‘A Brave New World for Chinese Joint Operations’

ABSTRACT

A key organizational challenge for all modern militaries is instituting an effective command-and-control (C2) structure for joint operations. China has been a relative latecomer to joint operations, with a persistent weakness in joint C2. Reforms launched in early 2016 sought to overcome this challenge by establishing a permanent two-level joint C2 structure. Although not a ‘tipping point’ that will lead ineluctably to stronger operational effectiveness, this reform is nonetheless an important milestone in an evolutionary process towards better PLA joint operations. The result could be added operational challenges for several of China’s neighbors and the United States.

KEYWORDS:

• China
• People’s Liberation Army
• joint operations
• command and control
• reform

Acknowledgment

For helpful comments on previous drafts, the author thanks Dennis Blasko, Phillip Saunders, Jaehwan Lim, and Shinji Yamaguchi.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ ‘CMC opinions on deepening national defense and military reforms’ [中央军委关于深化国防和军队改革的意见], Xinhua, 1 Jan. 2016. For an English-language summary, see: ‘China releases guideline on military reform’, Xinhua, 1 Jan. 2016.

² Pending elements include force structure changes and changes to the PLA’s procurement, legal, and budget systems. For an initial analysis of the reforms, see Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, ‘China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms’, Joint Force Quarterly 82 (July 2016), 68–75; Kenneth Allen, Dennis Blasko, and John Corbett, ‘The PLA’s new organizational structure: What is known, unknown, and speculation (Part 1)’, China Brief, 4 Feb. 2016; and Dennis Blasko, ‘Integrating the Services and Harnessing the Military Area Commands’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 1 Aug. 2016.

³ See, e.g., Derek Grossman and Michael Chase, ‘Xi’s purge of military prepares the Chinese ARMY FOR CONFROntation’, Newsweek, 21 Apr. 2016; James Mulvenon, ‘Hotel Gutian: We haven’t had that spirit here since 1929’, China Leadership Monitor, 19 Mar. 2015; and Zhao Lei, ‘Inspectors to cover all of military’, China Daily, 6 May 2016.

⁴ This is known in the PLA’s current jargon as ‘informatized local wars’ (信息化局部战争). See: China’s Military Strategy (Beijing: State Council Information Office 2015).

⁵ David M. Finkelstein, Initial Thoughts on the Reorganization and Reform of the PLA (Arlington, VA: CNA 2015), 18; James Mulvenon, ‘China’s ‘Goldwater-Nichols’? The Long-Awaited PLA Reorganization Has Finally Arrived’, China Leadership Monitor, 1 Mar. 2016.

⁶ ‘Zhang Junshe: Creating New Theaters Better Protects National Sovereignty’ [张军社: 重新划设战区可更好维护国家主权], China National Radio, 4 Feb. 2016. Senior Captain Zhang is vice president of the PLA Naval Research Institute; ‘Army adjustment and establishment completed in five theater commands’, China Military Online, 4 Feb. 2016.

⁷ Some key sources remain unavailable, such as authoritative PLA guidance on joint campaigns, details on joint training exercises, and certain details on how the new joint C2 structure will operate, such as the nature of its physical infrastructure. However, the available sources allow for a relatively detailed examination of the subject and its implications.

⁸ Joint Publication 3–0: Joint Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense 2011), I-2.

⁹ Allied Joint Doctrine AJ0-01(D) (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2010), 5-I.

¹⁰ Milan N. Vego, Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press 2007), V-99.

¹¹ Ibid., V-109.

¹² Milan N. Vego, ‘Major Joint/Combined Operations’, Joint Force Quarterly 48/1 (Jan. 2008), 113.

¹³ James R. Locher III, ‘Has It Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act’, Naval War College Review 54/4 (Summer 2001), 99; Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr, ‘The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness’, Political Science Quarterly 113/1 (Spring 1998), 95–6.

¹⁴ The rescue attempt, known as Operation Eagle Claw, highlighted various weaknesses in conducting joint operations. The joint task force commander later recalled that there were ‘four commanders at the scene without visible identification, incompatible radios, and no agreed-upon plan, and not even a designated location for the commander.’ Op. cit. Locher, ‘Has It Worked?’ 100.

¹⁵ Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, the chairman was responsible mainly for convening meetings. Joint Chiefs of Staff opinions required unanimous consent, which strengthened the influence of the service chiefs (all of whom were members of the JCS). After the reform, the chairman no longer required consent to provide advice to the president and secretary of defense. The reforms also created the office of JCS vice chairman.

¹⁶ Martin E. Dempsey, ‘The future of joint operations’, Foreign Affairs, 20 June 2013.

¹⁷ Athena Bryce-Rogers, ‘Russian Military Reform in the Aftermath of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War,’ Demokratizatsiya 21/3 (Summer 2013), 351.

¹⁸ Ariel Cohen and Robert E. Hamilton, The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College 2011), 35.

¹⁹ Ibid., 50.

²⁰ Tom Dodd, Frontline First: The Defence Costs Study, House of Commons Library Research Paper 94/101, 14 Oct. 1994, 7.

²¹ The comparable French organization is the Commandement pour les opérations interarmées (CPOIA), created in 2016. The German cognate is the Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command. For a discussion of the evolution of the German organization, see: Martin Zapfe, ‘Strategic Culture Shaping Allied Integration: The Bundeswehr and Joint Operational Doctrine’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/2 (2016), 249–251.

²² Interviews, Taiwan, Sept. 2016.

²³ Bruce Klingner, ‘South Korea: Taking the Right Steps to Defense Reform’, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 2618 (Oct. 2011).

²⁴ Dang Chongmin and Zhang Yu, Science of Joint Campaigns [联合作战学] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press 2009), 43. See also: Kevin McCauley, ‘PLA Yijiangshan joint amphibious operations: Past is Prologue,’ China Brief, 13 Sept. 2016.

²⁵ Ralph L. Powell, ‘Maoist Military Doctrines’, Asian Survey 8/4 (Apr. 1968), 239–62.

²⁶ For a review of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, see M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2008), Chapter 4. On the 1968 Sino-Soviet border clash, see: Lyle Goldstein, ‘Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why It Matters’, The China Quarterly 168 (Dec. 2001), 985–997. On the 1979 Sino-Vietnam border war, see: Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great War and the Long March (New York: Cambridge University Press 2003), 119–43.

²⁷ Tan Yadong (ed.), Joint Operations Course Materials [联合作战教程] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press 2013), 8. The KMT did not formally abandon the goal of militarily retaking the mainland until 1991.

²⁸ For a discussion, see: Alexander Huang, ‘Transformation and Refinement of Chinese Military Doctrine: Reflection and Critique on the PLA’s View’, in James Mulvenon and Andrew Yang (eds.), Seeking Truth from Facts: A Retrospective on Chinese Military Studies in the Post-Mao Era (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2001); Ellis Joffe, ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions: A Doctrine for Modern War’, The China Quarterly 112 (Dec. 1987), 555–71; and Paul H.B. Godwin, ‘Changing Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy and Operations in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 1978–87’, The China Quarterly 112 (Dec. 1987), 572–90.

²⁹ This was discussed in the 1987 Guidelines on Science of Campaigns [战役学纲要], approved by the Central Military Commission, and the 1988 teaching volume Science of Campaigns Course Materials [战役学教程]. See: Yadong, Joint Operations Course Materials, 8.

³⁰ Liu Huaqing, Memoirs [刘华清回忆录] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press 2004), Chapter 20. See also: Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, Science of Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Military Science Press 2005), 420–1.

³¹ David M. Finkelstein, ‘China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of the ‘Military Strategic Guidelines’’, in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell (eds.), Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: Army War College 2007), 126. See also Nan Li, ‘The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, 1985–95: A Chinese Perspective’, The China Quarterly 146 (June 1996) 443–63; and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘The Evolution of China’s Military Strategy: Comparing the 1987 and 1999 Editions of Zhanluexue’, in James Mulvenon and David M. Finkelstein (eds.), China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2005), 79–99.

³² Robert S. Ross, ‘The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force’, International Security 25/2 (Fall 2000), 87–123; Allen S. Whiting, ‘China’s Use of Force 1950–96, and Taiwan’, International Security 26/2 (Fall 2001), 120–3; and Joel Wuthnow, ‘The Integration of Cooptation and Coercion: China’s Taiwan Strategy Since 2001’, East Asia 23/3 (Fall 2006), 23–5.

³³ The Guidelines themselves are not publicly available. However, they are briefly discussed in Zhang Peigao, Lectures on Joint Campaign Command [联合战役指挥教程] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press 2012), 7.

³⁴ For instance, during the 1995–6 Taiwan Strait crisis, Jiang Zemin observed a joint exercise in the Yellow Sea simulating an attack on one of Taiwan’s offshore islands.

³⁵ Chongmin and Yu, Science of Joint Campaigns, 43.

³⁶ Kevin Pollpeter, ‘Towards an Integrative C4ISR System: Informationization and Joint Operations in the People’s Liberation Army’, in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (eds.), The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: Army War College 2010), 212–9; Wanda Ayuso and Lonnie Henley, ‘Aspiring to Jointness: PLA Training, Exercises, and Doctrine, 2008–2012’, in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner (eds.), Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era (Carlisle, PA: Army War College 2014), 188.

³⁷ ‘Chairman Hu Jintao Calls for Transformation in Military Training Towards Informatization’ [胡锦涛主席要求推进军事训练向信息化转变], Xinhua, 28 June 2006.

³⁸ Pollpeter, ‘Towards an Integrative C4ISR System’, 219.

³⁹ Ayuso and Henley, ‘Aspiring to Jointness’, 182; ‘Study how to fight modern warfare – An account of personal experience in the ‘Joint Education-2012 Queshan’ joint exercise’ [‘学打现代战争’ – – 亲历‘联教-2012·确山’联合演习], Nanfang Zhoumo (南方周末), 15 June 2012.

⁴⁰ Mark Stokes and Ian Easton, ‘The Chinese People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department: Evolving Organization and Missions’, in Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth Allen (eds.), The PLA as Organization v2.0 (Vienna, VA: DGI 2015), 154–7.

⁴¹ Blasko, ‘Integrating the Services and Harnessing the Military Area Commands’, 18; Ayuso and Henley, ‘Aspiring to Jointness’, 182.

⁴² David L. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military (Berkeley: University of California Press 2002), Chapter 4.

⁴³ In later years, however, MR naval and air force component chiefs were dual-hatted as MR deputy commanders, while at least one deputy chief of the GSD was usually a non-ground force officer.

⁴⁴ For instance, the commandant of a PLA service academy described the relationship between the services and MRs as one of ‘you don’t listen to me, and I don’t listen to you.’ Discussion with senior PLA officer, Washington, April 2016. On joint logistics, see: Susan M. Puska, ‘Taming the Hydra: Trends in China’s Military Logistics Since 2000,’ in Kamphausen, Lai, and Scobell (eds.), The PLA at Home and Abroad, 573–5.

⁴⁵ Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, ‘The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence’, in James Mulvenon and Andrew Yang (eds.), The People’s Liberation Army as Organization (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 546–7.

⁴⁶ In fact, during the 1995–6 Taiwan Strait crisis, the Nanjing MR was temporarily renamed Nanjing War Zone as part of a joint exercise. Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, 260–2.

⁴⁷ For a discussion, see: Dean Cheng, ‘The PLA’s Wartime Structure,’ in Pollpeter and Allen (eds.), The PLA as Organization v2.0, 456–8; and Dean Cheng, ‘Zhanyixue and Joint Campaigns,’ in Mulvenon and Finkelstein (eds.), China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs, 107–11.

⁴⁸ Zhang, Lectures on Joint Campaign Command, 3.

⁴⁹ Fang Yongzhi, ‘When will the Chinese military set up its joint operations command’ [中国军队何时设立联合作战司令部)], China Youth Daily [中国青年报], 28 March 2014. The author is an Associate Professor at the PLA Engineering Academy. For similar critiques, see: Wang Xiaohui, ‘What strategic preparations should China’s military make in a transition era?’ [转型期中国军队要做哪些战略准备] National Defense Reference [国防参考], 27 Oct. 2015; and Tu Chenxin, ‘An exclusive interview with major general Xu Guangyu: Performing arts troupes bear the brunt of force reduction’ [本端专访徐光裕少将：裁军文工团首当其冲], Zhejiang Online [浙江新闻], 4 Sept. 2015.

⁵⁰ M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s new military strategy: ‘Winning Informationized Local Wars’’, China Brief, 2 July 2015.

⁵¹ China’s Military Strategy.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ ‘CPC central committee decision on deepening of reforms for major issues’ [中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定], Xinhua, 15 Nov. 2013.

⁵⁵ ‘Xi Jinping: build a modern military power system with Chinese characteristics’ [习近平：构建中国特色现代军事力量体系], Renmin Ribao [人民日报], 31 Aug. 2014. The article provides quotes from Xi’s remarks on military reform, made on 27 Dec. 2013.

⁵⁶ ‘At CMC reform work meeting, Xi Jinping stresses: Comprehensively implement reform and military strengthening strategy, resolutely take path to strong military with Chinese characteristics’ [习近平在中央军委改革工作会议上强调全面实施改革强军战略坚定不移走中国特色强军之路], Xinhua, 26 Nov. 2015.

⁵⁷ ‘CMC opinions on deepening national defense and military reforms.’

⁵⁸ Also called 战区 in Chinese. However, PRC English-language media has referred to these as ‘Theater Commands,’ likely to signify that they have both peacetime and wartime functions.

⁵⁹ Wang Xiaohui [王晓辉], ‘What Types of Strategic Preparations Must China’s Military Undertake?’, [中国军队要做哪些战略准备], Southern Weekend [南方周末], 11 Sept, 2015.

⁶⁰ ‘Starting with a new style under fluttering red combat flags: Observations on the new theater commands’ [开局新风起 猎猎战旗红: 东南西北中五战区成立伊始见闻], Xinhua Online [新华网], 2 Feb. 2016.

⁶¹ The key geographic change was the apparent addition of southwestern Yunnan and Guizhou provinces to the Southern TC. These forces were previously assigned to the Chengdu MR.

⁶² ‘Forging a strong and comprehensive joint operations command structure’ [锻造全面过硬的联合作战指挥机构], Renmin Ribao [人民日报], 28 Feb. 2016.

⁶³ Interviews, Beijing, 2016.

⁶⁴ These missions will be performed by the JSD Overseas Operations Office (海外行动处), within the JSD Operations Bureau. ‘Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on Mar. 31’, PRC Ministry of National Defense, 31 Mar. 2016.

⁶⁵ By contrast, none of the TC commanders sit on the CMC as of writing. The future composition of the CMC will be determined at Party meetings, such as the 19th Party Congress set for late 2017. For a discussion of possible revisions to the CMC’s membership, see: Allen, Blasko, and Corbett, ‘The PLA’s New Organizational Structure.’

⁶⁶ A new CMC Training Management Department, formed from the previous GSD Military Training Department, will also play a role in managing joint training. The division of labor between this organization and the JSD has not been announced.

⁶⁷ The latter function was previously performed by the PLA Intelligence Department (2PLA), whose portfolio appears to have been transferred to the JSD.

⁶⁸ Austin Ramzy, ‘China’s President, Xi Jinping, Gains a New Title: Commander in Chief,’ The New York Times, 21 Apr. 2016.

⁶⁹ Interviews, Beijing, 2016.

⁷⁰ ‘CMC sends training supervision teams to all theater commands and some service units’ [中央军委训练监察组进驻各战区和军种部分单位], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], 11 May 2016.

⁷¹ Zhang Shibo and Liu Yazhou, ‘Strive to build the highest military academy with the world’s advanced standards and unique Chinese characteristics’ [努力建设具有世界先进水平和中国特色的最高军事学府”], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], 17 Apr. 2016. Zhang and Liu are president and political commissar of the PLA NDU, respectively.

⁷² ‘Expert: The strategic support force is a key to winning throughout the course of operations’ [专家：战略支援队将贯穿作战全过程是致胜关键], Renmin Ribao Online [人民网], 5 Jan. 2016.

⁷³ ‘China sets up joint logistics force, Xi Confers flags,’ Xinhua, 3 Sept. 2016.

⁷⁴ The TC and CMC JOCCs, equipped to provide real-time communications between and across echelons, will likely play a critical role in this respect. ‘Xi Jinping inspects CMC joint operations command center’ [习近平视察军委联合作战指挥中心], China Central Television Online [央视网], 20 Apr. 2016; ‘Starting with a new style under fluttering red combat flags.’

⁷⁵ Recent joint exercises led by non-army components include Mission Action-2013C (Air Force) and Joint Action 2014A (Navy). Thanks to a referee for making this point.

⁷⁶ Dang and Zhang, Science of Joint Campaigns (2009), 226. See also Zhang Yuliang, Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006), 273–326; and Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016), 89–90.

⁷⁷ Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, 90–1. See also: Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, ‘What do China’s military reforms mean for Taiwan?’ NBR Commentary, 19 May 2016.

⁷⁸ Prior to the reforms, the PLA established an East China Sea JOCC to coordinate enforcement of the East China Sea ADIZ, announced in November 2013. It is unclear whether that center still exists or whether it will be merged with the Eastern TC JOCC. The Southern TC JOCC would likely be responsible for enforcing a South China Sea ADIZ. Harry Kazianis, ‘The strategy behind China’s ADIZ in the East China sea,’ Asia Times, 17 Mar. 2016.

⁷⁹ This could be in the context of what PLA doctrinal writings call ‘joint border area counterattacks,’ in which multiple service forces are used to resist enemy incursions into China’s border areas. See: Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 273.

⁸⁰ See, e.g., M. Taylor Fravel and Christopher P. Twomey, ‘Projecting strategy: The myth of Chinese counter-intervention’, The Washington Quarterly 37/4 (Winter 2015), 171–187; and Timothy Heath and Andrew S. Erickson, ‘Is China pursuing counter-intervention?’ The Washington Quarterly 38/3 (Fall 2015), 143–156. Doctrinally, PLA sources often avoid using the terms ‘counter-intervention,’ although the need to counter intervening adversary forces is clear in discussions of joint anti-air raid, firepower, and other types of campaigns. See, e.g., Zhang, Science of Campaigns (2006), 273–343; Dang and Zhang, Science of Joint Campaigns (2009), 218–20.

⁸¹ Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, 59–63.

⁸² ‘China inaugurates PLA rocket force as military reform deepens’, Xinhua, 1 Jan. 2016.

⁸³ ‘Transcript of Eastern theater commander Liu Yuejun’s interview’ [东部战区司令员刘粤军访谈录], China Military Online [中国军网], 3 Mar. 2016; ‘Southern theater commander: Safeguarding South China sea rights and interests is our most important mission’ [南部战区司令员：维护南海权益是最重要使命], Renmin Ribao [人民日报], 28 Feb. 2016.

⁸⁴ David Logan, ‘Implications of the New PLA Rocket Force’, Joint Force Quarterly, 2016; Joel Wuthnow and David Logan, ‘Should Taiwan Fear China’s New Rocket Force?’ Policy Forum, 2 Sept. 2016. This is consistent with previous assessments of weak SAF integration in cross-service exercises. See: Michael Chase et al., China’s Incomplete Military Transformation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 81.

⁸⁵ As noted above, the SSF is also not clearly integrated into the TCs. It is not even clear that the SSF maintains permanent units within the TCs.

⁸⁶ The exception, General Zhu Fuxi of the Eastern TC, is a current Air Force officer who spent most of his career in the army.

⁸⁷ For instance, nearly 70% of the participants in the 2016 PLA NDU senior-level command course were ground force officers, most of them group army commanders and political commissars.

⁸⁸ Locher, ‘Has It Worked?’ 101–3; Roman and Tarr, ‘The Joint Chiefs of Staff,’ 93–7.

⁸⁹ Anit Mukherjee, ‘Fighting separately: Jointness and civil-military relations in India,’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 5 July 2016, 18–19. For an argument in favor of an Indian COCOM-like system, see: Vijai Singh Rana, ‘Enhancing Jointness in Indian Armed Forces: Case for Unified Commands,’ Journal of Defence Studies 9/1 (January-March 2015) 33–62.

⁹⁰ David Liebenberg and Joel Wuthnow, ‘Navigating the Dangerous Shoals: An Overview of the New Period of China’s Military Reform’, paper presented at the 2014 CAPS-RAND-NDU Conference on the PLA, 22 Nov. 2014, 9–11.

⁹¹ For instance, an April 2016 operation to evacuate sick workers from Fiery Cross Reef was ordered by the PLA navy commander, Admiral Wu Shengli. ‘PLA carries out historic medical mission in South China sea,’ China Daily, 18 Apr. 2016.

⁹² The war did involve PLA air force sorties and the deployment of a naval task force to the Paracels to resist a possible Soviet naval interdiction. Nevertheless, one scholar concluded that ‘backwardness in doctrine and tactics precented the Chinese forces from carrying out a real coordinated operation.’ Xiaoming Zhang, ‘China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment,’ The China Quarterly 184 (Dec. 2005) 870–1. For an earlier assessment, see: Harlan W. Jencks, ‘China’s ‘Punitive’ War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment,’ Asian Survey 19/8 (Aug. 1979) 801–815.

⁹³ The 2013 Science of Strategy acknowledges this problem, noting that ‘the PLA has not undergone the trials of real combat in joint operations.’ Academy of Military Sciences Military Strategy Studies Department, Science of Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Military Science Press 2013), 125.

⁹⁴ The 19th Party Congress, to be held in late 2017, will offer useful indications of the direction of PLA leadership appointments. Several senior officers at the CMC, JSD, and TC levels will have reached retirement age, giving the PLA a chance to draw more non-ground force officers into senior billets.

⁹⁵ For instance, General Joseph Dunford has said that the COCOM system needs to be revised in order to meet challenges such as those posed by China, North Korea, and ISIS. In his words, ‘Our current planning, our organization construct, and our command and control is really not optimized for that fight.’ Rowan Scarborough, ‘Gen. Dunford: U.S. commands, war plans outdated,’ The Washington Times, 14 Dec. 2015. For a discussion of proposed amendments to Goldwater-Nichols, see: Aaron Mehta and Joe Gould, ‘Carter unveils goldwater nichols reforms,’ Defense News, 5 Apr. 2016.

⁹⁶ The 2016 report provided a useful overview of the reforms, but did not explain their implications for the situations such as the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, or China-India border. See: Annual Report to Congress, 1–3.

⁹⁷ Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) Vesion 1.0 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense 2012).

⁹⁸ The U.S. Defense Department has already announced that its most advanced newest capabilities will be deployed to the Pacific, including the Zumwalt-class destroyer and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Ashton Carter, ‘Remarks on the next phase of the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific,’ U.S. Department of Defense Website, 6 Apr. 2015.

⁹⁹ On Air-Sea Battle, see: Jan Van Tol et al., AirSea Battle: A Point of Departure Operational Concept (Washington, DC: CSBA 2010). On Offshore Control, see: Thomas X. Hammes, ‘Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict,’ NDU Strategic Forum278 (June 2012). See also Andrew Krepinevich, ‘How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense’ Foreign Affairs 94 (March/April 2015) 78–86.

¹⁰⁰ PLA doctrine has long emphasized ‘key point strikes’ on critical enemy infrastructure, such as command-and-control nodes, computer networks, and airbases. For a discussion, see: Roger Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Anti-Access Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 34–7.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Joel Wuthnow

Joel Wuthnow is a Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the U.S. National Defense University.