1980.

¹³⁵ TNA, PREM 19/694, Wade-Gery to Coles, ‘Trident’, 26 February 1982.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ TNA, CAB 130/1182, ‘Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy, United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence’, 2 March 1982.

¹³⁹ TNA, PREM 19/694, Wade-Gery to Coles, ‘Trident’, 26 February 1982.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid; Due to an increase in bellicose statements from Guatemala during the Falkland’s crisis, as well as continued pressure from the US and Belize governments, the Thatcher government retained a substantial force in Belize throughout the 1980s, see TNA, DEFE 25/417, Franklin, ‘Belize’, 14 June 1982; A.J. Payne, ‘The Belize Triangle: Relations with Britain, Guatemala and the United States’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 32/1 (1990), 119–35.

¹⁴¹ TNA, PREM 19/694, Wade-Gery to Coles, ‘Trident’, 26 February 1982.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ See TNA, PREM 19/695, Armstrong to Thatcher, 3 March 1982.

¹⁴⁴ See A. Dobson, ‘Labour or Conservative: Does it Matter in Anglo-American Relations?’ Contemporary History 25/4 (1990), 387–407.

¹⁴⁵ C. Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 573.

¹⁴⁶ See J. Baylis, ‘Exchanging Nuclear Secrets: Laying the Foundations of the Anglo-American Nuclear Relationship’, Diplomatic History 25/1 (2001), 34; Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and NATO, 4-5; Dobson, Anglo-American Relations, 124–64.

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Suzanne Doyle

Suzanne Doyle is a Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations at the University of East Anglia. She recently completed her PhD thesis on the Trident missile agreements. Her research interests include US–UK relations, US and British foreign policy, and nuclear history.