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Original Articles

Anarchy’s anatomy: Two-tiered security systems and Libya’s civil wars

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ABSTRACT

No issue deserves more scrutiny than the mechanisms whereby popular unrest unleashes civil wars. We argue that one institution – two-tiered security systems – is particularly pernicious in terms of the accompanying civil war risk. These systems’ defining characteristic is the juxtaposition of small communally stacked units that protect regimes from internal adversaries with larger regular armed forces that deter external opponents. These systems aggravate civil war risks because stacked security units lack the size to repress widespread dissent, but inhibit rapid regime change through coup d’état. Regular militaries, meanwhile, fracture when ordered to employ force against populations from which they were recruited.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

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9 Yezid Sayigh, ‘Agencies of Coercion: Armies and Internal Security Forces’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 43/3 (2011), 403–05.

10 Abul-Magd, Militarizing the Nation, 78–151; and Lee, Defect or Defend, 104–50.

11 Steven Cook, Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 2007).

12 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California 1978), 231–32.

13 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2010), 56–61.

14 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 2nd edition (Berkeley: University of California 2000), 443–562.

15 Philip Roessler, ‘The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa’, World Politics 63/2 (2011), 300–46.

16 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia UP 2011), 1–84.

17 Naunihal Singh, Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 2014), 41–78.

18 Rolf Schwarz, War and State Building in the Middle East (Gainesville: Florida UP 2012), 58–74.

19 James Quinlivan, ‘Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East’, International Security 24/2 (1999), 131–65.

20 Jan Grebe and Max Mutschler, (eds.), Global Militarisation Index 2015 (Bonn: BICC, 2015). <https://www.bicc.de/publications/publicationpage/publication/global-militarisation-index-2015–627/>.

21 Theodore McLauchlin, ‘Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion’, Comparative Politics 42/3 (2010), 333–50.

22 Quinlivan, ‘Coup-Proofing’, 131–65.

23 Erica De Bruin, ‘Preventing Coups d’état: How Counterbalancing Works’, Journal of Conflict Resolution (2017). doi: 10.1177/0022002717692652.

24 Lars-Erik Cederman, et al., Inequality, Grievances and Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2013), 57–92.

25 Hicham Nassif, ‘“Second-Class”: The Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed Forces’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/5 (2015), 626–49.

26 Michael Findley and Peter Rudloff, ‘Combattant Fragmentation and the Dynamics of Civil Wars’, British Journal of Political Science 42/4 (2012), 879–901.

27 Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, ‘Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management’, American Journal of Political Science 47/2 (2003), 318–32.

28 David Latin, ‘The Industrial Organization of Merged Armies’, in Roy Licklider, (ed.), New Armies From Old: Merging Competing Military Forces After Civil Wars (Washington, DC: Georgetown UP 2014), 231–43.

29 Cederman et al., Inequality, Grievances and Civil War, 84–87.

30 Kristen Harkness, ‘The Ethnic Army and the State: Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of Democratization in Africa’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 60/4 (2016), 587–616.

31 Ali Ahmida, The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization and Resistance, 1830–1932 (New York: SUNY UP 1994), 20–27.

32 Ibid, 73–102.

33 Ibid, 28–31.

34 Emmanuelle Paoletti, ‘Libya: Roots of a Civil Conflict’, Mediterranean Politics 16/2 (2011), 317.

35 Peter Cole and Fiona Mangan, Tribe, Security, Justice, and Peace in Libya Today (Washington, DC: USIP 2016), 8–17.

36 Ahmida, The Making of Modern Libya, 27.

37 Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012), 24–34.

38 Ibid, 34–42.

39 TNA FO 1021/73 Proposed Future Development of the Libyan Royal Guard, 1952.

40 Kenneth Pollack, Arabs At War: Military Effectiveness 1948–1991 (Lincoln: Nebraska UP 2002), 358–59.

41 TNA FO 1021/73 Conversation between Ali Jerbi and Oriental Secretary, 6 Mar. 1952.

42 TNA FO 1021/102 Libyan Army Progress Report No.4, 1953.

43 TNA FO 371/131807 The Iraqi Contribution, May 1958.

44 TNA PREM 13/2758 Anglo-Libyan Treaty Review, 1965.

45 TNA FO 371/131807 Graham to Watson, 29 Jul. 1958.

46 TNA FCO 39/442 Military Mission Report, 30 Jun. 1969.

47 TNA FO 371/119763 Expansion of the Libyan Army, 1956.

48 TNA FCO 39/442 British Military Mission Progress Report, 30 Jun. 1969.

49 TNA FO 371/159169 Arms for Cydef, 23 Aug. 1961.

50 TNA FCO 39/442 British Military Mission Report, 30 Sep. 1969.

51 CIA, The Fall of the Libyan Monarchy, 9 Sep. 1969, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-287-1-4-8.pdf (accessed Jan. 2018).

52 TNA FCO 39/442 Military Mission Report, 30 Sep. 1969.

53 Moncef Ouannes, Militaires, Elites et Modernisation dans La Libye contemporaine (Paris: Harmattan 2009), 84–102.

54 TNA FCO 39/442 P.G.A. Wakefield, 29 Oct. 1969.

55 TNA FCO 39/442 British Military Mission Report, 30 Sep. 1969.

56 TNA PREM 13/2758 Draft Telegram, 2 Sep. 1969.

57 TNA FCO 39/381 Telegram 211, 1 Sep. 1969.

58 Yehudit Ronen, Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics (Boulder: Lynn Reiner 2008), passim.

59 Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 149.

60 Ouannes, Militaires, Elites et Modernisation dans La Libye contemporaine, 275.

61 Richard H. Sanger, ‘Libya: Conclusions on an Unfinished Revolution’, Middle East Journal 29/4 (1975), 411–412.

62 Luis Martinez, The Libyan Paradox (London: Hurst 2007), 95.

63 Pollack, Arabs At War, 362.

64 Ouannes, Militaires, Elites et Modernisation dans La Libye contemporaine, 275–76.

65 Florence Gaub, ‘The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup-proofing and Repression’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36/2 (2013), 221–44.

66 Martinez, The Libyan Paradox, 98–101.

67 Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 146.

68 Alison Pargeter, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi (New Haven: Yale UP 2012), 96–103; and Martinez, The Libyan Paradox, 94.

69 Taoufik Monastiri, ‘Chronique politique Libye’, in Annuaire de l’Afrique Du Nord (Paris: CRESM 1981) 559–62.

70 Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya,145.

71 William Foltz, ‘Libya’s Military Power’, in René Lemarchand (ed.), The Green and the Black: Qadhafi’s Policies in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana UP 1988), 52–69.

72 Pollack, Arabs at War, 368–97.

73 Ronen, Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics, 9–40, 145–79.

74 TNA DEFE 24/1623 Defence Sales to Libya, 7 Apr. 1978.

75 Ouannes, Militaires, Elites et Modernisation dans La Libye contemporaine, 310–14.

76 Interviews with anti-Gaddafi Militants, Derna, 23 Feb. 2012.

77 Martinez, The Libyan Paradox, 60–71.

78 Ibid.

79 Interview with General Ali, Benghazi, 22 Feb. 2012.

80 Martinez, The Libyan Paradox, 93.

81 Interview with General Yousef, Benghazi, 22 Feb. 2012.

82 Martinez, The Libyan Paradox, 93.

83 Pargeter, Libya, 210–25.

84 Ibid., 241.

85 Alia Brahimi, ‘Libya’s Revolution’, The Journal of North African Studies 16/4 (2011), 607–14.

86 Martinez, The Libyan Paradox, 97.

87 Nenevine Afiouni, ‘Qaddafi’s children as controversial as father’, Al Arabiya, 26 Oct. 2011.

88 Interview with Fawzi, militia leader, Benghazi, 22 Feb. 2012.

89 Peter Bartu, ‘The Corridor of Uncertainty: The National Transitional Council’s Battle for Legitimacy and Recognition’, in Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn (eds.), The Libyan Revolution and its Aftermath (London: Hurst 2015), 33–34.

90 Interviews with Army Officers, Benghazi, 22 Feb. 2012.

91 Interview with Air Force Colonel Ali Sadiq Duwi, Misrata, 27 Feb. 2012.

92 Christopher Chivvis and Jeffrey Martini, Libya after Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the Future (Santa Monica: RAND 2014), 13.

93 Data on Benghazi’s Martyrs (2011), Provided by the National Transitional Council, Feb. 2012.

94 Lindsey Hilsum, Sandstorm: Libya in the Time of Revolution (New York: Penguin 2012), 20–25.

95 Interview with General Yousef, Benghazi, 22 Feb. 2012.

96 Interview with Mohammed Hamid, Tripoli, 19 Feb. 2012.

97 Noman Benotman, et al., Islamists in Jason Pack, ed., The 2011 Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Future (New York: Palgrave 2013), 213–14.

98 Hilsum, Sandstorm, 265–67.

99 Ibid., 214.

100 Brian McQuinn, Armed Groups in Libya: Typology and Roles (Geneva: Small Arms Survey 2012), 1–4.

101 Interview with Commandant Lofti, Shaheed Katiba, 26 Feb. 2012.

102 Membership Rosters, Shaheed Katiba, Feb. 2012.

103 Interview with Colonel Duwi, Misrata, 27 Feb. 2012.

104 Brian McQuinn, ‘History’s Warriors: The Emergence of Revolutionary Battalions in Misrata’, in Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn (eds.), The Libyan Revolution and its Aftermath (London: Hurst 2015), 237.

105 Membership Rosters.

106 Alex Crawford, Colonel Gaddafi’s Hat (London: Collins 2012), 133.

107 McQuinn’s data set differs slightly from ours, with each employing different categories, but they are consistent on the uninvolvement of military personnel and the level of civil servant involvement. McQuinn, ‘History’s Warriors’, 253.

108 Interviews with Resistance Leaders, Misrata, 26 Feb. 2012.

109 Crawford, Colonel Gaddafi’s Hat, 133.

110 Ibid., 132.

111 Brian Fishman and Joseph Felter, Al‐Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records (West Point: Counterterrorism Center 2007), 10–11.

112 ‘In Libya, holy warriors put their faith in the ballot, The International Herald Tribune (25 Jun. 2012).

113 Wolfram Lacher and Ahmed Labnouj, ‘Factionalism Resurgent: The War in the Jabal Nafusa’, in Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn (eds.), The Libyan Revolution and its Aftermath (London: Hurst 2015), 269.

114 Dario Cristiani, ‘The Zintan Militia and the Fragmented Libyan State’, The Jamestown Foundation (19 Jan. 2012) at <https://jamestown.org/program/hot-issue-the-zintan-militia-and-the-fragmented-libyan-state/> (accessed 1 Apr. 2013).

115 Hilsum, Sandstorm, 36–37.

116 Benotman et al., ‘Islamists’, 213–14.

117 ‘Qaddafi Forces Take Back Strategic Town’, The New York Times, 10 Mar. 2011.

118 Interview with Lotfi, militia leader, Misrata, 26 Feb. 2012.

119 Interviews with Militia Personnel, Libya, Feb. 2012.

120 Gaub, ‘The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup-proofing and Repression’, 238–39.

121 Benotman et al., ‘Islamists’, 210–21.

122 Cristiani, ‘The Zintan Militia and the Fragmented Libyan State, 3.

123 ‘M. Belhaj: “Nous voulons un Etat civil en Libye”’, le Monde, 3 Sep. 2011.

124 John Hamilton, North Africa Outlook: Time is Running Out for Libya’s Interim Institutions (London: Cross-Border Information 2013), 1.

125 Libya: Dealing with the Militias and Advancing Security Sector Reform (Kitchener: CSG 2014), 1–10.

126 Chris Stephen, ‘Libya Militias Prepare to Retake Bani Walid’, The Guardian, 26 Jan. 2012.

127 Marie-Louise Gumuchian, ‘Pro-Government Forces Seize Old Gaddafi Bastion’, Reuters, 24 Oct. 2012.

128 Frederic Wehery and Peter Cole, Building Libya’s Security Sector (Washington: Carnegie Endowment 2013).

129 Missy Ryan, ‘Libyan force was lesson in limits of U.S. power’, The Washington Post, 5 Aug. 2015.

130 Philippe Droz-Vincent, ‘Libya’s Tentative State Rebuilding: Militia’s “Moral Economy”, Violence, and Financing (In)Security’, in Zeinab Abul-Magd and Elke Grawert, Businessmen in Arms: How the Military and Other Armed Groups Profit in the MENA Region (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 2016), 187–88.

131 ‘Libya Shield commander denies murder’, Libya Herald, 18 Oct. 2013.

132 Noureddine Jebnoun, ‘Beyond the mayhem: debating key dilemmas in Libya’s statebuilding’, The Journal of North African Studies 20/5 (2015), 842–43.

133 Jon Lee Anderson, ‘The Unravelling’, The New Yorker, 23 Feb. 2015.

134 Jebnoun, ‘Beyond the mayhem’, 844.

135 Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectariansim, Regionalism and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1978 (London: Croom Helm 1979), 31–97; and Amatzia Baram, ‘Saddam’s Power Structure: the Tikritis Before, during and After the War’, The Adelphi Papers 43 (2003), 93–123.

136 Michael Knights, ‘The Military Role in Yemen’s Protests: Civil-Military Relations in the Tribal Republic’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36/2 (2013), 261–88.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Marc R. DeVore

Marc R. DeVore is a Lecturer at the School of International Relations, University of St Andrews, UK. In the past, he has served as a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute, a Senior Research Fellow at the University of St.Gallen, and an Adviser to the President Ange-Felix Patassé of the Central African Republic. His past research has benefited from support from the Fulbright Program, Harvard’s Centre for European Studies, and the French government’s Chateaubriand Fellowship Program.

Armin Stähli

Armin Stähli is an Affiliate at the Centre for Security, Economics and Technology (C SET), University of St.Gallen. His research interests lie at the intersection of security studies and international legal theory, focusing on the role of violent non-state actors in international relations.

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