Theories of Non-Balancing and Russia’s Foreign Policy

ABSTRACT

The beginning of the twenty-first century has witnessed the emergence of balancing responses to the US hegemony, among which Russia’s foreign policies stand out as corresponding to what is understood as ‘hard balancing.’ Why is the United States being balanced against? This paper categorizes the existing theories of non-balancing into six conditions that together guarantee the absence of balancing and demonstrates that the current unipolar system can satisfy only one of them. This eases the systemic constraints and makes balancing possible. The paper then presents three cases of balancing with reference to President Putin’s foreign policy. It argues that even though in terms of relative military capabilities unipolarity still holds, the emergence of counter-hegemonic balancing is indicative of important changes in the nature of post-Cold War American domination.

KEYWORDS:

• Balance of power
• balancing
• unipolarity
• foreign policy
• Russia

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ Or, ‘theories of non-balancing,’ comprising the body of literature representing different theoretical approaches but agreeing on one crucial point – that balancing by a secondary state against American superpower is impossible or highly unlikely due to various characteristics of the US-led unipolarity. See: G. John Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivalled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell UP 2002); Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 2008); G. John Ikenberry, ‘Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of Post-war Order’, International Security 23/3 (Winter 1998/99), 43–78; William C. Wohlforth, ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’, International Security 24/1 (Summer 1999), 5–41; The special volumes of International Security 30/1 (Summer 2005), 7–177 and World Politics 61/1 (January 2009), 1–213 also deal with the issues of the absence of balancing in the US-led unipolar world.

² Bertil Nygren, The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin’s Foreign Policy towards the CIS Countries (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge 2007); Janusz Bugajski, Dismantling the West: Russia’s Atlantic Agenda (Washington, DC: Potomac Press 2009).

³ Reuben Steff and Nicholas Khoo, ‘Hard Balancing in the Age of American Unipolarity: The Russian Response to US Ballistic Missile Defense during the Bush Administration (2001–2008)’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/2 (2014), 222–58.

⁴ See William C. Wohlforth, ‘Hegemonic Decline and Hegemonic War Revisited’, in G. John Ikenberry (ed.), Power Order, and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2014), 109–31. Among the consistent proponents of the US-led unipolarity are realists Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth and intuitionalist John Ikenberry. See, for example, Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, ‘Don’t Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment’, International Security 37/3 (Winter 2012/13), 7–51.

⁵ Structural realists have believed that balancing behavior is inevitable. States are prone to worry about their safety and survival in the unbalanced international system and will either concentrate efforts to increase their capability (internal balancing) or try to realign with other secondary powers (external balancing). For this view, see: Kenneth Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security 25/1 (Summer 2000), 4–41; Christopher Layne, ‘This Time it’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana’, International Studies Quarterly 56/1 (March 2012), 203–13. Balancing has also been shown to be an intrinsic part of international relations. See: Joseph M. Parent and Sebastian Rosato, ‘Balancing in Neorealism’, International Security 40/2 (2015), 51–86.

⁶ Christopher Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Moment’, International Security 31/2 (Fall 2006), 13.

⁷ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White House September 2002), 30.

⁸ T. V. Paul, James Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (eds.), Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (California: Stanford UP 2004), 82.

⁹ William C. Wohlforth, ‘U.S. Strategy in a Unipolar World’, in G. John Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivalled (Ithaca: Cornell UP 2002), 106.

¹⁰ Wohlforth, ‘U.S. Strategy in a Unipolar World’, 114.

¹¹ Robert J. Art, ‘Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO’, Political Science Quarterly 111/1 (Spring 1996), 36.

¹² Stephen M. Walt, ‘Keeping the World “Off Balance”: Self Restraint and U.S. Foreign Policy’, in G. John Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivalled (Ithaca: Cornell UP 2002), 137.

¹³ Walt, ‘Keeping the World “Off Balance”’, 133–9.

¹⁴ Josef Joffe, ‘Defying History and Theory: The United States and the “Last Remaining Superpower”’, in G. John Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivalled (Ithaca: Cornell UP 2002), 170.

¹⁵ John M. Owen, ‘Transnational Liberalism and American Primacy; or, Benignity is the Eye of the Beholder’, in G. John Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivalled (Ithaca: Cornell UP 2002), 257.

¹⁶ Wohlforth, ‘U.S. Strategy in a Unipolar World’, 100.

¹⁷ Aurangzeb Qureshi, ‘Flawed US Foreign Policy Encourages Russia-China Alliance’, Foreign Policy Journal, 29 May 2014, <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/05/29/flawed-us-foreign-policy-encourages-russia-china-alliance/#.U4gJjBDNwsk>.

¹⁸ It is worth noting that American officials do not present the US pivot to Asia as a strategy to contain China. The author’s interviews and fieldwork in China in summer 2016 reveal, however, that this is how this strategy is viewed in China by both government officials and the many in the academic community.

¹⁹ Jane Perlez, ‘U.S. Allies See Trans-Pacific Partnership as a Check on China’, New York Times, 6 Oct. 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/world/asia/trans-pacific-partnership-china-australia.html?_r=3>.

²⁰ Vladimir Soldatkin, ‘In Moscow, new Chinese leader Xi warns against meddling’, Reuters, 23 March 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/24/us-china-russia-moscow-idUSBRE92M02F20130324>.

²¹ Jonathan Marcus, ‘China-Russia drills in Med show shifting strategies’, BBC News, 11 May 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-32686956>.

²² Andrey Ostroukh, ‘Russia, China Forge closer ties with new economic, financing accords’, The Wall Street Journal, 8 May 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-china-forge-closer-ties-with-new-economic-financing-accords-1431099095>.

²³ Fu Ying, ‘How China Sees Russia: Beijing and Moscow are Close by Not Allies,’ Foreign Affairs (January/February 2016), 96–105.

²⁴ Susan Crabtree, ‘John Kerry: The world is “ready to act” against Russia’, Washington Examiner, 24 April 2014, <http://washingtonexaminer.com/john-kerry-the-world-is-ready-to-act-against-russia/article/2547693>.

²⁵ Rajeev Sharma, ‘20 deals in 24 h: Russia-India relations given $100 billion-worth boost’, RT, 12 December 2014, <http://rt.com/op-edge/213835-russia-india-contracts-nuclear/>; Nirmala George, ‘Putin turns to India to clinch new deals’, Associated Press, 11 Dec. 2014, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/11/putin-turns-india-clinch-new-deals/?page=all>.

²⁶ For a more comprehensive theoretical analysis of the nature of alliances, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1990) and Mark R. Brawley, ‘The Political Economy of Balance of Power Theory,’ in T. V. Paul, J. J. Writz, M. Fortmann, Balance of Power, 76–99.

²⁷ Peter Baker, ‘Obama, Seeking Unity on Russia, Meets Obstacles’, New York Times, 4 June 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/world/europe/in-show-of-support-obama-meets-with-ukraine-leader.html?action=click&contentCollection=Europe&region=Footer&module=MoreInSection&pgtype=article&_r=1>.

²⁸ Petter Stelenheim, Catalina Perdomo, and Elisabeth Sköns, SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2008), 187–9.

²⁹ It was argued that this factor, together with the offer of better prospects for joining NATO, gave the Georgian government an inflated opinion of Georgian forces and their ability to react and solve difficult combat tasks. See Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel, Explaining Foreign Policy: International Diplomacy and the Russo-Georgian War (London: Lynne Rienner 2012).

³⁰ This amount has been publicly admitted by the US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Victoria Nuland <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article37599.htm>.

³¹ ‘Ministr Oboronu Rossii General Armii Sergei Shoigy Provel Peregovoru s Kitaiskim Kollegoi General-Polkovnikom Chan Wancyanem [Russia’s Defense Minister Army General Sergei Shoigy Conducted Negotiations with His Chinese Colleague Colonel-General Chang Wanquan], Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 18 Nov. 2014, <http://function.mil.ru/news_page/world/more.htm?id=12000207@egNews>.

³² ‘Sovmestnoe Zayavlenie Rossiiskoi Federacii i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki ob Yglyblenii Vseob’emluschego Partnerstva i Strategicheskogo Vzaimodeistviya i o Prodvizhenii Vzaimovugodnogo Sotrudnichestva [Russia-China Joint Statement on Deepening Comprehensive Partnership, Strategic Interactions, and Promotion of Mutually-Beneficial Cooperation, 8 May 2015],’ <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/4969>.

³³ ‘Rossiya i Kitai Dogovorilis’ Protivodeistvovat’ “Cvetnum Revolyciyam” [Russia and China agreed to Counteract “Color Revolutions”]’, Vzglyad Newspaper, 25 May 2015, <http://vz.ru/news/2015/5/25/747182.html>.

³⁴ Bo Rothstein, ‘Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Government’, American Behavioural Scientist 53/3 (November 2009), 311–30.

³⁵ ‘Text of President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address’, The Washington Post, 29 Jan. 2002, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm>.

³⁶ World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>.

³⁷ ‘A Comparison of Soviet and US Gross National Products, 1960–83,’ A Research Paper, Office of Soviet Analysis, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000498181.pdf>.

³⁸ SIPRI Yearbook 2015, p. 17, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB16%20Summary_EN_0.pdf>.

³⁹ SIPRI’s Trend in World Military Expenditures <http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=476>.

⁴⁰ For more details on this type of measurement, see: Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘Estimates of Chinese Military Spending,’ Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 21 Sept. 2016, p. 25. It should be born in mind, however, that actual military spending in China or Russia is hard to assess due to the secrecy of information and volatility of currency exchange rates.

⁴¹ SIPRI’s Trends in World Military Expenditures.

⁴² Robert A. Pape, ‘Soft Balancing against the United States’, International Security 30/1 (2005), 7–45; T. V. Paul, ‘Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy’, International Security 30/1 (2005), 46–71.

⁴³ Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2006), Chap. 7.

⁴⁴ Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion Revisited’, 29–30.

⁴⁵ Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion Revisited’, 8–9

⁴⁶ Colin Elman, ‘Introduction’, in J. Vasquez and C. Elman (ed.), Realism and the Balancing of Power (NJ: Prentice-Hall 2003), 8.

⁴⁷ Jack S. Levy, ‘Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design’, in J. Vasquez and C. Elman (ed.), Realism and the Balancing of Power (NJ: Prentice-Hall 2003), 128–53.

⁴⁸ ‘Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy’, The Washington Post, 12 Febr. 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html>.

⁴⁹ Vladimir Sizov, ‘Piatidnevka Protivostoyaniya [Five Days of Confrontation]’, International Trends 6/2 (2009), 116–22.

⁵⁰ Sergei Karaganov, ‘Lucky Russia. Russia in global affairs’, Russia in Global Affairs, 29 Mar. 2011, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Lucky-Russia-15154>. This interpretation of Russia’s actions in Georgia as a preventive war to maintain its sphere of influence is dominant in multiple Russian-language publications on the issue. See, for instance: Sizov, ‘Piatidnevka Protivostoyaniya [Five Days of Confrontation]’.

⁵¹ ‘Kyrgyz MPs vote to shut US base’, BBC News, 19 Febr. 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7898690.stm>.

⁵² Isabel Gorst, ‘Kyrgyzstan to shut US military base’, Financial Times, 4 Febr. 2009, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8d9e47de-f227-11dd-9678-0000779fd2ac.html>.

⁵³ Mark Thompson, ‘Obama Loses a Key Base for Afghanistan’, Time Magazine, 19 Febr. 2009, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1880686,00.html>.

⁵⁴ Lyubov Pronina, ‘Medvedev, Russian Navy Head to Latin America to Boost Influence’, Bloomberg, 21 Nov. 2014, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a3C50T7bxKlo>.

⁵⁵ Karaganov, ‘Lucky Russia.’

⁵⁶ Data from the official web portal of the Eurasian Economic Commission, <>.

⁵⁷ Abigail Hauslohner, ‘Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus form Eurasian Economic Union’, Washington Post, 29 May 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-kazakhstan-belarus-form-eurasian-economic-union/2014/05/29/de4a2c15-cb01-4c25-9bd6-7d5ac9e466fd_story.html>.

⁵⁸ Bradley Klapper, ‘Clinton fears efforts to “re-Sovietize” in Europe’, Associated Press, 6 Dec. 2012, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/clinton-fears-efforts-re-sovietize-europe>.

⁵⁹ ‘Astana gears up for Eurasian Economic Union’, Euronews, 23 May 2015, <http://www.euronews.com/2014/05/23/astana-gears-up-for-eurasian-economic-union/>.

⁶⁰ ‘EU loses Armenia to Russia’s Customs Union’, EurActive, 4 Sept. 2013, <http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/eu-loses-armenia-russia-customs-news-530224>.

⁶¹ ‘Ukraine drops EU plans and looks to Russia’, Aljazeera, 21 Nov. 2013, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/11/ukraine-drops-eu-plans-looks-russia-20131121145417227621.html>.

⁶² ‘Transcript: Obama’s remarks on Russia, NSA at The Hague on March 25’, The Washington Post, 25 Mar. 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/transcript-obamas-remarks-on-russia-nsa-at-the-hague-on-march-25/2014/03/25/412950ca-b445-11e3-8cb6-284052554d74_story.html>.

⁶³ Steven Lee Myers and Anthony Shadid, ‘U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Syrian Leader and 6 Aides’, New York Times, 18 May 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/world/middleeast/19syria.html?_r=0>.

⁶⁴ Charles Recknagel and Richard Solash, ‘U.S., European Leaders Call for Assad To Step Down’, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 14 Oct. 2015, <http://www.rferl.org/content/syria_un_military_operations_stopped/24299678.html>.

⁶⁵ ‘Obama calls on Syria’s Assad to step aside’, Aljazeera, 18 Aug. 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/08/2011818125712354226.html>.

⁶⁶ Gordon Lubold, ‘Foreign Policy Situation Report: Syria’s red line, crossed; Top brass still sceptical of arming the rebels; Don’t get this Aussie angry; Why Obama will get an earful in Germany over NSA; The Marines are pumped about the Israeli MOD’s arrival today; and just a bit more’, Foreign Policy, 14 Jun. 2013, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/14/syrias_red_line_crossed_top_brass_still_skeptical_of_arming_the_rebels_don_t_get>.

⁶⁷ ‘Text of President Obama’s Remark on Syria’, The New York Times, 31 Aug. 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/middleeast/text-of-president-obamas-remarks-on-syria.html?ref=middleeast&_r=1&>.

⁶⁸ Joseph Candel, ‘Angry over Libya, Russia takes hard stance on ally Syria’, 1 May 2011, <http://endtimeinfo.com/2011/05/angry-over-libya-russia-takes-hard-stance-on-ally-syria/>.

⁶⁹ Henry Meyer, Brad Cook, and Ilya Arkhipov, ‘Russia Warns U.S., NATO Against Military Aid to Syria Protests After Libya’, Bloomberg, 2 Jun. 2011, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-01/russia-warns-u-s-nato-against-military-aid-to-syria-protests-after-libya.html>.

⁷⁰ Vladimir Putin, ‘A plea for caution from Russia: What Putin has to say to Americans about Syria’, New York Times, 11 Sept. 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html>.

⁷¹ Security Council – Veto List, The United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library electronic resource, <http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_en.AQ23 shtml>.

⁷² Meeting of the Security Council on the situation Syria: Chinese and Russian vetoes, Voltaire Network, 4 Oct. 2011, <http://www.voltairenet.org/article171639.html>.

⁷³ ‘Russia, China will “pay price” over support for Syria: Clinton’, Press TV, 6 Jul. 2012. <http://www.presstv.com/detail/2012/07/06/249632/us-warns-russia-china-over-syria/>.

⁷⁴ Louis Charbonneau, ‘Russia, China resist U.N. Syria sanctions push: Envoys’, Reuters, 26 Aug. 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/26/us-syria-un-idUSTRE77P4X920110826>.

⁷⁵ ‘Russia and China veto UN move to refer Syria to international criminal court’, The Guardian, 22 May 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/russia-china-veto-un-draft-resolution-refer-syria-international-criminal-court>.

⁷⁶ Jonathan Saul, ‘Exclusive: Russia steps up military lifeline to Syria’s Assad – sources’, Reuters, 17 Jan. 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/17/us-syria-russia-arms-idUSBREA0G0MN20140117>.

⁷⁷ For more on Russia’s Pivot to Asia, see: Alexander Korolev, ‘Russia’s Reorientation to Asia: Causes and Strategic Implications’, Pacific Affairs 89/1 (2016), 53–73.

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Alexander Korolev

Alexander Korolev is a Research Fellow at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. His research interests include international relations theory and comparative politics with special reference to China and Russia. He has recently co-edited two volumes: International Cooperation in the Development of Russia’s Far East and Siberia (Palgrave, 2015) and The Political Economy of Pacific Russia: Regional Developments in East Asia (Palgrave, 2016). His recent articles appeared in Far Eastern Affairs, International Studies Review, Pacific Affairs, Critical Review, Studies in Comparative International Development, and Journal of Strategic Studies.