Japan’s Emerging Trajectory as a ‘Cyber Power’: From Securitization to Militarization of Cyberspace

ABSTRACT

Japan has been overlooked as a ‘cyber power’ but it now becoming a serious player in this new strategic domain. Japanese policy-makers have forged a consensus to move cybersecurity to the very core of national security policy, to create more centralized frameworks for cybersecurity, and for Japan’s military institutions to build dynamic cyberdefense capabilities. Japan’s stance has moved rapidly toward the securitization and now militarization of responses to cyber challenges. Japan’s cybersecurity stance has bolstered US–Japan alliance responses to securing all dimensions of the ‘global commons’ and extended its defense perimeter to further deter but potentially raise tensions with China.

KEYWORDS:

• Japan
• cybersecurity
• China
• US–Japan alliance
• securitization

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, Asia: The Cyber Security Battleground (Washington DC: Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives 2013), <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20130723/101186/HHRG-113-FA05-20130723-SD002.pdf>. The literature on the extent and nature of change of Japanese security policy is very extensive. For a sample of influential views, arguing for essential continuity of Japanese security strategies, see Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press 1998); Jennifer Lind, ‘Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,’ International Security 29/1 (2004), 92–121; Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press 2007); Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press 2008); Paul Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism? (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press 2011); Adam P. Liff, ‘Japan’s Defense Policy: Abe the Evolutionary,’ The Washington Quarterly 38/2 (2015), 79–99. For some counter-views detecting significant change stirring in Japan’s security, see Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Reemergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004); Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: Public Affairs 2007); Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarization (London: Routledge 2009); and Sebastian Maslow, ‘A Blueprint for a Strong Japan? Abe Shinzō and Japan’s Evolving Security System,’ Asian Survey 55/4 (2015), 739–65.

² For one of the first looks at Japan’s emerging cybersecurity policies, see Paul Kallender, ‘Japan, the Ministry of Defense and Cyber-Security,’ The RUSI Journal 151/1 (2014), 94–103. For examples of the as yet limited academic analysis in English and Japanese, see Yasuhide Yamada, Atsuhiro Yamagishi, and Ben T. Katsumi, ‘Comparative Study of the Information Security Policies of Japan and the United States,’ Journal of National Security Law & Policy 4 (2010), 217–32, <http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/14_Yamada.pdf>; Tsuchiya Motohiro, ‘Cybersecurity in East Asia: Japan and the 2009 Attacks on South Korea and the United States,’ in Kim Andreasson (ed.), Cybersecurity: Public Threats and Responses (Boca Raton FL: CRC Press 2012), 55–76; Pōru Karendā, ‘Bōeishō to Saibā Sekyuritī ni Kansuru Shinten to Otoshiana,’ SFC Kenkyūjo Nihon Kenkyū Purattofōm, Rabowākingu Pēpa Shirīzu, 8, Dec. 2013, 1–16, <http://jsp.sfc.keio.ac.jp/pdf/wp/jsp-wp_8_Paul%20Kallender.pdf>.

³ For the classic definition of securitization, see Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1998), 25.

⁴ OECD, ‘Country Statistical Profile: Japan,’ OECDi Library, 28 Feb. 2013, <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/country-statistical-profile-japan_20752288-table-jpn>.

⁵ Bōeishōhen, Bōei Hakusho 2010 (Tokyo: Zaimushō Insatsukyoku 2010), 17–18; Bōeishō, ‘Heisei 17nen ikō ni Kakawaru Bōeikeikaku no Taikō ni Tsuite’ (10 Dec 2004), 8–9, <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2005/taiko.pdf>.

⁶ METI, Cybersecurity and Economy Study Group Report of August 2011 (Tokyo: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2011). A Japanese summary of the report is held by the authors.

⁷ ‘At least 2 million sets of personal data feared leaked after cyberattacks in 2015,’ The Japan Times, 3 Jan. 2016, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/01/03/national/least-2-million-sets-personal-data-feared-leaked-cyberattacks-2015/#.VolMYoR8zzI”>.

⁸ Jumpei Kawahara, Director for Counter Cyber Attacks, Security Planning Division, Security Bureau, NPA, ‘Cyber attacks situation and police measures,’ Presentation to the International Cybersecurity Symposium – Critical Infrastructure Protection Towards 2020, Tokyo (29 Feb. 2016).

⁹ National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2014: Diversification of Roles in the People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies 2014), 52–3.

¹⁰ Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2013 (Tokyo 2013), 80–1.

¹¹ Bōeishōhen, Bōei Hakusho 2011 (Tokyo: Zaimushō Insatsukyoku 2011), 23, 28–32.

¹² Bōeishō, ‘Heisei 23nen ikō ni Kakawaru Bōeikeikaku no Taikō ni Tsuite’ (17 Dec. 2010), 2, 5, <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2011/taikou.pdfpp>; Bōeishō, ‘Heisei 26nen ikō ni Kakawaru Bōeikeikaku no Taikō ni Tsuite’ (17 Dec. 2013), 2, <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217.pdf>.

¹³ Naikaku Kanbō, Kokka Anzen Hoshō ni Tsuite (15 Dec. 2013), 7–8, <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-j.pdf>.

¹⁴ The IT Basic Law, Article 22 mandates the assurance of security and reliability of advanced information and telecommunications networks and the protection of personal information. In the ‘e-Japan Strategy’ of January 2001, security is only mentioned twice; once in connection with promoting a shift to the use of IPv64 addressing in a discussion of targets, and the other, in passing, notes that security is important as the government should work to eliminate the use of paper, see IT Strategy Headquarters, ‘e-Japan Strategy’ (22 Jan. 2001), <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/it/network/0122full_e.html>.

¹⁵ National Information Security Center, ‘Japanese Government Efforts to Address Information Security Issues: Focusing on the Cabinet Secretariat’s Efforts’ (Nov. 2007), <http://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/overview_eng.pdf>.

¹⁶ Information Security Policy Council, The First National Strategy on Information Security: Toward the Realization of a Trustworthy Society (2 Feb. 2006), <http://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/national_strategy_001_eng.pdf>.

¹⁷ Tsuchiya, ‘Cybersecurity in East Asia,’ 61.

¹⁸ National Information Security Policy Council, The Second National Strategy on Information Security, Aiming for Strong ‘Individual’ and ‘Society’ in IT Age (3 Feb. 2009), <http://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/national_strategy_002_eng.pdf>.

¹⁹ Tsuchiya, ‘Cybersecurity in East Asia,’ 61–2.

²⁰ Information Security Policy Council, ‘Information Security Strategy for Protecting the Nation’ (11 May 2010), 3, <http://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/New_Strategy_English.pdf>.

²¹ Taipei Times, ‘Japan Probes Website Attacks Amid Anonymous Claims,’ AFP, 27 Jun. 2012, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2012/06/29/2003536553>.

²² Information Security Policy Council, ‘Information Security 2012’ (4 Jul. 2012), 21–2, <http://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/is2012_eng.pdf>.

²³ Jiyū Minshutō Seisaku Chōkai IT Senryaku Tokubestu Iinkai, Jōhō Sekyuritī Taisaku ni Kansuru Mōshiire (28 Oct. 2011), 1–2, <http://www.jimin.jp/policy/policy_topics/pdf/seisaku-088.pdf>.

²⁴ Jiyū Minshutō, Jōhō Sekyuritī ni Kansuru Teigen (24 Feb. 2012), 4, 16, <https://www.jimin.jp/policy/policy_topics/pdf/seisaku-096.pdf>.

²⁵ Informational Security Policy Council, Cybersecurity Strategy: Towards a World-Leading, Resilient and Vigorous Cyberspace (10 Jun. 2013), 4, <http://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/cybersecuritystrategy-en.pdf>.

²⁶ Information Security Policy Council, Cybersecurity Strategy, 41–2.

²⁷ Cabinet Secretariat, ‘Overview of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets,’ <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/tokuteihimitsu/gaiyou_en.pdf>.

²⁸ NISC, Saiba Sekuritī Kihon Hōan no Gaiyō, 10 Aug 2014, <http://www.nisc.go.jp/conference/seisaku/dai40/pdf/40shiryou0102.pdfhttp://www.nisc.go.jp/conference/seisaku/dai40/pdf/40shiryou0102.pdf>.

²⁹ Yasu Taniwaki, ‘Cybersecurity Strategy in Japan,’ Deputy Director-General NISC (9 Oct. 2014), <http://www.nisc.go.jp/security-site/campaign/ajsympo/pdf/keynotelecture.pdf>; and Hiroshi Kawaguchi, ‘Cybersecurity Strategy in Japan, Japan Security Operation Centre’ (21 Jan. 2015), <http://staff.cs.kyushu-u.ac.jp/en/event/2015/01/data/17%20kawaguchi.pdf>.

³⁰ Kawaguchi, ‘Cybersecurity Strategy in Japan.’

³¹ Government of Japan, Cybersecurity Strategy (4 Sep. 2015), 35, 37, 38, 53, <http://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/cs-strategy-en.pdf>.

³² Paul Kallender-Umezu, ‘Japan Takes Action Against Complex Cyber Threats,’ Defense News, 9 Oct. 2012, <http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20121009/C4ISR01/310090010/Japan-Takes-Action-Against-ComplexCyber-Threats>.

³³ For further details on the DII and the Central Command System (a system that performs operations such as intensive processing of data while connected online with various command systems of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces), see Bōeichō, ‘Bōeichō, Jietiai ni Okeru Jōhō Tsūshin Gijutsu Kakumei e no Taio Sōgō-teki Shisaku no Suishin Gaiyō: Jōhō Yūetsu no Tame no Kiban Kōchiku o Mezashite’ (Dec. 2000), <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/security/it/youkou/index.html>; Bōeishō, ‘Kaisetsu: Jieitai Shiki Tsūshin Shisutemutai Kashō no Shinhen’ (2007), <http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2007/2007/html/j22c1000.html>.

³⁴ Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2010 (Tokyo: Urban Connections 2010), 184–5.

³⁵ Japan Ministry of Defense, ‘Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2011–FY2015)’ (17 Dec. 2010), 4, 6, <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/mid_termFY2011-15.pdf>.

³⁶ Shozo Nakayama, ‘Govt. Claims Cyberdefense Right/Says International Laws Should be Applied to Computer Infiltration,’ Yomiuri Shimbun, 17 May 2012, <http://news.asiaone.com/print/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20120518-346660.html>.

³⁷ Bōeiryoku no Arikata Kentō no Tame no Iinkai, Bōeiryoku no Arikata Kentō ni Kansuru Chūkan Hōkoku (26 Jul. 2012), 1, 3, 8, <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2013_chukan/20130726.pdf>.

³⁸ Japan Ministry of Defense, Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace (Sep. 2012), 3, 5, 7–12, <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/others/pdf/stable_and_effective_use_cyberspace.pdf>.

³⁹ Bōeishō, Heisei 24nendo Bōei Yosanan no Gaisan no Gaiyō (Dec. 2012), 3, <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/yosan/2012/kankei.pdf>.

⁴⁰ Paul Kallender-Umezu, ‘Experts: Japan’s New Cyber Unit Understaffed, Lacks Skills,’ Defense News, 9 Jul. 2013, p. 10.

⁴¹ Japan Ministry of Defense, ‘National Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond’ (17 Dec. 2013), 14–15, 20, <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf>; Japan Ministry of Defense, ‘Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)’ (17 Dec. 2013), 13–14, <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/Defense_Program.pdf>.

⁴² Information Security Policy Council, The First National Strategy on Information Security, 5, 29.

⁴³ National Information Security Policy Council, The Second National Strategy on Information Security, 68–9.

⁴⁴ Information Security Policy Council, Information Security Strategy for Protecting the Nation, 17–18; and Information Security Policy Council, Information Security 2012, 92–3.

⁴⁵ Informational Security Policy Council, Cybersecurity Strategy, 49.

⁴⁶ The Government of Japan, Cybersecurity Strategy, 41–4.

⁴⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘Press Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Koichiro Gemba’ (14 Feb. 2012), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2012/2/0214_01.html>; Kallender-Umezu, ‘Japan Takes Action’.

⁴⁸ Information Security Policy Council Japan, International Strategy on Cybersecurity Cooperation – j-Initiative for Cybersecurity (2 Oct. 2013), <http://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/InternationalStrategyonCybersecurityCooperation_e.pdf>.

⁴⁹ Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, ‘Joint Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN-Japan Ministerial Policy Meeting on Cybersecurity Cooperation, Tokyo’ (13 Sep. 2013), http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000249127.pdf; Koji Nako, ‘Toward Proactive Response Against Cyber-Attacks Based on Global Monitoring and Analysis: PRACTICE Project (Research Part)’, 2013 < https://sicherheit.eco.de/wp-content/blogs.dir/27/files/1145_nakao2.pdf>.

⁵⁰ Taipei Times, ‘Japanese Navy Officer Arrested for Leaking Secret Data: Police,’ AFP, 13 Dec. 2007, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2007/12/14/2003392484>. In an embarrassing incident in 2006–2007, it was discovered that details of the US Aegis system had been copied by a 34-year old lieutenant commander onto a CD and passed to other MSDF officers, who had themselves made copies, causing the United States to temporarily halt the shipment of parts Aegis radar upgrades on the Japanese destroyer Kongō just as Japan was pressing the United States to allow it to procure the F-22 fighter and stealth technologies.

⁵¹ Bōeichō, ‘Nihon Bōeichō to Beikoku Kokubōshō no Jōhō Hoshō to Konpyūtā Nettowāku Bōgyō ni Okeru Kyōryoku ni Kansuru Ryōkai Obegaki (MOU) no Teiketsu ni Tsuite’ (18 Apr. 2006), <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2006/04/18a.html>.

⁵² Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee. Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation’ (1 May 2007), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0705.html>.

⁵³ Executive Office of the President of the U.S., Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications (May 2009), 20–1, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf>; Executive Office of the President of the United States, International Strategy for Cyberspace Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World (May 2011), 11–15, 18, 21, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf>; Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Report (Feb. 2010), 38–9, <http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QDR_as_of_29JAN10_1600.pdf>; United States Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010 (18 Feb. 2010), 34–6, <http://fas.org/man/eprint/joe2010.pdf>.

⁵⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee. Toward a Deeper and Broader U.S.-Japan Alliance: Building on Fifty Years of Partnership’ (21 Jun. 2011), 6, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/pdfs/joint1106_01.pdf>

⁵⁵ The US–Japan Cyber Dialogue involves representatives from Japan’s MOFA, Cabinet Secretariat, NISC, Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, NPA, MIC, METI, and JMOD. The US Department of State, ‘Joint Statement on U.S.-Japan Cyber Dialogue’ (10 May 2013), <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/209238.htm>.

⁵⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘Fact Sheet: U.S.-Japan Cooperative Initiatives’ (Apr. 2012), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/pmv1204/pdfs/Fact_Sheet_en.pdf>.

⁵⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee. Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities’ (3 Oct. 2013), 2, 4, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000016028.pdf>; Japan Ministry of Defense, ‘Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Cyber Defense Policy Working Group’ (30 May 2015), http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2015/05/30a_1.pdf; Bōeishō, ‘Nichbei Saibā Bōei Seisaku Wākingu Gurūpu no Gaiyō Honnen Hachigatsu no Nichbei Bōei Kaidan ni Okeru ni Motozuki, Jieitai to Beigun no Saibā, Kyōryoku o Shinka suru Nichbei Bōei Tōkyoku de Giron o Okonau Tame no Wakugumi toshite Secchi’ (3 Oct. 2013), <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youjin/2013/10/03_cdpwg_gaiyou.html>.

⁵⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee. A Stronger Alliance for a Dynamic Security Environment: The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation’ (27 Apr. 2015), 3–4, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000078186.pdf>.

⁵⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation’ (27 Apr. 2015), 21, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000078188.pdf>.

⁶⁰ Japan Ministry of Defense, ‘Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Cyber Defense Policy Working Group’ (29 May 2015), 1, <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2015/05/30a_1.pdf>.

⁶¹ U.S. Department of State, ‘The 4th U.S.-Japan Bilateral Cyber Dialogue’ (27 Jul. 2016), <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/07/260572.htm>.

⁶² Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Turnbull Joint Statement “Next Steps of the Special Strategic Partnership: Asia, Pacific and Beyond”’ (18 Dec. 2015), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/ocn/au/page4e_000362.html>; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership: Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World’ (12 Dec. 2015), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page3e_000432.html>; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘Joint Statement by the Prime Minister of the U.K. and Japan: A Leading Strategic Partnership for Global Prosperity and Security’ (10 Apr. 2012), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/uk/joint1204.html>.

⁶³ Ministry of Defense Japan, ‘Second Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting 8 January 2016 Joint Statement’, 2016 <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youjin/2016/01/08_js_e.pdf>.

⁶⁴ Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Fact Sheet: India and Japan, Working Together for Peace and Prosperity,’ (12 Dec. 2015), <http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26179/Fact_Sheet_India_and_Japan_Working_Together_for_Peace_and_Prosperity>; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘Japan-EU Relations February 2016,’ (2016), 3–4, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000033265.pdf>.

⁶⁵ James Andrew Lewis, U.S.-Japan Cooperation in Cybersecurity: A Report of the CSIS Strategic Technologies Program, CSIS, Washington DC (Nov. 2015), 11, <http://csis.org/files/publication/151105_Lewis_USJapanCyber_Web.pdf>; Bōeishō, Waga Kuni no Bōei to Yosan: Heisei 28nendo Yosan no Gaiyō (24 Dec. 2015), 13, <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/yosan/2016/yosan.pdf>.

⁶⁶ The Department of Defense, The DoD Cyber Strategy (Apr. 2015), 5–6, <http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyberstrategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf>.

⁶⁷ Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Under the ‘Abe Doctrine’ (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2015), 28–57, 65–70.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Paul Kallender

Paul Kallender (MA, Columbia; Ph.D candidate, Keio University) is coauthor of In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy (Stanford University Press, 2010). He is an associate researcher at the Global Security Research Institute.

Christopher W. Hughes

Christopher W. Hughes (Ph.D, University of Sheffield) is Professor of International Politics and Japanese Studies, University of Warwick, and author of Japan’s Re-emergence as a Normal Military Power (Oxford, 2004), Japan’s Remilitarisation (Routledge 2009), and Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Under the ‘Abe Doctrine’ (Palgrave 2015).