Improvise, adapt and fail to overcome? Capacity building, culture and exogenous change in Sierra Leone

 ABSTRACT

Military capacity building (MCB) is as problematic as it is ubiquitous, with the British experience in Sierra Leone providing a rare example of ostensible success. This article critiques the dominant conceptualisation of MCB as purely a principal–agent (PA) problem, using military change scholarship to examine the impact of wartime British intervention on the Sierra Leonean armed forces. Here, indigenous military change was both externally driven and fundamentally adaptive in nature, allowing MCB to bypass some of the difficulties predicted by PA models. However, this adaptive approach nonetheless failed to reconcile Western military values with prevailing Sierra Leonean culture, complicating post-war stabilisation efforts.

KEYWORDS:

• Military capacity building
• security force assistance
• adaptation
• intervention
• Sierra Leone

Acknowledgments

This study was conducted as part of the author’s doctoral research at the University of Exeter’s Strategy & Security Institute, and conforms with the project's terms of ethical and institutional approval. The author is grateful to his doctoral supervisory team, and the two anonymous peer reviewers for their comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

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⁹ This study is based on the author’s doctoral research at the University of Exeter, and was funded through a scholarship provided by the University of Exeter in conjunction with Babcock International.

¹⁰ Biddle et al., ‘Small Footprint, Small Payoff’, 7–16.

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²⁶ Torunn Laugen Haaland, ‘The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/7 (2016), 999–1022.

²⁷ Anthony King, ‘Understanding the Helmand Campaign: British Military Operations in Afghanistan’, International Affairs 86/2 (2010), 311–32.

²⁸ Sergio Catignani, ‘“Getting COIN” at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (2012), 513–39; Sergio Catignani, ‘Coping with Knowledge: Organizational Learning in the British Army?’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/1 (2014), 30–64.

²⁹ Grissom, ‘Shoulder-to-Shoulder Fighting Different Wars: NATO Advisors and Military Adaptation in the Afghan National Army, 2001–2011’, in Farrell, Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, 263–87.

³⁰ Magnus Jörgel & Mats Utas, The Mano River Basin Area: Formal and Informal Security Providers in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency 2007), 12.

³¹ Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James Currey 2008), 34–7.

³² Patrick Chabal & Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument (Oxford: James Currey 1999), 1–16; Morten Bøås, ‘Liberia and Sierra Leone: Dead Ringers? The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule’, Third World Quarterly 22/5 (2001), 698–701.

³³ Hicham Bou Nassif, ‘“Second-Class”: The Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed Forces’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/5 (2015), 626–49; James T. Quinlivan, ‘Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East’, International Security 24/2 (1999), 131–65; Philip Roessler, ‘The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa’, World Politics 63/02 (2011), 300–46.

³⁴ Andrew Stewart, ‘An Enduring Commitment: The British Military’s Role in Sierra Leone’, Defence Studies 8/3 (2008), 360–5; Brigadier F. A. S. Clarke, ‘The Story of the Royal West African Frontier Force’, RUSI Journal 97/586 (1952), 223–9.

³⁵ Anton Bebler, Military Rule in Africa: Dahomey, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Mali (NY: Praeger 1973),64–73; David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James Currey, 2005) 14–6.

³⁶ Paul Jackson & Peter Albrecht, Reconstructing Security after Conflict: Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2011), 61.

³⁷ Keen, Conflict and Collusion, 16–7; Krijn Peters, War and the Crisis of Youth in Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2011), 42–3.

³⁸ Colonel Mike Dent, ‘Sierra Leone Background Brief’, IMATT internal briefing document (Shrewsbury, 24 July 2002), 10.

³⁹ Jimmy D. Kandeh, ‘What Does the “Militariat” Do When It Rules? Military Regimes: The Gambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia’, Review of African Political Economy 23/69 (1996), 387–404.

⁴⁰ Keen, Conflict and Collusion, 96–105.

⁴¹ Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest, 9–15; Peters, Crisis of Youth, 1–4, 62–9. See also, Mats Utas & Magnus Jörgel, ‘The West Side Boys: Military Navigation in the Sierra Leone Civil War’, Journal of Modern African Studies 46/3 (2008), 487–511.

⁴² Lansana Gberie, ‘The May 25 Coup d’Etat in Sierra Leone: A Militariat Revolt?’, Africa Development 22/3–4 (1997) 152; David Shearer, ‘Private Armies and Military Intervention’, Adelphi Paper 316 (Oxford: Oxford UP 1998).

⁴³ Keen, Conflict and Collusion, 197–201; Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, ‘Position Statement of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)’, 18 September 1999.

⁴⁴ Kandeh, ‘What Does the “Militariat” Do When It Rules?’ 387–404; Gberie, ‘The May 25 Coup d’Etat’, 149–70; Steve Riley, ‘Sierra Leone: The Militariat Strikes Again’, Review of African Political Economy 24/72 (1997), 287–92.

⁴⁵ Gberie, ‘The May 25 Coup’, 149–70; Riley, ‘the Militariat Strikes Again’, 287–92.

⁴⁶ Lansana Gberie & Peter Penfold, ‘An Interview with Peter Penfold’, African Affairs 104/414 (2005), 117.

⁴⁷ Keen, Conflict and Collusion, 215–8.

⁴⁸ Paul Williams, ‘Fighting for Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone’, Contemporary Security Policy 22/3 (2001), 140–68; Richard Connaughton, ‘The Mechanics and Nature of British Interventions into Sierra Leone (2000) and Afghanistan (2001–2002)’, Civil Wars 5/2 (2002), 77–95.

⁴⁹ Andrew M. Dorman, Blair’s Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone (Abingdon: Routledge 2009).

⁵⁰ Interview with Major General (retd.) Jerry Thomas, JTFHQ and Colonel, General Staff of the SLAF during Operation Palliser, conducted in Exeter on 13 January 2015.

⁵¹ Imperial War Museum Film Archives BFA 1390 L1, ‘Operation Palliser, Sierra Leone, May 2000‘, Press statement by the Adjutant 1 Para.

⁵² Richard Connaughton, ‘Operation “Barass”’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 12/2 (2001) 110–19.

⁵³ Ucko, ‘Can Limited Intervention Work?’, 6.

⁵⁴ Interview with British Army officer ‘A’, who served with IMATT in 2000–1, conducted in Salisbury on 1 October 2015.

⁵⁵ Gwyn Prins, The Heart of War: On Power, Conflict and Obligation in the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge 2002), 205–6; Utas & Jörgel, ‘The West Side Boys’, 487–511.

⁵⁶ Nina Kollars, ‘War’s Horizon: Soldier-Led Adaptation in Iraq and Vietnam’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/4 (2015), 259–553.

⁵⁷ Interview with Major General Jerry Thomas.

⁵⁸ Interview with Colonel (retd.) Mike Dent, SILSEP and IMATT Adviser to the Sierra Leone Ministry of Defence 1999–2002, conducted in Worcester on 20 November 2015; Dent, ‘Sierra Leone Background Brief’, 23.

⁵⁹ Prins, Heart of War, 205–6.

⁶⁰ International Crisis Group, ‘Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy’, Africa Report No. 28 (Freetown/London/Brussels 11 Apr. 2001); Dent, ‘Sierra Leone Background Brief’, 23–31; Interview with British Army officer ‘A’.

⁶¹ Imperial War Museum Film Archives BFA 1457 L1, ‘British Army in Sierra Leone, November 2000, (Tape 1)’, Interview with WO2 Fred Byrne of 1st Battalion, The Prince of Wales’s Own Regiment of Yorkshire.

⁶² Interview with British Army officer ‘A’.

⁶³ Interview with Brigadier (retd.) Barry Le Grys, Commander IMATT 2005–6, conducted in London on 24 July 2015. Le Grys was also seconded to the UN in Sierra Leone during the Rebel War.

⁶⁴ Interview with ‘B’, a retired senior British officer in IMATT in 2002, conducted in Wiltshire on 21 September 2015.

⁶⁵ Interview with British Army officer ‘A’.

⁶⁶ Interview with British Army officer ‘A’.

⁶⁷ In October 1999, the UK agreed to provide Sierra Leone with 7,000 rifles and 800,000 rounds of training ammunition, along with machine guns, 81mm mortars and ammunition. In May 2000, the British provided a further 10,000 surplus weapons, specifically Self Loading Rifles from British Army stocks, followed by 10 million rounds of ammunition in June and July 2000. Eric G. Berman, ‘Re-Armament in Sierra Leone: One Year After the Lomé Peace Agreement’, Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 1 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey Dec. 2000), 23.

⁶⁸ Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (retd.) Jeremey Stadward, who served in IMATT from 2001–3, conducted in Wiltshire on 8 September 2015.

⁶⁹ Gberie & Penfold, ‘An Interview with Peter Penfold’, 119–20.

⁷⁰ Interview with British Army officer ‘A’.

⁷¹ Interview with ‘B’.

⁷² Interview with Commander (retd.) Sam Seward, IMATT Maritime Adviser 2000–2002 and UK Defence Attaché to Sierra Leone 2010–13, conducted in Devon on 30 October 2015.

⁷³ Interview with ‘B’.

⁷⁴ Interview with British Army officer ‘A’.

⁷⁵ International Crisis Group, ‘Time for a New Military and Political Strategy’, 23.

⁷⁶ Dent, ‘Sierra Leone Background Brief’, 24; Interview with Colonel (retd.) Mike Dent.

⁷⁷ Interview with British Army officer ‘A’.

⁷⁸ Interview with ‘B’.

⁷⁹ Interview with ‘B’.

⁸⁰ International Crisis Group, ‘Sierra Leone After Elections: Politics as Usual?’, Africa Report No. 49 (Freetown/Brussels, 12 Jul. 2002), 2, 9–10.

⁸¹ International Crisis Group, ‘Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance’, Africa Report No. 67 (Freetown/Brussels, 2 Sept. 2003), 6–7.

⁸² Aldo Gaeta, ‘Operation Pebu and the Ministry of Defence’, in Peter Albrecht & Paul Jackson (eds.), Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone 1997–2007: Views from the Front Line (Berlin: Lit 2010), 60–8.

⁸³ Interview with ‘C’, a retired senior British officer serving in IMATT in 2003–4, conducted in Somerset on 10 October 2015.

⁸⁴ Interview with Brigadier Barry Le Grys; Gaeta, ‘Operation Pebu’. 61.

⁸⁵ Interview with Brigadier (retd.) David Santa-Olalla, Commander IMATT 2005, conducted in London on 29 June 2015.

⁸⁶ Interview with Colonel (retd.) Philip Stack, an IMATT officer serving as the RSLAF Deputy Joint Force Commander in 2004, conducted in Bath on 17 August 2015.

⁸⁷ Interview with British Army officer ‘A’.

⁸⁸ Interview with ‘C’; Peter Albrecht & Paul Jackson, Securing Sierra Leone 1997–2013: Defence, Diplomacy and Development in Action (London: Routledge 2014).

⁸⁹ See British Government, Building Stability Overseas Strategy (London: HMSO 2011).

Additional information

Funding

This research was funded by doctoral scholarships awarded by the University of Exeter in conjunction with Babcock International.

Notes on contributors

Alex Neads

Alex Neads is a Fellow in the Centre for Defence Management and Leadership at Cranfield University, based at the Defence Academy of the UK. He holds a PhD in Strategy & Security from the University of Exeter.