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ABSTRACT
By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated defense planning and reporting systems. An explanation for this systematic failure across European post-Communist defense institutions can be found in the continued slow development of an over-arching policy framework which directs and approves all activities of the armed forces, as well as the de-centralization of financial decision-making down to capability providers. The essay ends with an examination of the adverse effects of the early introduction of planning programming, budgeting system (PPBS), have had on the development of effective policy and planning capabilities within these defense institutions.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Cf., Carolina Vendil Pallin and Fredrik Westerlund, ‘Russia’s War in Georgia: Lessons and Consequences’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 20/2 (June 2009), 400–424; and, Colby Howard and Ruslan Pukhov, eds., Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine (Minneapolis: East View Press 2014).
2 Poland, White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw: The National Security Bureau 2013), 49. One source calculated that from 1989 until 2009, some 67,000 soldiers and civilians served abroad on UN, NATO, OSCE, and EU operations. Quoted by Marek Pietras, ‘Poland’s Participation in NATO Operations’, in Janne Haaland Matlary and Magnus Petersson (eds.), NATO’s European Allies: Military Capability and Political Will, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2013), 210.
3 See, for instance, Poland, Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland: Sector Strategy of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, (Warsaw: Ministry of National Defence 2009); Poland: Vision of the Polish Armed Forces 2030 (Warsaw: Ministry of National Defence May 2008); and, Poland, White Paper (Warsaw: Ministry of National Defence 2001).
4 Poland, White Book on National Security.
5 Interviews, Ministry of Defense and General Staff of Poland, Warsaw, May 2012 and February 2017.
6 Lukas Dycka and Miroslav Mares, ‘The Development and Future of Fighter Planes Acquisition in Countries of the Visegrad Group’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 25/4 (2012), 544–546; 555.
7 ‘15 Years in NATO’ (Warsaw: Ministry of National Defence Republic of Poland 2014) 16.
8 Barre R. Sequin, ‘Why did Poland Choose the F-16s?’, Occasional Papers Series No. 11 (Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall Center June 2007), 11.
9 Agnieszka Gogolewska, ‘Problems Confronting Civilian Democratic Control in Poland’, in Hans Born, Marina Caparini, Karl W. Haltiner, and Jürgen Kuhlmann (eds.), Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and Institutional Change (New York: Routledge 2006), 112.
10 Tomasz Paszewski, ‘Can Poland Defend Itself?’, Survival 58/2 (April–May 2016), 126–127.
11 Romania, ‘Strategy of Transformation of Romanian Armed Forces’, signed by State Secretaries for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Defence Policy, and Armament, and Chief of General Staff; approved by the Secretary General of the Ministry of National Defence (Bucharest: General Staff 2007).
12 Romania, ‘Law on Defence Planning’, No. 473 of 4 November 2004; repeals Government Ordinance No.52/1998 on national defence planning, Monitorul Oficial (Bucharest No.525, 25 October 2000).
13 Oana-Raluca Manole, ‘PPBES Process Overview: Considerations Regarding its Implementation and Use’, in Maria Constantinescu (ed.), Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Evaluation System: Benefits and Challenges Workshop unfolded during the postgraduate course in Planning Programming Budgeting System (Bucharest: National Defence University ‘Carol I’ Publishing House 2010), 36.
14 Marie Vlachova, ‘Defence Reform in the Czech Republic’, in Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (eds.), Post-Cold War Defence Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States (Washington DC: Brassey’s 2002), 400–401.
15 Kristina Soukupova, ‘The Influence of Civil-Military Relations on the Implementation of Network Enabled Capabilities as a Transformation Driver and Security Sector Consolidation Catalyst in the Czech Republic’, Ph.D. Dissertation (London: King’s College London March 2010), 160.
16 Czech Republic, The White Paper on Defence (Prague: Ministry of Defence 2011), 54.
17 I am grateful to my colleague, Dr Kristina Soukupova, for documenting this series of policy statements and planning documents.
18 David J. Betz, ‘Civil-Military Relations in the Czech Republic: Ambivalent Reformers, Immature Structures’, in Natalie Mychajlyszyn and Harald von Riekhoff (eds.), The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in East-Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Westport CT: Praeger, 2004), 51.
19 Pál Dunay, ‘The Half-Hearted Transformation of the Hungarian Military’, in Timothy Edmunds, Andrew Cottey, and Anthony Fraser (eds.), Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist Europe: Reviewing the Transition (London: Rutledge 2006), 21.
20 Mihály Zambori, ‘Economically Viable Management and Defence Spending’, in Wim F. Van Eekelen, and Philipp H. Fluri (eds.), Defence Institution Building (Vienna: LaVAK 2006), 275–294.
21 Note that these reviews were never publicly released in their entirety, but new policy priorities did ensue, e.g., reducing the size of the armed forces.
22 Tamás Csiki, ‘Lessons Learnt and Unlearnt. Hungary’s 15 years in NATO’, in Robert Czulda and Marek Madej (eds.), Newcomers No More? Contemporary NATO and the Future of the Enlargement from the Perspectives of ‘Post-Cold War’ Members (Warsaw: International Relations Research Institute 2015), 68; 64.
23 Jozsef Paor, ‘The Resource, Cost and Budget Planning Sub-Systems in the Defence Planning Process’, in, Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Evaluation System, 59.
24 For background of these early efforts to establish the Slovak defence institution, see Jeffrey Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics: Comparative Study in Civil-Military Relations (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 2004), 147–148; 162–163.
25 See Zolton D. Barnay, The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), 72–77; and Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics, 244.
26 Contained in the Garret report. See Barany, The Future of NATO Expansion, 81.
27 Reka Szemerkenyi, ‘Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk’, Adelphi Paper 306 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1996), 34.
28 Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics, 200.
29 Slovakia, The White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic (Bratislava: Ministry of Defence 2013), 16–17; 18, 39.
30 Ibid., 17; 39. For historical background and context see, Marian Majer, ‘Slovakia’, in Marian Majer (ed.), Security Sector Reform in Countries of Visegrad and Southern Caucasus: Challenges and Opportunities (Bratislava: Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA) 2013), 106–108.
31 Jaroslav Naď, Marian Majer, and Milan Šuplata, 75 Solutions for Slovakia’s Defence (Bratislava: Central European Policy Institute ca. 2015), 4.
32 Anton Alex Bebler, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Slovenia’, in Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker (eds.), Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States (Boulder CO: Westview Press 1996), 167.
33 Specifically, Slovenia, ‘Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces up to 2025’, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 99/2010 (Ljubljana: Ministry of Defence 7 December 2010).
34 See Branimir Furlan, ‘Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness: Slovenian case’, Armed Forces and Society 39/3 (2012), 442.
35 Slovenia, Defence Sector Strategic Review 2009 (DSSR): Summary of Key DSSR 2009 Conclusions, No. 800–1/2009–189 (Ljubljana: Ministry of Defence 14 October 2009), 42.
36 Ibid., 11–15.
37 ‘Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces up to 2025’, 24.
38 Slovenia has its own unique HRM challenges in that the defence institution and armed forces must engage in collective bargaining with five separate labour unions. See Slovenia, Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2013, No. 0100-127/2013-34 (Ljubljana: Ministry of Defence 27 May 2014), 89. See as well ‘Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces up to 2025’, 24.
39 ‘Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces up to 2025’, 28.
40 Slovenia, Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2013, 83.
41 Jim Seroka, ‘Serbian National Security and Defence Strategy: Forever Wandering in the Wilderness?’ Journal of Slavic Military Studies 23/3 (September 2010), 442.
42 Political-Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace, ‘Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Defence Review Group, Belgrade’, PFP/SC-N(2006)0072 (20 December 2006), Annex 1, 1–3.
43 The rebirth of the Serbia defence institution was hardly a quick and essay passage. The plebiscite by Montenegro to dissolve the State Union in June 2006 hit the Federal Ministry of Defence hard as it was one of the few truly federal ministries. In consequence, upon the dissolution of the State Union, the Serbian defence institution was in a prolonged state of jus nullius, during a critical period when a policy framework should have been taking hold.
44 Svetlana Djurdjevic-Lukic, ‘Defence Reform in Serbia/Serbia and Montenegro: Hampering Exceptionalism’, in Philipp H. Fluri and George Katsirdakis (eds.), Security Sector Reform in the New Partnership for Peace Members: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia (Geneva: The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2007), 130 n.15.
45 See presentation by the Republic of Serbia, ‘Defence Reform – Current Results’, Southeast Europe Clearinghouse meeting, Bucharest (Belgrade: Ministry of Defence December 2006), 1.
46 To the credit of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Ministry of Defence, at least the function and purpose of ministerial guidance was defined in an open-source document. ‘Ministerial Guidance defines objectives, tasks and priorities in planning and provides guidelines for organisational changes, personnel project, development, modernisation and equipment of the SMAF as well as financing of the defence [sic] in 2006‘. See, Serbia and Montenegro, Ministerial Guidance for the Year 2006 (Belgrade: Federal Ministry of Defence Sector for Defence Policy, 2006), 5.
47 See LTC Katarina Štrbac, Briefing, ‘Ministerial Guidance 2007’ (Belgrade: Ministry of Defence, Department of Strategic Planning circa March 2007).
48 See, for example, Serbia, Strategic Defence Review: Final (Belgrade: Ministry of Defence July 2006), III-8.
49 Amadeo Watkins, ‘Security Sector Reform and Donor Assistance in Serbia: Complexity of Managing Change’ (Shrivenham: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom September 2010), 9.
50 Robert M. McNab, ‘Implementing Program Budgeting in the Serbian Ministry of Defence’, Public Budgeting and Finance 31/2 (Summer 2011), 217; 221.
51 Specifically, the Defence Strategy and the White Paper on Defence. See, Islam Yusufi, ‘Macedonia’, in Miroslav Hadžić, Milorad Timotić, and Predrag Petrović (eds.), Security Policies in the Western Balkans (Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2010), 98; 114.
52 See, Islam Yusufi, ‘Republic of Macedonia: Defence Sector Assessment’, in Anja H. Ebnöther, Philipp H. Fluri, Predrag Jurekovic (eds.), Security Sector Governance in the Western Balkans: Self-Assessment Studies on Defence, Intelligence, Police and Border Management Reform (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2007), 149; and, Macedonia, White Paper on Defence (Skopje: Ministry of Defence December 2012), 30–31.
53 Kęstutis Paulauskas, ‘The Baltic Quest to the West: From Total Defence to “Smart Defence” (and Back?)’, Tony Lawrence and Tomas Jermalavičius (eds.), Apprenticeship, Partnership, Membership: Twenty Years of Defence Development in the Baltic States (Tallinn: International Centre for Defence Studies 2013), 74.
54 ‘Treaty of Peace with Finland signed in Paris’, 10 February 1947, United Nations Treaty Series 48, 203 ff. For background on Estonia’s connection to Finnish defence expertise see Holger Mölder, ‘The Development of Military Cultures’, Apprenticeship, Partnership, Membership, 105–106.
55 See Eric Männik, ‘Development of the Estonian Defence: Finnish Assistance’, Baltic Defence Review 1/7 (2002), 34–42.
56 Mölder, ‘The Development of Military Cultures’, 108. This skepticism aside, Mölder makes a strong point that ‘… Estonia has taken its commitments to NATO very seriously. Despite its strong commitment to the Nordic model of military culture and suspicions of the European model, Estonia continues to support the transformation of NATO and the EU’s CSDP in promoting cooperative security approaches for the current security environment’.
57 Paulauskas, ‘The Baltic Quest to the West’, 74–76; 59.
58 Estonia, ‘National Defence Development Plan, 2013–2022’ (Tallinn: Ministry of Defence n.d.)
59 Henrik Praks, ‘Estonia and NATO: Back to Basics after a Decade of Membership’, Newcomers No More, 194–195
60 Estonia, ‘Effectiveness of Formation, Maintenance and Replenishment of Resources Required for Increasing Military Capability and Mobilisation of Defence Forces from 2009–2012’ Summary of report (Tallinn: National Audit Office 30 May 2013).
61 Georgia, Georgia: Advancing towards NATO (T'bilisi: Ministry of Defence 2007), and David Darchiashvili, ‘Georgian Defence Policy and Military Reform,’ in Bruno Coppieters and Robert Legvold (eds.), Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution (Cambridge MA: MIT Press 2005), 146–147.
62 Georgia enjoys one of the most transparent Ministry of Defence and vibrant community of think tanks and NGOs in the former Soviet Union, many of which are focused on national defence and security issues. Without any doubt, one of the best detailed descriptions and analysis of the formation of the Georgian Ministry of Defence and its armed forces is found in, David Darchiashvili, ‘Defence Reform and the Caucasus: Challenges of Institutional Reform during Unresolved Conflict’, Mediterranean Quarterly 20/3 (Summer 2009), 19–39.
63 Georgia, National Security Concept of Georgia (T’bilisi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011), 15.
64 Robert L. Larsson, ‘The Enemy Within: Russia’s Military Withdrawal from Georgia’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17/3 (2004), 410.
65 Darchiashvili, ‘Georgian Defence Policy and Military Reform’, 124–125, 127.
66 Georgia, Law on Defence Planning, No. 4130 (T’bilisi: Legislative Herald of Georgia 28 April 2006).
67 Georgia, Strategic Defence Review, 2013–2016 (T’bilisi: Ministry of Defence 2013).
68 Georgia, National Security Concept of Georgia, 2011.
69 Georgia, Minister’s Vision, 2013–2014 (T’bilisi: Ministry of Defence 2013).
70 Georgia, National Military Strategy 2005 (T’bilisi: Ministry of Defence 2005).
71 Georgia, The White Book 2014: The Annual Report on the Activities of the Ministry of Defence of Georgia (T’bilisi: Ministry of Defence n.d.)
72 Georgia, Strategic Defence Review, 2013–2016, 4.
73 Tengiz Pkhaladze and Alexander Rondeli, ‘Georgia’, Security Sector Reform in Countries of Visegrad and Southern Caucasus, 41–42.
74 See Antje Fritz, ‘Security Sector Governance in Georgia (I): Status’, in Philipp H. Fluri and Eden Cole (eds.), From Revolution to Reform: Georgia’s Struggle with Democratic Institution Building and Security Sector Reform (Vienna, Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence; National Defence Academy, and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces in co-operation with PfP-Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, July 2005), 66–67.
75 Georgia, Manual Planning and Control: PPBS/FMS (T’bilisi: Ministry of Defence 9 March 2007).
76 Teona Akubardia, ‘Overview of the Legislation Facilitating the Civil Democratic Oversight of Armed Forces in Georgia’, in Tamara Pataraia (ed.), Democratic Control over the Georgian Armed Forces since the August 2008 War (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2010), 17.
77 Georgia, Strategic Defence Review, 2013–2016, 7–8.
78 How Betz can claim that the descendants of the Red Army benefited from possessing a large cadre of officers schooled in strategic planning (in comparison with their Warsaw Pact counterparts) simply does not ring true. All one has to do is examine the long record of failed attempts at drafting defence plans in this grouping of countries; or better yet, point to one that was both viable and implemented. That said, Betz is spot-on in stating that this (alleged) expertise came at the expense of preservation of old-thinking: it pervades the entire system. See David J. Betz, Civil-Military Relations in Russia and Eastern Europe (New York: Routledge Curzon 2004), 45.
79 Ukraine, ‘Ukraine’s Military Doctrine’, approved by the President of Ukraine, No. 555/2015 (Kyiv: Ministry of Defence, 24 September 2015).
80 Ukraine, The White Book 2006, Defence Policy of Ukraine (Kyiv: Ministry of Defence, Zapovit Publishing House 2007).
81 For an excellent discussion of this policy/financial disconnect in Ukrainian defence planning see, Deborah Sanders, ‘Ukraine’s Military Reform: Building a Paradigm Army’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 21/4 (2008), 607–611.
82 James Sherr, ‘Civil-Democratic Control of Ukraine’s Armed Forces: To what End? By What Means?’ David Betz and John Löwenhardt (eds.), Army and State in Postcommunist Europe (London: Frank Cass 2001), 72.
83 To understand the state of the defence institution’s inability to conduct even rudimentary planning see the explanation of the highly complex, confusing, and stilted ‘strategic planning’ process in the Ministry of Defence by then Deputy Minister of Defence H. Pedchenko, ‘Strategic Planning in Ukraine: Content and Challenges Related to its Realization in the Ministry of Defence of the [sic] Ukraine’, Defence Bulletin No. 5 (Kyiv: Defence and Security Policy Centre 2010), 4–5.
84 Roman Mileshko, ‘The Evolution of the Defence Budget Process in Ukraine, 1991–2006’, M.A. Thesis (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School June 2006), 70–71.
85 There is very little written in Western languages that address these Ukrainian-unique processes, let alone the assumptions upon which they are based. In Ukrainian there is, M. Neckhayev, ‘The System of Joint Strategic Planning of Resource support to the National Security in the Military Sphere’; Ye. F. Shelest, ‘“Resource” – The Information-Analytical System for Support to the Defence Planning’; and, O. F. Zaskoka, ‘On the Reforming of the System of Manning in the Armed Forces of Ukraine’, Science and Defence: Scientific-Theoretic and Scientific-Practical Journal 3 (2005), 9–15; 16–22; 23–29, respectively.
86 Vitaliy Kosianchuk, ‘Cobb-Douglas Production Function as an Approach for Better Resource Allocation in the Ukrainian Armed Forces’, M.A. Thesis (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School June 2013), 27; 3.
87 See E. Sheltes, ‘Comment of the Chairman of the Centre for Defence and Security Policy’, Defence Bulletin, No. 5 (Kyiv: Centre for Defence and Security Policy 2010), 14.
88 James J. Schneider, ‘The Origins of Soviet Military Science’, Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2/4 (1989), 498.
89 The current writer’s understanding of the Ukrainian planning and budgetary systems, obtained from working with that defence institution, was greatly expanded by the superb M.A. Thesis submitted by Iryna Bystrova, ‘Defence Planning in the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine: Decade of Attempts and Mistakes’, M.A. Thesis (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School June 2015).
90 Jack Rabin, ‘PPBS: Theory, Structure, and Limitations’, Robert T. Golembiewski (ed.), Public Budgeting and Finance, 4th ed. (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1997), 490.
91 See C. Vance Gordon and Wade Hinkle, ‘Best Practices in Defence Resource Management’, IDA Document D-4137 (Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analysis January 2011), B-1 thru B-5.
92 See, Charles Johnston Hitch, Decision-Making for Defence (Berkeley, University of California Press 1965).
93 As one respected U.S. defence analyst put it: ‘PPBS is inappropriate for this countries, in part, because it “helps” them solve problems that do not exist in their system and never will’.
94 Georgia presents an excellent example of this disconnect. See Akubardia, ‘Overview of the Legislation Facilitating the Civil Democratic Oversight of Armed Forces in Georgia’, 31–32.
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Thomas-Durell Young
Thomas-Durell Young Academic Associate for comparative defense planning curriculum, Department of National Security Affairs, and Program Manager Europe, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.