It Takes Two to Tango: Autocratic underbalancing, regime legitimacy and China’s responses to India’s rise

ABSTRACT

What factors do autocracies evaluate when responding to perceived threats and why might they fail to balance appropriately? I posit that autocratic leaders may choose greater exposure to an external threat if, by doing so, it preserves regime legitimacy. Specifically, the desire to promote a positive image to one’s domestic public creates incentives to publicly downplay a rival’s military progress, which then affects the state’s ability to mobilize resources to respond to the growing threat. I test this theory in the case of China’s response to India’s military rise. This research contributes to balancing theory and empirical work on East Asian security.

KEYWORDS:

• Balancing theory
• rising powers
• autocratic regimes
• regime legitimacy
• China
• India

Acknowledgments

An earlier version of this paper was presented at APSA (2016), ISA (2018), the University of Pennsylvania, Center for Contemporary China Speakers Series and Georgetown’s Asia In Depth Speaker Series. The author would like to thank Danni Song, Danni Wang, John Chen and Annie Kowalewski for their excellent research support as well as anonymous reviewers for their comments on previous drafts.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ John Mearsheimer, ‘Structural Realism’, in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP 2013), 72.

² For some examples, see Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton: Princeton UP 2006); Paul A. Papayoanou, ‘Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power’, International Studies Quarterly 41/1 (March 1997), 113–140; Richard Rosecrance and Chih-Cheng Lo, ‘Balancing, Stability, and War: The Mysterious Case of the Napoleonic International System’, International Studies Quarterly 40/4 (December 1996), 479–500.

³ Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 1. In Schweller’s case studies, the only clear autocracy evaluated was Paraguay in the War of the Triple Alliance in South America, 1864, but not as a case of underbalancing.

⁴ Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 21.

⁵ Figures derived from the COW data set, in which the initiator is defined as the state that made the first move by threatening, displaying or using force.

⁶ I used the search terms India’s rise (印度崛起) Indian military (印度军队) and the time period 2013–2017. This yielded 19, 145, 34 and 79 articles in the People’s Daily, the Global Times, the PLA Daily and Xinhua, respectively.

⁷ John Garver, ‘Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions’, Journal of Strategic Studies 25/4 (2002), 121.

⁸ Jessica L.P. Weeks, ‘Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve’, International Organization 62 (2008), 35–64; Jessica C. Weiss, ‘Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China’, International Organization 67/1 (2013), 1–35; Alexandre Debs and H.E. Goemans, ‘Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War’, American Political Science Review 104/3 (2010), 430–445.

⁹ David C. Kang, ‘Hierarchy, Balancing and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations’, International Security 28/4 (2004), 165–81; Robert Ross, ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia’, Security Studies 15/3 (2010), 355–395; Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, ‘Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia’, Security Studies 24/4 (2015), 696–727.

¹⁰ Garver, ‘Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions’; Susan Shirk, ‘One-Sided Rivalry: China’s Perceptions and Policies Toward India’, in Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding (eds.), The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know (New Delhi: Oxford UP 2004), 75–100; M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China Views India’s Rise: Deepening Cooperation, Managing Differences’, in Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough (eds.), Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers – China and India (Washington, DC: Strategic Asia 2011), 65–100.

¹¹ Garver, ‘Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions’.

¹² Fravel, ‘China Views India’s Rise’.

¹³ Shirk, ‘One-Sided Rivalry’.

¹⁴ Ashton B. Carter and Jennifer C. Bulkeley, ‘America’s Strategic Response to China’s Military Modernization’, Harvard Asia-Pacific Review 9/1 (2007), 51. Potential instabilities with other countries in East Asia countries also drive Chinese military modernization.

¹⁵ Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1996), 19.

¹⁶ The number of Chinese border violations rose from 180 in 2011 to more than 400 by September 2012. ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013’, U.S. Department of Defense (2013), 22.

¹⁷ Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1987), vi. While Walt was addressing systemic balancing, these factors can also explain balancing as a foreign policy strategy. In the case of China, this has primarily taken the shape of internal balancing, as China currently claims to be ideologically opposed to formal alliances.

¹⁸ In 2016, India was the fastest growing economy in the world. CIA, ‘The World Factbook: India – Economy – Overview’, Central Intelligence Agency, 17 Jun. 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html>.

¹⁹ Reuters, ‘China admonishes the U.S. for visit to disputed India–China border’, Reuters, 24 Oct. 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-india-security-usa-idUSKCN12O0WP>.

²⁰ Ministry of External Affairs – Government of India, ‘Question No .3037 illegal occupation of Indian territory’, 16 Mar. 2016, <http://www.mea.gov.in/loksabha.htm?dtl/26541/QUESTION_NO3037_ILLEGAL_OCUPATION_OF_INDIAN_TERRITORY>.

²¹ Sutirtho Patranobis, ‘India behind Tibet Problem’, Hindustan Times, 7 Aug. 2012, <https://www.hindustantimes.com/world/india-behind-tibet-problem/storyagt7XlEVnSeWspKqXJvw6O.html>.

²² Rajiv Sikri, ‘The Tibet Factor in India–China Relations’, Journal of International Affairs 64/2 (2011), 55–71.

²³ Kapil Patil, ‘India’s New Mountain Strike Corps: Conventional Deterrence’, The Diplomat, 8 Aug. 2013, https://thediplomat.com/2013/08/indias-new-mountain-strike-corps-conventional-deterrence/2/.

²⁴ Rajat Pandit, ‘No Budget, Army Struggles to Raise Mountain Strike Corps’, The Times of India, 7 Mar. 2016, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/No-Budget-Army-struggles-to-raise-mountain-strike-corps/articleshow/51283303.cms; John Pike, ‘Indian Army Divisions’, Global Security.org, 25 Jul. 2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/divisions.htm.

²⁵ Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/5 (2015), 27.

²⁶ International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Asia’, in The Military Balance 2016 (London: Routledge 2016) 219.

²⁷ Huanqiu Shibao, ‘Is India Really Ready for War against China at 10,000 ft?’ [Zai 10,000 Yingchi Haiba Tiaodong Dui Hua Zhanzheng, Yindu Zhen Zhunbei Haole Ma?]’, Global Times, 16 Jul. 2017, http://world.huanqiu.com/article/2017-07/10987372.html; Tang Bohu, ‘Cutting India’s Chicken-neck, It’s Not So Easy [Zhongguo Qia Duan Yindu Bozi? Bushi Zheme Hui Shi]’, Fenghuang Xinwen, 13 Jul. 2017, http://inews.ifeng.com/51425168/news.shtml?&back.

²⁸ Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press 2013), 72–73, 76–83.

²⁹ Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‘India To Upgrade Sukhoi Fleet With Russia’s Help’, Defense News, 27 Jul. 2016, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/asia-pacific/2016/07/27/india-sukhoi-russia-upgrade-su-30mki-fgfa/87609150; Rajat Pandit, ‘India Eyes Direct Purchase of Six Refueling Aircraft’, The Times of India, 31 Jul. 2016, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-eyes-direct-purchase-of-six-refuelling-aircraft/ articleshow/53471222.cms.

³⁰ Dutch Aviation Society, ‘India Air Force Armed Forces Overview’, Scramble, 14 Aug. 2017, http://www.scramble.nl/orbats/india.

³¹ Jiangyue Shi, ‘Can India Bear the Cost of Going to War with China? [Yindu neng chengshou duihua zhanzheng de daijia ma?]’, Asia Pacific Daily, 17 Jul. 2017, http://zh.apdnews.com/news/701235.html?node=698.

³² Sutirtho Patranobis, ‘Nervous India’s move to deploy BrahMos missile in Arunachal threat to China: PLA’, Hindustan Times, 22 August 2016, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/nervous-india-s-move-to-deploy-brahmos-missile-in-arunachal-threat-to-china-pla/story-yF6J5r1vRPpG7drSXIIVXN.html.

³³ Cohen and Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming, 94–95.

³⁴ Naval-Technology, ‘Shivalik Class Frigates, India’, Naval-Technology.com, 2018, http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/shivalik-class-friga; Naval-Technology, ‘Kolkata class guided missile destroyer, India’, Naval-Technology.com, 2018, http://www.navaltechnology.com/projects/Kolkata-class-guided-missile-destroyers.

³⁵ Jayana Gupta, ‘Aircraft Carrier INS Vikrant Will Be Delivered to Navy On Time: Cochin Shipyard Chief’, The Times of India, 15 Oct. 2015, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Aircraft-carrier-INS-Vikrant-will-be-delivered-to-Navy-on-time-Cochin-Shipyard-chief/articleshow/49392647.cms; Samuel Osborne, ‘INS Arihant: India Nears Completion of Nuclear Submarine “Slayer of Enemies” – So What Does It Mean For the World?’ The Independent, 27 Feb. 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/india-nears-completion-of-nuclear-submarine-named-slayer-of-enemies-a6899881.html.

³⁶ Elias Groll and Dan de Luce, ‘China is Fueling a Submarine Arms Race in the Asia-Pacific’, Foreign Policy, 26 Aug. 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/26/china-is-fueling-a-submarine-arms-race-in-the-asia-pacific/.

³⁷ Cohen and Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming, 107.

³⁸ International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2016, 301.

³⁹ Walt, Revolution and War, 19.

⁴⁰ Adam P. Liff, ‘Whither the Balancers: The Case for a Methodological Reset’, Security Studies 25/3 (2016), 427, 436.

⁴¹ Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 9.

⁴² Most Chinese ground forces in the Western Theater Command are oriented to the east, away from the border. Peter Wood, ‘China’s Western theater command’, Jamestown Foundation, Dec. 2016, https://www.p-wood.co/2016/12/18/chinas-western-theater-command.

⁴³ Survival, ‘Book Review: The China–India Nuclear Crossroads: China, India, and the New Paradigm’, Survival 55/4 (2013) 214. Calculations derived from information in IHS Jane’s, ‘China’s Strategic Weapons Systems’, in Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment (Washington, DC: Jane’s 2012), 8.

⁴⁴ Gonggar Air Base and Shigatase Air Base in Xizang (Tibet) and Hotan Air Base in Xinjiang only host rotational detachments of around 5 J-10 or J-11 aircraft from the 98th Air Regiment (J-11) based at Chongqing-Baishiyi and 131st Air Regiment (J-10A/S) based at Luliang in the Chengdu MR. IHS Jane’s, China – Air Force: Jane’s World Air Forces (Washington, DC: IHS Jane’s 2015), 16.

⁴⁵ Calculations derived from information in China – Air Force: Jane’s World Air Forces, 8. Each air regiment is estimated to have around 36 aircraft in operation.

⁴⁶ Department of Defense, ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China’, Department of Defense, May 2017, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF.

⁴⁷ ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,’ 3, 19.

⁴⁸ Andrew Small, The China–Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (New York: Oxford UP 2015), 1–3.

⁴⁹ The Times of India, ‘Chinese Navy Ships to be Deployed at Gwadar: Pak Navy Official’, The Times of India, 25 Nov. 2016, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Chinese-navy-ships-to-be-deployed-at-Gwadar-Pak-navy-official/articleshow/55622674.cms.

⁵⁰ Schweller’s government vulnerability factors starts with the same premise that some regimes are concerned about legitimacy. However, the mechanism connecting this to underbalancing differs – he argues that states focus resources on repression and do not build armies that can turn against them. Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 12.

⁵¹ Mark L. Haas, ‘Ideology and Alliances: British and French External Balancing Decisions in the 1930s’, Security Studies 12/4 (2003), 34–79; F. Gregory Gause III, ‘Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf’, Security Studies 13/22 (2003), 273–305; Steven R. David, ‘Explaining Third World Alignment’, World Politics 43/2 (1991), 233–256.

⁵² For an example, Wenhai Li, ‘The Fundamental Guarantee for Implementing the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese People’ [Shixian zhonghuaminzu weida fuxing de genben baozheng] People’s Forum 8 (2001): 7–8, http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/paper85/4118/482479.html.

⁵³ ChinaFile, ‘Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation: How Much Is a Hardline Party Directive Shaping China’s Current Political Climate?’ ChinaFile, Asia Society, 8 Nov. 2013, http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.

⁵⁴ ‘Democracy Doesn’t Suit China: President Xi Jinping’, The Times of India, 2 Apr. 2014.

⁵⁵ Bi Jingjing, ‘To Achieve the Great Chinese Rejuvenation, We Must Uphold the Party’s Leadership” [Shixian zhonghuaminzu weida fuxing bixu jianchi dang de lingdao]’, Qiushi, 3 Jul. 2016, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2016-07/03/c_1119153303.htm.

⁵⁶ Wenlin Tian, ‘Western-Style Democracy Will Not Work in China [Xishi minzhu zai zhongguo xingbutong]’, Qiushi, 15 Dec. 2014, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2014-12/15/c_1113618154.htm.

⁵⁷ This point comes out in most discussions with Chinese scholars on the topic. See also Justin Sommers (ed.), The India–China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Conference Report 2001), 17.

⁵⁸ Lim and Cooper, ‘Reassessing Hedging’.

⁵⁹ Though China does understate India’s economic progress. For one example, see Song Yu, ‘India’s Economic Growth is Overtaking China? Experts: The Numbers Don’t Conform to Reality’ [Yindu cheng jingji zengzhang chao zhongguo, zhuanjia: shuju yu shiji qingkuang bufu], Cankao Xiaoxi, 15 Feb. 2016, http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/finance/20160215/1075896.shtml.

⁶⁰ ‘North Korean People’s Army is a strong army with a certain victory that is invincible and revolutionary [Chosun inmingooneun moojeok pilseungeui hyukmyeong ganggooniida]’, DPRK Today, 25 Apr. 2017, http://dprktoday.com/main.php?type=201&no=19857; ‘American empire’s tragic end will be hastened’ [jaegookeui bigeukjuck jongmalii apdangkyeojil geotiida’], Chosun Joongang Tongshin, 13 Aug. 2017.

⁶¹ Data current as of 2013. For polity scores and coding rules, see ‘Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends’, The Center for Systemic Peace, 6 Jun. 2014, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.

⁶² James Meernik and Peter Waterman, ‘The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American Presidents’, Political Research Quarterly 49/3 (September 1996), 573–590. For a comprehensive review of the literature, see Karl DeRouen, ‘Presidents and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Research Note’, International Studies Quarterly 44/2 (2000), 317–328.

⁶³ Xiaoyun Ma, ‘India Imports More Arms and Cooperates with US to Counterbalance China [Yin wuqi jinkou zeng 12 bei jiakuai yu meiguo junshihezuo zhiheng zhongguo]’, Xinhua, 28 Apr. 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-04/28/c_128938390.htm.

⁶⁴ For example, Jibei Zhang, ‘A Change in Big Purchases [Dashoubizhong you xin bianhua]’, People’s Daily, 14 Apr. 2015, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2015-04/14/content_1553666.htm; Guo Qian, ‘India Purchases Four Maritime Patrol Aircraft from the US Worth Approximately 1 Billion USD [Yindu xiang mei goumai sijia haishang zhenchaji, jiazhi yue shiyi meiyuan]’, Xinhua, 29 Jul. 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-07/29/c_129186064.htm; Qu Song and Yuan Jirong, ‘India and Russia expand economic cooperation [Yin E mouqiu kuoda jingmao hezuo]’, People’s Daily, 5 Jun. 2017, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2017-06/05/nw.D110000renmrb_20170605_9-21.htm; Lei Wang, ‘India’s active military diplomacy [Yindu junshi waijiao huoyue]’, People’s Daily, 20 Nov. 2009, http://military.people.com.cn/GB/10413177.html.

⁶⁵ Zhen Wu, ‘Indian military modernization: ambition and reality [yindu junshi zhuanxing de xiongxin yu xianshi]’, PLA Daily, 2 Apr. 2016, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2016-04/02/content_6989175_2.htm.

⁶⁶ Jiangsheng Li, ‘Are China and India involved in an arms race in border areas?’ [Zhongyin zhenfengxiangdui zai bianjing diqu gao ‘zhanbei’?]’, Huanqiu Shibao, 17 Jul. 2017, http://hqtime.huanqiu.com/article/a-XCWT684875616988CAA20F; Quanhua Zhang, ‘India is using satellites to strengthen border monitoring [Yindu yong weixing jiaqiang bianfang jiance], Global Times, 5 Sep. 2017, http://mil.huanqiu.com/world/2017-09/11213747.html; Yang He, ‘India uses 13 satellites to monitor its competitors [Yinjun yong 13 ke weixing jianshi duishou]’, Global Times, 27 Jun. 2017, http://mil.huanqiu.com/world/2017-06/10902066.html.

⁶⁷ Hanghui Chen, Wei Wu and Xiaoning Wang, ‘Refine the strategic capabilities for pre-emptive strikes [duanzao xianfa zhirende zhanlue daji liliang]’, PLA Daily, 27 Feb. 2015, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-02/27/content_6369148.htm; Yunfeng Wei, ‘India procured 500 Russian T90 tanks [Yindu kuangmai jin 500 liang ezhi T90 tanke]’, Global Times, 9 Nov. 2016, http://mil.huanqiu.com/world/2016-11/9652980.html.

⁶⁸ Only 5 out of 23 People’s Daily articles and 14 out of 31 Global Times articles reviewed in the first stage of research even mention that China is a part of India’s calculus.

⁶⁹ Lin Hai, ‘Russia: Pakistan’s JF-17 Aircraft Are Ordered for Export, India’s LCA Is Still Not Combat Ready [Emei: xiaolong yihuo chukou dingdan yindu LCA hai weixingcheng zhanli]’, Global Times, 23 Jul. 2015, http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2015-07/7070918.html; Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), ‘Russia Evaluates India’s Agni-4 Missile Test: Capability Inferior to the Chinese [Emei ping yindu shishe liehuo 4 daodan: xingneng yuanyuan luohou zhongguo]’, Global Times, 22 Jan. 2014, http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2014-01/4778997.html.

⁷⁰ For example, see Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), ‘India’s defense industry is “hollowing” and military buying cannot bring India to a big military power [Yindu guofang gongye ‘kongxinhua’ jungou maibulai junshi qiangguo]’, People’s Daily, 10 Jun. 2014, http://military.people.com.cn/n/2014/0610/c1011-25125805.html; Xulong Lu, ‘Indian Defense Acquisition on a Balance Beam [Pinghengmu shangde yindu jungou]’, PLA Daily, 11 Nov. 2015, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2015-11/21/content_129893.htm; Zhenhua Wen, ‘India’s defense industry: Relying on “buying outside” will not make a strong military power [yindu guofang gongye: nalai zhuyi chengjiu buliao junshi qiangguo]’, PLA Daily, 10 Jun. 2014, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2014-06/10/content_5951323.htm.

⁷¹ Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), ‘Op-ed: India Operates Its First Indigenous Aircraft Carrier, China Should Not Fall Behind [Sheping: yindu guochan hangmu xiashui, zhongguo bie tailuohou]’, Global Times, 13 Aug. 2013, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2013-08/4236740.html. See also Pengfei Li, ‘India launches its own domestically built aircraft carrier [Yindu shousou guochan hangmu xiashui]’, People’s Daily, 13 Aug. 2013, http://world.people.com.cn/n/2013/0813/c1002-22541207.html.

⁷² Kun Liu, ‘India Plans to Develop Four Arihant Class Nuclear Submarines Before 2020 [Yindu 2020 nian qian jiang zhuangbei 4 sou ‘jiandizhe’ ji heqianting]’, Global Times, 22 Feb. 2016, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0229/c1011-28158538.html.

⁷³ Lei Wang, ‘India Receives Nuclear-Engine Submarines from Russia [Yindu cong eluosi jieshou zujiede hedongli qianting]’, People’s Daily, 25 Jan. 2012, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2012-01/25/nw.D110000renmrb_20120125_9-03.htm.

⁷⁴ ‘How big are the military gaps between China and India?’ [Zhongyin junshi chaju you duoda?] Sina, 29 November 2016, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2016-11-29/doc-ifxyawmp0524985.shtml.

⁷⁵ Suning Li ‘India Re-launches Agni5 ICBM, Claims to Cover Northeastern China [Yindu zaishe ‘liehuo 5‘ zhouji daodan haocheng neng dadao zhongguo dongbei],’ Global Times, 27 Dec. 2016, http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2016-12/9866248.html.

⁷⁶ Yan Ren, ‘India works to develop new missiles [Yindu dali yanzhi xinxing daodan]’, People’s Daily, 20 Jul. 2008, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2008-07/20/content_63857.htm.

⁷⁷ When India has made undeniable progress, for example, in the cases of Rudra helicopters, India’s ability to operate fighters off a carrier, its progress toward the nuclear triad, and potential U.S.–India cooperation in anti-submarine warfare, the media downplays the implications without making a direct comparison, since such a comparison would inevitably put China in an unfavorable light. See, for example, Zhaorui Zhou, ‘India successfully tests missiles from a submarine, will soon acquire nuclear triad [Yindu qianshe dandaodaodan shishe chenggong jianghuo sanweiyiti hedaji nengli]’, People’s Daily, 2 Dec. 2015, http://military.people.com.cn/n/2015/1202/c1011-27881754.html; Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), ‘India equips first indigenous armed helicopter; to be stationed near the Sino-India border [Yindu zhuangbei shoukuan guochan qingxing wuzhi huojiang bushu zhongyin bianjing]’, Global Times, 22 Jan. 2013, http://mil.huanqiu.com/world/2013-01/3568462.html; Dongdong Min, ‘India’s indigenous carrier-based aircraft tests its first take off, Russia provides support’ [Yin guochan jianzaiji wancheng shouci luji huayueqifei e tigong zhichi]’, People’s Daily, 24 Dec. 2014, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2014/12-23/6903967.shtml.

⁷⁸ Yunfeng Wei and Ma Jun, ‘Indian media listed “India has a stronger military than China”, ridiculous [Yinmei lieju ‘junli youyu zhongguo’, kexiao]’, Global Times, 7 Aug. 2017, http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2017-08/11088329.html.

⁷⁹ Author’s interviews, Shanghai, May 2012; ‘Where does the self-confidence of India come from? [Yindu de mizhizixin congheerlai?]’ Military of China, 6 Dec. 2016, http://mil.eastday.com/a/161206210111650.html?qid=wwweastday.

⁸⁰ One example is the development of the Arjun tank, in which India ended up buying Russian tanks. Kun Liu, ‘India’s tank Arjun faces another setback, what is the point of this indigenous development? [Yindu aqiong tanke zai shoucuo zheyangde ‘guochan’ youheyiyi?]’, Global Times, 1 Apr. 2016, http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2016-04/8795005.html. Another is the Arkash air defense system; Kun Liu, ‘Indian military calls 32-year-long missile development a failure after comparing to China [Yindu 32 nian yan yi daodan bei junfang tucao yu zhongguo bi gaoxialipan]’, Global Times, 22 Mar. 2016, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2016-03-22/doc-ifxqnskh1088515.shtml; Lixi Chen, ‘After 33 years, India’s first indigenous fighter jet is put into service [Lishi 33 nian yindu shoukuan guochan zhanji zhengshi fuyi]’, Xinhua, 3 Jul. 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-07/03/c_129110187.htm.

⁸¹ Chun Bai, ‘How strong is the Indian military? Big defense budget, difficult military modernization [Yindu junli you duoqiang? guofang yusuan daguo jundui xiandaihua hen jiannan]’, Global Times, 27 Jan. 2016, http://www.cannews.com.cn/2016/0127/146477.shtml.

⁸² Ruiqing Zhu and Jian Du, ‘India’s tejas lca reveals the impatience of India’s military development [Cong ‘guanghui’ zhanji kan yindu fazhan junshi duo ‘houji’]’, Xinhua, 18 Mar. 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-03/18/c_128810724_2.htm.

⁸³ Zhengjun Liao, ‘India diversifies its purchases, Russian tanker aircraft eliminated from the short list’ [Yindu jundui jiasu jungou duoyuanhua eluosi jiayouji zao taotai], People’s Daily, 10 Jan. 2013, http://www.chinanews.com/gj/2013/01-10/4476126.shtml.

⁸⁴ Cankao Xiaoxi (Reference News), ‘Unreasonable goals impede India’s military modernization, purchasing demands are not pragmatic [Haogaowuyuan kunrao yindu junshi xiandaihua caigou yaoqiu bu shiji]’, Cankao Xiaoxi, 9 Feb. 2016, http://military.china.com.cn/2016–02/09/content_37761666.htm.

⁸⁵ Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), ‘Indian military is unsatisfied with insufficient defense budget, expert says double the amount to match the Chinese [Yindu junfang baoyuan junfei taishao zhuanjia: fanfan caineng kangheng zhongguo]’, Global Times, 6 May 2016, http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2016-05/8863988.html.

⁸⁶ Generally, there is consistent coverage of the territorial disputes between India and Pakistan. For a recent piece, see Ji Wei, ‘Conflict between Pakistan and India at Kashmir [Bajisitan junfang shuo bayin zai Keshimier diqu zaici fasheng jiaohuo]’, Xinhua, 21 Jul. 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2017-07/20/c_1121347645.htm.

⁸⁷ Yudh Abhyas is a joint military training exercise in Uttarakhand, an area less than 100 km from the Chinese border. See ‘The U.S. AND India will hold a combined military exercise, the location is approximately 100 kilometers from the Sino-Indian Border [Meiyin Jiang Juxing Lianhe Junyan, Didian Ju Zhongyin Bianjie Yue 100 Gongli]’, Global Times, 12 Sep. 2016, http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2016-09/9429338.html.

⁸⁸ Liya Tan, ‘India and Indonesia will hold a joint military exercise to counter insurgency threat [Yindu yu yinni jiang juxing lianhe junshi xunlian yingdui panluan fenzi weixie]’, Global Times, 9 Mar. 2016, http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2016–03/8679660.html.

⁸⁹ Wen Yu, ‘Indian media report that the Indian military conducted military exercises along Sino-India border [Yinmei cheng yinjun zai zhongyin bianjie shidan yanxi]’, Global Times, 6 Jul. 2016, http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2016-07/9128221.html. For more on Chinese coverage of Indian military exercises, see Oriana Skylar Mastro, ‘China’s lukewarm response to India’s military modernization’, China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, 13 Jan. 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-lukewarm-response-indian-military-modernization/.

⁹⁰ Hong Zhang, ‘India, don’t overestimate yourself [Yindu bietai ba ziji danghuishi]’, People’s Daily, 12 Aug. 2017, http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0812/c1002-29466233.html.

⁹¹ Xinhua News, ‘Indian Media: Indian armed forces had military exercise in the Andaman and Nicobar islands targeting on China [Yinmei: Yinjun zai Andamanqundao juxing daxing junyan jinding Zhongguo]’, Xinhua Net, 27 Nov. 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-11/27/c_129750541.htm; Jiang Shu ‘The Indian army, navy, and air force holding massive military exercise, targeting China’s activities in the Indian ocean [Yindu hailukongjun daguimo yanxi cheng yingdui Zhongguo zai Yinduyang huodong]’, Global Times, 25 Nov. 2017, http://world.huanqiu.com/article/2017-11/11401205.html.

⁹² Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, ‘The security situation in the Indian ocean and the “cooperation dilemma” faced by China and India [Yinduyang anquan jushi yu zhongyin mianlin de 'hezuo kunjing']’, Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, 15 Feb. 2015, http://www.cctb.net/llyj/lldt/qqzl/201502/t20150215_318265.htm; Liangchen Zhou‘ China and Sri Lanka place increased weight on cooperation [Zhongsi wei hezuo jiama, fazhan quantianhou youyi, yindu danxin]’, Global Times, 11 Apr. 2016, http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2016-04/8804065.html; Weimin Wu, ‘Indian Media: India purchases 4 Patrol aircrafts “Staring intently at China just like an eagle’s eye” [Yinmei: yindu mai 4 jia xunluoji, 'xiang ying de yanjing yiyang jinding zhongguo'’]’, Global Times, 29 Jul. 2016, http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2016-07/9238187.html.

⁹³ Huanqiu Shibao  (Global Times), ‘Experts: American, Indian, and Japanese Military Exercises exert pressure against Diaoyu Islands, India is being used by Japan [Zhuanjia: meiyinri junyan zhendui diaodao shiya, yindu beiri liyong], People’s Daily, 16 Jun. 2016, http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2016-06/9047406.html; Zhixin Li, ‘The sword of the “malabar 2016” combined military exercises points at the East China Sea’ [Malabaer 2016 lianhe junyan jian zhi zhongguo donghai], China Youth Daily, 23 Jun. 2016, http://world.huanqiu.com/hot/2016-06/9072894.html.

⁹⁴ ‘Foreign media: Indian warships enter the South China Sea at a sensitive moment, will participate in exercises with the Philippines and Vietnam” [Waimei: yindu junjian mingan shike shiru nanhai, jiang yu feitye yanxi]’, Global Times, 2 Jun. 2016, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0602/c1011-28406409.html. See also Mastro, ‘China’s Lukewarm Response to India’s Military Modernization.’

⁹⁵ Yifang Huang and Ying Xue ‘Naval Drills Conclude in the “2016 Pacific Rim” Exercises [‘Huan taipingyang 2016’ yanxi haishang yanlian jieshu]’, Xinhua, 4 Aug. 2016, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0804/c1011-28611560.html; Jiefang Ribao (PLA Daily), ‘45 warships from 26 nations participate in the Pacific Rim Exercises. Why do foreign militaries call our navy a “Little Navy”? [26 Guo 45 sou jianting canjia huan taipingyang junyan. Waijun weihe cheng haijun wei ‘xiaohaijun’?]’, PLA Daily, 7 Aug. 2016, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0807/c1011-28616972.html.

⁹⁶ Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), ‘Editorial: China has many more cards to play than India [Sheping: zhongguo keyi dade pai bi yindu duo de duo]’, Global Times, 10 Jul. 2017, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2017-07/10955505.html; Cuiping Zhu, ‘Why is India tangling between great powers? [Yindu yuanhe zai daguo zhi jian zuoyoufengyuan?],’ Shijie Zhishi, 14 Aug. 2017, https://www.sohu.com/a/155995194_170375 .

⁹⁷ Cuiping Zhu, ‘Why is India Tangling Between Great Powers?’; Zhang Hong, ‘India Can’t Wait to Move Forward to its “Great Power Dream”’ [Yindu Tuijin Daguo Meng Ji Buke Nai]’, Renmin, 20 Jul. 2017, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2017-07/20/content_1792076.htm.

⁹⁸ Xuetong Yan, ‘China and India are destined for war? [Zhongguo he yindu bi you yizhan? zheyang xiang ni jiu cuole],’ 14 Aug. 2017, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2017-07-10/doc-ifyhweua4557431.shtml; Huanqiu Shibao, ‘Is India Really Ready for War against China at 10,000 ft?’

⁹⁹ ‘China’s National Defense in 2010’, Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 31 Mar. 2011.

¹⁰⁰ Lora Saalman, ‘Between “China Threat Theory” and “Chindia”: Chinese Responses to India’s Military Modernization’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 4 (2011), 87–114.

¹⁰¹ Saalman, ‘Between “China Threat Theory” and “Chindia”’.

¹⁰² Author’s meetings, Shanghai, May 2014.

¹⁰³ Gaocheng Zhao, ‘The India Factor in China’s Border Strategy [Zhongguozhoubian zhanlvezhong de yindu yinsu]’, Guoji Guanxi 2 (2014), 34–46.

¹⁰⁴ Zhen Wu, ‘The ambition and reality of Indian military modernization [yindu junshi zhuanxing de xiongxin yu xianshi]’, PLA Daily, 2 Apr. 2016, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2016-04/02/content_6989175_2.htm. For more Chinese sources arguing this point, see Manjeet S. Pardesi, ‘Understanding (Changing) Chinese Strategic Perceptions of India,’ Strategic Analysis 34/4 (2010), 572.

¹⁰⁵ Xin Yu and Wei Du, ‘India, Who Wants a “Prolonged War”, is Wooing These Countries [Yangyan yao zai zhongyin bianjie da chijiuzhan de yindu, zhengzai jili lalong zhexie guojia]’, Cankao Xiaoxi, 11 Jul. 2017, http://ihl.cankaoxiaoxi.com/2017/0711/2181401_3.shtml.

¹⁰⁶ Yao Guan, ‘Why does India want to intervene in the South China Sea? [Yindu yaozai nanhai chayijiao de mudi shi shenme?]’, Indian China Web, 26 Nov. 2013, http://www.indiancn.com/news/junshi/22028.html; Jian Li and Liye Du, ‘The Great Power Dream: A road to dominating the Indian Ocean and a road mingled with hope and fear for the Indian Navy [Daguo mengxiang: rang yindu haijun xiyou canbande zhudao yinduyang zhilu]’, PLA Daily, 16 Aug. 2013, http://navy.81.cn/content/2013-08/16/content_5443183.htm; Li, ‘India launches its own domestically built aircraft carrier.’

¹⁰⁷ Rajat Pandit, ‘India conducts major exercise in strategically-located Andaman and Nicobar Islands’, The Times of India, 24 Nov. 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-conducts-major-exercise-at-the-strategically-located-andaman-nicobar-islands/articleshow/61784692.cms.

¹⁰⁸ Zhang Hui, ‘Indian Ocean military drill irresponsible: experts’, Global Times, 26 Nov. 2017, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1077287.shtml.

¹⁰⁹ Zhang, ‘Indian Ocean military drill irresponsible: experts’.

¹¹⁰ Xin Yu and Wei Du, ‘India Who Wants a “Prolonged War”, is Wooing These Countries;’ Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), ‘Editorial: China has Many More Cards to Play than India.’

¹¹¹ Liu, ‘Analysis on the Two Faces;’ Wang, ‘India’s Ocean Strategy and Its Implications for Sino-Indian Relations’.

¹¹² Zongjian Yuan, ‘India Emerging as a Power: Its Implications for Sino-Indian Relations [Qianxi yindu de jueqi dui zhongyinguanxi de yingxiang]’, South Asian Studies Quarterly, 4 (2004), 89–95.

¹¹³ Jie He and Mingjie Xie, ‘India’s Military Looks East; Strengthens Security Cooperation with US, Japan, Vietnam and Australia [Yindu junli xiangdongzou qianghua yu meiriyueao anquan hezuo]’, PLA Daily, 27 Feb. 2015, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2015/02-27/7083603.shtml.

¹¹⁴ Yanbing Ma, ‘The Strategic Intentions of India’s “Look East” Policy [Yindu ‘dongxiang’ zhanlve de yitu]’, Peace and Development, 5 (2011), 42–43; Zhiyong Hu, ‘Why are India and Vietnam getting closer [Yindu yuenan weihe zoujin]’, Jiefang Daily, 18 Aug. 2011, http://newspaper.jfdaily.com/jfrb/html/2011-08/18/content_637250.htm.

¹¹⁵ Xiaozhi Fang, ‘Strategic Analysis and Future Forecast of India’s South China Sea Policy [Dui dangqian yindu nanhai zhengce de zhanlve jiexi ji qianjing zhanwang]’, International Forum 15/1 (2013), 66–71.

¹¹⁶ Guan, ‘Why Does India Want to Intervene in the South China Sea?’ India is allegedly using closer relationships with countries like Vietnam and Australia to help it break into that area.

¹¹⁷ You Ji, ‘China’s Emerging Indo-Pacific Naval Strategy’, Asia Policy 22 (2016), 11–12.

¹¹⁸ Zhang, ‘Indian Ocean Military Drill Irresponsible: Experts’.

¹¹⁹ Li Li and Qian Feng, ‘How much military capabilities do the major military big powers have? [Shijie zhuyao junshi daguo you duoshao bingli]’, Global Times, 17 Apr. 2013.

¹²⁰ Xing Zheng and Wang Hengjun, ‘India’s aircraft carrier will face which direction? [Yindu ‘hangmu’ jiang shixiang hefang?]’, People’s Daily, 9 Jun. 2012, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2012-06/09/content_1064571.htm.

¹²¹ Haochen Xiao, ‘India’s path to great power status still long [Yindu daguo zhilu rengran manchang]’, Chinese Social Science Net, 13 Jul. 2016, http://www.cssn.cn/dybg/gqdy_gqcj/201607/t20160713_3120905.shtml.

¹²² Bing Zhao, ‘Modernization is Difficult and the Three Military Services Are Not Balanced [Xiandaihua jiannan, sanjun bupingheng]’, Xinhua, 17 Jan. 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-01/27/c_128671966.htm.

¹²³ Wu, ‘The ambition and reality of Indian military modernization’.

¹²⁴ ‘India is getting close to US, Japan, Australia and Vietnam to contain China [Waimei: yindu wei ‘fengsuo zhongguo’ xunsu yu meiriaoyue deng jiejin]’, Caokao Xiaoxi, 17 Apr. 2016, http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/world/20160417/1129920.shtml; Yongnian Wu, ‘The concerns behind India’s weaponry procurement [Yindu jungou beihou de jiujie], Jiefang Daily, 28 Dec. 2012, http://opinion.cntv.cn/2012/12/28/ARTI1356663466515225.shtml.

¹²⁵ Zhen Yuan, Qing Mu, Zhong Ren, Yuandan Guo, and You Ma, ‘Indian secretary of defense visiting Sikkim has aroused speculations [Yin Fangzhang tufu xijin yu zhongguo junren youhao jiaoliu zai shifang hezhong xinxi]’, Global Times, 9 Oct. 2017, http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2017-10/11313144.html.

¹²⁶ One of the four limiting factors discussed was problems in external relations, mainly with Pakistan and India’s limited soft power influence with smaller countries in Southeast Asia. Jianhua Yu, ‘The zig-zagging course for a stronger India [Wanyan qianxing de Yindu qiangguomeng]’, Jiefang Daily, 12 Dec. 2013, http://newspaper.jfdaily.com/jfrb/html/2013-12/12/content_1125329.htm.

¹²⁷ Bill Emmott, Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India, and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade (Orlando: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Co. 2009), 14.

¹²⁸ Author’s interviews, Shanghai, May 2014.

¹²⁹ Yuandan Guo, ‘The first time! Chinese navy rescued foreign merchant ship from Somali pirates’ [Diyici! zhongguo haijun cong suomali haidao shouzhong duohui waiji huochuan], Global Times, 9 Apr. 2017, http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2017-04/10447308.html.

¹³⁰ Author’s interviews, Beijing, July 2016.

¹³¹ The India Times, ‘China under Xi’s 2nd term might deal with instances like Doklam head-on: Chinese expert’, India Times, 15 Nov. 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/china-under-xis-2nd-term-might-deal-with-instances-like-dokalam-head-on-chinese-expert/articleshow/61661348.cms.

¹³² Such crisis instability also exists in the US–China relationship, though for different reasons. Avery Goldstein, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.–China Relations, International Security, Vol 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), 49–89. Additionally, after a conflict erupts, China may be unwilling to talk to India for fear of looking weak. See Oriana Skylar Mastro, ‘The Theory and Practice of War Termination: Assessing Patterns in China’s Historical Behavior,’ International Studies Review, Feb. 2018, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix061.

¹³³ Sections of this paragraph come from Oriana Skylar Mastro and Arzan Tarapore, ‘Countering Chinese Coerfion: The Case of Doklam’, War on the Rocks, 29 Aug. 2017. https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/countering-chinese-coercion-the-case-of-doklam/.

¹³⁴ Curtis Stone, ‘Op-ed: India is playing with fire, and it could get burned’, People’s Daily, 10 Aug. 2017, http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/0810/c90000-9253612.html.

¹³⁵ ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Yan Shugang Regular Press Conference, 6 Jul. 2017’ [Waijiao bu fayan ren geng shuang zhuchi li xing jizhe hui],” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 Jul. 2017, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1475878.shtml.

¹³⁶ Paul H.B. Godwin and Alice L. Miller, China’s Forbearance Has Limits: Chinese Threat and Retaliation Signaling and Its Implications for a Sino-American Confrontation (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2013).

¹³⁷ For more on India and China’s role in the rebalancing, see David Shambaugh, ‘Assessing the US “Pivot” to Asia’, Strategic Studies Quarterly (Summer 2013), 14–17.

¹³⁸ Alex N. Wong, “Briefing on the Indo-Pacific Strategy, U.S. Department of States, 2 April 2018, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/04/280134.htm.

¹³⁹ Michael D. Swaine, “Creating an Unstable Asia: The ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ Strategy, Foreign Affairs, 2 Mar. 2018.

¹⁴⁰ Evan Montgomery, ‘Competitive Strategies Against Continental Powers: The Geopolitics of Sino-Indian-American Relations’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 1 (2013), 76–100.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Oriana Skylar Mastro

Oriana Skylar Mastro is an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University where her research addresses critical questions at the intersection of interstate conflict (in particular military strategy and operations), great power relations and the challenges of rising powers – with a focus on China and East Asian security. From 2017 to 2019, she is also a Jeane Kirkpatrick Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). She is the author of the forthcoming Cornell University press book, The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime. She holds a BA in East Asian Studies from Stanford University and an MA and PhD in Politics from Princeton University. More at: www.orianaskylarmastro.com.