French Exception or Western Variation? A Historical Look at the French Irregular Way of War

ABSTRACT

This article aims at challenging the notion of a French exception in the realm of irregular warfare, suggesting that it rather amounts to a western variation. Born out of a transatlantic community under British influence, the French irregular experience carried on through the early Cold War challenges, strengthening France’s ties with its Western allies. France’s subsequent involvement in post-colonial counter-insurgencies did contribute to generating some specific strategic features, although never totally disconnected from international circulation. Finally, the post-Cold War order significantly drove French irregular warfare back into its Western fold through the adoption of US- and NATO-sponsored concepts and doctrines, thus enhancing interoperability and some degree of standardisation.

KEYWORDS:

• France
• Irregular Warfare
• Counter-insurgency
• Special Operations
• Strategic culture

Notes

¹ Michael Howard, War in European History (New York: Oxford UP 2001), 23ff.

² Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1996).

³ Itai Brun, ‘‘‘While You’re Busy Making Other Plans” – The “Other RMA’’’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (2010), 535–65.

⁴ According to the Pentagon, irregular warfare is ‘a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations’, quoted in United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010 (as amended through 15 June 2015), 121.

⁵ James Kiras, ‘Irregular Warfare’, in David Jordan (ed.) Understanding Modern Warfare. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2008), 224–91.

⁶ Alan Bloomfield, ‘Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate’, Contemporary Security Policy 33/3 (2012), 437–61. See also Beatrice Heuser and Jeannie Johnson, ‘National Style and Strategic Culture’, in Beatrice Heuser and Eitan Shamir (eds), Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, forthcoming 2017).

⁷ See for instance Robert M. Cassidy, Counter-insurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War (Westport, CT: Praeger 2006); Thomas Rid and Thomas A. Keaney (eds), Understanding Counter-insurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges (London: Routledge 2010); Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds), Counter-insurgency in Modern Warfare (Oxford: Osprey Publishing 2011).

⁸ To limit oneself to a few titles in English: Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria : The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine (New York: Praeger 1964); Douglas Porch, ‘French Imperial Warfare (1945-62)’, in Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds) Counter-insurgency in Modern Warfare (Westminster, MD: Osprey Publishing 2011), 91–112; Etienne de Durand, ‘France’, in Thomas Rid and Thomas A. Keaney (eds) Understanding Counter-insurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges (London: Routledge 2010), 11–27; Jacques Frémeaux and Bruno Reis, ‘French Counterinsurgency in the Era of the Algerian Wars, 1830-1962’, in Beatrice Heuser and Eitan Shamir (eds), Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies.

⁹ David Potter, ‘Chivalry and Professionalism in the French Armies of the Renaissance’, in D.J.B. Trim (ed.) The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 149–82. For its most modern expression, see for instance Pascal Vennesson, Les Chevaliers de l’air. Aviation et conflits au XXe siècle (Paris: Sciences Po, 1997).

¹⁰ Douglas Porch, ‘Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare’, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1986), 376–407.

¹¹ Simon Anglim, ‘MI(R), G(R) and British Covert Operations, 1939–42’, Intelligence and National Security 20/4 (2005), 631–53; Aaron R.B. Linderman, Rediscovering Irregular Warfare: Colin Gubbins and the Origins of Britain’s Special Operations Executive (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press 2016).

¹² Alfred H. Paddock, US Army Special Warfare. Its Origins. Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952 (Washington, DC: National Defense UP 1982), 7.

¹³ William J. M. Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE: Special Operations Executive, 1940-1945 (London: St Ermin’s Press 2000); David Garnett, The Secret History of PWE: The Political Warfare Executive, 1939-1945 (London: St Ermin’s Press 2002).

¹⁴ TNA, HS 8/960, Special Training Schools Folder, 1941-1942.

¹⁵ Michael R.D. Foot, SOE in France. An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940-1944 (London: Frank Cass 2004); Tim W. Brooks, British Propaganda to France, 1940-1944: Machinery, Method and Message (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP 2007).

¹⁶ Will Irwin, The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944 (London: Public Affairs 2005).

¹⁷ Jean Sassi, Opérations Spéciales: 20 Ans de Guerres Secrètes (Paris: Nimrod 2009), 49.

¹⁸ Regarding the liquidation of SOE and OSS, see Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand. Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: John Murray 2001), 79–85. For the somewhat more complicated fate of the ‘Service Action’ in post-war France, see Service Historique de la Défense (SHD), DITEEX, 3K 60, ‘Témoignage de Paul Aussaresses’ and 3K 71, ‘Témoignage de Robert Maloubier’.

¹⁹ TNA, AIR 75/116, ‘Defence Policy and Global Strategy 1950’, Report by the Chiefs of Staff, 20^th March 1950.

²⁰ Andrew Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda: The Information Research Department (London: Routledge, 2007).

²¹ Hilary Footitt, ‘‘A Hideously Difficult Country’: British Propaganda to France in the Early Cold War’, Cold War History 13, no. 2 (May 2013): 153–69.

²² Author interview with Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac, Paris, June 10^th 2013.

²³ SHD, GR 5Q 21, Note pour le S.G.P.D.N., 31^st December 1950; Paul et Marie-Catherine Villatoux, La République et Son Armée Face Au ‘péril Subversif’. Guerre et Action Psychologiques. 1945-1960 (Paris: Les Indes savantes, 2005).

²⁴ TNA, FO 371/102555, WU16912/1/G, ‘Suggestion by Lt Col Chesshyre that a NATO authority should be set up to give Gen. Eisenhower political guidance on Psychological Warfare, 16^th November 1951’.

²⁵ SHD, 1S 49, Aide-mémoire des questions d’actualités en matière d’action psychologique et d’information, 30th October 1952’.

²⁶ SHD, 1H 2409, État-major des forces armées, TTA 117, Instruction provisoire sur l’emploi de l’arme psychologique, approuvé par le Général Ely, Chef d’État-Major Général des Forces Armées, 29 July 1957.

²⁷ SHD, 5Q21, Message NATO no. 6931, from SACEUR to CINCNORTH, NATO confidential, 13 September 1956; TNA, DEFE 28/177, ‘National advice to SACEUR on psychological Warfare in support of his military objectives’, note by the Interdepartmental working Party on Psychological Warfare, PSW(57)1, secret, 22nd January 1957; SHD, 1S49, ‘Guerre psychologique’, lettre du général d’armée, chef d’état-major général des forces armées à M. le général Commandant suprême allié en Europe, NATO secret, 30 January 1957.

²⁸ Giles Scott-Smith, ‘Not a NATO Responsibilty? Psychological Warfare, the Berlin Crisis, and the Formation of Intererdoc’, in Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher (eds), Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges beyond Deterrence in the 1960s (London: Routledge 2006), 31–49.

²⁹ SHD, 7U 767, ‘Création du Bataillon de Choc n°11 type ‘Etude et Instruction’’, lettre du général Revers, 13 August 1946.

³⁰ SHD, 7U 767, ‘Synthèse personnelle’ du Commandant Godard, adressée au général de Corps d’Armée commandant la 5^e RM (Toulouse), 21 November 1949.

³¹ Erwan Bergot, 11e Choc, Collection ‘Troupes de Choc’ (Paris: Presses de la Cité 1986), 15–17; Paul Aussaresses, Pour La France. Services Spéciaux. 1942-1954 (Monaco: Le Rocher 2001), 192–93; Sassi, Opérations Spéciales, 169–70.

³² SHD, 10H144, ‘Aide-mémoire sur la conférence tenue à Singapour’, 26 November 1949, p. 10-11.

³³ SHD, 10T945, ‘Emploi des Hélicoptères en Malaisie’, Fiche pour la 2^e Division de l’EMFA, 17 June 1955; Déodat Puy-Montbrun, L’honneur de La Guerre (Paris: Albin Michel 2002), 141.

³⁴ This decision can be roughly dated from the NSC 64 (27 February 1950). See Department of Defense, The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision-Making on Vietnam, Senator Gravel Edition, vol. I (Boston, MA: Beacon Press 1971), 179.

³⁵ NARA, RG59, 751G.5 MAP/6-2050, ‘Telegram from Saigon, 20th June 1950’. See also Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960, (Washington, DC: Center for Military History 1985), 161.

³⁶ Thibaut de Saint Phalle, Saints, Sinners and Scalawags: A Lifetime in Stories (Brookline, NH: Hobblebush Books 2004), 291–316.

³⁷ SHD, 10H608, ‘Extrait d’une lettre de M. du Gardier à M. Baeyens, directeur d’Asie-Océanie’, 17 November 1950.

³⁸ Philippe Pottier, ‘GCMA/GMI: A French Experience in Counter-insurgency during the French Indochina War’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 16/2 (2005), 125–46.

³⁹ SHD, 10T1013, ‘Rapport de Mission du CBA Jacques Rousset sur le Deuxieme cours de Guerre Psychologique suivie à l’Army General School’, 8 April 1952.

⁴⁰ NARA, RG319, UD 148, Box 1, ‘Major Accomplishment of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Wafare’, 24 March 1953. See also Paddock, US Army Special Warfare, 200n.

⁴¹ Villatoux, La République et Son Armée Face Au ‘péril Subversif’, 387.

⁴² Pierre Journoud, De Gaulle et Le Vietnam: 1945-1969, La Réconciliation (Paris: Tallandier 2011).

⁴³ Author interview with Rufus Phillips, Arlington, VA, 14 March 2012. See also Edward Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars. An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia (New York: Harper & Row 1972), 217.

⁴⁴ Jean-Marc Le Page and Élie Tenenbaum, ‘The ‘Unquiet Allies’: French and American Intelligence Relations During the First Indochina War, 1950–54’, Studies in Intelligence 55/3 (2011), 25–37.

⁴⁵ Etienne de Durand, ‘Francs-Tireurs et Centurions. Les Ambiguïtés de L’héritage Contre-Insurrectionnel Français’, Focus Stratégique, no. 29 (March 2011).

⁴⁶ Gabriel Périès, ‘Populo-Politico-Militaire: Un Mot à L’aube de La Cinquième République’, Mots (1998), 95–111.

⁴⁷ Paul Villatoux, ‘Le 5e Bureau En Algérie’, in Jean-Charles Jauffret and Maurice Vaïsse (eds), Militaires et Guérilla Dans La Guerre d’Algérie, (Bruxelles: André Versaille 2012), 399–420.

⁴⁸ Gabriel Périès, De l’action militaire à l’action politique. Impulsion, codification et application de la doctrine de la ‘guerre révolutionnaire’ au sein de l’armée française, 1944-1960 (Paris: Panthéon-Sorbonne 1999).

⁴⁹ Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria : The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine; Donn A. Starry, ‘La Guerre Révolutionnaire’, Military Review February (1967), 61–70.

⁵⁰ SHD, 10T326, Lettre de l’attaché militaire de Grande-Bretagne en France au Chef du 2^e Bureau, 10 June 1955; see also Martin Thomas, The French North African Crisis: Colonial Breakdown and Anglo-French Relations, 1945-62 (Basingstoke: St. Martin’s Press 2000), 134.

⁵¹ SHD, 10T326, ‘Propositions du brigadier général Jackson, Attaché militaire britannique à Paris’, 13 juillet 1956.

⁵² SHD, 10T326, Lettre du Major General R.H. Heweson, Commandant’s Office Staff College, Camberley, 12 November 1959.

⁵³ NARA, RG59, CDF, Box 3324, 751.5/6-1957, ‘Transmitting a copy of the Revue Militaire d’Intervention’, 19 June 1957.

⁵⁴ Robert B. Rigg, ‘Twilight War’, Military Review November (1960), 28–32. See also George A. Kelly, ‘Revolutionary War and Psychological Action’, Military Review October (1960), 6.

⁵⁵ US Army Heritage and Education Center (USAHEC), UG1232.T72 R4613 1957a, ‘Report of the operations research mission on H-21 helicopter operations in Algeria’. Translated from the original report dated 12/1956, 21 April 1957; David Riley, ‘French Helicopter Operations in Algeria’, Marine Corps Gazette 42/2 (1958), 21–26. For a historical approach of this issue, read Matthew Allen, Military Helicopter Doctrines of the Major Powers, 1945-1992: Making Decisions About Air-Land Warfare (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing 1993); Charles R. Shrader, The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria, 1954-1962 (Westport, CT: Praeger 1999).

⁵⁶ Douglas Blaufarb, The Counter-insurgency Era, U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present (New York: Free Press 1977); Frank L. Jones, ‘The Guerrilla Warfare Problem Revolutionary War and the Kennedy Administration Response, 1961-1963’, in J. Boone Bartholomees (ed.), The US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, vol. II (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College 2010), 397–411.

⁵⁷ USAHEC, B5/FA/S4/Box 14/Folder 226, ‘Some Comments on Guerrilla Warfare’, 20 March 1961.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ NARA, RG319, NM-3/47P, Box 24, ‘Report of Educational Survey Commission’, 20 November 1962.

⁶⁰ SHD, 10T1077, ‘Visite à Fort Bragg, Caroline du Nord’, 13 February 1963.

⁶¹ SHD, 10T1073, ‘Enseignements de la guerre d’Algérie’, Lettre du Général Gouraud à au Chef d’état-major de la Défense Nationale, Division Renseignement, 12 July 1962; Paul Aussaresses, Je N’ai Pas Tout Dit. Ultimes Révélations Au Service de La France (Paris: Le Rocher 2008).

⁶² Department of the Army, ‘FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations’ (Washington, DC, February 1963); Department of the Army, ‘FM 31-22, US Army Counter-insurgency Forces’ (Washington, DC, November 1963), 31–22. See also the testimonies of two US Army officers at the CMH, Oral History (OH) no. 2012-01, ‘Interview of Brig. Gen. John Johns (Ret.), US Army, and Col. Carl Bernard (Ret.), US Army’, 28 January 2003. The author wishes to thank CMH historian Andrew Birtle for his dedicated help in providing the transcripts.

⁶³ SHD, 10T1073, ‘L’Armée Américaine face à la Guérilla, exposé du Lt. Col. Aussaresses, officier de liaison à l’US Army Infantry School’, 25 November 1963. See also Andrew J. Birtle, United States Army Counter-insurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976 (Washington, DC: Center for Military History 2006), 229–30.

⁶⁴ Hoover Institution Library and Archives (HILA), Lansdale Collection, Box 40, ‘Correspondence with Rand Corporation’, 16 April 1962.

⁶⁵ Stephen T. Hosmer, ed., Counter-insurgency. A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006); David Galula, ‘Pacification in Algeria. 1956-1958’ (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1963 2006); David Galula, Counter-insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing 2006). For a good biographical account, see Alain A. Cohen, Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of Counter-insurgency (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing 2012).

⁶⁶ SHD, 7 U 767, Rapport Trimestriel concernant l’information et le moral, par le CBA Barthez, commandant le 11^e BPC, Perpignan, 21 novembre 1963; SHD/DITEEX, 1KT 527, Fonds Merglen, Lettre de Pierre Messmer à Alfred Merglen, Paris, 11 février 1992.

⁶⁷ Rémy Martinot-Leroy, ‘La Contestation de La Dissuasion Dans L’armée de Terre: L’Atome et La Guerre Subversive Dans Les Travaux Des Officiers de l’École Supérieure de Guerre (1962-75)’ (thèse de doctorat sous la dir. de Jean Klein, Lille III 1999).

⁶⁸ Thomas Deltombe, Jacob Tatsitsa, and Manuel Domergue, Kamerun! Une guerre cachée aux origines de la Françafrique (1948-1971) (Paris: La Découverte 2011).

⁶⁹ Jean-Pierre Bat, Le Syndrome Foccart: La Politique Française En Afrique, de 1959 à Nos Jours, Folio Histoire 202 (Paris: Gallimard 2012).

⁷⁰ Marc R. DeVore, ‘Institutions, Organizational Culture, and Counter-insurgency Operations: Why Do States Fight Similar Insurgencies Differently?’ Comparative Strategy 32/3 (2013), 169–91.

⁷¹ Regarding the French case, see Walter Bruyère-Ostells, Dans l’ombre de Bob Denard: les mercenaires français de 1960 à 1989 (Paris: Nouveau monde éd. 2014). And then compare it to Clive Jones, Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1965: Ministers, Mercenaries and Mandarins: Foreign Policy and the Limits of Covert Action (Portland, OR: Sussex UP 2004).

⁷² Regarding the US case see David Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget: US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq (Stanford: Stanford UP 2013).

⁷³ Stéphane Mantoux, Les guerres du Tchad, 1969-1987 (Clermont-Ferrand: Lemme 2014).

⁷⁴ Rémy Gaussères, ‘Les enseignements de Kolwezi - Mai 1978’, Cahiers du Retex no. 12 (October 2006).

⁷⁵ Eliott A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs 1978).

⁷⁶ Jean Guiart, ‘A Drama of Ambiguity: Ouvéa 1988-89’, The Journal of Pacific History 32/1 (1997), 85–102.

⁷⁷ Charlie A. Beckwith, Delta Force: The Army’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit (New York: Avon Books 2000).

⁷⁸ Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft. U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counter-insurgency, and Counter-Terrorism, 1940-1990 (New York: Pantheon Books 1992), 357; John Prados, The US Special Forces: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press 2015), 86.

⁷⁹ Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget, 227ff.

⁸⁰ For global assessment of French perception of the Gulf war, read Étienne de Durand, ‘La “mère” de toutes nos batailles’, Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains 244/4 (2011), 9.Little has been published regarding its SOF component, however some useful first-hand accounts can be found in Jacques Rosier and Etienne Leclère (eds), Les forces spéciales françaises dans la guerre du Golfe, 1991 (Ivry-sur-Seine: ECPAD 2011).

⁸¹ William Rosenau, Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2001), 34ff; Peter DelaBillière, Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War (London: Harper Collins 1992), 222–34; Rosier and Leclère (eds) Les forces spéciales françaises dans la guerre du Golfe, 6–15.

⁸² Jacques Lanxade, ‘Le Commandement Des Opérations Spéciales (COS)’, in Forces Spéciales: Concept et Histoire, by Centre d’Etude et d’Histoire de la Défense (Paris: Cahiers du CEHD 2007), 55–60; Éric Denécé, Forces spéciales, l’avenir de la guerre ? de la guérilla aux opérations clandestines (Monaco: Éd. du Rocher 2002), 211.

⁸³ Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford: Stanford UP 1999).

⁸⁴ Grégoire de Saint-Quentin, ‘Retour à La Guerre Révolutionnaire ?’, Revue de Défense Nationale no. 591 (1997), 105; Grégory Daho, ‘Une Revanche Des Généraux: L’institutionnalisation de La Coopération Civilo-Militaire En France’ (Thèse de doctorat sous la dir. de Michel Dobry, Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne 2013), 116–27, 257–70.

⁸⁵ Jacques Guilhou, ‘Les Actions Civilo-Militaires Conduites Par Le Commandement Des Opérations Spéciales En Ex-Yougoslavie’, in Forces Spéciales: Concept et Histoire. Actes Du Colloque Des 11-12 Juin 2001, by Centre d’Etude et d’Histoire de la Défense (Paris: Cahiers du CEHD 2007), 61–68.

⁸⁶ Roger Faligot, Jean Guisnel, and Rémi Kauffer, Histoire politique des services secrets français: de la seconde guerre mondiale à nos jours (Paris: La Découverte 2012).

⁸⁷ Stéphane Taillat, ‘National Traditions and International Context: French Adaptation to Counter-insurgency in the 21st Century’, Security Challenges 6/1 (2010): 85–96.

⁸⁸ David H. Ucko, The New Counter-insurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars (Washington, DC: Georgetown UP 2009).

⁸⁹ Douglas Porch, ‘David Galula and the Revival of COIN in the US Military’, in Celeste Ward Gventer, David Martin Jones, and M.L.R Smith (eds), The New Counter-Insurgency Era in Critical Perspective (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2014), 173–94.

⁹⁰ Christophe Lafaye, L’armée Française En Afghanistan: Le Génie Au Combat (2001-2012) (Paris: CNRS éditions 2016), 119ff.

⁹¹ Centre de Doctrine et d’Emploi des Forces, Doctrine de contre rébellion (Paris, January 2009).

⁹² Ibid. 28; see also Michael P. Finch, A Progressive Occupation? The Gallieni-Lyautey Method and Colonial Pacification in Tonkin and Madagascar, 1885-1900 (Oxford: Oxford UP 2013).

⁹³ Centre de Doctrine et d’Emploi des Forces, Doctrine de contre rébellion 23, 29–31, 35–39.

⁹⁴ Bernard B. Fall, ‘A Portrait of the “Centurion”’, in Roger Trinquier, trans. Daniel Lee, Modern Warfare. A French View on Counter-insurgency (New York: Praeger 1964), vii–xviii.

⁹⁵ Centre interarmées de concept de doctrine et d’expérimentation, DIA-3.4.4 Contre-insurrection (COIN), 5 November 2010, 9.

⁹⁶ David H. Ucko, ‘Critics Gone Wild: Counterinsurgency as the Root of All Evil’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 25/1 (2014), 161–79.

⁹⁷ Daho, ‘Une Revanche Des Généraux’, 469.

⁹⁸ David E Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power (New York: Broadway Books 2013).

⁹⁹ Linda Robinson, One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare (New York: PublicAffairs 2013).

¹⁰⁰ Denécé, Forces spéciales, l’avenir de la guerre ?, 205.

¹⁰¹ Daniel Reiner, Jacques Gautier and Gérard Larcher, Rapport d´Information fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées du Sénat sur le renforcement des forces spéciales françaises, Paris, 13 May 2014.

¹⁰² Ministère de la Défense, ‘Présentation de l’armée de Terre Modèle: Au Contact’, 12 June 2015, available at http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/378792/5577159/file/Plaquette%20Au%20Contact.pdf, last accessed 27 July 2015.

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Élie Tenenbaum

Élie Tenenbaum is a Research Fellow at IFRI’s Security Studies Center and coordinator of the Defense Research Unit (LRD). He holds a PhD in History from Sciences Po (2015) and has been a visiting fellow at Columbia University (2013–14). He has taught international security at Sciences Po and international contemporary history at the Université de Lorraine. His research focuses on French defence policy, irregular and hybrid warfare as well as on military interventions and expeditionary forces.